Tuesday, December 18, 2018

Maimonides' Mean of the Doctrines


Now that KolHamevaser's website is gone, I am publishing here my essay on Maimonides and synthesis of opinions. The first essay is the rewritten, reformatted, and generally cut-down version for KolHamevaser. The essay following it is the same essay, but meant for my philosophy professor and not completely prepared for print. Each one has something the other lacks, and the wise one will synthesize the two to create a middle path.


Maimonides and the Mean of Doctrines
By: Aryeh Sklar

Just about every essay written about Maimonides and the contradictions apparent in his philosophic magnum opus, the Guide for the Perplexed, begins with some pithy statement about how Maimonides’ use of contradictions created more controversy than conclusions. Arthur Hyman, in his essay, “Interpreting Maimonides,” states that, “Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed is a difficult and enigmatic work which many times perplexed the very reader it was supposed to guide.”[i] Warren Harvey writes, “Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed is a book of puzzles… No one will gainsay that Maimonides did a superb job of concealment. After almost eight centuries, students of the Guide are still trying to figure out its puzzles.”[ii] Menachem Kellner states, “Maimonides precipitated a cottage industry in Jewish intellectual circles, and has kept his interpreters busy ever since for close to a millennium.”[iii]
            This serves as a warning of sorts for the reader of interpretations of the Guide. How can one proceed to ascertain Maimonides’ true belief? When there are multiple interpretations which seem correct, which one should be accepted? The discussion invariably involves Maimonides’ declaration of his use of contradictions early in the Guide, especially the seventh contradiction. The seventh reason for contradiction, one that Maimonides promises he will employ in the Guide, is translated thusly by Pines (18):[iv]
In speaking about very obscure matters it is necessary to conceal some parts and disclose others. Sometimes in the case of certain dicta this necessity requires that the discussion proceed on the basis of a certain premise, whereas in another place necessity requires that the discussion proceed on the basis of another premise contradicting the first one...The vulgar must in no way be aware of the contradiction; the author accordingly uses some device to conceal it by all means.
            There have been many interpretations of this passage, too many to discuss here.[v] What I would like to focus on is an approach to some of the seeming contradictions that I have not seen emphasized elsewhere. That is, at least at times, when there are competing sources of truth, such as the Aristotelian and the religious, and the conflict cannot be resolved through logical demonstration, the position one should take is the middle path, the mean of opinions. This means adopting aspects of the two opinions and synthesizing them for the best of the religious and philosophical approaches to relieve the tension between two accepted sources of truth. This is most obvious in cases where Maimonides lists conflicting or competing opinions, such as with providence or prophecy in the Guide, and his own opinion is obscured by other passages in the Guide. Before attempting to apply this theory to those cases to show its possibility as an interpretive method of some of the contradictions of the Guide, first we will establish the philosophical and religious basis within Maimonidean thought for such an approach.
Firstly, given Maimonides’ near-constant advocacy of the middle path as the ultimate goal of man in so many of his writings, his approach to writing the Guide could align with this as well. In his commentary to the Mishnah,[vi] in his Mishneh Torah,[vii] and in his Guide,[viii] he repeatedly refers to a type of middle path reminiscent of Aristotle's, with some important changes.[ix] That is, in most cases, one should seek the middle way between two extremes of moral vices, such as the middle way between greediness and being a spendthrift. Similarly, one should find the middle path between cowardice and recklessness. And so on for most moral ills. Generally, the Golden Mean is understood to be a way of perfecting and maintaining moral attributes. How can opinions be considered in that category? Strikingly, Maimonides seems to consider both faith and reasoning itself as moral virtues.[x] In the Guide, 3:53, Maimonides states (631):
[W]hen you walk in the way of the moral virtues, you do justice to your rational soul, giving her the due that is her right. And because every moral virtue is called zedakah, it says: “And he believed in the Lord, and it was accounted to him as zedakah” (Gen. 15:6). I refer to the virtue of faith.
Thus, ideas and concepts can be included in the category of moral perfection, to be done through the Golden Mean.
There is another way that intellect and moral virtues converge in Maimonidean thought. Though Aristotle derived the basis for the Golden Mean from the tendency of nature to follow the middle path, Maimonides derives the basis instead from the religious invocation to imitate God, imitatio dei.[xi] As Marvin Fox put it, “Maimonides works here fully inside the Jewish tradition. He readily adopts the outer form of the mean as his theoretical base and principle of explanation, but the specific contents of the good life are defined not by way of nature but by way of the imitation of God.”[xii] Imitatio dei, another recurring theme in Maimonides’ writings, covers two areas that Maimonides was most interested in: the perfection of character traits, and also the perfection of one’s intellect.[xiii] If the perfection of the intellect occurs in the same fashion as the perfection of character traits, it makes sense that one should seek the mean of intellectual ideas when it would not compromise rational perfection.
Further, the very use of contradictions itself is an expression of imitatio dei, according to Maimonides. Maimonides states that the way the prophetic works of the Bible are written is such that the true opinions are hidden in the text, whether through the contradiction of differing parables, or the contradiction of stating a proviso out of its proper place, because of a certain necessity, such that it seems a contradiction. But he goes on to write that the question of whether the “seventh cause” described above, that of concealment and obfuscation, is to be found in the books of the prophets is “a matter for speculative study and investigation” (19). Although he expresses doubt if it was actually employed or not, he concedes its possibility. Thus, by employing the seventh cause in his own writing, he is following after those who have had communion with God, a God-approved style of writing.
It is also clear from Maimonides’ declaration of the purpose of the Guide, and the audience he is writing to, that he sought a kind of religious solution as well. In the very beginning of his introduction to the Guide (5-6) he describes the student who is “a religious man for whom the validity of our Law has become established in his soul and has become actual in his belief.” On the other hand, the student has also “studied the sciences of the philosophers and come to know what they signify.” Maimonides proposes to help this student “remove most of the difficulties.” His task, then, is that this must be done in a way that will allow the student to feel that the Torah law is still valid, and that he is not abandoning reason by believing in and following the Torah. Submission to one truth over another would not seem to work if Maimonides is to be successful. Many times, not all contradictions are merely apparent, and many seem insurmountable. Thus, when truth is unknown - when there are two competing sources for truth - the Golden Mean must be employed. A synthetic approach can at times be the best solution for Maimonides’ audience.
Maimonides writes regarding the contradictions in the Guide that the masses must not be aware of their existence. According to what we have been saying, this is because Maimonides only wants the reader to see the synthesized version, but not out of what it was created. To accept this synthesized version, one is required to accept two sources of truth when dealing with doubt— the philosophical  and religious—and  also be willing to come to a moderate position between both of them, which is a highly nuanced position. The ignorant philosopher would not accept the religious truth, and the ignorant religious person would not accept the philosophic truth,[xiv] and the nuanced mean is where neither has to suffer.
            As mentioned previously, Maimonides’ method can be most easily seen in lists of multiple opinions in the Guide for a given topic. In each case, there are at least three opinions, two of which are at the extremes. It is my contention that in each of these cases, Maimonides advocates the moderate position, the ‘mean’ of opinions. The listing of multiple possible positions occurs primarily in three places in the Guide; regarding creation, prophecy, and providence.
            Maimonides tells us that, in some fashion, the positions regarding creation aligns with that of prophecy. Specifically, he states in the Guide 2:32 (360), “The opinions of people concerning prophecy are like their opinions concerning the eternity of the world or creation of the world. I mean by this that just as the people to whose mind the existence of the Deity is firmly established, have, as we have set forth [in 2.13], three opinions concerning the eternity or creation of the world, so are there three opinions concerning prophecy.” The mystery, or puzzle, is what way did Maimonides intend that these align? A quick listing of the positions and who believes them are such:

