Rav Kook's Positive Viduy Confession?

You may have seen the above "viduy of Rav Kook". The fact is, that not only is it falsely attributed to an idea of Rav Kook, it is misleadingly implying that it is his actual text. When this happens, it is upsetting to say the least. And the attribution points to his commentary to Maaser Sheni "7:10", even though Maaser Sheni only has 5 chapters to it, making it all the more difficult to look it up.

Someone translated the viduy here 

Ahavnu - We have loved, Bachinu - we have cried, Gamalnu - we have given back, Dibarnu Yofi - we have spoken great things! He’emanu - We have believed, V’hishtadalnu - and we have given our best effort, Zacharnu - we have remembered, Chibaknu - we have embraced, Ta’amnu sefer - we have chanted Your book! Yatzarnu - We have created, Kamanu - we have yearned, Lachamnu avur hatzedek - we have fought for justice! Mitzinu et hatov - We have done all the good we could do, Nisinu - we have tried, Sarnu lirot - we have turned aside to see, Asinu asher tzvitanu - we have done as You have commanded us! Peirashu - We have learned interpretations of Torah, Tzadaknu lifamim - sometimes we have even been righteous, Karanu b’shimcha - we have called out Your Name! Ratzinu - We have been steadfast in our will, Samachnu - we have rejoiced, Tamachnu - we have been there to support one another.

What a beautiful thought! But if you look at what Rav Kook actually writes, it's the opposite of this meme. He does write that it is important to have positive confessions to recognize when we do the right thing, and that's why we mention how we did the commandments in our confession for various tithes. 

However (and this is a big however), he writes, we do it so few times, because it's important to not get too much haughtiness of our own worth. It's really important, he believes, to knock ourselves down a peg or two every so often, for the sake of our religious worship. He says, indeed, that that is what Yom Kippur is for! It's actually the opposite of what the above message is trying to say! For Rav Kook, a High Holiday confession of accomplishments is counter to the religious sense of humility and balance. Don't do it on Yom Kippur! Do it some other time!

See it here:

The people here do a good job of summarizing this balance:

If we seek to continually improve ourselves, we need to be aware of the full extent of our moral and spiritual responsibilities, whether this involves helping others, refining our character traits, or performing acts of holiness. Even when we are dedicated to pursuing the path of goodness, we will still be far from completely fulfilling our obligations. This is the attitude of the truly righteous. They see themselves as lacking in good deeds and thoughtfulness. This critical self-image prevents them from becoming pretentious and arrogant, and graces them with a sincere modesty.

However, we must be careful not to be overly self-critical. We should not let this attitude deny us a sense of joy and satisfaction in our accomplishments. For this reason, the Torah teaches that we should rejoice in our good deeds. In the proper measure, this contentment bolsters our resolve to serve God, to perform mitzvot and acts of kindness. It is proper to feel a measure of satisfaction and well-being, and not always regard our actions as flawed and inadequate when we have acted correctly.

In short: we need set times for regular viduy, to admit our mistakes and faults, so that we may refine our character traits and improve our actions. But we also need set times for a positive viduy, to express our awareness that we have discharged our obligations and attained some of our spiritual goals.

This positive declaration, however, should be less frequent than our periodic soul-searching. We must avoid the sense of self-satisfaction that can lead to smugness and complacency. Thus Viduy Ma’aser is performed only twice in seven years.

Beat Him Until He Says, "I Consent"?

The concept that an ideology can force its followers to maintain their observance to it is one that is very difficult today. However, even the promise of good and bad reward for observance is in itself a kind of force. What is the difference between the promise of reward/the threatening of punishment seen in all religions and ideologies, and the actual beating of people? Both are coercive. But when that force turns to violent means to enforce, for some reason that is a terrible thing. And we must also question its purpose - what kind of points are given to a person who does a command only because he was forced to do so? It seems counterproductive to one's spiritual growth to require such a thing.

Yet, Judaism seems to require this by the courts (at least, and perhaps even by the people). Leviticus 1:3 states:

If his sacrifice is a burnt offering from cattle, an unblemished male he shall bring it. He shall bring it willingly to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, before the Lord.		גאִם עֹלָה קָרְבָּנוֹ מִן הַבָּקָר זָכָר תָּמִים יַקְרִיבֶנּוּ אֶל פֶּתַח אֹהֶל מוֹעֵד יַקְרִיב אֹתוֹ לִרְצֹנוֹ לִפְנֵי יְהֹוָה:
He shall bring it: [This clause] teaches us that the person is coerced [to bring the offering if he is remiss in bringing the sacrifice he had promised]. One might think that this means that they should force him against his will [to bring the offering]! Scripture therefore says: “[He shall bring it] willingly (לִרְצֹנוֹ).” How is this possible [that on one hand he should be forced, yet on the other, he must bring the offering willingly? The explanation is that] they must coerce him until he says “I am willing.” - [R.H. 6a, Torath Kohanim 3:15] 3-4.		יקריב אתו: מלמד שכופין אותו. יכול בעל כרחו, תלמוד לומר לרצונו, הא כיצד כופין אותו עד שיאמר רוצה אני:

So which is it? Is he forced, or does the law require it to be brought by his own free will? How can forcing someone to say he wants it ever be considered free will? As the koifer Ehrlich points out in Mikra Kefshuto:

"I have not merited to see what the difference between this and being forced to do it is."

The various gemaras that talk about it shed light on this. There's a lot to talk about but I'll just reference possible sources for the Rambam (which we'll see later) that one's inner will is always to do mitzvot, and external force to do a mitzvah is getting one in touch with his true self. Where does this come from?

The Talmud Kiddushin 49b tells the story of a man who sold all of his assets in order to make aliyah to Israel from Babylonia. When he sold the items to someone, he didn't stipulate explicitly for the sale to be valid only should he successfully leave to Israel. In fact, he was not successful, and sued to have his items returned, as he only sold them with the intention to leave to Israel.

Rava opined that his intention in selling, as an unspoken "davar she-b'lev", is not considered worth anything in a court of law. He could not get his items returned.

The Talmud attempts to adduce Rava's source for his contention. One suggestion is that it comes from a very different area of law. The Torah states that (Leviticus 1:3) "If his offering be a burnt-offering of the herd, he shall offer it a male without blemish; he shall bring it to the door of the tent of meeting, according to his will, before God." Note the underlined. It must be according to his will. The Talmud states that this means he cannot be forced to offer a sacrifice. What if he doesn't want to bring the offering that he promised? The famous line of the Talmud, "We force him until he says, 'I want.'" What do we see, asks the Talmud? That even though in his heart he clearly doesn't want to, we get him to say he does! "Devarim she-b'lev einan devarim"!

But the Talmud suggests that "devarim she-b'lev einan devarim" isn't the principle in use there, but rather that since he receives atonement, we can testify he was happy about that aspect, and therefore it was done willfully even inwardly.

So it admits defeat in this area, the sacrifice, and moves onto the end part of this statement, that divorce documents and manumission documents must be done of the husband/master's own volition, but if they refuse, they can be forced until they say, "I want."

But the Talmud suggests that perhaps this works not because "devarim she-b'lev einan devarim", but because it is a mitzva to listen to the sages. And so, it moves on to a different solution to find a source for "devarim she-b'lev einan devarim".

What do we learn? There are at least two reasons why force works. One is that there are cases where in the end, it causes them to acquire something they want (atonement), even though the cause to get it was by force. The second is that forcing someone to do a mitzvah (such as listening to the rabbis) is not considered force. As Rashi states, "דמצוה לשמוע דברי חכמים. ואית לן לאחזוקיה בחזקת מקיים מצוה וגמר בלבו לקיים דברי בית דין:" - Meaning, that we have an assumption that we will fulfill mitzvot, and that everyone wants to really keep the word of Bet Din in their hearts. This Talmudic passage sounds like the source for the Rambam Gerushin 2:20, as the Kesef Mishna suggests. Rambam says:

מי שהדין נותן שכופין אותו לגרש את אשתו ולא רצה לגרש. בית דין של ישראל בכל מקום ובכל זמן מכין אותו עד שיאמר רוצה אני ויכתוב הגט והוא גט כשר... ולמה לא בטל גט זה שהרי הוא אנוס בין ביד עכו"ם בין ביד ישראל. שאין אומרין אנוס אלא למי שנלחץ ונדחק לעשות דבר שאינו מחוייב בו מן התורה כגון מי שהוכה עד שמכר או עד שנתן. אבל מי שתקפו יצרו הרע לבטל מצוה או לעשות עבירה והוכה עד שעשה דבר שחייב לעשותו או עד שנתרחק מדבר האסור לעשותו אין זה אנוס ממנו אלא הוא אנס עצמו בדעתו הרעה. לפיכך זה שאינו רוצה לגרש מאחר שהוא רוצה להיות מישראל ורוצה הוא לעשות כל המצות ולהתרחק מן העבירות ויצרו הוא שתקפו וכיון שהוכה עד שתשש יצרו ואמר רוצה אני כבר גרש לרצונו. 

When a man whom the law requires to be compelled to divorce his wife does not desire to divorce her, the court should have him beaten until he consents, at which time they should have a get written. The get is acceptable. This applies at all times and in all places.

...

Why is this get not void? For he is being compelled - either by Jews or by gentiles - [to divorce] against his will [and a get must be given voluntarily].

Because the concept of being compelled against one's will applies only when speaking about a person who is being compelled and forced to do something that the Torah does not obligate him to do - e.g., a person who was beaten until he consented to a sale, or to give a present. If, however, a person's evil inclination presses him to negate [the observance of] a mitzvah or to commit a transgression, and he was beaten until he performed the action he was obligated to perform, or he dissociated himself from the forbidden action, he is not considered to have been forced against his will. On the contrary, it is he himself who is forcing [his own conduct to become debased].

With regard to this person who [outwardly] refuses to divorce [his wife] - he wants to be part of the Jewish people, and he wants to perform all the mitzvot and eschew all the transgressions; it is only his evil inclination that presses him. Therefore, when he is beaten until his [evil] inclination has been weakened, and he consents [to the divorce], he is considered to have performed the divorce willfully.

So the obligation to keep the mitzva is the real free will, and the inner push not to keep it is the real taking away of free will, and we are trying to "restore" him to his true free will.

