The Onkelos-Anthropomorphism Debate And Shadal’s Third Approach

The intended audience and motives of a translation are usually closely connected for any translation for the public. If the translation is accurate and consistent, one can attempt to discern the concerns of the translator through the choices made. Onkelos, the ancient translation of the Pentateuch, should not be an exception to this rule. Yet, it has continued to perplex interpreters of Onkelos as to how to understand the reasons for seeming inconsistencies in its translation, and Onkelos’ motives as a translator. In medieval rabbinic discourse (and to some extent, today’s rabbinic discourse), there is an even stronger need to detect Onkelos’ school of thought. Traditions of Onkelos’ origins place the translator in the same time-frame as important Talmudic rabbis and even interacting with them, making Onkelos an almost “Chazal-sanctioned” translation. Thus, the identification of Onkelos’ school of thought becomes most important to the rabbis as they equate Chazal with Onkelos’ translation.¹ One major rabbinic debate, the question of Onkelos’ purpose in the sometimes inconsistent anthropomorphic changes of the translation, represents an interesting example of this need.

Maimonides, in his Guide for the Perplexed (1:27), writes:

Onqelos the Proselyte was very perfect in the Hebrew and Syrian languages and directed his effort toward the abolition of the belief in God’s corporeality. Hence he interprets in accordance with its meaning every attribute that Scripture predicates of God and that might lead toward the belief incorporeality. Thus whenever he encounters one of the terms indicative of one of the kinds of motion, he makes motion to mean the manifestation and appearance of a created light, I mean the Indwelling or the action of providence. Thus he renders, [Exodus 19:11] The Lord will descend, by the words, The Lord will manifest Himself; [Exodus 19:20] And the Lord descended, by the words, And the Lord manifested Himself. He does not translate: And the Lord came down...This occurs continually in his interpretation.²

Maimonides, a Judeo-Aristotelian, read Onkelos as sharing a similar philosophical view as to God’s incorporeality. Similarly, as stated in Guide 1:48, Onkelos never translates “hearing” literally, but rather that the matter “reached” God.

Maimonides (Guide 1:27) does deal with one inconsistency, that of Genesis 46:4, I will descend with thee into Egypt, which is translated literally. He declares that it is unnecessary to protect against anthropomorphic mentionings occurring in dreams, as is the case here, because these are not “matters having existence.”³ Thus, he sees Onkelos as writing for both the wise and the masses, supporting the appropriate views for the learned, and removing incorrect views from the unlearned. He states this explicitly in Guide 1:36:

I do not consider as an infidel one who cannot demonstrate that the corporeality of God should be negated. But I do consider as an infidel one who does not believe in its negation; and this particularly in view of the existence of the interpretation of Onqelos and of Jonathan ben Uziel, may peace be upon both of them, who cause their readers to keep away as far as possible from the belief in the corporeality of God.⁴

Again, to Maimonides, a translation written to enforce and reinforce correct ideas about God, does not need to change the literal verse when people would not make the mistake of misunderstanding God’s incorporeality.

Nachmanides, in his commentary to Genesis 46:1, mounts a formidable argument against Maimonides interpretation of Onkelos. His objections can be distilled into five categories:

1. Cases where sometimes Onkelos translates an action of God literally, yet other times changes it from its literal meaning. For example, Maimonides spends much time praising Onkelos on his changes to the word “hearing”, yet “speaking”⁵ and “seeing”⁶ in reference to God have many cases where they are translated literally. Rather, Nachmanides posits, just as “hearing” can mean “understanding”, so do “seeing” can denote understanding, and Onkelos is consistent when the Pentateuch uses it to mean God’s discernment and when it doesn’t. Additionally, sometimes Onkelos will paraphrase God “passing over” something, as in Exodus 34:6, and other times will translate literally, such as Nachmanides’ version of Deuteronomy 31:3.
2. Cases where Onkelos translates a corporeal reference to God’s “body” literally, such as Exodus 31:18, without apparent fear of corporeality, such as Exodus 14:31 “the great hand”, or Deuteronomy 33:2, “at His right hand was a fiery law.” Additionally, Onkelos translates God “standing” literally.
3. Cases where sometimes Onkelos translates non-literally even for events occurring in dreams, contra Maimonides who says that dreams and visions are reasons for Onkelos translating literally.
4. Cases where there is no fear of corporeality, yet Onkelos changes it anyway to distance it from God. Nachmanides posits that “their secret meaning is known to the learned student [of the mystical law of the Torah].”
5. Cases where sometimes Onkelos translates the motion of God non-literally as the “Divine Presence”, and other times translates it literally. Again, Nachmanides posits that “All these subjects [...are not influenced by a fear of using terms denoting corporeality but rather by secrets] of the Cabala known to Onkelos…”

Some defenders of Maimonides found it necessary to bring him closer to the thought of Nachmanides to answer these questions. Rabbi Yom Tov ben Avraham Asevilli (1250-1330), known as the Ritva, was a follower of the school of Nachmanides, as a student of the Ra’ah, a student of Nachmanides himself. Even so, he composed a book, Sefer HaZikaron, in defense of Maimonides for most of the places where Nachmanides argues against him in his commentary on the Pentateuch.” Whereas Nachmanides states that the reason for seeming inconsistencies for the most part is because of Onkelos’ knowledge of Kabbalah, Ritva posits that Maimonides believed Onkelos had knowledge of the “Work of the Chariot”, Maaseh Merkava, and used it as part of his translation. This being so, Maimonides also writes in his introduction to the Guide that Maaseh Merkava should only be expressed by way of flashing hints (which is his solution to the Mishnaic dictum not to discuss this with students more than one at a time, and even then, only chapter headings), and this is the purpose of the confusing inconsistencies found in Onkelos. As he writes, “If he would have translated everything in one way and with a single intention, he would have revealed the secret, and in another way, he would have completely hidden it. It is better regarding secrets that they be revealed in one in one aspect, and hidden in another.”⁷

So then what is Onkelos’ intended audience? While Nachmanides thinks the intended audience of Onkelos includes the kabbalist will understand the true reasons for the different translations, for the Ritva’s Maimonides, it is the philosopher. Both might allow for the surface meaning to be intended for the masses as well. But, as I wrote above, Maimonides himself definitely believed Onkelos was for both the learned and the unlearned.