C1 - Creation ex nihilo (those who believe in the Torah)
C2 - Creation out of eternal matter (Plato)
C3 - Eternal universe (Aristotle)

P1 - Prophecy is given to whomever God chooses (the vulgar)
P2 - Prophecy is a natural process and God has no part in who receives it (the philosopher)
P3 - Prophecy is natural but can be hindered by God at His choosing (the Torah and our foundation)
           
The maximum number of possible combinations, at the face of it, is nine in all. However, there are a few combinations that are improbable. We have to assume that there must be some sort of philosophical parallel, or group parallel, with each of the correspondences. Meaning, we can say with certainty there are specific combinations that Maimonides would never had had in mind. He never would have thought that Aristotle's eternity of the world would correspond with the view of prophecy that it can be presented to nearly anyone, because one philosophically casts God as impotent, and the other omnipotent as regards to choice and communication with man. Thus there has to be some sort of line-up regarding the philosophical underpinnings of the positions. Similarly, it is difficult to argue that the “philosopher” group as regards to prophecy could line up with the vulgar group as regards to creation, simply because the groups themselves are so incompatible.
            Thus, we seem “stuck” with three opinions about possible combinations: Harvey[xv], Davidson[xvi], and Kaplan[xvii]. Where Creation is the first number and prophecy the second, Harvey sees it as 1:1, 2:2, 3:3. Davidson sees it as 1:1, 2:3, 3:2. Kaplan sees it as 1:3, 2:1, 3:2. Each one has its advantages, and each one has its disadvantages.
Let us begin with Harvey’s combination. Creation ex nihilo lines up well with ultimate freedom by God to choose anyone as a prophet, both granting God omnipotence. This would mean, however, that Maimonides believes Creation ex nihilo lines up with the position of the vulgar, which defies the exoteric reading of the Guide. The Platonic view of creation also lines up as a group parallel with the naturalist view of prophecy, which Maimonides marks as the position of the philosophers. But there is a great disadvantage with this view, because Maimonides emphasizes that the naturalist view does not allow God to step in and block prophecy from those who deserve it naturally, while the Platonic view would allow it. Additionally, Aristotle’s view of creation should not concur with God’s ability to prevent prophecy from someone. Harvey is forced to explain that Maimonides would have to argue against the accepted Aristotelian view that the eternality of the world necessitates God’s inability to act in it—a necessity that Maimonides seems to accept within the Aristotelian view.
Kaplan represents a “religious” approach to Maimonides, wherein Maimonides aligns creation ex nihilo with prophecy that allows for God obstructing it from certain people. But Kaplan lines up Platonic creation with absolutely free choice by God in prophecy. It is difficult to understand why each one could not apply to the other. Meaning, it is even easier to argue creation ex nihilo could align with absolutely free divine choice in prophecy, and Platonic creation with a limited divine choice.
That is, in fact, what Davidson argues. Thus, the Platonic creation would line up with the “Law of Moses” view of prophecy, and based on this analysis he concludes that Maimonides believed the Platonic view of creation to be true. There are still a few issues to work out. This interpretation relies on a rarely-held position that Maimonides is really a Platonic philosopher, at least as regards to creation. While it is true that he allows for the Platonic view of creation as a “possible opinion” in the Guide, he is fairly explicit in his vehement denial of Jewish belief to allow for the Platonic view, which he equates to the Aristotelian one in that regard. Furthermore, the Platonic view of creation does not appear to be obviously present in the Guide or in Maimonides’ other writings. As Davidson himself notes, it also seems to go against the thrust of Maimonides’ argument in the Guide for the creation of the world. Maimonides spends a large amount of his book showing that creation ex nihilo is equal in demonstrative proof as Aristotle’s theory of an eternal world, meaning that both do not have it. He spends very little time on the Platonic theory. If he was hiding his theory through esotericism, it would be the Aristotelian one, which he fights against in the Guide, if anything. So why would he do this?
By supposing Maimonides is seeking the middle of these opinions here, these issues could be resolved. Within the theories of creation, there is an Aristotelian view of eternity of the universe, and there is the religious/traditional view of creation ex nihilo. The middle path, then, is a Platonic view that allows for creation and miracles. The others could not be chosen. If creation ex nihilo is picked, Maimonides’ audience would feel it has abandoned its intellect. If the view of an eternal world is picked, Maimonides’ audience will feel its religious foundation crumbling, with no miracles and no revelation. Instead, Platonic creation can take the best features of both Aristotelian eternity and religious creation ex nihilo: eternal matter but with the possibility of miracles.
Indeed, Maimonides explicitly states that he agrees with Aristotle half-way. In Guide 2:29 (346) he states, “We agree with Aristotle with regard to one half of his opinion…” He goes on to state this half as being an eternal world a parte post, until God miraculously changes it. Is this really any part of Aristotle’s position? It can scarcely be said to be in any semblance to Aristotle’s theory of an eternal universe. The real half that could be agreed upon would be the state of eternal matter. That is closer to Aristotelian philosophy than that of agreeing to an eternal world a parte post were God never to miraculously change it. However, he could not do this if the audience remained convinced the philosophic demonstrable truth lies of with Aristotelian eternity. So his first job was to lower the demonstrable truth of eternity to the same level as Platonic creation and creation ex nihilo. Then, and only then, could he create a successful synthesis. While not necessarily believing in the Platonic view of creation himself, Maimonides allows his religiously and philosophically committed reader to take a middle path between the two.[xviii]
Similarly, there are three opinions regarding prophecy. One is a view of prophecy that sees it as wholly miraculous, and anyone God chooses can receive it. Another is a view of prophecy that is wholly naturalistic, believing that God can’t choose any particular person to receive or not receive that prophecy. Both pose a problem to the religious philosopher. The philosopher believes in divine overflow, and the perfection of the intellect to receive prophecy, so the first view of prophecy cannot be true. The second position, however, poses a problem to the religious person who believes that God has an active part in the process in which the person to which prophecy is conveyed receives his prophecy. Thus, Maimonides chose the opinion that represents the best of both, that prophecy is a natural process in which God has the power to withhold prophecy should He will it. In this synthesis model, Maimonides was not saying that there is a correspondence of a precise nature in both discussions. Rather, there are three opinions, two of which are at extremes, and a third opinion exists that can be seen as a moderate view.
Another area Maimonides discusses various views and has his own in the Guide is in regard to divine providence. In Guide 3:17, Maimonides lists six opinions as regards to providence, including his own. If we disregard the one he attributes to Epicurus and quickly dismisses, there are five. The first four are:

1.     Only permanent and ordered things have providence, but not individuals (Aristotle)
2.     Everything has divine providence (Asharite)
3.     Man has free will, but divine providence also acts over everything using divine wisdom (Mutazilite)
4.     Man and God have free will, and God is just. Divine providence acts over all humans using divine justice. This may imply some “suffering of love.” It may also imply violations of natural law. (Believers in the Torah)

Maimonides explains the problems he has with each of these theories, and proposes his own that combines the Torah theory with Aristotle’s theory. It is important to point out that Maimonides explicitly connects Aristotle’s view with that about creation. Regarding Aristotle’s view, he writes, “This view is closely connected with his theory of the Eternity of the Universe and with his opinion that everything different from the existing order of things in Nature is impossible. It is the belief of those who turned away from our Law…” If so, it would make sense for Maimonides to take elements of it into account as he did for creation. Thus, his own opinion is such that he agrees with the Torah view in that Divine providence exists for human individuals who excel in intellectual perfection. However, Aristotle is correct about other aspects of the world, such as individual animals, the natural world, which are left to chance. A leaf blows because of natural chance, not because God specifically willed it. In doing this, he explicitly combines the two approaches to form a synthesized third.
In summation, Maimonides’ method of contradictions could be related to his doctrine of the mean, at least in cases of unproven opinions. We have seen that faith and reasoning are subject to the category of virtue and vice, and that following the middle path among both moral and intellectual extremes can fulfill imitatio dei. We proposed that Maimonides wrote his Guide with contradictions that are resolved through the mean because it would fulfill another aspect of imitation dei, following God’s own use of contradictions. In some cases, where Maimonides lists multiple opinions and obfuscates what his own opinion is, he appears to support the position which follows the mean. In other cases, it is clear that his own position does, in fact, combine aspects of other opinions. Thus, it can be said that Maimonides believes not only in the doctrine of the mean, but also the mean of doctrines.

Aryeh Sklar is a student at Bernard Revel School for Jewish Studies majoring in Jewish Philosophy



[i] Hyman, “Interpreting Maimonides,” Gesher, Vol. 5 (1976), 46
[ii] Harvey, “A Third Approach To Maimonides' Cosmogony-Prophetology Puzzle”, The Harvard Theological Review, Vol. 74, No. 3 (July, 1981), 287
[iii] Kellner, Menachem, “Reading Rambam: Approaches to the Interpretation of Maimonides,” Jewish History Vol. 5, No. 2 (Fall, 1991), 75
[iv] All translations of the Guide of the Perplexed and pagination are from the Pines translation of The Guide of the Perplexed, Chicago: University of Chicago, 1963
[v] See for example, Leo Strauss, Persecution and the Art of Writing (Glencoe, IL: Free, 1952) 38-94; and his "How to Begin to Study The Guide of the Perplexed," Pines’ Guide of the Perplexed, xi-lvi, and Joseph Buijis’ response, “The Philosophical Character of Maimonides’ Guide - A Critique of Strauss’ Interpretation,” Judaism, Vol. 27 (1978), 448-457. For an approach not too dissimilar from the one argued in this article, see especially Marvin Fox, Interpreting Maimonides: Studies in Methodology, Metaphysics and Moral Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 67-90, and Yair Lorberbaum, “On Contradictions, Rationality, Dialectics, and Esotericism in Maimonides' ‘Guide of the Perplexed’”, The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 55, No. 4 (Jun., 2002), 711-750
[vi] Such as his introduction to Avot and Avot 4:4
[vii] Such as Laws of Temperaments (De’ot) 1 and 2
[viii] Such as his reasoning for circumcision in Guide 3:49
[ix] See Fox’s “The Doctrine of the Mean in Aristotle and Maimonides” in Interpreting Maimonides: Studies in Methodology, Metaphysics and Moral Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 93-123, also found in Maimonides: A Collection of Critical Essays (IN: Notre Dame Press, 1998), 234-263
[x] See Menachem Kellner, Science in the Bet Midrash, 165-173
[xi] See Maimonides’ Mishneh Torah, Laws of Temperaments 1:6, and his Book of the Commandments: positive commandment #8
[xii] Fox ibid., 253
[xiii] See Howard Kreisel, “Imitatio Dei in Maimonides' Guide of the Perplexed,” AJS Review Vol. 19, No. 2 (1994), 169-211
[xiv] Indeed, this is what drives Maimonides to write in his introduction to Avot that he will censor the names of the philosophers he has in mind, as the masses would throw out the very valid ideas just based on where they came from.
[xv] Harvey, “A Third Approach To Maimonides' Cosmogony-Prophetology Puzzle”, The Harvard Theological Review, Vol. 74, No. 3 (July, 1981), 287-301
[xvi] See Herbert Davidson, "Maimonides' Secret Position on Creation," in Isadore Twersky, ed., Studies in Medieval Jewish History and Literature (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1979) 16-40
[xvii] The Harvard Theological Review, Vol 70 (1977), 233-56
[xviii] Presented here are only a few positions regarding Maimonides on creation. For further study into the topic, see Jewish Philosophy: Perspectives and Retrospectives, Academic Studies Press, 2012, 157-232

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[Class version]