Another Talmudic passage is Ketubot 86a:

א"ל רב כהנא לרב פפא לדידך דאמרת פריעת בעל חוב מצוה אמר לא ניחא לי דאיעביד מצוה מאי א"ל תנינא במה דברים אמורים במצות לא תעשה אבל במצות עשה כגון שאומרין לו עשה סוכה ואינו עושה לולב ואינו עושה מכין מכין אותו עד שתצא נפשו:

 Said R. Kahana to R. Papa: According to you, that you said that the repayment of [a debt to] a creditor is a mitzvah,  what is the ruling where [a debtor] said, 'I do not want to perform [this] mitzvah'? 

He replied, "We have learned: [We whip someone 40 lashes] in what case? For [someone who refuses to perform] negative precepts, but in the case of positive precepts, as for instance, when a man is told, 'Make a sukkah'  and he does not make it or, 'Perform the commandment of the lulav',  and he does not perform it he is beaten until his soul departs.

It is very difficult to believe that Bet Din would be obligated to beat someone to death if he won't keep positive commands, because then he surely won't keep them when he's dead! It could be that the knowledge that such a possible conclusion to this case would prevent sinners from reaching it.

Parenthetically, I have understood the problem of Amalek in similar terms. That is, if a nation was willing to attack Israel early on, and Israel did not respond in kind (at least in theory), it would open a pandora box of marauding peoples who view the Israelites as weak, perceiving an easy target in them. They would see the possibility of taking the Israelites riches for themselves, and enslaving the people. This was the nature of the times and rules of war. It could mean extinction if not dealt with fiercely. By having this strict rule on the books, the other nations would know the very dire consequences of such actions. I believe that the point of the law was preventative, not prescriptive. Maybe maybe maybe, one can see this a bit in Maimonides' Guide for the Perplexed, 3:41 (Pines Version, page 566):

The Book of Judges includes also the commandment to destroy the seed of Amalek, for one particular tribe or nation ought to be punished, just as one particular individual is punished, so that all tribes should be deterred and should not co-operate in doing evil. For they will say: Lest be done to us what was done to the sons of such and such a man. Thus, even if there should grow up among them a wicked corrupt man who does not care about the wickedness of his soul and does not think of the wickedness of his action, he will not find a helper of his own tribe to help him in the wicked things whose realization he desires. Accordingly, it was commanded that Amalek, who hastened to use the sword, should be exterminated by the sword.

On a drush level, we could say the above Talmudic passage of "beat him until his soul departs" is the source for the Rambam as well. We could say that "until his soul emerges" means until his true self comes out through a weakened will to sin, through a beating. But not death. His true soul is coming to the fore.

That's derush-y. I think on a more real level, but still not exactly pshat, is that the Rambam believes that it is impossible for Jewish people to be truly cruel. The Talmud states that the mark of the Jew is his way of kindness. In Hilchot Avadim 9:8 of the laws of slaves, Rambam records this as law that although Judaism allows for crueller treatment of non-Jewish slaves than Jewish slaves, the way of the Jew is to be merciful and kind, and one should even suspect the lineage of a cruel Jew. So it could be that he truly believed that deep down, nobody is so cruel as to refuse his wife a get. So to beat him so his inner self comes out, the mark of the Jew, isn't force at all:

It is permissible to have a Canaanite slave perform excruciating labor.Although this is the law, the attribute of piety and the way of wisdom is for a person to be merciful and to pursue justice, not to make his slaves carry a heavy yoke, nor cause them distress. He should allow them to partake of all the food and drink he serves. This was the practice of the Sages of the first generations who would give their slaves from every dish of which they themselves would partake. And they would provide food for their animals and slaves before partaking of their own meals. And so, it is written Psalms 123:2: "As the eyes of slaves to their master's hand, and like the eyes of a maid-servant to her mistress' hand, so are our eyes to God."

Similarly, we should not embarrass a slave by our deeds or with words, for the Torah prescribed that they perform service, not that they be humiliated. Nor should one shout or vent anger upon them extensively. Instead, one should speak to them gently, and listen to their claims. This is explicitly stated with regard to the positive paths of Job for which he was praised Job 31:13, 15: "Have I ever shunned justice for my slave and maid-servant when they quarreled with me.... Did not He who made me in the belly make him? Was it not the One who prepared us in the womb?"

Cruelty and arrogance are found only among idol-worshipping gentiles. By contrast, the descendants of Abraham our patriarch, i.e., the Jews whom the Holy One, blessed be He, granted the goodness of the Torah and commanded to observe righteous statutes and judgments, are merciful to all.

And similarly, with regard to the attributes of the Holy One, blessed be He, which He commanded us to emulate, it is written Psalms 145:9: "His mercies are upon all of His works." And whoever shows mercy to others will have mercy shown to him, as implied by Deuteronomy 13:18: "He will show you mercy, and be merciful upon you and multiply you."

But what to make of yet another Talmudic passage, Bava Batra 47b-48a which states:

אמר רב הונא: תליוהו וזבין - זביניה זביני מ"ט? כל דמזבין איניש, אי לאו דאניס לא הוה מזבין, ואפילו הכי  זביניה זביני. ודילמא שאני אונסא דנפשיה מאונסא דאחריני אלא כדתניא: (ויקרא א') יקריב אותו - מלמד שכופין אותו, יכול בעל כרחו? תלמוד לומר: לרצונו, הא כיצד? כופין אותו עד שיאמר רוצה אני. ודלמא שאני התם, דניחא ליה דתיהוי ליה כפרה ואלא מסיפא: וכן אתה אומר בגיטי נשים, כופין אותו עד שיאמר רוצה אני. ודלמא שאני התם, דמצוה לשמוע דברי חכמים אלא סברא הוא, אגב אונסיה גמר ומקנה.

R. Huna said: If a person sells something out of fear of physical violence the sale is valid.

Why so? Because whenever a man sells, it is under compulsion [because he presumably needs money], and even so his sale is valid.

But should we not differentiate internal from external compulsion? - [We must] therefore [give another reason], as it has been taught: [From the superfluous words], "he shall offer it," we learn that a man can be forced to bring an [offering which he has vowed].

Does this mean, even against his will? - [This cannot be] because it says, "According to his will."

How then [can he be forced, yet it is willfully done]?

He is forced until he says, 'I consent.' 

But perhaps there is a special reason in this case, that he may be well satisfied [to do so retrospectively], so as to have atonement made for his sins? 

We must therefore [look for the reason in] the next passage: 'Similarly in the case of divorces, [where the Rabbis have said that the husband can be forced to give a divorce] we say [that what is meant is that] force is applied to him till he says, "I consent."

But there too perhaps there is a special reason, that it is a religious duty to listen to the word of the Sages? 

What we must say therefore is that it is reasonable to suppose that under the pressure he really made up his mind to sell.

Lots of mystery in this piece of Talmud. R. Huna states that a sale under duress is valid, and this is very difficult to understand for the Talmud. The Talmud entertains the possibility that all sales are under duress, and are nonetheless valid, but quickly disabuses us from such notions by making a distinction between internal duress (needing money to buy food etc), which would be valid, and external duress (someone beating you until you consent) which would not be valid. It states this as an obvious difference, but does not explain why there should be a difference. And many more implications. This passage is something I hope to explore soon.

Understanding the Theme of the Golden Calf

In the closing chapters of Exodus, we are told over and over how everyone in the Israelite community, men and women, contributed to the tabernacles.

We have:

35:22 - The men accompanied the women, and those who wanted to make a donation brought bracelets, earrings, finger rings, and body ornaments, all made of gold. There were also all the ones who donated a wave offering of gold to God. 

35:23 - Every person who had sky-blue wool, dark red wool, crimson wool, fine linen, goats' wool, reddened rams' skins or blue processed hides, brought these items. 

35:24 - Whoever donated silver or copper brought it as a divine offering, and anyone who had acacia wood that could be used for the dedicated work, also brought it. 

35:25 - Every skilled woman put her hand to spinning, and they [all] brought the spun yarn of sky-blue wool, dark red wool, crimson wool and fine linen. 

35:26 - Highly skilled women volunteers also spun the goats' wool. 

35:27 - The tribal leaders brought the sardonyxes and other precious stones for the ephod and breastplate, 

35:28 - as well as the fragrances and olive oil for the lamp, the anointing oil, and the perfumed incense. 

35:29 - Every man and woman among the Israelites who felt an urge to give something for all the work that God had ordered through Moses, brought a donation for God.

Again and again, we have men and women contributing. Special mention goes to the women for their skills in sewing, the term "chachmat lev" being used for their talents and artistry.

In fact, when we come to these mysterious verses, we find that some interpret this to be referring to the women as well:

36:6 - Moses gave orders to make an announcement in the camp, 'Let no man or woman bring any more material for the sacred offering.'The people stopped bringing, 

36:7 - but the materials were more than enough for all the work that had to be done.

The question is, if people were bringing material, why does the verse say there was too much "work" being done? Rashbam answers that it refers to the spinning of cloth which was being donated. Meaning, the women went above and beyond! High praise, indeed.

We gain the impression, then, that the women who were donating cloth were to be commended for their work, and the Torah is praising them for their "chachmat lev."

Yet, somehow it is turned into an insult by Rabbi Elazer. In the Yerushalmi, Sotah 3:4, the story goes like this. I am bringing in the fuller context because it is important. (Also see Bamidbar Rabbah 9:49, Bavli Yoma 66b)

 ובן עזאי דלא כרבי לעזר בן עזריה. דתני מעשה בר' יוחנן בן ברוקה ורבי אלעזר חסמא שהיו מהלכין מיבנה ללוד והקבילו את ר' יהושע בבקיעין אמר להן מה חידוש היה לכם בבית המדרש היום ואמרו לו הכל תלמידיך ומימיך אנו שותים אמר להן אפי' כן אי אפשר לבית המדרש שלא יהא בו דבר חדש בכל יום.  מי שבת שם.  אמרו לו רבי לעזר בן עזריה.  ומה היתה פרשתו הקהל את העם האנשים והנשים והטף.  ומה אמר בה.  הואיל והאנשים באין ללמוד והנשים באות לשמוע.  הטף למה בא.  אלא ליתן שכר למביאיהן 

אמר להן אין הדור יתום שרבי אלעזר בן עזריה שרוי בתוכו 

And Ben Azzai [in the Mishna, who said that one must teach his daughter Torah], does not accord with Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya [who said that it is forbidden to teach one's daughter Torah]. 

As it was taught: It happened that Rabbi Yochanan ben Beroka and Rabbi Elazar Chasma were traveling from Yavneh to Lod, and they visited Rabbi Yehoshua in Beki'in. 

He said to them, "What innovation was [taught] in the Bet Midrash today?" 

They replied, "All are your students, and from your waters do we drink." 

He responded, "Even so, it cannot be that there is a Bet Midrash with no innovation every day! Whose week was it [to deliver the discourse]?" 