Enter Rabbi Samuel David Luzzatto (1800-1865), known by the acronym Shadal (which he called himself in his lifetime), an Italian mixture of traditional and “enlightened” Jew. He could be said to be “stuck” in this case. For he believed on the one side that Maimonides’ drawing on Aristotelian philosophy was incorrect and hurtful to Judaism, and on the other, kabbalistic mysticism was not authentic. In his commentary on the Torah to Exodus 20:2, he writes, “Thank God that we have been exempted from that philosophy that was in vogue in his days, which Maimonides was inclines towards too much, even if his intentions were good,"⁸ echoing the formula pronounced by a father at his son’s bar mitzvah for God having removing his son’s spiritual responsibility from him. This is in the context of disputing Maimonides enumeration of belief (specifically belief in God in this case) as part of the commandments. Shadal also wrote an essay in the periodical Kerem Hemed 3 (1838): 61–76, criticizing Maimonides concept of the soul for, among other things, being drawn straight from Aristotelian philosophy. He discontinued his friendship with Rabbi Solomon Judah Rapoport partly because of that essay. He wrote a book on Jewish belief called “Yesodei HaTorah”, an obvious attempt at replacing Maimonides’ “Yesodei HaTorah”. In these ways and many more, Shadal is considered an “anti-Maimonidean”.⁹ He was also against kabbalistic mysticism, penning a pamphlet while still unmarried at 28, pointedly titling “Vikuach al Chochmat HaKabbalah”.¹⁰

So what was Shadal to do in writing a book about Onkelos? After all, he called it “Ohev Ger”, his love for Onkelos starting when he first discovered a rare manuscript of Onkelos at 13. He could never allow Onkelos to be an Aristotelian, nor a secret kabbalist. Instead, he discerned a third approach. This is almost at the very beginning, after he declares that most will not accept this truth he will now lay out:

The Targum was not made for the scholar, but for the layman. The main intention of Onkelos in his translation was to remove all stumbling blocks from before the masses, and from before the converts, so that their listening to the recitation of the Torah would be beneficial to them, and not damaging, God forbid. And without it, shallow-minded people would be able to find something in the holy Torah that is loathsome to them, and they will not ponder it in their shallow minds; they will cause an iniquitous stumbling block in whichever way it will be [interpreted], or they’ll cause the honor of the Torah to be insignificant in their eyes, allowing scornful people a context in which to mock it, God forbid. It was also for the gentiles, so that it won’t be distant to them, if their hearts lift them to come to take refuge under the wings of the Shechinah. Along with that, it was also to prevent the nation from being an object of mockery and scorn in the eyes of the gentiles, if they find things in our Torah and in the narratives of our forefathers that are not honorable and glorious in their eyes.

So, there are three audiences in mind. One is the unlearned masses and converts, who need a translation that will not take away from the glory and majesty of the biblical characters, including God. Two is those who seek to mock Judaism, to lessen their ability to do so by protecting the biblical characters. And third are for the gentiles (quite an extraordinary claim that an analysis of exceeds the scope of this paper), which is also to protect Jews from mockery as well as to make the stories acceptable so that it won’t make gentiles run away from converting because of the strange stories.

His book is made up of 32 “paths”¹¹ to understanding Onkelos’ changes in translation, along with numerous examples for each category. His third path is:

“...when Onkelos changes the words out of concern for God’s honor, removing any mention of imagery with regards to Him, and any actions [by Him] or actions toward Him, which have the effect of lessening God’s honor in the hearts of the masses… Onkelos did not flee from any mention of anthropomorphism, unless it was the kind that would cause people to view God with less respect. Even though the figure of speech of ‘the finger of God’ is anthropomorphic, it stays well with those who hear it. Instead of being damaging, it is actually beneficial, to raise up the glory of the Torah… Nachmanides, already, occupied himself with Maimonides’ opinion that Onkelos tried to remove all physicality in regards to God... [Shadal proceeds to list a dozen verses that could be brought for Onkelos’ literal translations of God’s anthropomorphism]… While Nachmanides answered for Onkelos by way of sod [kabbalah], we can go according to what we have said very simply, we do not have to veer right or left, we can just say that Onkelos did not feel the necessity to change the language of Scripture when these figures of speech only enhance and elevate the glory of God in His abilities and providence, and do not lower His glory, God forbid, in the eyes of the masses.”

Shadal certainly has an interesting theory, but does it hold up to the inconsistent verses? It is difficult to imagine why (Exodus 19:11), “The Lord will descend,” takes away from the glory of God so much so that Onkelos translates it as, “The Lord will manifest Himself,” yet His promise to Jacob, (Genesis 46:4), “I will descend with you,” did not, and is therefore translated literally. The explanation is insufficient to explain every detail. Presumably, it takes a great deal of subjectivity to determine if something would “take away from the glory of God for the masses”, and that is the weakness of this approach.¹²

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1 Some academics, in contrast, place Onkelos squarely outside of Pharasaic theology. Daniel Boyarin, for example, in Border Lines: The Partition of Judeo-Christianity (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press) 112-127, argues that Onkelos’ frequent use of “memra” - “the word”, is evidence of the “pararabbinic” doctrine of Logos theology, which has a major place in early Christian thought (as seen in the Prologue to the Gospel of John), but is also found in the Jewish Platonist Philo as well. Boyarin’s argument, as he states explicitly, relies on the presumption that the people of the synagogues had vastly different beliefs than the rabbinic elite of the time. Other scholars, such as Avigdor Shinan (“Live Translation: On the Nature of the Aramaic Targums to the Pentateuch,” Prooftexts 3 (1983) 44), argue that Onkelos and the targumim represent a version of rabbinic thought that was engineered so as to be easily understood to the layman. These will be interesting in comparison to Shadal’s view which will be analyzed.