Maimonides and the Mean of the Doctrines

Just about every essay written about Maimonides and the contradictions of the Guide begins with some pithy statement about how Maimonides’ use of contradictions created more controversy than conclusions. Arthur Hyman, in his essay, “Interpreting Maimonides,” states that, “Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed is a difficult and enigmatic work which many times perplexed the very reader it was supposed to guide.”[i] Warren Harvey writes, “Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed is a book of puzzles… No one will gainsay that Maimonides did a superb job of concealment. After almost eight centuries, students of the Guide are still trying to figure out its puzzles.”[ii] Menachem Kellner states, “Maimonides precipitated a cottage industry in Jewish intellectual circles, and has kept his interpreters busy ever since for close to a millennium.”[iii]
            This fact cannot be avoided, and serves as a warning of sorts for the reader of scholarly interpretations of the Guide. These statements are a testament to the inability for interpreters of Maimonides to definitively derive Maimonides’ position about nearly anything. Maimonides has been variously cast through the centuries as, at times, a master kabbalist on one side, an uber-Aristotelian on the other, and more still. Harvey, in offering yet a third approach to one such esoteric puzzle of Maimonides (which we will look at more closely later) said it best when he first frames his argumentation as, “The current discussion of this puzzle would, I think, be lacking if some words were not said in favor of the most obvious correspondence…”[iv] Although he continues to say he believes this is the correct correspondence, he frames it first as though given the possibility for this approach, the argument should at least be made, and the discussion would “be lacking” otherwise. This is quite interesting indeed - the way it is phrased shows how scholars have begun to approach Maimonidean puzzles. Maimonides, in his use of contradictions, opened himself up so wide that the mere possibility of approach could be a valid one[1] .
            It is with this in mind that I would like to produce another reading of Maimonides’ seventh contradiction, and I think the discussion would be lacking without it. The seventh contradiction, one that Maimonides promises he will employ in the Guide, is translated thusly by Pines (18):[v]
In speaking about very obscure matters it is necessary to conceal some parts and disclose others. Sometimes in the case of certain dicta this necessity requires that the discussion proceed on the basis of a certain premise, whereas in another place necessity requires that the discussion proceed on the basis of another premise contradicting the first one...The vulgar must in no way be aware of the contradiction; the author accordingly uses some device to conceal it by all means.
            There have been many varied types of readings of this passage.[vi] While Fox,[vii] Lorberbaum,[viii] and others take a “dialectic” approach, I will take a “synthesis” approach, quite to the opposite. That is, at least at times, when there are multiple interpretations of truths, such as the Aristotelian and the Torah, and the conflict is not capable of being resolved through demonstration, the position one should take is the middle path, the mean of opinions. This means adopting aspects of the two opinions and synthesizing them for the best religious and philosophical approach to the tension between two accepted truths. This is most obvious in cases where he lists conflicting or competing opinions, such as with providence or prophecy in the Guide, and his own opinion is obscured by other passages in the Guide. Before attempting to apply this theory to those cases to show its possibility as an interpretation of the many contradictions of the Guide, it is important to establish the philosophical and religious basis within Maimonidean thought for such an approach.
As I have alluded to earlier, such an approach could fit with Maimonides’ general advocation of the middle path as the ultimate goal of man. In the introduction to his Commentary to Avot, in his Mishneh Torah, and in his Guide, he repeatedly refers to a type of middle path reminiscent of Aristotle's, with some important changes.[ix] For the most part, Maimonides applies this to moral perfection. That is, the middle way between two extremes of moral vices, such as cowardice and recklessness, is courage, and that is to be sought. The middle way between the extremes of arrogance and self-abasement is humility. And so on. However, it is my contention that this applies to uncertain opinions as well.
Generally, the Golden Mean is understood to be a way of perfecting and maintaining moral attributes. How can opinions be considered in that category? Strikingly, Maimonides seems to consider both faith and reasoning itself as moral virtues.[x] In the Guide, 3:53, Maimonides states (631):
[W]hen you walk in the way of the moral virtues, you do justice to your rational soul, giving her the due that is her right. And because every moral virtue is called zedakah, it says: “And he believed in the Lord, and it was accounted to him as zedakah” (Gen. 15:6). I refer to the virtue of faith. This applies likewise to His dictum, may He be exalted: "And it shall be zedakah to us if we take care to observe" (Deut. 6:25), and so on...
It is unclear how faith “does justice to your rational soul.” However, Maimonides in one of his[2]  earliest writings, his Treatise on Logic, in the 14th chapter, writes that, “Reasoning, the act of conceiving ideas,” can, like moral actions, be described as “either excellent or defective. We thus speak of intellectual virtues and vices.” Thus, the act of reasoning is a moral action to the self, the perfecting of the rational soul through repeated efforts, like other moral deeds.
In the second chapter to his introduction to Avot, “Eight Chapters”, Maimonides provides some more information about the rational soul, distinguishing between moral virtues and intellectual virtues:[xi]
Now, as for the virtues, they are of two kinds, moral and intellectual, with the corresponding two classes of vices. The intellectual virtues belong to the rational faculty. They are (1) wisdom, which is the knowledge of the direct and indirect causes of things based on a previous realization of the existence of those things, the causes of which have been investigated; (2) reason, consisting of (a) inborn, theoretical reason, that is, axioms, (b) the acquired intellect, which we need not discuss here, and (c) sagacity and intellectual cleverness, which is the ability to perceive quickly, and to grasp an idea without delay, or in a very short time. The vices of this faculty are the antitheses or the opposites of these virtues.[xii]
Earlier in the chapter, Maimonides considers the possibility of transgression when it comes to believing false doctrines, though he is not firm on that point:
As regards the rational faculty, uncertainty prevails (among philosophers), but I maintain that observance and transgression may also originate in this faculty, in so far as one believes a true or a false doctrine, though no action which may be designated as an observance or a transgression results therefrom.[xiii]
Thus, like moral actions, doctrinal errors are also subject to the category of sin. In the next chapters, Maimonides states that the soul can only be perfected when achieving the goal of the mean in action. Since rational mistakes are not only immoral in terms of action, as seen in the Guide and the Treatise on Logic,[xiv] but also subject to sin as seen in his Eight Chapters, it emerges that Maimonides would understand thoughts and beliefs as having a similar to solution to its vices as moral actions do, some kind of doctrine of the mean.
What is, after all, the basis for the doctrine of the mean? Maimonides himself does not discuss this aspect of the mean, and he seems to assume its truth without inquiry into its philosophical basis. Aristotle, on the other hand, uses nature as one of the indications of the truth of this ideal. Nature, to Aristotle, follows the doctrine of the mean as much as possible for the greatest purpose. For example, “Eyes may be large or small, or medium-sized. The medium-sized are the best.”[xv] If, as Fox points out,[xvi] Maimonides seems to completely assume the doctrine of the golden mean as philosophically and empirically true, it would make sense that this could apply to areas outside of that of moral actions, which is what Maimonides discusses most directly. Thus, Maimonides, in forming his own opinion of philosophical questions, when demonstrable truth is not attainable, would also seek a moderate positions between two possible extreme ones[3] .
The doctrine of the mean, for Maimonides, goes further than nature itself being a general indication of the good life. More than that, it is knowledge and therefore the imitation of God, imitatio dei, that is the middle way of the good life. As Fox puts it, “Maimonides works here fully inside the Jewish tradition. He readily adopts the outer form of the mean as his theoretical base and principle of explanation, but the specific contents of the good life are defined not by way of nature but by way of the imitation of God.”[xvii] (According to this, even as regards to the doctrine of the mean itself, Maimonides synthesizes two traditions to arrive at his own opinion.) Fox thinks it significant that the first of 11 commandments stated in Maimonides Hilkhot Deot, dedicated to actional perfection, is the obligation to imitate God, and that he devotes the first five of seven chapters to this topic. And Maimonides understands imitatio dei as not only achieved through ethical perfection of action, but also through intellectual perfection. Bringing these together, it would seem that when intellectual truth is unattainable through rational inquiry, it seems necessary that, forced to make choices, one should seek the middle path between opinions, the moderate position among extremes, in the same way as one seeks the middle path between temperaments.
The very use of contradictions itself is an expression of imitatio dei, to Maimonides. Maimonides states that the way the prophetic works of the Bible are written is such that the true opinions are hidden in the text, whether through the third cause of differing parables, or the fourth cause of stating a proviso out of its proper place, because of a certain necessity, such that it seems a contradiction. But he goes on to write that the question whether the seventh cause, of concealment and obfuscation, is to be found in the books of the prophets is “a matter for speculative study and investigation” (19). Thus, by employing the seventh cause in his own writing, he is following after those who have had communion with God, a God-approved style of writing.
It is also clear from Maimonides’ declaration of the purpose of the Guide, and the audience he is writing to, that he sought a kind of religious solution as well. He recognized that the conflict between philosophic and religious opinions were at the root of the problem he wished to solve, and that this tension was impacting people’s faith in Judaism. In the very beginning of his introduction to the Guide (5-6) he describes the student who is “a religious man for whom the validity of our Law has become established in his soul and has become actual in his belief.” On the other hand, the student has also “studied the sciences of the philosophers and come to know what they signify.” Maimonides then states that only two resolutions appear to face a person in this state of perplexity. Either he eschews the Law, something he cannot do, or he eschews the intellect and feels “a loss to himself and harm to his religion.” This is significant. Maimonides proposes to help this student “remove most of the difficulties.” His task, then, is that this must be done in a way that will allow the student to feel that the Torah law is still valid, and that he isn’t abandoning reason to do so.
There is really a limited number of ways that Maimonides could make this attempt. One is to show how a certain philosophical theory does not, in fact, contradict the Torah. For example, one perplexity Maimonides spends much of the beginning of the Guide discussing is the problem of anthropomorphisms in the Torah. The Torah seems to describe a god that is physical, and the accepted philosophical approach is an incorporeal god. Maimonides’ solution is to show how the words that contain these descriptions are simple anthropomorphic metaphors and the conflict is resolved with no worse for philosophic or religious wear.
But what of cases where religious thought is indeed negatively affected by the competing accepted philosophic position? Intellectual perfection demands the seeking of truth above all else. But this becomes difficult when the philosophic idea competes with the very foundations of religion - miracles, providence, and the like, are founded upon an active and creative god. Not only that, but many of these topics are predicated on certain premises not demonstrable, or at least can be argued so. It isn’t as much a search for truth as a search for what seems more true than something else. It is in these cases that it could be religiously problematic, and his goal to “remove most of the difficulties”, including preserving the important religious feelings of his learned Jewish audience, can find a solution in synthesis of ideas. Thus, he would need to find a solution that would take this into account. It is here that a kind of synthesis would be possible, and necessary[4] .
Maimonides doesn’t want the masses to be aware of the contradictions. According to what we have been saying, this is because Maimonides only wants the reader to see the synthesized version, but not out of what it was created. To accept the synthesized version that Maimonides creates, one is required to accept two modes of truth when dealing with doubt: philosophic and religious, and also be willing to compromise on both of them[5] , which is a very nuanced position. The ignorant philosopher doesn’t accept the religious truth, and the ignorant religious person doesn’t accept the philosophic truth,[xviii] and nobody wants to compromise on their convictions.
            As mentioned previously, Maimonides’ method can be most easily seen in lists of multiple opinions in the Guide for a given topic. In each case, there are at least three opinions, two of which are at the extremes of positions. It is my contention that the real Maimonidean position in these cases is the moderate position. The listing of multiple possible positions occurs in three main places in the Guide, those being in regards to creation, prophecy, and providence. Additionally, he famously lists three types of readers of the Torah in his introduction to his commentary to the 10th chapter of Mishnah Sanhedrin. We will also examine Maimonides’ approach to the question of divine will versus divine wisdom in the Law.
            Maimonides tells us that, in some fashion, the positions regarding creation aligns with that of prophecy. Specifically, he states in the Guide 2:32 (360), “The opinions of people concerning prophecy are like their opinions concerning the eternity of the world or creation of the world. I mean by this that just as the people to whose mind the existence of the Deity is firmly established, have, as we have set forth [in 2.13], three opinions concerning the eternity or creation of the world, so are there three opinions concerning prophecy.” The mystery, or puzzle, is what way did Maimonides intend that these align? A quick listing of the positions and who believes them are such:

C1 - Creation ex nihilo (those who believe in the Torah)
C2 - Creation out of eternal matter (Plato)
C3 - Eternal universe (Aristotle)

P1 - Prophecy is given to whomever God chooses (the vulgar)
P2 - Prophecy is a natural process and God has no part in who receives it (the philosopher)
P3 - Prophecy is natural but can be hindered by God at His choosing (the Torah and our foundation)
           
The maximum number of possible combinations, at the face of it, is nine in all. However, there are a few combinations that are improbable. We have to assume that there must be some sort of philosophical parallel, or group parallel, with each of the correspondences. Meaning, certainly there are specific combinations that Maimonides would never had had in mind. He never would have thought that Aristotle's eternity of the world would correspond with the view of prophecy that it can be presented to nearly anyone, where one philosophically casts God as impotent, and the other omnipotent as regards to choice and communication with man. Thus there has to be some sort of line-up regarding the philosophical underpinnings of the positions. Similarly, it is difficult to argue that the “philosopher” group as regards to prophecy could line up with the vulgar group as regards to creation, because the groupings represent two very different outlooks.
            Thus, we seem “stuck” with actually three opinions about possible combinations: Harvey[xix], Davidson[xx], and Kaplan[xxi]. Where Creation is the first number and prophecy the second, Harvey sees it as 1:1, 2:2, 3:3. Davidson sees it as 1:1, 2:3, 3:2. Kaplan sees it as 1:3, 2:1, 3:2. Each one has its advantages, and each one has its disadvantages.
Let’s take Harvey’s combination, for example. Creation ex nihilo lines up well with ultimate freedom by God to choose anyone as a prophet, both granting God omnipotence. This would mean, however, that Maimonides believes Creation ex nihilo lines up with the position of the vulgar, which defies the exoteric reading of the Guide. The Platonic view of creation also lines up as a group parallel with the naturalist view of prophecy, which Maimonides marks as the position of the philosophers. But there is a main disadvantage with this view, because Maimonides emphasizes that the naturalist view does not allow God to step in and block prophecy from those who deserve it naturally, while the Platonic view would allow it. Additionally, Aristotle’s view of creation should not concur with God’s ability to prevent prophecy from someone. Harvey is forced to explain Maimonides as arguing against the accepted Aristotelian view that with eternity of the world God cannot act[6] .
Kaplan represents a “religious” approach to Maimonides, wherein Maimonides aligns creation ex nihilo with prophecy that allows for God obstructing it from certain people. But Kaplan lines up Platonic creation with absolutely free choice by God in prophecy. It is difficult to understand why each one couldn’t apply to the other. Meaning, it is even easier to argue creation ex nihilo could align with absolutely free divine choice in prophecy, and Platonic creation with a limited divine choice.
That is, in fact, what Davidson argues. This would line up Platonic creation with the “Law of Moses” view of prophecy, and suppose Maimonides believed this to be the truth.. But there are a few issues to work out. It relies on a rarely-held position that Maimonides is really a Platonic philosopher, at least as regards to creation. It is true that he allows for the Platonic view of creation as a “possible opinion.” Though he is fairly explicit elsewhere in his vehement denial of Jewish belief to allow for the Platonic view, which he equates to the Aristotelian one. And holding like the Platonic view of creation is not at all obviously present in the Guide or in Maimonides’ other writings. It also seems to go against the thrust of Maimonides’ argument in the Guide. Maimonides spends a large amount of his book showing that creation ex nihilo is equal in demonstrative proof as Aristotle’s theory of an eternal world, meaning that both don’t have it. He spends very little time on the Platonic theory. If he was hiding an esoteric theory, it would be the Aristotelian one, which he fights against in the Guide, if anything. So why would he do this?
By supposing Maimonides is seeking the middle of these opinions here, these issues could be resolved. Within the theories of creation, there is an Aristotelian view of eternity of the universe, and there is the religious/traditional view of creation ex nihilo. The middle path, then, is a Platonic view that allows for creation and miracles. The others could not be chosen. If creation ex nihilo is picked, Maimonides’ audience would feel they have abandoned their intellect. If eternal world is picked, Maimonides’ audience will feel their religious foundation crumbling, with no miracles and no revelation. Instead, Platonic creation can take the best features of both Aristotelian eternity and religious creation ex nihilo: eternal matter but with the possibility of miracles.
Indeed, Maimonides explicitly states that he must agree with Aristotle half-way. In Guide 2:29 (346) he states, “We agree with Aristotle with regard to one half of his opinion…” He goes on to state this half as being an eternal world a parte post, until God miraculously changes it. Is this really any part of Aristotle’s position? It can scarcely be said to be in any semblance to Aristotle’s theory of an eternal universe. The real half that could be agreed upon would be the state of eternal matter. That is closer to Aristotelian philosophy than that of agreeing to an eternal world a parte post were God never to miraculously change it[7] . However, he could not do this if the audience remained convinced the philosophic demonstrable truth lies of with Aristotelian eternity. So his first job was to lower the demonstrable truth of eternity to the same level as Platonic creation and creation ex nihilo. Then, and only then, could he create a successful synthesis for his audience, and follow the middle path.
Similarly, there are three opinions as regards to prophecy. One is a type of prophecy that is wholly miraculous, and anyone God chooses can receive it. Another is a type of prophecy that is wholly natural, and God can’t choose any particular person to receive or not receive that prophecy. Both pose a problem to the religious philosopher. The philosopher believes in divine overflow, and the perfection of the intellect to receive prophecy, so the first type of prophecy cannot be true. The second type, however, poses a problem to the religious person who believes that God has an active part in the process in which the person to which prophecy is conveyed receives his prophecy. Thus, Maimonides chose the opinion that represents the best of both, that prophecy is a natural process in which God has the power to withhold prophecy should He will it. In this synthesis model, Maimonides was not saying that there is a correspondence of a precise nature in both discussions. Rather, there are three opinions, two of which are at extremes, and a third opinion exists that can be seen as a moderate view.
This is where a third opinion exists to be a moderate that he could choose. But sometimes, he had to create a third middle opinion. Regarding will vs. wisdom as applied to the Law, Maimonides lists two opinions on the extreme, and then proceeds to offer his own. In the Guide 3:26 (506), Maimonides states:
Just as there is disagreement among the men of speculation among the adherents of the Law whether His works, may He be exalted, are consequent upon wisdom or upon the will alone without being intended toward any end at all, there is also the same disagreement among them regarding our Laws, which He has given to us. Thus there are people who do not seek for them any cause at all, saying that all Laws are consequent upon the will alone. There are also people who say that every commandment and prohibition in these Laws is consequent upon wisdom and aims at some end, and that all Laws have causes and were given in view of some utility.[xxii]
Yet, as Maimonides goes on, it becomes clear he is much more nuanced in his approach than “all or nothing.” Though he agrees that the generalities of the commandments have some cause, he posits that for many, the particulars do not have any cause whatsoever. He writes, “Know that wisdom rendered it necessary... that there should be particulars for which no cause can be found; it was, as it were, impossible in regard to the law that there could be nothing of this class in it” (506). Thus, elements of the extreme opinions are included in his own belief[8] .
Another area Maimonides discusses various views and has his own in the Guide is in regard to divine providence. In Guide 3:17, Maimonides lists six opinions as regards to providence, including his own. If we disregard the one he attributes to Epicurus and quickly dismisses, there are five. The first four are:

1.     Only permanent and ordered things have providence, but not individuals (Aristotle)
2.     Everything has divine providence (Asharite)
3.     Man has free will, but divine providence also acts over everything using divine wisdom (Mutazilite)
4.     Man and God have free will, and God is just. Divine providence acts over all humans using divine justice. This may imply some “suffering of love.” It may also imply violations of natural law. (Believers in the Torah)

Maimonides explains the problems he has with each of these theories, and proposes his own that combines the Torah theory with Aristotle’s theory. It is important to point out that Maimonides explicitly connects Aristotle’s view with that about creation. Regarding Aristotle’s view, he writes, “This view is closely connected with his theory of the Eternity of the Universe and with his opinion that everything different from the existing order of things in Nature is impossible. It is the belief of those who turned away from our Law…” If so, it would make sense for Maimonides to take elements of it into account as he did for creation. Thus, his own opinion is such that he agrees with the Torah view in that Divine providence acts over humans and rewards them for good deeds and punishes them for the bad[9] . However, Aristotle is correct about other aspects of the world, such as individual animals, the natural world, which are left to chance. A leaf blows because of natural chance, not because God specifically willed it. In doing this, he explicitly combines the two approaches to form a synthesized third.
This method is not limited to the Guide. In his commentary to the 10th chapter of Mishnah Sanhedrin, known as Perek Helek, Maimonides delineates three groups of interpreters of Torah and aggadic portions of the Talmud.[xxiii] The first group believes in the Torah and the rabbis, and reads the texts, even the fantastic ones, literally, and are happy to do so in what they consider religious faith. The second group does not believe in the Torah and the rabbis, and also reads these texts literally, but in order to mock them. Both these groups are large. The last group, smallest of them all, are people who take a middle path: they believe in the Torah and the rabbis, and therefore read the text in such a way that though the usual way is to read it literally, when it comes to the impossible, it is read figuratively. Again, this is the Maimonidean middle way, taking the moderate position among a few when it does not come to demonstrable facts.
In summation, Maimonides’ method of contradictions could be related to his doctrine of the mean, at least in cases of non-demonstrable opinions. We have seen that faith and reasoning are subject to the category of virtue and vice, and that the mean is fulfilling imitatio dei, as is God’s own use of contradictions. This can be applied to cases where Maimonides lists multiple opinions, and sometimes obfuscates what his own is among them. In other cases, it is clear what his position is, and it combines aspects of others. Thus, it can be said that Maimonides believes not only in the doctrine of the mean, but also the mean of the doctrine.
       i. 
[i] Hyman, “Interpreting Maimonides,” Gesher, Vol. 5 (1976), 46
[ii] Harvey, “A Third Approach To Maimonides' Cosmogony-Prophetology Puzzle”, The Harvard Theological Review, Vol. 74, No. 3 (July, 1981), 287
[iii] Kellner, Menachem, “Reading Rambam: Approaches to the Interpretation of Maimonides,” Jewish History Vol. 5, No. 2 (Fall, 1991), 75
[iv] “A Third Approach To Maimonides' Cosmogony-Prophetology Puzzle”, 288
[v] All translations of the Guide of the Perplexed and pagination are from the Pines translation of The Guide of the Perplexed, Chicago: University of Chicago, 1963
[vi] See for example, Leo Strauss, Persecution and the Art of Writing (Glencoe, IL: Free, 1952) 38-94; and his "How to Begin to Study The Guide of the Perplexed," Pines’ Guide of the Perplexed, xi-lvi, and Joseph Buijis’ response, “The Philosophical Character of Maimonides’ Guide - A Critique of Strauss’ Interpretation,” Judaism, Vol. 27 (1978), 448-457
[vii] See Marvin Fox, Interpreting Maimonides: Studies in Methodology, Metaphysics and Moral Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 67-90.
[viii] See Yair Lorberbaum, “On Contradictions, Rationality, Dialectics, and Esotericism in Maimonides' ‘Guide of the Perplexed’”, The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 55, No. 4 (Jun., 2002), 711-750
[ix] See Fox’s “The Doctrine of the Mean in Aristotle and Maimonides” in Interpreting Maimonides: Studies in Methodology, Metaphysics and Moral Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 93-123, also found in Maimonides: A Collection of Critical Essays (IN: Notre Dame Press, 1998), 234-263
[x] See Menachem Kellner, Science in the Bet Midrash, 165-173
[xi] All translations of the Eight Chapters follows Isidore Twersky’s A Maimonides Reader, (NY: Library of Jewish Studies, 1972)
[xii] ibid. 365-366
[xiii] ibid. 365
[xiv] And indeed, as Kellner ibid (172) notes, Ibn Tibbon includes “emunah” as part of Maimonides list of examples of moral virtues in that chapter, although other translations do not and Al Farabi, whom Kellner believes Maimonides based his Eight Chapters on, does not include it.
[xv] Quoted in Fox, “The Doctrine of the Mean in Aristotle and Maimonides”, Maimonides: A Collection of Critical Essays (IN: Notre Dame Press, 1998), 242
[xvi] ibid., 251
[xvii] ibid., 253
[xviii] Indeed, this is what drives Maimonides to write in his introduction to Avot that he will censor the names of the philosophers he has in mind, as the masses would throw out the very valid ideas just based on where they came from.
[xix] Harvey, “A Third Approach To Maimonides' Cosmogony-Prophetology Puzzle”, The Harvard Theological Review, Vol. 74, No. 3 (July, 1981), 287-301
[xx] See Isadore Twersky, ed., Studies in Medieval Jewish History and Literature (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1979) 16-40
[xxi] The Harvard Theological Review, Vol 70 (1977), 233-56
[xxii] Interestingly, Masha Turner suggests this as proof that when Maimonides connected the opinions of prophetology and cosmogony, he only meant to say they were groups of three, contra Abravanel and most academics, see Turner, Masha, “Examining the Relationship Between the Opinions on Creation and the Opinions on Prophecy in the Guide of the Perplexed" (Heb.), in Daat: A Journal of Jewish Philosophy & Kabbalah, No. 50/52 (2003), pp. 73-82
[xxiii] See Isidore Twersky’s A Maimonides Reader, (NY: Library of Jewish Studies, 1972), 407-409