They said, "Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah." 

"And what was his portion [of the Torah]?" 

"Hakhel - gather the men, women, and children..." 

"And what did he say about it?" 

"Since the men come to learn, and the women come to listen, why do the children come? Rather, to give reward to those who bring them [the women]." 

He said to them, "Any generation that Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya dwells in, is not an orphaned [generation]." 

Thus, we see that Rabbi Elazar holds that the women do not come to Hakhel to learn, because they are exempt and (according to him) even forbidden from doing so on for its own sake. But, he says that they come to listen to the Torah reading because they are commanded to. And, they get reward for bringing their children along! Even though Rabbi Elazar doesn't ask them to learn beyond what is necessary, he accords them great reward for their actions, and Rabbi Yehoshua considers him a parent for the entire generation for this statement. That is why the next story is difficult to understand.

מטרונה שאלה את רבי לעזר מפני מה חט אחת במעשה העגל והן מתים בה שלש מיתות.  אמר לה אין חכמתה של אשה אלא בפילכה דכתיב (שמות לה) וכל אשה חכמת לב בידיה טוו.  אמר לו הורקנוס בנו בשביל שלא להשיבה דבר אחד מן התורה איבדת ממני שלש מאות כור מעשר בכל שנה.  אמר ליה ישרפו דברי תורה ואל ימסרו לנשים.  וכשיצתה אמרו לו תלמידיו רבי לזו דחיתה לנו מה אתה משיב.  רבי ברכיה רבי אבא בר כהנא בשם רבי ליעזר כל מי שהיה לו עדים והתראה היה מת בבית דין.  עדים ולא התרייה היה נבדק כסוטה.  לא עדים ולא התרייה היה מת במגפה.  רב ולוי בר סיסי תריהון אמרין זיבה קיטר ניסך היה מת בבית דין.  טיפח ריקד שיחק היה נבדק כסוטה שמח בליבו היה מת במגפה. 

A certain noble-woman asked Rabbi Elazar, "Why was there but one sin regarding the golden calf, yet they died three [different kinds of] deaths?"

He replied, "The only wisdom for women is in the spinning wheel, as it is written, 'And all the women who were wise in heart spun with their hands' (Exodus 35:25)."

Hyrcanus his son said to him, "Because you didn't answer one thing from the Torah, you have lost me 300 barrels of tithes in one year [for she donates to me every year]!"

He responded, "The words of Torah should be burned, and not given over to women!"

When she left, his students said to him, "Rabbi, you pushed her off, but for us, what is your answer?" 

Rabbi Berachia in the name of Rabbi Aba bar Kahane in the name of Rabbi Elazar said, "Anyone who had witnesses and warning died a court-imposed punishment. Anyone who had witnesses and no warning were checked like a Sotah woman. [Anyone] without witnesses, nor warning, died in a plague." Rav and Levi bar Sisi both said, "Anyone who sacrificed and incensed and libated [to the calf] died a court-imposed punishment. Anyone who clapped and danced and played were checked like a Sotah woman. Anyone who was happy in his heart died in a plague."

It's one thing to say that a man is forbidden to teach his daughter Torah. But Rabbi Elazar went so far as to insult the woman using a Biblical praise, which is most unusual. And then when his son questions this move for practical purposes, Rabbi Elazar responds (with her apparently still there, as she had yet to leave), that he couldn't care less about the money, because better the Torah be burned than given to women. Which is especially surprising because this seems to be a question on the written Torah, which many hold is permissible to teach women.

What is going on?

One avenue of approach is to understand why Rabbi Elazar was against women learning Torah. Rav Ovadya Bartenura, Tosafot Yom Tov, and Tiferet Yisrael take the Talmud's understanding that it was because he was afraid women, who had no obligation to learn Torah, would take advantage of the little they did know to find ways around laws. This is especially crucial regarding Sotah cases, where there are very real ramifications, such as ruined marriages, and worse, mamzerim.

When they went to fulfill the mitzva of Hakhel, they were learning from the Torah, and bringing children to share in this learning was very important for the Jewish family, and the Jewish woman herself.

The Meiri has a fascinating answer in Yoma 66b, that he was just afraid that if he gave her an answer, many other people who were not knowledgable in Torah would inundate the rabbis with questions, and it would not be good. But not that it was forbidden to answer her. Which makes sense according to his position in Sotah about why not teach a woman Torah is about certain women believing that through knowing a little, they know everything and then make mistakes.

Maharitz Chajes quotes Rav Sherira Gaon in his novella to Yoma there that Rabbi Eliezer was just someone who never repeated that which he didn't hear from his own teachers. So he didn't want to answer her because of that, not because it's inherently forbidden. Maharitz Chajes criticizes Rav Sherira Gaon based on the Yerushalmi, where he answers his students! So he was willing! Rav Henkin suggests that according to the Yerushalmi, he did indeed answer in the name of his teachers, while in the Bavli he didn't because according to them he had no tradition.

But the story of the matron teaches us something. I don't believe it was random that her question was about the three-fold punishment of the golden calf. If you look at the answer, you see that only those who had witnesses but no warning were checked like a Sotah woman. What this woman was really asking was, what criteria is it to be checked like a Sotah woman, and how do I get out of it, fly under the radar while cheating on my husband? I know the answer, but I want you to tell me so I can go do it. It's when there are no witnesses, and no warning, right?

His answer is, basically, get out. If this is what women will use a little bit of knowledge of the law for, then better it be burned.

We can understand this position a bit if that was the problem Rabbi Elazar was facing, and why this might be different today.


But I think a different answer might have been going on there. I think that, as I noted above, the Torah uses the woman's artistry skills as a tremendous praise of their knowledge, and yet, Rabbi Elazar manages to transform it into an insult, "All your brains are in sewing!" How can this be?

I think there's something deeper here, at least on a drush level. Rabbi Elazar was saying, "How can you so misconstrue the theme and message of the calf story? How can you focus on the deaths, when the real lesson is how we were forgiven after? That's the real lesson, and you're missing it! Do you want me to show you how misconstruing the theme of a passage can actually ruin it? How about the line, "The women who were wise of heart spun with their hands..."? How about, that's all they're good for! That would completely misunderstand the statement, don't you think?"

By doing this, he didn't answer her question, and insulted her at the same time. When his son questioned this move, he answered that if the Torah was to be so misunderstood by those not obligated in its understanding, it should better be burned than misunderstood like that.

Chava wore tefillin?

You can get all excited about a new source, and unfortunately, it can turn out just to be people mistakenly citing things.

Hebrewbooks recently uploaded a pretty impressive work, called be-Darkei Avot that collects many short statements of various rishonim and acharonim which talk about various issues within the assumption that all (good) characters in the Torah before revelation also kept the Torah. One of them caught my eye, a quote from the Zohar (Genesis 28a) that the "skins" that God dressed Adam and Eve in, were actually Tefillin. That would be an exciting new source I haven't seen mentioned in last year's debates over women wearing tefillin in Orthodoxy, where God actually dresses a woman in tefillin!

The acharon whose book title is "Birkat Avot" brings it up because he has a gevaldig question.

How could Eve wear tefillin if we know from several sources in the Talmud (Jerusalem Talmud Berachot page5, Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat page3) that keeping commandments that you are exempt from is just idiocy, and women are exempt from tefillin since it is a commandment that is time bound! Wasn't God/Eve paying attention to the Yerushalmi?

He answers that the reason it is called idiocy is because of the suspicion of self-aggrandizement, also called "yuhara", and since Adam and Eve were the only ones around, there was no fear of trying to show off.

See:

Unfortunately, the Zohar simply doesn't say anything about literal Adam and Eve wearing tefillin. The actual quote goes like this:

תפקחנה עיני שניהם, וידעו ישראל כי ערומים הם בטונא דמצרים, דהוו בלא אורייתא, ואתמר בהו (יחזקאל טז ז) ואת ערום ועריה, ואיוב בגין דא אמר ב' זמני (איוב א כא) ערום יצאתי מבטן אמי וערום אשוב שמה, מה דהוה משה, אתהפך לערב רב לשמה ולשנינה, אשוב שמה, הכא רמיז דעתיד לאחזרא בינייהו בגלותא בתראה, ואזיל בינייהו לשמ"ה, ואיהו אמר (שם) יהו"ה נתן ויהו"ה לקח יהי שם יהו"ה מבורך. ובזמנא דאתברו תרין לוחין דאורייתא, ואורייתא דבעל פה, אתמר בהון ויתפרו עלה תאנה, אתכסו בכמה קליפין מערב רב, בגין כי ערומים הם, דלא יתגלי עריתייהו, וכסוייא דילהון כנפי ציצית, ורצועין דתפלין, דעלייהו אתמר:
ויעש יהו"ה אלהי"ם לאדם ולאשתו כתנות עור וילבישם, אבל לגבי ציציות ויתפרו עלה תאנה ויעשו להם חגורות, דא איהו (תהלים מה ד) חגור חרבך על ירך גבור, ודא ק"ש, דאתמר ביה (שם קמט ו) רוממות אל בגרונם וגו', דא הוא ויעשו להם חגורות:

Basically, and I won't pretend I know Zohar at all, but I can gather that the Zohar is reading the Adam and Eve story as a metaphor for the story of the genesis of the Israelite nation in Egypt and after. So the "opening of their eyes that they were naked" was the Jews realizing their situation in Egypt, that they didn't have a Torah. When Moses broke the two tablets, and the Oral Torah, they were naked again, and wrapped themselves in tzitzit and tefillin, as it says that "God made for Adam and his wife skin clothing and dressed them."

So it's not talking about Adam and Eve at all, but of the Jewish people. 

So much for that source. It means that the Birkat Avot misread his source very badly, and be-Darkei Avot didn't check his sources.

The Miracle of the Breast-Growing Man

The Talmud Shabbat discusses a story of a man whose wife dies, leaving behind a newborn baby. He is so poor he cannot afford a wetnurse to nurse his child. Lo, a miracle happens and he grows breasts! Now he can feed his baby.

Shabbat 53b:

מעשה באחד שמתה אשתו והניחה בן לינק, ולא היה לו שכר מניקה ליתן, ונעשה לו נס ונפתחו לו דדין כשני דדי אשה והניק את בנו. אמר רב יוסף: בא וראה כמה גדול אדם זה, שנעשה לו נס כזה! אמר לו אביי: אדרבה, כמה גרוע אדם זה שנשתנו לו סדרי בראשית

This launches an amazingly interesting discussion in the gemara over whether it marks the greatness of someone that God needs to step in in a revealed manner to alleviate their problem, or whether it means that he is not so great that the problem had to be there to begin with, and wasn't dealt with in a natural way.