2 Translation Pines ed. Vol 1 pg 57

3 Ibid. 58. This fits into Maimonides’ understanding of angels. To Maimonides, any mentioning of angels taking on form in the Bible necessarily occurring in dreams, since angels cannot take on form in existence. Even though angels cannot be physical, he says, the Bible makes it seems so because they occur in dreams, and one can understand that something that is not actually happening can be talked about this way. This concept, too, is debated by Nachmanides on Genesis 18:1, and one cannot help but wonder if they are connected concepts.

4 Both Arthur Hyman in “Maimonides as an Exegete” and David Shatz in “The Biblical and Rabbinic Background to Medieval Jewish Philosophy,” connect this declaration with Maimonides’ categorization of anthropomorphists as heretics in Mishneh Torah, Laws of Repentance 3:7. Hyman sees this as a “response” to the opinion as expressed in the gloss of Abraham ben David (the Raabad) on that statement: “People greater and better than he have followed this opinion, based on what they saw in scriptural texts and in the words of the Aggadah, which corrupt opinions.” To Maimonides, the existence of the Targumim such as Onkelos negate that allowance, because people could trust the Targumim. Nachmanides’ disagreeance, as we shall examine soon, would also have an impact in this area as to how to categorize an anthropomorphist, since to him, people do not have the Targumists to rely on for correct philosophical opinions.

5 In the Guide 1:65, Maimonides might have provided reasons for this exception. “Now in all cases in which the words saying and speaking are applied to God… they are used to denote either will or volition...The terms in question never signify that He, may He be exalted, spoke using the sounds of letters and a voice...As regards volition and will being denoted by the word saying and speaking… [this is] because these words are equivocal...They are used by way of likening Him to us. For...man cannot understand at first how, where there is a will that a thing be done, that thing should be done by the mere will alone.” In other words, “saying” does not indicate actual verbal speech, and even were Onkelos to change the phrase to be “God wished” or some other phrase such as that, it would still be just as confusing to people in terms of what caused what. When speaking to prophets, however, Maimonides explains that God’s “speech” is meant to signify that a prophet understands His will, not that they produced the thought themselves. Since these occur in people or the world, and not in God, it is unnecessary to change them. See also Guide 1:21.

6 In Guide 1:48, Maimonides chalks up some of these exceptions to scribal errors.

7 http://www.hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=40011&st=&pgnum=43&hilite=

8 וברוך המקום שפטרנו מאותה פילוסופיאה שגברה בימיו אשר נטה אחריה הרמב"ם יותר מן הראוי גם כי לטובה היתה כוונתו. Shadal explained what he means by those last few words “his intentions were for good” in the Vikuach, that medieval sages only became interested in philosophy because people were leaving Judaism in the pursuit of it. As a stop-measure, the rabbis such as Maimonides wrote reconciliations of the two studies. Interestingly, Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook would write something very similar only a generation or two later, in L’Nevuchei HaDor chapter 2 (recently published by Yediot Acharonot), where he also claimed that it was the responsibility of the rabbis in our own generation to follow the strategy of the medieval scholars who saw their youth following after non-Jewish studies, and write new books reconciling the new ideas in his own times. Edit: I thought this was revlatory, but now I see in Nachmanides' letter to the French rabbis disagreeing with their protests of Maimonides, he claims that Maimonides saw people leaving the path for philosophy and science, and that is why he wrote his books. Although I have heard this many times about Maimonides' motivations, it seems from his introduction to the Guide that he explicitly was writing his book for those well versed both in Torah and the sciences, studiously learning and keeping the Torah, while having access to the outside world, without explanations for all the contradictions they found.

9 See also his letter to Almeda about Jewish beliefs for more relevant information about this, http://www.hakirah.org/Vol%2010%20Klein.pdf

10 A choice quote, “The haughtiness of Yerovam drove him out of the world, and the haughtiness of the kabbalists causes them to choose to deny God, and to say that God is not God, and that Ein Sof is not Ein Sof, in a way that they have no God anymore at all, rather than admitting that there is dispute between their sages, something with is clear like the sun at noon.” Translated here http://parsha.blogspot.com/2008/05/authenticity-of-kabbalah-pt-xxxii.html

11 “Netivot”, which may be a reference, or even a parody, of the 32 netivot mentioned in Sefer Yetzira.

12 An interesting note: In his flight from Maimonides, Shadal still agrees with one of his premises: Onkelos intended to protect people from erroneous understandings of Scripture. Nachmanides is properly disagreeing; there is nothing similar about their approaches. Another approach, as seen in Maharal Tiferet Yisrael 33, is that it cannot be that the verse as translated literally would be made in a way to cause man to have erroneous ideas. Rather, when a verse mentions God “going down”, it means that that is literally how Israel experienced it, and the Torah speaks from the perspective of man’s experience of events (see Rav Kook on the creation story, as well). Why, then, did Onkelos differ? Because, while the Torah can speak however it would like in its references to God, Onkelos felt a need to be more respectful than that. Since I have looked at this inside, it remains to be seen how he deals with exceptions.

Shot Analysis of a Scene from Hitchcock's Rear Window

Confrontation and Defenestration: A Shot Analysis of Hitchcock's Rear Window

The 1954 Alfred Hitchcock film Rear Window tells the story L.B Jeffries (played by James Stewart) who, after breaking his leg on the job as a photographer, must entertain himself while holed up in his apartment by looking out his window into the lives of others. An observer (at least for most of the movie), his life is not affected by the lives of the others he watches. Only at the end, when the world of his window and that of the other windows collide, does he become involved in the story unfolding, and his life even becomes endangered. We reach the climax of the film when he is confronted by the suspected murderer, Lars Thorwald (played by Raymond Burr), who, quite literally, pushes Jeffries out of his own window into the world of everyone else. It pays to give attention to the build-up to this climax, the confrontation itself. There are several shots here which symbolize Jeffries’ transfer from observer to participant, and every detail is related to that transfer.