Tuesday, April 3, 2018

God's Circumvention and Leaning at the Seder

Here is a strange midrash on the beginning of Beshalach, Exodus Rabbah 20:18:

ויסב אלהים את העם מכאן אמרו רבותינו (פסחים צט, ב) אפילו עני שבישראל לא יאכל עד שיסב שכך עשה להם הקדוש ברוך הוא שנאמר ויסב אלהים:
(Exodus 13:18) "God tilted the path [vayasev]..." From here our rabbis said (Pesachim 99b), "Even the poor Jewish man cannot eat until he leans [sheyesev], for this is what God did for them, as it says, "And God tilted the path."
This is also quoted by others, such as the Abudraham, in his discussion of leaning at the seder:

וכל מי שצריך הסבה אם אכל ושתה בלא הסבה לא יצא. ואמרינן בואלה שמות רבה (פ"כ י"ח) ויסב אלהים את העם מכאן אמרו רבותינו אפילו עני שבישראל לא יאכל עד שיסב שכך עשה להם האלהים שנאמר ויסב אלהים את העם. וכתב אבי העזרי בזמן הזה שאין רגילות בארצנו להסב יושב כדרכו ואינו צריך להסב. 
Anyone who is required to lean and eats and drinks without leaning, he does not fulfill his obligation. And we say in Exodus Rabbah: "God tilted the path..." From here our rabbis said , "Even the poor Jewish man cannot eat until he leans, for this is what God did for them, as it says, "And God tilted the path." And the Avi HaEzri writes that today, we don't normally lean, a person should sit as he normally does and does not need to lean.

(This might be an important midrash - does it indicate a Torah obligation, or an asmachta of a rabbincal obligation?)

What is the connection between the two? What does God's circuitous route have to do with leaning at the seder? I am collecting answers in this list, most seem very similar:


  1. Rav Menachem Mendel Kasher, in Torah Shelema, quotes the Ktav Sofer that it means the following: The emphasis is the "poor Jewish man." How can the poor man, the most destitute person, lean at the seder, when there are so many reasons to not feel free? How can the rabbis insist he do something he does not feel? The answer is that the poor man might think he's in a hopeless situation, no way out, but that's what the Jews felt in the desert - that they were trapped, with no way out. God took them out from a situation that felt hopeless, and he could here to the poor man as well. The same tilting God did then, the poor person should keep in mind now.
  2. A similar idea: Sometimes God takes us on circuitous routes. The poor man may think that he will be poor forever, but it may just be a stop on the circuitous path of the man's life. Tomorrow is another day, and perhaps the next time he leans, it will be on a better foot.
  3. From the Shu"t Divrei Yatziv OH 210: The reason God takes a circuitous route is because He was concerned (so to speak) "פן ינחם העם", lest the nation (am) turns around. The Alshich says that this refers to the mixed multitude, the non-Israelite members of the group, who were scared and would turn around at the sign of war. Indeed, he says, the Torah describes the "children of Israel" as leaving "חמושים", which midrashically means "armed." If they were armed, and therefore prepared for war, they wouldn't be scared and turn around. So the "am" that God is concerned for is obviously the mixed multitude, not the "children of Israel." Therefore, says the Divrei Yatziv, even the poor Jewish person leans at the seder as a free person, demonstrating that the Jews are always free so long as they learn Torah (which arms us). Even when we eat maror, even when our lives are bitter, we lean because we have the Torah to defend us against any onslaught.
  4. Similar to all of these: The lesson is that freedom is an ontological truth of being Jewish. No matter what external circumstances make us feel enslaved, the redemption of the Jewish people in Egypt is so essential to the nature of the Jewish people that even the most downtrodden person is truly a king. So when God took them on a circuitous route, that symbolizes the external nature of the exile before they return to Israel. The exile cannot change the nature of the Jewish people. A famous Maharal (Gevurat Hashem 61) that speaks to this:

    יש מקשים מה הועיל לנו היציאה הרי אנו משועבדים בשאר מלכיות דמאי שנא מלכות מצרים משאר מלכיות. ודברי הבאי הם כי כאשר יצאו ישראל ממצרים קבלו הטוב בעצמם עד שהיו ראוים בעצמם להיות בני חורין מצד מעלתם, וזאת המעלה עצמית לישראל שהם ראוים להיות בני חורין מצד עצם מעלתם, ודבר מקרי לא יבטל דבר עצמי כלל כי עדיין על ישראל המעלה הזאת שהם בני חורין בעצמם עם השעבוד, במקרה, כי אחר שהוציא הקדוש ברוך הוא את ישראל ממצרים ונתן אותם בני חורין ולא עוד אלא אף מלכים שנאמר (שמות י"ט) ואתם תהיו לי ממלכת כהנים וגוי קדוש, זה השם הוא לישראל בעצם והמעלה והחשיבות שיש בזה בזה לא נתבטל בגלותם שהוא (הגלות) במקרה, ולפיכך אומרים חכמי ישראל (שבת קי"א ע"א) כל ישראל בני מלכים הם אף בגלותם, וזה מצד המעלה והחשיבות שקנו ישראל בעצם לא נתבטל במקרה כלל, ואין ספק שכמה דברים הם נמשכים אל ישראל מן המעלה והחשיבות, אחר שהם בני חורין בעצם ואל יגרע כחם מה שהם עבדים במקרה, ודבר פשוט הוא זה ואין להאריך בדבר שהוא מבואר למי שהבין דבר זה
  5. The Baal HaTurim thinks (based on Bamidbar Rabbah) that this alludes to the idea that God didn't tilt their path, but set a table and prepared them food to eat, as it says in Psalms 78:19 - "Yea, they spoke against God; they said: 'Can God prepare a table in the wilderness?"
  6. Rav Levanon answers here that the earlier midrash indicates that "ויסב" means that God encircled the Jewish people to protect them. If so, maybe the encircling of the clouds are like the protection of kings by the palace and the guards. Thus, we are all kings on the seder night be recreating this "kings palace."
  7. He cites Rav Soloveitchik as saying that it took a long time from leaving Egypt to getting to Israel, because of God's circuitous route, and this shows the Jewish people's great faith in God. So too, we lean on the Seder night to say that we, too, have faith like our ancestors that we will eventually be in Israel and in redemption.
  8. The Beracha Hameshuleshet on Mishnah Pesachim 10:1 asks on Tosafot's Yesh Maforshim which has a "yesh meforshim" that the line that even a poor Jewish man cannot eat until he leans, is going on the previous part, and means to say that even if he hasn't eaten for several days, he cannot eat until he leans. However, asks the Beracha Hameshuleshet, the Midrash clearly sees it as the law of leaning itself, nothing special about eating or not eating for a long time! The Yad Hachaim answers that it seems that Tosafot had the girsa that was "ואפילו" - "and" (which is how the Mishna has it and not the Gemara, and also how the Yerushalmi has it), which connects to the previous line, while the midrash had the girsa we have without the vav. And he points to Tosafot Menachot 40b which says "אפילו" witha vav goes on the previous statement.

    But we could say with even more pshat, that the yesh meforshim explains this midrash as well. The point is that even the poor person, who has not eaten in a long time, must wait until he leans. Similarly, God took the Jewish people on a long route, which would mean they would not see Israel for a long time. Yet, they had to wait for the right time, and this is the lesson for the poor man as well.
  9. The Avir Yaakov says on Beshalach: The Chatam Sofer in his drashot understands what it says in Maariv "He took out his nation Israel from Egypt לחירות עולם" that this means "freedom from the world" - the desert was meant to be an oasis divorced from desires of the world. This is true freedom, being able to live without worldly desires. So, says the Avir Yaakov, the world seems to think that freedom is lots of money, possessions, and power, when in fact, Jews believe that even a poor person can be free if they work on their desires.
  10. Why would you think the poor person wouldn't have to lean? Isn't he like any other Jew? Tosafot on the page say that maybe you would think he doesn't have to lean because he has no pillows to lean on, so its not really leaning "in a way of freedom." Ritva, however, cites Tosafot as saying that a poor person never leans during the year, so you would think they wouldn't have to on Pesach either. Perhaps this midrash is saying this second reason, that one should lean, even if it is not what they do normally. So too, God took them on a circuitous route the Jews would not normally have gone down.
  11. The Beer Yosef on Beshalach writes: The Maaseh Hashem from R. Eliezer Ashkenazi says that we say Avadim Hayinu in response to the Mah Nishtana to answer the specific question of why we lean tonight. We say that God took us out with a great and mighty hand, and we want to demonstrate absolute and complete freedom, by leaning. If Pharoah had just let us out with the great power demonstrate by God, we would have the moral obligation to be grateful to him. But God took us out in a way that takes away that moral obligation, and thus we are completely free. So we lean. So this explains the midrash, says the Beer Yosef. God took us the long way to trap us, have the Egyptians chase after us, and then to need to completely rely on God to rescue us. Thus, the only moral obligation of gratitude is toward God, and no human. To demonstrate everyone is completely free from gratitude toward Egypt, everyone, even the poor person, must lean.
  12. Different but similar: A rich person is defined by Chazal as someone who is happy with their lot. By contrast, then, a poor person is unhappy with their lot. The people could have complained when God took them a roundabout route, but they did not. At that moment, even the poorest person was rich because they were just happy that God took them out, and appreciative of that fact. They were happy with their lot. Whatever would happen now, it would have been enough, dayeinu, for them to be grateful. Therefore, even the poor person today should recreate that aspect of gratitude, a thankfulness that stays even when being taken a roundabout way, by leaning like God "leaned" the Jewish people.
  13. Similar: A person who is poor financially might be rich spiritually. God took the Jewish people the hard way, to teach them that freedom isn't physical, but spiritual. And so, when they would come against war, they would be ready with the knowledge that God will protect them because of their spiritual merits. Even a poor person, physically speaking, should lean with the riches of spirituality.
  14. In Bareiach Hatichon, by Yosef Chaim Bron, he writes: In Berachot 8a (and other places), you find the term "סב" referring to an elderly person (indeed, we call a grandfather a "saba" in Hebrew). He is so called because as an elderly person, he "leans" on his staff to stand because of a "bent" back. The idea is that סב can encompass the concept of moving away from something straight - in the case of the old man, his back, but also moving away from a direct path. So too, God took us on a different path, from the paved path that would have been bad for us, to the uncommon path that was good for us. We lean on the seder night to remember this "lean" away from what was normal for us at the time, slavery. He adds that the verse says, "God tilted the path of the people," as in the most simple people, the masses. This is why even the poor person, who doesn't know so much, must lean to represent this move as well.
  15. Here's a crazy one, from the Divrei Tovah on Beshalach. He says that had God taken us the short way, we would have arrived in the land of Israel in one day. Remember, they are traveling on Chag Hamatzot, having ate the Pesach the night before. If they arrive in Israel that day, they would have kept only one day of chag. But since God had them go the long way, they were in Chutz Laaretz, and therefore He was literally "יסב" them - He made them have to lean again and have the Seder for another night, for Yom Tov Sheni shel Galuyot! Therefore the derivation makes sense - God made them lean for another night, and if we know they leaned the second night, they obviously leaned the first night. Hats off, very creative.
  16. Yismach Moshe says that the Israelites were so downtrodden leaving Egypt they were not sure if they deserved redemption. They didn't believe in themselves. So God gave them the understanding that they could lean like free people, that they were already free, even if they had a hard time believing it. So too, a poor person should feel this on the seder night.