By the way, we know that stress is actually a cause of male lactation. That this poor person started lactating seems not to be miraculous at all, if he was starving and dealing with the trauma of losing his wife and needing to feed his baby. Unless it fits into a Maimonidean approach to miracles where its the timing that is miraculous - as in, it seems miraculous, but doesn't actually break from nature.

Indeed, Maharam Horwitz and others ask the question how this man could grow breasts if the verse in Ecclesiastes says that "there is nothing new under the heavens." The answer they give generally is that men have breasts. The ability to lactate is not a regular occurrence, however, and therein lies the miracle.

Nevertheless, certainly in the time of the Talmud they would have thought this story a miraculous occurrence, wherein Abaye claims that open miracles are bad for a person, "שנשתנו לו סדרי בראשית"

I posed this question on Facebook about 3 years ago.

Adam Friedmann: Interesting conclusion to the gemarah. I'm trying to figure out exactly what the argument is. I've narrowed it down to two possibilities. 

1) Rav Yosef holds that this was not a case of שינוי סדר בראשית. If so, everyone agrees that where there is a change of סדר בראשית the event is not miraculous, or at least a miracle of a lesser quality which is what Abayey means. This person must not have been such a great individual since the miracle done for him required a change in the natural order. If he had been truly great then the miracle would have appeared from within the natural order. This approach is interesting but also means that this is essentially a מחלוקת במציאות. 

Or 2) everyone agrees that this event was not part of the natural order but Rav Yosef still regards such a thing as a proper miracle while Abaye does not since it could have been done without changing the natural order. In this case the argument would be about the nature of miracle which is much more satisfying in terms of "lomdus". Either way Abaye fits with the Rambam's definition. The greatness of a miracle is not the magnitude of change that it causes in the natural order אדרבה! The more it changes the order the less we think of it. In the second version however Rav Yosef would be holding that a miracle which changes the natural order makes it better. Another thing to consider is (please don't shoot me) that they likely did not know that any man could produce milk given the proper biological stimulus. Which raises the question of how much this is a change in natural order after all. Even though we now know that this is biologically possible it certainly is not the דרך הטבע. Thats all I've been able to think of thus far. Let me know if you have any thoughts.

Aryeh: A possibility I'm thinking of that they're simply using this story they heard as a jump-off point to argue about metaphysical concepts about schar and onesh. They're arguing about loss of merit after an open miracle happens. Rav Yosef says "He's awesome, and stays awesome even after an open miracle. You don't lose "merit" for miracles happening for you." Abaye says, "What do you mean? He might have been awesome before, but he loses merit in Olam Haba if his reward takes place here." It's a possibility, which I think I see in the Meharsha.

Rashi says on Abaye's retort: "ולא זכה ליפתח לו שערי שכר" This would seem to indicate possibility number two, that Abaye thinks a better miracle would have been to just give him a parnassa instead of making him breastfeed his child. This could be taken many ways. 1) The obvious one is that a hidden miracle is better than an open miracle. This is probably like the Ran, who says "שחפץ השי"ת לקיים מנהגו של עולם בכל מה דאפשר" If you use my pshat above, its because you lose merit for an open miracle that you wouldn't for a hidden one. 2) Another option is that Abaye sees this miracle as degrading to a man, that he was not created (seder bereishit) to breastfeed a child. 3) Another option is that it is better to teach a man to fish that he can eat every day than to give him a fish that he can eat once. In this context, it might have solved his wet nurse problem, that now he doesn't need one, but he's still dirt-poor. Abaye is saying, sure, he's great, but he still can't feed himself.

Interestingly, the Mesoras Hashas brings down the תוס' ישנים that says:ובבראשית רבה על פסוק "ויהי אומן את הדסה" שנפתחו למרדכי שני דדים כדדי אשה ליכא למיפרך הכי, דהכי קאמר נשתנו דלא ה"ל שכר מניקה, ומרדכי ה"ל שכר אך לא היה מוצא מניקה". Tosafot Yeshenim quotes Bereshit Rabbah (Genesis Rabbah 30:8) on the verse (Esther 2:7) "He brought up Hadassah" that Mordechai grew breasts - but surely he was a good person! So how can Abaye say that such a person is bad? Rather Mordechai had the funds but simply couldn't find a wetnurse anywhere, so he was forced to grow breasts to feed her. Whereas this man didn't have the funds, and instead of getting funds, grew breasts instead.

That midrash is actually very interesting, Genesis Rabbah 30:8 and also Esther Rabbah:

מרדכי - זן ופירנס. אמר רבי יודן פעם אחת חזר על כל המניקות ולא מצא לאסתר לאלתר מניקה והיה מניקה הוא. רבי ברכיה ורבי אבהו בשם רבי אליעזר בא לו חלב והיה מניקה כד דרש ר' אבהו בציבורא גחוך ציבורא לקליה אמר להון ולא מתניתא היא רבי שמעון בן אלעזר אומר חלב הזכר טהור:

Basically, Mordechai couldn't find a wetnurse. So he nursed Esther himself. Several rabbis had this tradition, says the Medrash. One time Rabbi Abahu said it and the congregation laughed at him! Ostensibly they can't believe in such a weird miracle occurring, even to a biblical character (goes to show how much we allow in derashas today). He responds, we have a mishnah (Machshirin 6:7) that talks about male milk as not a liquid that allows the imparting of tumah! So it can happen, its not too weird. So says Rabbi Abahu.

Chashukei Chemed Bechoros 41a writes an interesting comment that would solve Tosafot Yeshenim's question. He states that there are many rabbis in Chazal who had miracles happen to them, and we wouldn't claim them as bad, like Abaye does with this guy. Rather, it must be that since he remains just an "echad", instead of a "chassid echad" or other moniker of having deserved the miracle, that he is considered bad from Abaye's perspective:
וקשה באמת הלא מצינו לחז"ל מעשי נסים הרבה ולא אמרו עליהם "כמה גרוע" חלילה, אבל התירוץ הוא כי על האיש שנודע לקדוש, לא יפלא שיעשה לו הקב"ה נס אף למעלה מהטבע, אבל במאמר הנ"ל לא נאמר "מעשה בחסיד אחד" כי אם מעשה "באחד", לכן שפיר אמר אביי "כמה גרוע",

It is interesting that there is another part of the machloket, after Rav Yosef and Abaye:
אמר רב יהודה בא וראה כמה קשים מזונותיו של אדם שנשתנו עליו סדרי בראשית אמר רב נחמן תדע דמתרחיש ניסא ולא אברו מזוני:

The last opinion, Rav Nachman, uses the words "mitrachesh nisa", miracles occuring, which reminds me of the story on Megilla 7b about Rabbi Zeira's response to Rabbah, where he says nisim are not mitcharesh all the time:
אמר רבא מיחייב איניש לבסומי בפוריא עד דלא ידע בין ארור המן לברוך מרדכי רבה ורבי זירא עבדו סעודת פורים בהדי הדדי איבסום קם רבה שחטיה לרבי זירא למחר בעי רחמי ואחייה לשנה אמר ליה ניתי מר ונעביד סעודת פורים בהדי הדדי אמר ליה לא בכל שעתא ושעתא מתרחיש ניסא

I wonder if there is a connection.

And this sounds like a very good reading of Rashi:
לדעת בעל ה"ישועות יעקב" (או"ח סימן ריח), אין כאן בעצם מחלוקת בין רב יוסף לבין אביי. שניהם מודים שמי שנעשה לו נס כזה, אדם גדול הוא. אביי שאמר כמה גרוע אדם זה, נתכוון לגריעות מזכויותיו. הדבר גם מדוייק מלשון הגמרא שנקטה: "כמה גרוע" מלשון גרעון (ולא נקטה "כמה פחות" וכדומה).

Basically, the Yeshuot Yaakov claims that Rav Yosef and Abaye aren't arguing that this person is good or bad. Rather, whether such a miracle detracts from one's merits. He argues that's why Abaye uses the word "garua", as in a detraction.

Lighting a Candle to Save a Life - Updated

Horiyot 12a:

אמר רבי אמי האי מאן דבעי לידע אי מסיק שתיה אי לא ניתלי שרגא בעשרה יומי דבין ראש השנה ליום הכפורים בביתא דלא נשיב זיקא אי משיך נהוריה נידע דמסיק שתיה

"R. Ammi said: He who wishes to ascertain whether he will live through the year or not shall, during the ten days between the New Year and the Day of Atonement, kindle a lamp in a house wherein there is no draft. If the light continues to burn he may know that he will live through the year."

I put forth this Talmudic passage on the Facebooks, and these are the responses I received:

Skootsky suggests: כי נר מצווה ותורה אור

Morrow suggests: כי נר ה' נשמת אדם

Posner suggests: Sounds like a good confidence boost.

I suggest: 

What does a "house without a draft" mean? It's the Soncino translation of "דלא נשיב זיקא".
My alternate understanding is the only time I know ״זיקא״ is used in Tanach, Isaiah 50:10-11: 

" 10 Who is among you that fears the Lord,That obeys the voice of His servant,That walks in darkness and has no light? Let him trust in the name of the Lord and rely on his God. 11 Behold, all you who kindle a fire,Who encircle yourselves with firebrands (זיקות),Walk in the light of your fire And among the brands (זיקות) you have set ablaze.This you will have from My hand:You will lie down in torment."

In this, זיקות are bad. People who have firebrands don't fear the Lord, they will lie down in torment. It would seem that according to Rashi, "walking in darkness" in verse 10 means that people who trust in the Lord even when times are bad. Thus, lighting a firebrand is someone who doesn't trust in the Lord and follow his prophets when times are bad. I suggest that one should find a house without zika in it - have trust in the Lord when times are bad. Then, light a fire in it not based on worry but on strength of faith. If it does not extinguish over the period of teshuva, you can be sure it is real.

Weisinger suggests:  Maybe, allegorically, during the aseret yemei teshuva, you should shut out everything else besides for self-improvement, and if that fire continues to burn after yom kippur ends, you'll know that you've done well?

Sigala suggests: All year long we struggle with religious observance and the realities and situations that prevent our perfect devotion. Perhaps the meaning is that during this time we have to focus one our merits and abilities, and if in a vacuum (i.e. without distractions and obstacles) we serve God properly and show that we truly have a desire for closeness with him, then God will forgive us if the "candle" had blown out because of the wind. 