In the previous scene, Thorwald looks into Jeffries’ window and see Jeffries, a reversal from most of the film. Frightened, Jeffries asks his detective friend, Tom Doyle (Wendell Corey), to come and see the evidence he has, and to hurry. Jeffries looks back at Thorwald’s apartment, but it is dark. He can’t see inside. He gets another call, thinking it’s Doyle, says that he thinks Thorwald has left his apartment, but no one is on the other end. Jeffries realizes that the phone call is from Thorwald, who now knows where he is and that he knows about Thorwald. We wait in anticipation as we hear the thump-thump of Thorwald’s walk up the steps to Jeffries’ apartment. Jeffries struggles to find a spot to hide, but is restricted by his cast. He waits by the window, his only weapon his camera and bulbs, something he only used previously in the film to view through, but not to use to photograph. Now his tool for voyeurism will be his tool of involvement. The light is turned off in the hallway. Thorwald appears at the door.

Everything in this scene is a study in opposites. Thorwald stands at the door, his body slightly left of center in the frame, the closed, dark door on his left. We can only see his legs in the light, emphasizing his mobility. We see just a bit of his shoulders, emphasizing his massive frame and his ability to easily crush Jeffries. This is why he takes up so much of the frame. The shot is from Jeffries’ perspective, at the window looking up at the monster at the door. Contrast this to the shot of Jeffries from Thorwald’s perspective from the door. Jeffries sits at the window, his body slightly right of center in the frame, the open, moon-lit window on his left. We can only see his legs in the light, emphasizing his lack of mobility. We see a slight glint of light from his camera, right in the center of the frame. It is his only hope. The shot is from Thorwald’s perspective at the door, looking down at the much smaller Jeffries, who does not take up the frame at all. We, the audience, anticipate a murder about to take place, because the compositions of these two shots are so unbalanced. Lighting is unbalanced, as are the characters in them.

Thorwald stands apart from the door, indicating he is now in the apartment, while Jeffries sits in the area of the frame with the window, foreshadowing his defenestration. His position at the window indicates his wish to remain an observer. However, his back is now to the window, his face to his door. As indicated previously, his camera no longer takes on the role of viewer, but of action. This is reminiscent of the opening scene, when we find out how he got his cast. “I got myself half-killed for ya,” he says to his editor, Gotteson, on the phone, while watching the other people. “And you reward me by stealing my assignments.” The editor protests, “I didn’t ask you to stand in the middle of that racetrack.” Jeffries responds, “You asked for something dramatically different. You got it.” The editor says back, “So did you,” referring to his cast and confinement to his apartment. A bit later, Jeffries says, “If you don’t pull me out of this swamp of boredom, I’m going to do something drastic.” “Like what,” asks Gotteson, as the shot shows Jeffries beginning to view the unhappily married Thorwalds. Jeffries responds by talking about marriage, something he talks about with disdain. The foreshadow is there, indicating his drastic action will involve the Thorwalds. We see several things in that scene for sure, but principal among them is that he got a broken leg in the first place by getting involved with his camera in the middle of something dangerous, a racetrack. And he is about to get a second one by doing it again. This is why the camera takes a center position in the shot.

There is no music, only a howl of wind from the open window. Throughout the movie, music is playing, whether from the pianist or the radio. All of that audio ceases to exist, indicating that all others do not play a role in what happens within Jeffries’ window. Only when Jeffries is being pushed out his window, do all the other neighbors look out theirs. All audio is diagetic. These shots are cuts, which is supposed to be sudden and jarring. In both shots, the actors are still in their respective places, and the camera stays still because it is from their respective perspectives (say that five times fast).

For the shot we are looking at, there is no dialogue. Thorwald says nothing, and Jeffries says nothing. The silence emphasizes the lack of lighting. For Thorwald, the lighting (or lack thereof) is his friend - no one can see him from the other windows as he confronts Jeffries. For Jeffries, the lighting (or, once again, lack thereof) is his friend - his only defense is to momentarily stop Thorwald through the use of his camera flashes. No dialogue occurs as we realize that the scene operates and hangs on the lighting. Eventually, both will be thrown into the light as Thorwald lunges at Jeffries, pushing Jeffries out the window.

Works Cited

Rear Window. Dir. Alfred Hitchcock. Paramount, 1954.

Piskei teshuvot on Rebuking Chilonim

A surprising almost Kookian moment from Halacha Sefer Piskei Teshuvos, on rebuking the Chilonim (Shulchan Aruch 608:2):

מצוות תוכחה לחילונים שבימינו 

סﬠי' ב', רמ"א: ואם יודﬠ שאין דבריו נשמﬠים לא יאמר ברבים להוכיחם וכו' אבל ביחיד חייב להוכיחו ﬠד שיכנו או יקללנו. וﬠיין היטב במ"ב וביה"ל. והﬠולה למﬠשה לﬠנין החילונים שבימינו שבﬠוה"ר מופקרים לגמרי ר"ל מﬠול תורה מצוות, ואף שﬠושים לתיאבון וכתינוקות שנשבו, והולכים לביהכ"נ בימים הנוראים וכדו' מחמת הרגילות בזה, מ"מ ﬠוברים ﬠל כל התורה כולה, וממש לשחוק בﬠיניהם אם יאמר לו ﬠל דבר אחד בחן ובתחנונים למה תﬠשה כך. וﬠ"ז אמר הכתוב אל תוכח לץ וכו, ופטורים מלהוכיחם ﬠל חילול שבת שﬠושים כנסיﬠה במכונית וכיוצ"ב ﬠד שיראה בהם קצת נטיה ליהדות ﬠ"י שבאים לשאול כפﬠם בפﬠם ﬠל ההיתר וﬠל האסור ﬠ"י רוח טהרה שמתנוצץ בהם, כאשר יארﬠ כמה פﬠמים. אז יוכל לקיים מצוות תוכחה כמשמﬠותה.