------------

3/3/15

Skootsky and Morrow are on point. I recently read the Midrash Rabbah on Tetzaveh (Shemot Rabbah 36), which speaks to this:

זית רענן ראה, היאך דברי תורה מאירין לאדם בשעה שעוסק בהן, וכל מי שאינו עוסק ואינו יודע, הוא נכשל. משל למי שעומד באפילה בא להלך, מצא אבן ונכשל בה. מצא ביב נופל בו. הקיש פניו בקרקע. למה? שלא היה בידו נר. כך הדיוט, שאין בידו דברי תורה. מצא עבירה ונכשל בה ומת, שכן רוח הקודש צווחת (משלי ה): הוא ימות באין מוסר, ואין מוסר אלא דברי תורה, שנאמר (שם ד) החזק במוסר אל תרף. למה הוא מת? לפי שאינו יודע בתורה והולך וחוטא, שנא' (שם): דרך רשעים באפילה לא ידעו במה יכשלו. 

אבל אותם שעוסקים בתורה, הם מאירים בכל מקום. משל למי שעומד באפלה, ונר בידו. ראה אבן ולא נכשל. ראה ביב ולא נפל. למה? על שהיה בידו נר, שנאמר (תהלים קיט): נר לרגלי דבריך ואור לנתיבתי. וכן (משלי ד)": אם תרוץ לא תכשל. וכן (שם כ): נר ה' נשמת אדם. אמר הקב"ה: יהא נרי בידך ונרך בידי. ואיזו נרו של הקב"ה? זו תורה, שנאמר (שם ו): כי נר מצוה ותורה אור. 

מהו כי נר מצוה? אלא, כל מי שעושה מצוה, הוא כאלו מדליק נר לפני הקב"ה, ומחיה נפשו שנקראת נר, שנאמר (שם כ): נר ה' נשמת אדם. ומהו ותורה אור? אלא, הרבה פעמים שאדם מחבב בלבו לעשות מצוה, ויצר הרע שבתוכו אומר: מה לך לעשות מצוה ומחסר את נכסיך? עד שאתה נותן לאחרים, תן לבניך. ויצר טוב אומר לו: תן למצוה! ראה, מה כתיב: כי נר מצוה. מה הנר הזה, כשהוא דולק אפילו אלף אלפים קרוינין וסבקין מדליקין הימנו, אור במקומו. כך כל מי שיתן למצוה, אינו מחסר את נכסיו, לכך נאמר: כי נר מצוה ותורה אור:

(Jeremiah 11:16) [God called your name,] "A thriving olive tree, [beautiful in fruit and form"; With the noise of a great tumult He has kindled fire on it, And its branches are worthless.]

See how the Torah enlightens man when he delves into it, and anyone who does not delve and does not know, how he stumbles! A parable to one who stands in darkness who goes to walk and happens upon a stone and stumbles on it. He happens upon a drainage pipe and stumbles upon it, and his head hits the ground. Why? Because he had no candle in his hand. Such is the ignorant, who has no Torah in his hand. He happens upon a sin, and he stumbles upon it and dies. For the [one with the] divine spirit [of prophecy] cried, (Proverbs 5:23) "He dies without discipline (mussar)." And "mussar" only refers to Torah, as it says, (Proverbs 4:13) "Take hold of instruction (mussar); do not let go." Why does he die? Because he doesn't know Torah, and goes and sins, as it says, (Proverbs 4:19) "The way of the wicked is in darkness; They do not know over what they stumble." 

But those who delve in Torah, they are enlightened everywhere. A parable to one who stands in darkness, and a candle is in his hand. He sees a stone and he does not stumble. He sees a drainage pipe and does not fall. Why? Because he had a candle in his hand, as it says, (Psalms 119:105) "Your word is a lamp to my feet And a light to my path." And similarly, (Proverbs 4:12) "When you run, you will not stumble." And similarly, (Proverbs 20:27) "The soul of man is the candle of God." Said the Holy One, blessed be He: My candle shall be in your hand, and your candle shall be in Mine. And what is the candle of the Holy One, blessed be He? That is Torah, as it says, (Proverbs 6:23) "For the commandment is a candle and the Torah is light." 

What does it mean, "For the commandment is a candle"? Rather, all who perform the commandments, it is as if he has lit a candle before the Holy One, blessed be he, and resuscitated becomes his soul, which is called "a candle", as it says (Proverbs 20:27) "The soul of man is the candle of God." And what is "And the Torah is light"? Rather, many times a person make his heart desirous to perform a commandment, and the evil inclination that is inside him says: What is it to you to perform a commandment and lose money? Before you give to others, give to your children! And the good inclination says to him: Give for the commandment! See what it says, "For the commandment is a candle". Just like this candle, when it is lit even a million times, wax and tallow candles can be lit off of it, its light [remains] in place, so too anyone who gives for a commandment, he does not lose money. Therefore it says, (Proverbs 6:23) "For the commandment is a candle and the Torah is light." 

9/13/15 Erev Rosh Hashana

There are some rabbis who write about this connection.

Rabbi Asher Rosenbaum, Sefer Meadnei Asher, suggests that this is in reference to the statement in Rosh Hashana 16b:

"א''ר יוחנן: שלשה ספרים נפתחין בר''ה, אחד של רשעים גמורין ואחד של צדיקים גמורין ואחד של בינוניים. צדיקים גמורין נכתבין ונחתמין לאלתר לחיים, רשעים גמורין נכתבין ונחתמין לאלתר למיתה, בינוניים תלויין ועומדין מר''ה ועד יוה''כ זכו נכתבין לחיים לא זכו נכתבין למיתה" 

R`Kruspedai said in the name of R`Johanan: Three books are opened [in heaven] on New Year, one for the thoroughly wicked, one for the thoroughly righteous, and one for the intermediate.

The thoroughly righteous are forthwith inscribed definitively in the book of life; the thoroughly wicked are forthwith inscribed definitively in the book of death; the fate of the intermediate is suspended from New Year till the Day of Atonement; if they merit, they are inscribed in the book of life; if they do not merit, they are inscribed in the book of death.

So, he writes, that the reference to a candle that will not go out is repenting with all one's heart. Why does he say that? Because of yet another midrash, which equates the candle to Torah, and man to a house (Deuteronomy Rabbah 4)

אם שמור תשמרון. אמר הקב״ה נרי בידך ונרך בידי, אם אתה תשמור נרי שהיא התורה, אני משמר נרך שהיא הנשמה, כמש״כ ״כי נר מצוה ותורה אור״ הרי שהתורה נקראת אור, וגופו של אדם נקרא בית ״ביום שיזועו שומרי הבית״

 "If you will keep them..." Says God, "You have my candle, and I have your candle. If you guard my candle, which is the Torah, I will guard your candle which is the soul, as it says, 'For the commandment is a candle and the Torah is light', and the Torah is called "light." And the body of man is called a house, as it says, (Ecclesiastes 12:3) "in the day when the keepers of the house tremble."

Thus, the line means that if one lights his candle, Torah and mitzvot, and doesn't let in a ruach, (which he says we know is a reference to ruach shtus which is the cause of sin, (Sotah 3a) "for one only sins because of a little ruach shtus"), then he will be successful, he is a guaranteed to live out the year and to be written in the book of life.

There are other suggestions as well:

Rabbi Yisrael Bernstein, Sefer Kerem Yisrael, suggests homiletically that this is a statement that reflects on how the Jewish people have survived - they made sure that they focused on the places where the zeitgeist, the ruach hazman, could not enter - the Beit Knesset and the Beit Misrash.

When Using Useful Immoral Principles for Moral Purposes

R. Yehiel Yaakov Weinberg, in a letter to his close friend Samuel Atlas in 1965, poignantly declares that today’s world Jewry must realize that halachot that create difference between Jew and non-Jews can no longer apply. “Meiri wrote as such,” he writes, “but the teachers and ramim whisper in the ears of the students that all this was written because of the censor.”^[i] R. Menachem Meiri, the 13th century Talmudist and halachist, indeed writes in several places in his commentary to the Talmud^[ii] that when the Talmud distinguished between Jews and non-Jews, it only applied to non-Jews who were heathen savages. But, according to the Meiri, non-Jews who possess religion and laws are not those referred to by the Talmud, and the Talmudic edicts to not apply in these cases. This medieval recognition of the moral content of other religions and governments aligns with our recognition today, but the traditional halachic process seems to represent a lack of this recognition. This is what R. Weinberg was expressing when he hints to the will of the young students to hold like the Meiri, but held back by their teachers who wish to brush off Meiri’s comments as being invalid as halachic statements.

Although the moral desire to hold like the Meiri and other such minority opinions is certainly a powerful one today, we must be careful to consider the other side of the moral/halachic coin in the adoption of such “resolutions”. It is the truism that “every kula is a chumra, and every chumra is a kula”, and in our rush to eschew the distinctions between Jews and non-Jews in halacha, we may cause a negative impact on other areas of halacha where those distinctions can be helpful in solving vexing problems.

We can see a case of such a distinction coming to the rescue by looking at a teshuva of R. Yitzchak Elchanan Spektor^[iii].

R. Yitzchak Elchanan Spektor (1817-1896) was one of the greatest halachic decisors of the 19th century. R. Spektor received a letter from a rabbi of a certain community where a terrible event took place. A Jewish girl, engaged to be married to a nice Jewish boy of a prestigious family, was raped by a non-Jewish man. Unfortunately, she became pregnant with her rapist’s child, but still, her fiance wished to go ahead with the marriage. Alas, there was a problem. The halacha is^[iv] that one may not marry a woman who was impregnated by another man while she is pregnant, nor while she is nursing another man’s child. The reasoning provided is that there is a fear that he, the second man, would not care for the welfare of the first man’s child. To prevent serious potential problems, the rabbis of the Talmud^[v] enacted that one who wishes to marry this woman must wait until both these periods are over, i.e. when the baby is 24 months old.

However, writes the rabbi to R. Spektor, if the boy is asked to wait the 24 months (and the length of the pregnancy) until he can marry this girl, there is a fear that he will move on to other prospects. Additionally, there was also a fear that her family’s prestige would be adversely affected from this situation, and perhaps she would be unable to find someone else to marry. Is there any way to waive the Talmudic waiting period in the face of this terrible situation?