The Commandment to Rebuke the Chilonim of Today 

Seif 2, Rama: If he knows his words will not be heeded, he should not rebuke them in public, but privately he is obligated to rebuke to the point that they strike him or curse him. 

And investigate well the Mishnah Berurah and Biur Halacha. 

And this becomes practical today regarding the chilonim of today who have completely cast off, God have mercy, the yoke of Torah and mitzvot. Even as they act as they desire and are like "children taken captive", they go to synagogue during the Days of Awe etc because they are used to doing so, nevertheless they transgress the whole Torah, and its actually a joke to them if someone would say a word to them nicely and pleadingly as to why they act this way. Scripture writes about this (Proverbs 9:8) "Do not rebuke a scorner..." We are exempt from rebuking them about the desecration of Shabbat when they travel by car and other things. That is, unless we see they lean a bit toward Judaism, when they come to ask once in a while about what is prohibited and what is permitted because of the pure spirit that sparks within them, which has happened many a time. Then one can fulfill the mitzvah of rebuke as is stated.

Shavuot and the Sin of Adam and Eve

Rosh HaShanah 16a:

תניא א"ר יהודה משום ר"ע...ומפני מה אמרה תורה הביאו שתי הלחם בעצרת מפני שעצרת זמן פירות האילן הוא אמר הקב"ה הביאו לפני שתי הלחם בעצרת כדי שיתברכו לכם פירות האילן

It was taught: Rabbi Yehudah said in the name of Rabbi Akiva: For what purpose did the Torah say to bring the two loaves on Shavuot? Because Shavuot is a time for the fruit of the trees. Says the Holy One, blessed be He, "Bring before Me the two loaves on Shavuot, so that for you will be blessed the fruits of the trees.

What is the connection between bringing bread, made of wheat, and representing the blessing of fruit? Many ask this question. For example, Maimonides in the commentary to Rosh Hashana attributed to him states:

ואם תשאל ומה ענין פירות האילן לשתי הלחם יש לומר שהשם דומה לפירות האילן שפירות האילן נקראו בכורים כדכתיב מראשית כל פרי האדמה ושתי הלחם נקראו בכורים כדכתיב חלות תהינה חמץ תאפנה בכורים להי כלומר הביאו בכורים כדי שיתברכו לכם בכורי הפירות.

Question: What do the fruits of trees have to do with the two loaves? Answer: The [name of the] two loaves is similar to the [name of the] fruits of the tree, for the fruits of the tree are called "bikkurim", as it says, "the first of all the fruits of the ground." And the two loaves are called "bikkurim", as it says, (Leviticus 23) "they shall be baked with leaven, for first-fruits unto the LORD." Meaning, bring these bikkurim so that you can be blessed with the bikkurim of fruit.

This might be pshat. However, Rashi:

שתי הלחם. ירצו על פירות האילן שהן מתירין להביא בכורים שאין מביאין בכורים קודם לעצרת דכתיב (שמות לד) בכורי קציר חטים ואני שמעתי דרבי יהודה לטעמיה דהא אזלא כמאן דאמר בסנהדרין (דף ע:) עץ שאכל אדם הראשון חטה היתה

[What does the two loaves have to do with fruits?] The two loaves: were offered for the fruits of the trees, for they permit people to start bringing their first fruits, for the first fruits were not brought before Shavuot, as it states [Exodus 34:22] "... first fruits of the wheat harvest." And I heard [an idea] that Rabbi Yehudah is going according to his reasoning, as the one who said in Sanhedrin 70b, "The tree that Adam HaRishon ate from was wheat."

I want to focus on the second answer. Rashi is evidently saying that at least according to Rabbi Yehudah, "wheat" can be considered a "fruit" in some senses to represent the blessing of fruit. How could wheat ever be considered a fruit? Some suggest that wheat grows in the same cycle as fruit, yearly. Others point to the midrashim indicating that wheat used to be huge fat trees of wheat, and making bread was easy. So the tree was a fruit.

[I'll just add the Abudraham in Tefilot Pesach has similar answers: ויש מקשים על הא דאמרינן הביאו לפני שתי הלחם בעצרת כדי שיתברכו לכם פירות שבאילן שכל אותן האחרים הוא הקרבן ממין המתברך אבל שתי הלחם אינם ממין אילן. ומתרצים כמאן דאמר (ברכות מ, א) חיטה מין אילן הוא. ואתיא נמי כמאן דאמר (שם) עץ שאכל ממנו אדם הראשון חטה היתה. ויש מתרצים תירוץ אחר כי שתי הלחם הם בכורים שעל שמם נקרא עצרת יום הבכורים ואמר הקב"ה הביאו לפני שתי הלחם הזה המין המובחר והטוב מכל מיני הצמחים לצורך חיי האדם כדי שיתברכו לכם שאר כל מיני האילן שהביאו מהם בכורים]

I'd like to suggest it refers specifically to the seeds in the spikelet of the wheat, a "fruit" of the wheat stalk. Looks like this:

The wheat seeds themselves look something like this:

It could be that wheat seed eating was common, and so no explanation was necessary for why wheat products could represent other fruits and nuts.

A book called Parperet HaTorah (not to be confused with Parperet LaTorah) found on Hebrewbooks points out that Rashi's answer is difficult. How can Rashi claim that Rabbi Yehudah is just being consistent in both Rosh HaShanah and Sanhedrin (and Berachot but not quoted here) when in Rosh HaShanah, he is quoting Rabbi Akiva? That would require placing Rabbi Yehudah's opinion of the definition of wheat onto Rabbi Akiva, something we ostensibly have no evidence for.