Before we get to R. Spektor’s answer, we should explain at the outset that the examination of the enactment will be a close look at its use of the word “chaver”. The Talmud^[vi] states that, “lo yisa me’uberet chavero, v’lo yisa me’yuneket chavero” - “one may not marry a woman impregnated by one’s fellow, nor may one marry a woman who is nursing his fellow’s [child].” The use here of the word “chaver”, which literally means “fellow”, is not meant to convey fellowship in terms of friendliness. This is especially true when we are questioning the status of a rapist in this case, who is definitely not that type of “chaver”. Instead, the debate will revolve around the halachic category of “chaver” - in this case, is it being used specifically by the Talmud to refer only to a “fellow Jew,” or it could be just a way to say, “fellow person”, Jewish or gentile?

R. Yehezkel Landau, the Noda B’Yehuda,^[vii] takes the former position, that since the term used by the Talmud to describe the enactment is “me’uberet chavero” - “a woman impregnated by one’s fellow”, and since “fellow” only pertains to Jews, there is no waiting time necessary when she was impregnated by a non-Jew. Thus, it would seem they could get married immediately should they so wish.

However, it is not so clear. R. Akiva Eiger in his responsa^[viii] disagrees with such a suggestion, providing several examples when the Talmud says “chaver” - “fellow”, yet clearly refers to both Jews and non-Jews. For example, the Mishnah in Shabbat 150a states that one may not hire workers on the Sabbath, nor ask his “chaver” to hire workers for him. The Talmud immediately questions who this “chaver” refers to, for if it were another Jew, that should be obvious; one cannot have another Jew work for him on the Sabbath. And if it’s a non-Jew, that is also obvious because of “amira l’akum” laws. So what novel ruling does the Mishna mean to present? The conclusion of the Talmud is that the Mishna refers to a case where he says cryptically to his fellow, “Let’s see if you’ll meet me here tonight,” without explicitly asking him, and implying not on the Sabbath itself. This does not seem to be specifically referring to a Jew, but rather both to a Jew or a non-Jew, and Tosafot there^[ix] concludes this way.

R. Spektor points to other Tosafots who also say “chaver” refers to both Jews and non-Jews, Tosafot in Eruvin 32a^[x] and in Sukkah 39a^[xi]. The weight of the evidence seems to point in the direction of R. Eiger and not the Noda B’Yehuda, and thus, at the outset, it would seem that our sorry couple would have to wait or cancel the engagement.

However, R. Spektor continues, there are many who don’t hold like Tosafot. Rashi^[xii] holds that “chaver” does not refer to an am ha’aretz, an ignoramus of certain laws, and by implication, all the more so it does not refer to a non-Jew. In addition, R. Moses Isserles^[xiii] states as a “yesh omrim” the position of Hagahot Ashiri, R. Israel of Krems^[xiv], who holds that “chaver” does not refer to non-Jews, and indeed, R. Israel holds this way on Avoda Zara 6a as well. Thus, with a Rashi, and two Ashiri’s (and R. Isserles assuming the Ashiri’s position as well), the Noda B’Yehuda seems to be on safe ground after all. If so, the conclusion one would make is that "chaver" only refers to Jews, and the woman pregnant through the gentile could get married to her Jewish husband without fear.

Another path toward leniency is a closer look at Tosafot, who hold “chaver” refers to both a Jew and a non-Jew in other cases. Does this necessarily extend to our case?

Perhaps, suggests R. Spektor, the Tosafot we have seen would agree with the reasoning put forth by R. Yom-Tov Lipmann Heller. In his Tosafot Yom Tov,^[xv] he claims that the reason the term “chaver”, which means fellow or friend, is chosen, is to denote that it is common for both parties in those cases to have some kind of familiar relationship. Thus, the reason why “chaver” would apply to a non-Jew who is asked to hire workers for Shimon is because Shimon probably wouldn’t ask him if they didn’t have any prior relationship. Indeed, we could apply this understanding to Tosafot in Eruvin and Sukkah as well, and R. Moses Sofer states this similarly.^[xvi]

If this is the reasoning of the use of the word “chaver”, it does not apply to the “chaver” statement in our case, where the “chaver” refers to the father of the child. A man who marries a woman who is pregnant does not usually have any connection to the father of the child, and his relationship to the woman doesn’t come from any relationship with the father of the child. Thus, they are not “chavers” in the same sense as the other cases, where this would be so. “Chaver” in this case must have been chosen because it specifically refers to a Jew and not a non-Jew. In reading the line of the Talmud carefully, this may reveal why there are two separate clauses to the enactment. It doesn’t say, “One may not marry a pregnant woman nor a nursing woman of his fellow”, but rather, “One may not marry a pregnant woman of his fellow nor a nursing woman of his fellow.” This indicates that the author of this Baraita wanted to especially emphasize the uniqueness of this “chaver” over other “chaver” cases, i.e. that this refers to Jews specifically and not non-Jews.

It seems, then, that we have plenty of support for the Noda B’Yehuda’s position, and they may marry immediately. However, R. Spektor introduces another element, the authority of Maimonides. He writes that he is unwilling to be too lenient, since Maimonides^[xvii] and others provide the reasoning for the enactment, i.e. that he would not care for the welfare of the baby, as part of the law. If so, this worry would not be different depending on if the father is part of the tribe or not, and so it would seem that to Maimonides, “chaver” would apply to both Jews and non-Jews. Although the Noda B’Yehuda does indeed deal with this position of Maimonides, R. Spektor feels that given Maimonides’ clear position, we may only be lenient to allow this boy and girl to get married after the pregnancy, just a few months instead of years, by making sure she swears not to nurse her child herself, but rather gives over that responsibility to a wetnurse. This would bypass Maimonides’ issue about protecting the baby.

Throughout R. Spektor’s responsa, as exemplified by this responsum, we find a constant seeking to find ways to be lenient in exigent circumstances, while also remaining felicitous to the halachic process. It is no wonder that the great majority of his responsa deal with many varieties of aguna questions, given this methodology. As we noted from the outset, it is important to realize that the discussion above, and the leniencies derived from it, could never have taken place if R. Spektor had cast away the distinctions between Jews and non-Jews within halacha. We must be wary of adopting such broad halachic rules like the Meiri’s, while with conscientious deliberation, search out new ways to be loyal to halacha as well as to our own morality.

Indeed, there are cases where R. Weinberg, who himself held like the Meiri for moral reasons, would use a halachic argument that he felt was immoral if it lead to halachic leniency. Professor Marc Shapiro points out in his book^[xviii] that R. Weinberg declared the justification of Tosafot that a Jewish woman is permitted to her husband

R. Tam’s states that sex with a Gentile does not cause a woman to become forbidden to her husband. R. Weinberg had ethical problems with the reason R. Tam gives, and I don’t think it goes too far to say that he thought that, from our modern perspective, R. Tam’s justification is to be regarded as immoral.[13] Yet I also note that in seeking to find a heter for a woman who committed adultery with a non-Jew to return to her husband he is prepared to make use of R. Tam’s position.[14] I don’t think this raises any problems, since at the end of the day, R. Tam’s position is part of the halakhic tradition. If it can be used to to reach a lenient decision, then it serves a purpose, even if the contemporary posek doesn’t agree with the underlying assumptions of R. Tam’s pesak

[14] Kitvei R. Weinberg, vol. 1, p. 58.

I think the concept is altogether fascinating.

---

^[i] Marc Shapiro, "Scholars and Friends" (The Torah U-Madda Journal, v. 7, 1997),  118.

^[ii] See, for example, Beit HaBechira to Avoda Zara 26a, Beit HaBechira to Bava Metzia 59a, and Beit HaBechira to Bava Kama 37b.

^[iii] Resp. Ein Yitzchak, EH 1:15

^[iv] See Shulchan Aruch EH 13:11

^[v] See TB Yevamot 42a

^[vi] ibid.

^[vii] Resp. Noda B’Yehuda, Mahadura Tanina Siman 38

^[viii] Resp. R. Akiva Eiger, Siman 95

^[ix] Tosafot, s.v. “Omer Adam”

^[x] Tosafot, s.v. “HaOmer”

^[xi] Tosafot, s.v. “HaLokeach”

^[xii] Rashi, Sukkah 39a, s.v. “HaLokeach”

^[xiii] Rama, Shulchan Aruch OH 500:1

^[xiv] Hagahot Ashiri, Beitza, 3:9

^[xv] Tosafot Yom Tov, Mishnah Damai 4:2

^[xvi] Chiddushei Chatam Sofer, Sukkah 39a

^[xvii] Mishneh Torah, Laws of Divorce 11:25

^[xviii] Which he summarizes here http://seforim.blogspot.com/2007/08/marc-b-shapiro-forgery-and-halakhic.html

The Importance of Genealogy in the Torah - A Source Sheet

Genealogy in the Torah:

Why does it matter that Lotan's sister was Timna?

Genesis 4:17-22

(יז) וַיֵּ֤דַע קַ֙יִן֙ אֶת־אִשְׁתּ֔וֹ וַתַּ֖הַר וַתֵּ֣לֶד אֶת־חֲנ֑וֹךְ וַֽיְהִי֙ בֹּ֣נֶה עִ֔יר וַיִּקְרָא֙ שֵׁ֣ם הָעִ֔יר כְּשֵׁ֖ם בְּנ֥וֹ חֲנֽוֹךְ׃ (יח) וַיִּוָּלֵ֤ד לַֽחֲנוֹךְ֙ אֶת־עִירָ֔ד וְעִירָ֕ד יָלַ֖ד אֶת־מְחֽוּיָאֵ֑ל וּמְחִיָיאֵ֗ל יָלַד֙ אֶת־מְת֣וּשָׁאֵ֔ל וּמְתוּשָׁאֵ֖ל יָלַ֥ד אֶת־לָֽמֶךְ׃ (יט) וַיִּֽקַּֽח־ל֥וֹ לֶ֖מֶךְ שְׁתֵּ֣י נָשִׁ֑ים שֵׁ֤ם הָֽאַחַת֙ עָדָ֔ה וְשֵׁ֥ם הַשֵּׁנִ֖ית צִלָּֽה׃ (כ) וַתֵּ֥לֶד עָדָ֖ה אֶת־יָבָ֑ל ה֣וּא הָיָ֔ה אֲבִ֕י יֹשֵׁ֥ב אֹ֖הֶל וּמִקְנֶֽה׃ (כא) וְשֵׁ֥ם אָחִ֖יו יוּבָ֑ל ה֣וּא הָיָ֔ה אֲבִ֕י כָּל־תֹּפֵ֥שׂ כִּנּ֖וֹר וְעוּגָֽב׃ (כב) וְצִלָּ֣ה גַם־הִ֗וא יָֽלְדָה֙ אֶת־תּ֣וּבַל קַ֔יִן לֹטֵ֕שׁ כָּל־חֹרֵ֥שׁ נְחֹ֖שֶׁת וּבַרְזֶ֑ל וַֽאֲח֥וֹת תּֽוּבַל־קַ֖יִן נַֽעֲמָֽה׃

(17) And Cain knew his wife; and she conceived, and bore Enoch; and he builded a city, and called the name of the city after the name of his son Enoch. (18) And unto Enoch was born Irad; and Irad begot Mehujael; and Mehujael begot Methushael; and Methushael begot Lamech. (19) And Lamech took unto him two wives; the name of one was Adah, and the name of the other Zillah. (20) And Adah bore Jabal; he was the father of such as dwell in tents and have cattle. (21) And his brother’s name was Jubal; he was the father of all such as handle the harp and pipe. (22) And Zillah, she also bore Tubal-cain, the forger of every cutting instrument of brass and iron; and the sister of Tubal-cain was Naamah.