He finds a Tosafot Shabbat 66a that answers a question by saying that Rabbi Akiva holds the same thing that Rabbi Yehudah does about wheat as fruit:

ונראה בזה דגם ר“ע לשיטתו אזיל דהגמ‘ בשבת דף סו. מביאה משנה בכלים פי“ז מי“ז דתנן כוורת של קש ושפופרת של קנים רבי עקיבא מטמא ור‘ יוחנן בן נורי מטהר והקשו התוס‘ איך מטמא ר“ע הרי לא חזי לישיבה ולא מטמא מדרס, ולענין טמא מת הא לא כתיב בפרשה אלא כלי עץ ועור ובגד ושק ותירצו דקש נמי חשיב של עץ כדאמר פרי שאכל ממנו אדם הראשון חטה היה יעויי“ש בדבריהם, ומבואר שגם ר“ע ס“ל שעץ שאכל ממנו אדה“ר חטה היה, וא“כ גם ר“ע לשיטתו.

 It seems that Rabbi Akiva also hold like that opinion, as the Talmud Shabbat 66a brings a Mishnah from Kelim 17:17 that it was taught, "A straw mat or a tube of reeds, Rabbi Akiva declares capable of impurity, and Rabbi Yochanan ben Nuri declares incapable." Tosafot ask, how can Rabbi Akiva declare [straw] impure, it is not fit for sitting upon, an doesn't make unclean as a midrash, and for the impurity of the dead, the Torah only writes about wood, leather, cloth, baggage! They answer that straw is also considered wood, as it says, the fruit that Adam HaRishon ate from was the wheat, see their words there. It follows, then, that Rabbi Akiva also holds that the tree Adam HaRishon ate was wheat, so then Rabbi Akiva is going "leshitaso" [here as well].

There is another source that indicates a connection between the sin of Adam and Eve, and Shavuot. For example, Megillah 31b states:

תניא, רבי שמעון בן אלעזר אומר: עזרא תיקן להן לישראל שיהו קורין קללות שבתורת כהנים קודם עצרת, ושבמשנה תורה קודם ראש השנה. מאי טעמא? אמר אביי ואיתימא ריש לקיש: כדי שתכלה השנה וקללותיה. בשלמא שבמשנה תורה איכא כדי שתכלה שנה וקללותיה, אלא שבתורת כהנים, אטו עצרת ראש השנה היא? - אין, עצרת נמי ראש השנה היא, דתנן: ובעצרת על פירות האילן.

It has been taught: R`Simeon B`Eleazar says: Ezra made a regulation for Israel that they should read the curses in Leviticus before Shavuot and those in Deuteronomy before New Year. What is the reason? Abaye (or you may also say Resh Lakish) said: So that the year may end along with its curses. I grant you that in regard to the curses in Deuteronomy you can say, 'so that the year should end along with its curses'. But as regards those in Leviticus - is Shavuot a New Year? - Yes; Shavuot is also a New Year, as we have learnt: 'On Shavuot is the new year for [fruit of] the tree'.

Again we see that the sin with regard to the creation of the world, is connected to Shavuot's new year of the fruit of the tree.

The concept that Shavuot is somehow connected to Adam HaRishon and the sin of the tree is fascinating. That Shavuot represents the giving of the Torah is one thing, and that Adam's sin represents the giving of knowledge of good and evil is another. Does Torah-learning rectify this knowledge? What is this knowledge, after all?

This rabbi, Rabbi Lebhar, suggests that the process of counting the omer is a procession of man becoming civilized. He starts with the barley offering of the second day of Pesach, animal food, and ends 50 days later with wheat, which represents the pinnacle of human work - taking wheat, grinding it, cooking it. Before the sin, we could have just had the food. Now we have to work at it. We want to show that we are working on ourselves through Torah to become the best we can be as a human species. Nice derasha. Maybe.

Rav Tzadok on Bechukotai says similarly, but a bit differently, that we rue the fact that no longer can we devote all of our time to Torah and worship, but now have to work for our bread. We want to get back to a time when we didn't have to work:

  עזרא תיקן להם לישראל שיהיו קורין קללות שבתורת כהנים קודם עצרת וכו' כדי שתכלה שנה וקללותיה וכו' אלא שבתורת כהנים אטו בעצרת ראש השנה היא אין עצרת נמי ראש השנה היא דתנן בעצרת על פירות האילן (מגילה ל"א ב), וצריך להבין הא עיקר מאכל האדם הוא הלחם כמו שנאמר (דברים ח', ג') כי לא על הלחם לבדו יחיה האדם ובפסח העולם נידון על התבואה (ראש השנה ט"ז א) והיה לו לתקן שיקראו קודם פסח מהאי טעמא. ואם משום דלפי סדר הפרשיות מיקלע בחוקותי קודם עצרת ולא קודם פסח הא מלשון עזרא תיקן לא משמע שהוא מפני סדר הפרשיות, ובאמת לבני מערבא דמסקי אורייתא לתלת שנין כמו שאמרו במגילה (כ"ט ב) לא מיקלע בחוקותי קודם עצרת היה לו לעזרא לתקן שיקראו התוכחה קודם פסח. גם לפי מה שאמרו בגמרא (ראש השנה ז' ב) ט"ז בניסן ראש השנה לעומר ו' בסיון ראש השנה לשתי הלחם. והנה שתי הלחם הוא ראש השנה להתיר החדש במקדש אבל כבר הותר לאכילת הדיוט מט"ז בניסן מזמן הקרבת העומר ובמקדש לא שייך תכלה שנה וקללותיה. ויתכן יותר לתקן שיקראו קודם פסח שאז ראש השנה להתיר אכילת הדיוט מחדש, גם מה שתיקן עזרא שיקראו שבתורת כהנים קודם עצרת ושבמשנה תורה קודם ראש השנה ולא להיפוך בודאי יש שייכות לכל פרשה לזמנה.