Genesis 36:22

(22) And the children of Lotan were Hori and Hemam; and Lotan’s sister was Timna.

(כב) וַיִּהְי֥וּ בְנֵי־לוֹטָ֖ן חֹרִ֣י וְהֵימָ֑ם וַאֲח֥וֹת לוֹטָ֖ן תִּמְנָֽע׃

Sanhedrin 99b

Our rabbis taught: (Numbers 15:30) "But anyone who sins defiantly... [blasphemes God and must be cut off from the people of Israel.]" - this refers to Menasheh ben Chizkia, who explicated [Biblical] narratives blasphemously. He would say, "Did Moshe have nothing to write but, 'And Lotan's sister was Timna'?" ... Nevertheless, what is the purpose of [writing], "And Lotan's sister was Timna?" Timna was a royal princess, as it is written, "alluf [duke] Lotan", [and later it is written] "alluf [duke] Timna". "Alluf" means authority without a crown. She wanted to convert, so she went to Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, but they did not accept her. So she went and became a concubine to Eliphaz the son of Esau, saying, "Rather a maidservant to this nation than a noblewoman to another nation." From her Amalek descended, who afflicted Israel. Why so? Because they should not have pushed her away.

ת"ר (במדבר טו, ל) והנפש אשר תעשה ביד רמה זה מנשה בן חזקיה שהיה יושב ודורש בהגדות של דופי אמר וכי לא היה לו למשה לכתוב אלא (בראשית לו, כב) ואחות לוטן תמנע ... מיהת אחות לוטן תמנע מאי היא תמנע בת מלכים הואי דכתיב (בראשית לו, כט) אלוף לוטן אלוף תמנע וכל אלוף מלכותא בלא תאגא היא בעיא לאיגיורי באתה אצל אברהם יצחק ויעקב ולא קבלוה הלכה והיתה פילגש לאליפז בן עשו אמרה מוטב תהא שפחה לאומה זו ולא תהא גבירה לאומה אחרת נפק מינה עמלק דצערינהו לישראל מאי טעמא דלא איבעי להו לרחקה

Timna = hold back. Play on words. See also Prov. 3:27: אלַ־תִּמנְְְעַ־טוֹ֥ב מִבְְּעָלָי֑ו בִּהְְְֽיוֹ֨ת לְְאֵל֖ ידיך֣ לַֽעֲשֽׂוֹת

This can be read as "don't hold Timna back from the good as the master of it, to be for God. Your hand is capable of doing it!

Rambam, Introduction to Perek Chelek, Mishnah Sanhedrin

The 8th Principle: And this is that you believe that all of this Torah that was given by Moses our teacher, peace be upon him, that it is all from the mouth of God. Meaning that it was received by him entirely from God, which is described by the expression "spoken". And it is not known how Moses received it except by Moses himself, peace be upon him, that it came to him. That he was like a scribe that you read to him and he writes all that is told to him: all the events and dates, the stories, and all the commandments. Therefore he is called "The Engraver". There is no difference between “And the sons of Cham were Kush, and Mitzraim, and his wife was Mehatbe’el” and “Timnah was his concubine” and “I am Hashem your God” and “Hear Israel [God is your God, God is one]” for it was all given by God. And it is all God’s perfect Torah; pure, holy, and true. ... Each and every statement in the Torah is from God and it is full of wisdom (each statement) and wondrous to those who understand them. And its depth of knowledge is greater than all of the land and wider than all the seas... And similarly the explanation of the Torah was also received from God and this is what we use today to know the appearance and structure of the sukka and the lulav and the shofar, tzitzis, tefillin and their usage. And all this God said to Moses and Moses told to us.

היות התורה מן השמים. והוא שנאמין כי כל התורה הזאת הנתונה ע"י משה רבנו ע"ה, שהיא כולה מפי הגבורה. כלומר, שהגיעה אליו כולה מאת ה' יתברך, בעניין שנקרא על דרך השאלה "דיבור". ואין ידוע היאך הגיע, אלא היה משה ע"ה שהגיע לו, וכי הוא היה כמו סופר, שקוראים לו והוא כותב כל מאורעות הימים, הסיפורים והמצוות. ולפיכך נקרא "מחוקק". ואין הפרש בין "ובני חם כוש ומצרים" "ושם אשתו מהטבאל" "ותמנע היתה פלגש" ובין "אנכי ה' אלקיך" ו"שמע ישראל". כי הכל מפי הגבורה, והכל תורת ה' תמימה טהורה וקדושה אמת. ... אלא כל דיבור ודיבור מן התורה יש בהן חכמות ופלאים למי שמבין אותם ולא הושג תכלית חכמתם, ארוכה מארץ מדה ורחבה מני ים ... וכמו כן פירוש התורה המקובל ג"כ מפי הגבורה וזה שאנו עושים היום מתבנית הסוכה ולולב ושופר וציצית ותפילין וזולתם הוא בעצמו התבנית אשר אמר הש"י למשה והוא אמר לנו

Zohar, Behalotecha 152b

Says Rabbi Shimon: Woe to the man who says that the Torah came to merely relate stories and ordinary words. For if this was so, even in this present day we could make a Torah from ordinary tales; and ones probably nicer than those [in the scriptures]. If it came to present earthly matters, then even the [present] rulers of the world have among themselves works which are superior. If this is the case, let us follow their example and compose some sort of Torah of our own. Rather, the Torah contains in all its words supernal truths and sublime mysteries... The angels in descending on earth put on themselves earthly garments, as otherwise they could not stay in this world, nor could the world endure them. Now, if thus it is with the angels, how much more so must it be with the Torah-the Torah that created them, that created all the worlds and is the means by which these are sustained. Thus had the Torah not clothed herself in garments of this world the world could not endure it. The stories of the Torah are thus only her outer garments, and whoever looks upon that garment as being the Torah itself, woe to that man--such a one will have no portion in the next world.

ר"ש אמר ווי לההוא ב"נ דאמר דהא אורייתא אתא לאחזאה ספורין בעלמא ומלין דהדיוטי, דאי הכי אפילו בזמנא דא אנן יכלין למעבד אורייתא במלין דהדיוטי ובשבחא יתיר מכלהו אי לאחזאה מלה דעלמא אפילו אינון קפסירי דעלמא אית בינייהו מלין עלאין יתיר, אי הכי נזיל אבתרייהו ונעביד מנייהו אורייתא כהאי גוונא אלא כל מלין דאורייתא מלין עלאין אינון ורזין עלאין... בשעתא דנחתין לתתא (אף על גב דנחתין) מתלבשי בלבושא דהאי עלמא ואי לאו מתלבשי בלבושא כגוונא דהאי עלמא לא יכלין למיקם בהאי עלמא ולא סביל לון עלמא, ואי במלאכי כך אורייתא דברא להו וברא עלמין כלהו וקיימין בגינה עאכ"ו כיון דנחתת להאי עלמא אי לאו דמתלבשא בהני לבושין דהאי עלמא לא יכיל עלמא למסבל, ועל דא האי ספור דאורייתא לבושא דאורייתא איהו, מאן דחשיב דההוא לבושא איהו אורייתא ממש ולא מלה אחרא תיפח רוחיה ולא יהא ליה חולקא בעלמא.

Zohar, Emor 98b

It is written, (Joshua 24:3) "But I took your father Abraham from the land beyond the Euphrates..." This verse requires investigation! Did Israel not know this? All the more so Joshua! Rather, the Torah is completely hidden and revealed, like the name of the Holy One is hidden and revealed, for the Torah is completely the name of the Holy One.

וכתיב ואקח את אביכם את אברהם מעבר הנהר וגו', הני קראי אית לאסתכלא בהו וכי כל ישראל לא הוו ידעי דא וכ"ש יהושע אלא אורייתא כולה סתים וגלייא כמה דשמא קדישא סתים וגלייא בגין דאורייתא כולה שמא קדישא היא

Ramban, Introduction to the Book of Genesis

עוד יש בידינו קבלה של אמת, כי כל התורה כולה שמותיו של הקב"ה, שהתיבות מתחלקות לשמות בענין אחד. כאילו תחשוב על דרך משל, כי פסוק בראשית יתחלק לתיבות אחרות, כגון: בראש יתברא אלהים. וכל התורה כן, מלבד צירופיהן וגימטריותיהן של שמות. ... ומפני זה ספר תורה שטעה בו באות אחת, במלא או בחסר - פסול. כי זה הענין יחייב אותנו לפסול ס"ת שיחסר בו ו' אחד ממלות אותם שבאו מהם ל"ט מלאים בתורה, או שיכתוב הו' באחד משאר החסרים, וכן כיוצא בזה, אע"פ שאינו מעלה ולא מוריד כפי העולה במחשבה. וזה הענין שהביאו גדולי המקרא למנות כל מלא וכל חסר, וכל התורה והמקרא, ולחבר ספרים במסורת עד עזרא הסופר הנביא, שנשתדל בזה, כמו שדרשו מפסוק ויקראו בספר בתורת האלהים מפורש ושום שכל ויבינו במקרא. ונראה שהתורה הכתובה באש שחורה על גבי אש לבנה, בענין הזה שהזכרנו היה, שהיתה הכתיבה רצופה בלי הפסק תיבות, והיה אפשר בקריאתה שתקרא על דרך השמות, ותקרא על דרך קריאתנו בענין התורה והמצוה, ונתנה למשה רבינו על דרך קריאת המצות, ונמסר לו על פה קריאתה בשמות. וכן יכתבו השם הגדול שהזכרתי כולו רצוף, ויתחלק לתיבות של שלוש שלוש אותיות, ולחלוקים אחרים רבים, כפי השימוש לבעלי הקבלה.

We have yet another mystic tradition that the whole Torah is comprised of Names of the Holy One, blessed be He, and that the letters of the words separate themselves into Divine Names when divided in a different manner, as you may imagine by way of example that the verse of Bereshith divides itself into these other words: berosh yithbare Elokim. This principle applies likewise to the entire Torah, aside from the combinations and the numerical equivalents of the Holy Names. ... It is for this reason that a Scroll of the Torah in which a mistake has been made in one letter's being added or subtracted is disqualified [even though the literal meaning remains unchanged] , for this principle [that the whole Torah comprises Names of the Holy One, blessed be He], obligates us to disqualify a scroll of the Torah in which one letter vav is missing from the word "otam" - of which there are thirty-nine fully-spelled ones in the Torah - [despite the fact that the same word appears many times without a vav] , or if he [the Scribe] were to add a vav to any of the other deficient ones [that is, words which could be written with an additional vav but are not so written]. So it is in similar cases even though it matters not one way or another on cursory thought. It is this principle which has caused the Biblical scholars to count every full and defective word in the Torah and Scripture and to compose books on the Masoretic text, going back as far as Ezra the Scribe and Prophet, so that we should be heedful of this, as the Sages derived it from the verse, And they read in the book in the Law of G-d, distinctly; and they gave the sense, and caused them to understand the reading.

Guide for the Perplexed 3:50

There are also things that belong to the mysteries of the Torah which have caused many people to stumble. Accordingly they ought to be explained. These are the stories recounted in the Torah the telling of which is thought to be useless, as for instance the account of the branching out of tribes from Noah and of their names and dwelling places, likewise the sons of Seir, the Horite, and the account of the kings that reigned in the land of Edom and the like. You know the saying of [the Sages] that the impious Manasseh occupied his vile council with nothing but criticism of such passages. They say: He used to sit there and interpret Scripture by means qulasphemous haggadoth. Thus he said: Moses did not have to write: And the sister of Lotan was Timna, and so on. As for me I shall inform you of a general principle, and then I shall come back to the details as I did with regard to the reasons for the commandments. Know that all the stories that you will find mentioned in the Torah occur there for a necessary utility for the Law; either they give a correct notion of an opinion that is a pillar of the Law, or they rectify some action so that mutual wrongdoing and aggression should not occur between men. I shall set this forth to you in an orderly fashion. As it is a pillar of the Law that the world was produced in time, that at first a single individual of the human species, namely, Adam, was created, and that approximately two thousand five hundred years elapsed between Adam and Moses our Master, men, if they were given this information only, would rapidly have begun to have doubts in those times. For people were to be found scattered up to the ends of the whole earth; there were different tribes and different and very dissimilar languages. These doubts were put to an end through an exposition of the genealogy of all of them and of their branching by mentioning the names of the famous men among them-such and such, the son of such and such-and their ages and by giving the facts regarding their habitats and the reason that necessitated their being scattered up to the ends of the earth and their languages being different in spite of their having at first dwelt in one place and having had all of them one language, a fact that was a necessary consequence of their being the children of a single individual. ... The enumeration of the tribes of the children of Seir and of their individual genealogy is made with a view to one single commandment; for He, may He be exalted, has commanded exterminating only the seed of Amalek. Now Amaleq was the son of Eliphaz and Timna the sister of was Lotan. He did not command killing the other children of Esau... All this was an act of justice on the part of God lest a tribe be killed indiscriminately in the course of the extermination of another tribe. ... To sum up: Just as, according to what I have told you, the doctrines, of the Sabians are remote from us today, the chronicles of those times are likewise hidden from us today. Hence if we knew them and were cognizant of the events that happened in those days, we would know in detail the reasons of many things mentioned in the Torah. You should also understand that the status of things that are set down in writing is not the same as the status of happenings that one sees. For in happenings that one sees, there are particulars that bring about necessary consequences of great importance, which cannot be mentioned except in a prolix manner. Accordingly, when narrations concerning these happenings are considered, the individual who reflects thinks that such narrations are too long or repetitious. If, however, he had seen what is narrated, he would know the necessity of what is recounted. ... In a similar way whenever the cause for a story's being narrated is hidden from thee, there is a strong reason for that story. Apply to the whole matter the principle to which [the Sages] have drawn our attention: (Deuteronomy 32:47) "For it is no vain thing from you" - "And if it is vain, it is from you."

יש גם דברים שהם מסתרי תורה ורבים נכשלו בהם. לכן ראוי להבהירם. הם סיפורים אלה המסופרים בתורה, אשר חושבים שאין תועלת בהזכרתם, כגון שהוא מתאר את הסתעפות השבטים מנוח, שמותיהם ומקומותיהם; וכן בני שֹעיר החורי ותיאור המלכים אשר מלכו בארץ אֱדום וכיוצא באלה. ואתה יודע את דברם (של חז"ל) שמנשה הרשע היה ממלא את מועצתו השפלה בביקורת על המקומות האלה. הם אמרו: היה יושב ודורש בהגדות של דופי. היה אומר: לא היה לו למשה לכתוב: ואחות לוטן תמנע (בראשית ל"ו) וגו'. אני אודיעך כלל ואחרי-כן אחזור לפרט, כמו שעשׂיתי במתן טעמים למצוות. דע שלכל סיפור שאתה מוצא מוזכר בתורה יש תועלת הכרחית לתורה, או כדי לאמת דעה שהיא יסוד מיסודות התורה, או לתיקון מעשׂה מן המעשׂים, כדי שלא יארעו עֹשֶק ומעשׂי איבה הדדיים בין בני-אדם. ואני אערוך זאת לפניך. יסוד התורה הוא שהעולם מחודש, ושמה שנברא בראשונה הוא פרט אחד מן המין האנושי והוא אדם (הראשון). הזמן אשר חלף מני קדם מאדם (הראשון) ועד משה רבנו היה אלפיים וחמש מאות שנה בקירוב. לוּ הודיעו לבני-אדם רק את זאת, היו ממהרים אז להטיל ספקות, שכּן הם נמצאו מפוזרים בכל קצוות הארץ, בשבטים שונים, והלשונות שונות ורחוקות זו מזו מאוד. לאותה הטלת ספק הושׂם קץ בכך שהוזכרו היוחסין וההסתעפות של כולם, והוזכרו האנשים המפורסמים הללו, פלוני בן פלוני, וכמה זמן חיו, איפה התגוררו ומה היה הטעם לפיזורם בקצוות הארץ והטעם לַשּוֹנִי בלשונותיהם, אף- על-פי שראשיתם היתה במקום אחד ושׂפה אחת לכול, שכך התחייב מהיותם בני איש אחד. ... תיאור שבטי בני שֹעיר והיוחסין האישיים שלהם הם בגלל מצוָה אחת. כי הוא יתעלה ציווה לעקור מן השורש את זרע עמלק דווקא. ואין עמלק אלא בן אליפז מתמנע אחות לוטן. את יתר בני עֵשָׁו לא ציווה להרוג... כל זה צדק מן האל, כדי שלא ייהרג שבט אחד בקֶרֶב שבט אחר ... בסיכומו של דבר, כמו שציינתי לך שמנהגי הצאביה רחוקים מאתנו היום, כן תולדות אותם ימים נסתרות ממנו. אילו ידענו אותן וידענו אותם אירועים שאירעו בימים ההם, היה מתברר לנו לפרטיו הטעם להרבה ממה שנזכר בתורה. עליך להבין שלא הרי הלימוד מן הסיפורים הכתובים כהרי הלימוד מן המצבים הנראים-לעין, מפני שיש למצבים הנראים-לעין פרטים המחייבים תוצאות הכרחיות גדולות, שלא ניתן להזכירן או שהזכרתן תארך. לכן, כאשר מתבוננים בסיפורים אלה, יחשוב המתבונן שיש בסיפורים אלה אריכות-יתר או חזרות. לוּ היה עֵד למה שסוּפר, היה יודע שהדברים היו מוכרחים להיאמר... כן יש סיבה חשובה לכל פרשה שהטעם מדוע הוזכרה נסתר ממך. יַשֵּׂם בכל העניין הזה את העיקרון ש(החכמים) ז"ל הסבו אליו את תשׂומת-לבנו: כי לא דבר רֵק הוא מכּם ואם ריק הוא, מכּם הוא.

Shadal on Genesis 4:20

(א) ותלד עדה וגו': נ"ל שהזכיר הכתוב את האנשים האלה ממציאי קצת המלאכות, מפני שהיו האנשים האלה בימים ההם נעבדים כאלהים, ורצה הקב"ה להודיע לישראל כי אנשים היו, ומי אביהם.

It seems to me that Scripture mentioned these men who invented some of the trades because these men were worshiped as gods in those times, and God wanted to let Israel know that they were mere men, and to identify their parents.

Umberto Cassuto, From Adam to Noah, p188

The incorporation of the aforementioned biographical details in the genealogical data finds a parallel in the literary works of the kings, next to the names of the kings and their kingdoms and the length of the reigns, there occur here and there notes on their activities and occupations before they ascended the throne, and mostly these notes are very similar to those in our passage... "Etana, a shepherd, who to heaven ascended, the one who consolidated all lands." "King of Uruk, the one who built Uruk..." Similarly, in the theogony of the Canaanites, as presented to us by Philo Byblius, there are incorporated notes on the gods or demigods, who invented all kinds of valuable devices for the benefit of human life...

...There is undoubtedly some similarity between what is written here and what we are told by Philo Byblius. On the other hand, there is also a vital difference between them; indeed, the divergence is more important than the resemblance. In Philo's account and in the King List, the themes are relayed to mythological legends. But in the Torah, we find only ordinary human beings and there is no mythological element whatsoever. This is a great innovation introduced by the Torah: it discards the mythological tradition and opposes the blurring of the boundaries between the Godhead and mankind. It seeks to emphasize that human civilisation was of human origin.

Ruth Rabba 2:1

(1) Rabbi Simon, in the name of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, and Rabbi Chama the father of Rabbi Hoshea in the name of Rabbi [Yehudah]: Chronicles was only given for exegetical purposes.

(א) רבי סימון בשם רבי יהושע בן לוי ור' חמא אבוי דרבי הושע בשם רבי לא ניתן דברי הימים אלא להידרש.

Sanhedrin 106b

Mar the son of Ravina said to his son: “Regarding all of them (the individuals mentioned in Sanhedrin 10:1), do not try to expound (to place them in a more negative light), except in the case of Bilaam, where whatever you can find (against him), expound."

א"ל מר בריה דרבינא לבריה בכולהו לא תפיש למדרש לבר מבלעם הרשע דכמה דמשכחת ביה דרוש ביה