  אך הענין שקודם הקלקול מאדם הראשון ניתן רק פרי העץ למאכל אדם וכמו שנאמר (בראשית ב', ח') ויטע גן בעדן ונטיעה היא באילנות אך אחר הקלקול ואכלת את עשב השדה רק כיון ששמע אדם הראשון הזיעו פניו ואמר מה אני נקשר לאבוס כבהמה אמר לו הקב"ה בזעת אפך תאכל לחם (בראשית רבה כ', י') והיינו שיהיה לו טורח לעשות מחטה לחם. וכמו שאמרו (ברכות נ"ח א) כמה יגיעות יגע אדם הראשון עד שמצא פת לאכול חרש וזרע וכו' אבל קודם הקלקול אף חטה היה מין אילן והיה גדל עליו גלוסקאות כמו שיהיה לעתיד (שבת ל' ב) ועתידה חטה שתתמר כדקל (כתובות קי"א ב) וכמו שמצינו שיש אילן שקמה המתקיים שש מאות שנה כמו שאמרו במדרש (תהלים צ') על מה שנאמר (ישעיה ס"ה, כ"ב) כימי העץ ימי עמי (ועיין בראשית רבה (י"ב, ו') אך שם מיירי לענין קומה כמו שפירש המתנות כהונה בשם פירוש רש"י) והאילנות שנטע הקב"ה בעצמו בגן עדן היה מתקיים לעולם ולא היה צריך שום נטיעה ועבודה. ואדם הראשון ניתן בגן עדן לעבדה ולשמרה לעבדה בפקודין דעשה ולשמרה בפקודין דלא תעשה (זוהר ח"א כ"ז. ותיקוני זוהר תיקון כ"א) ורק אחר הקלקול נאמר לו בזעת אפך תאכל לחם שיהיה נצרך לעבודה וטורח וכמה יגיעות יגע וכו', ובעצרת שהוא זמן מתן תורה דכתיב (תהלים פ"ב, ו') אני אמרתי אלהים אתם שיהיה התיקון כמו קודם החטא שלא יהיה מיתה (עבודה זרה ה' א) וכתיב (שמות י"ט, ו') ואתם תהיו לי ממלכת כהנים וגו' שאז לא היו ישראל רק פנוים לתורה ועבודה כמו קודם הקלקול, והיה מתבטל אז כל היצר הרע וקלקול הנחש וממילא מאכל אדם היה רק פירות האילן כמו שהיה קודם קלקול אדם הראשון, ורק אחר החטא חיבלתם מעשיכם אכן כאדם תמותון מכל מקום כשבא עצרת הוא הזמן בכל שנה לתקן הקלקול הראשון מאדם הראשון וכמו שהיה במתן תורה וזהו בעצרת על פירות האילן, וזה שאמרו בגמרא (ראש השנה ט"ז א) הביאו לפני שתי הלחם בעצרת כדי שיתברכו לכם פירות האילן ופירש רש"י דר' יהודה לטעמיה דאמר בסנהדרין (ע' ב) עץ שאכל אדם הראשון חטה היתה ולפי האמור מובן שבעצרת הזמן שיתברכו פירות האילן שיתוקן קלקול אדם הראשון ויהיה מאכל אדם פירות האילן וכמו שהיה קודם הקלקול: 

Perhaps its as simple as supposing that Torah is the elixir to the evil inclination that is in man because of the sin, as Kiddushin 30b states:

בראתי יצר הרע בראתי תורה תבלין כנגדו

I created the evil inclination, and I created Torah as the elixir against it

And indeed, in Kiddushin 21b states that:

לא דברה תורה אלא כנגד יצר הרע

The Torah only speaks in opposition to the evil inclination.

Indeed, Yerushalmi Rosh Hashana 4:8 records that Torah took away the sins of the people, as Rav Kitov points out:

ר' משרשיא בשם ר' אידי בכל הקרבנות כתיב חטא ובעצרת אין כתיב חטא אמר להן הקב"ה מכיון שקיבלתם עליכם עול תורה מעלה אני עליכם כאילו לא חטאתם מימיכם

But there may be another way. Maimonides, in Guide for the Perplexed 1:2, understands the story of the tree in a very interesting way:

Years ago a learned man propounded as a challenge to me a curious objection... This is what the objector said: It is manifest from the clear sense of the biblical text that the primary purpose with regard to man was that he should be, as the other animals are, devoid of intellect, of thought, and of the capacity to distinguish between good and evil. However, when he disobeyed, his disobedience procured him as its necessary consequence the great perfection peculiar to man... Now it is a thing to be wondered at that man’s punishment for his disobedience should consist in his being granted a perfection he did not possess before, namely, the intellect... 

[The answer:] For the intellect that God made overflow unto man and that is the latter’s ultimate perfection, was that which Adam had been provided with before he disobeyed. It was because of this that it was said of him that he was created in the image of God and in His likeness. It was likewise on account of it that he was addressed by God and given commandments, as it says: "And the Lord God commanded, and so on" (Genesis 2:16). For commandments are not given to beasts and beings devoid of intellect. Through the intellect one distinguishes between truth and falsehood, and that was found in Adam in its perfection and integrity. Good and bad, on the other hand, belong to the things generally accepted as known, not to those cognized by the intellect. For one does not say: it is good that heaven is spherical, and it is bad that the earth is flat; rather one says true and false with regard to these assertions... However, when he disobeyed and inclined toward his desires of the imagination and the pleasures of his corporeal senses, inasmuch as it is said: "That the tree was good for food and that it was a delight to the eyes" (Bereishit 3:6), he was punished by being deprived of that intellectual apprehension. He therefore disobeyed the commandment that was imposed upon him on account of his intellect and, becoming endowed with the faculty of apprehending generally accepted things, he became absorbed in judging things to be bad or good.

Truth and falsehood is innate, objective. Facts. Good and bad are externally contextual, subjective.

Good and bad, Maimonides says, is based on society. It is bad to be naked. It is good to be clothed. Nothing objectively wrong with nakedness, nothing objectively right with clothes. This was Adam and Eve's realization, and that's why their reaction is to be embarrassed and find clothes. They have now muddled their intellectual comprehension of facts, with emotional and societal pulls - conventions.

Perhaps the Torah represents an idealized knowledge of the world, that is unmuddled by the human experience. We want a day that we can return to this. We bring the two loaves, the wheat of good and bad, in hope of rectifying this mistaken attitude. We celebrate the Torah's giving, and learn much on that day(s) to rectify the muddling of truth.

I asked Rabbi Pesach Wolicki, this was his answer, in short:

Here's a short version: the different opinions re: what the fruit of the sin was are different opinions re: the fundamental cause of sin. Wheat represents human intellect and creativity. This is evident from a number of Gemaras (e.g. a child can only say Abba and Ima when he has tasted grain) Human intellect can and does cause great human problems - it is also the most exalted human characteristic - this is Torah. The shtei halechem represent the 2 luchot as well as Humanity as opposed to animals (maachal adam vs. maachal beheimah) Thus, the shtei halechem are the tikun of the cheit if we see the cheit as being a sin based in human thinking.

An esoteric reading of Ibn Ezra on Bechukotai

Ibn Ezra on Leviticus 26:13

וריקי מוח אמרו: כי הקללות רבות מהברכות ולא אמרו אמת, רק נאמרו הברכות כלל ונאמרו בקללות פרטים לירא ולהפחיד השומעים. והמסתכל היטב יתברר לו דברי.

"The empty of mind say that the curses are more numerous than the blessings, and they have not said the truth. Rather, the blessings were said in generalities, and the curses were said in detail to inspire fear in the listeners. And one who looks into this well will have clarity of my words."

Were I inclined to be an esoteric reader of Ibn Ezra, he's saying the entire blessings and curses were written later, when they were already in Israel, to scare them into keeping the law. That's of course not what he's saying.

Rosh Chodesh, the time for Torah

Bamidbar begins with

1. The Lord spoke to Moses in the Sinai Desert, in the Tent of Meeting on the first day of the second month, in the second year after the exodus from the land of Egypt, saying.

א. וַיְדַבֵּר יְהוָֹה אֶל משֶׁה בְּמִדְבַּר סִינַי בְּאֹהֶל מוֹעֵד בְּאֶחָד לַחֹדֶשׁ הַשֵּׁנִי בַּשָּׁנָה הַשֵּׁנִית לְצֵאתָם מֵאֶרֶץ מִצְרַיִם לֵאמֹר:

Ehrlich (page 252 of Mikra Kipshuto) points out that Rosh Chodesh is consistently the day that the prophet or leader would announce or inaugurate holy things. Sometimes they would be Torah things, and sometimes they would inaugurate a holy thing. Let's look at his other examples. We find out that just a month prior, the Mishkan was set up on Rosh Chodesh, Exodus 40:17

17. It came to pass in the first month, in the second year, on the first day of the month, that the Mishkan was set up.

יז. וַיְהִי בַּחֹדֶשׁ הָרִאשׁוֹן בַּשָּׁנָה הַשֵּׁנִית בְּאֶחָד לַחֹדֶשׁ הוּקַם הַמִּשְׁכָּן:

When Moses begins to speak to them again, the long speech that starts in Deuteronomy, it makes sure to tell us it was Rosh Chodesh, Deuteronomy 1:3

3. It came to pass in the fortieth year, in the eleventh month, on the first of the month, that Moses spoke to the children of Israel according to all that the Lord had commanded him regarding them;

ג. וַיְהִי בְּאַרְבָּעִים שָׁנָה בְּעַשְׁתֵּי עָשָׂר חֹדֶשׁ בְּאֶחָד לַחֹדֶשׁ דִּבֶּר משֶׁה אֶל בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל כְּכֹל אֲשֶׁר צִוָּה יְהֹוָה אֹתוֹ אֲלֵהֶם:

He points out that the four sayings of Ezekiel occurred on the first of the month (Ezekiel 26:1, 29:17, 31:1, 32:1):

1. It came to pass in the eleventh year on the first of the month, that the word of the Lord came to me, saying:

א. וַיְהִי בְּעַשְׁתֵּי עֶשְׂרֵה שָׁנָה בְּאֶחָד לַחֹדֶשׁ הָיָה דְבַר יְהֹוָה אֵלַי לֵאמֹר:

17. And it came to pass in the twenty-seventh year in the first [month], on the first of the month, the word of the Lord came to me, saying:

יז. וַיְהִי בְּעֶשְׂרִים וָשֶׁבַע שָׁנָה בָּרִאשׁוֹן בְּאֶחָד לַחֹדֶשׁ הָיָה דְבַר יְהֹוָה אֵלַי לֵאמֹר:

1. Now it came to pass in the eleventh year, in the third [month], on the first of the month, that the word of the Lord came to me, saying:

א. וַיְהִי בְּאַחַת עֶשְׂרֵה שָׁנָה בַּשְּׁלִישִׁי בְּאֶחָד לַחֹדֶשׁ הָיָה דְבַר יְהֹוָה אֵלַי לֵאמֹר:

1. Now it came to pass in the twelfth year, in the twelfth month, on the first of the month, that the word of the Lord came to me, saying:

א. וַיְהִי בִּשְׁתֵּי עֶשְׂרֵה שָׁנָה בִּשְׁנֵי עָשָׂר חֹדֶשׁ בְּאֶחָד לַחֹדֶשׁ הָיָה דְבַר יְהֹוָה אֵלַי לֵאמֹר:

The question the husband of the Shunemite woman asks strongly implies that Rosh Chodesh was a time to see the prophet (II Kings 4:23):

23. And he said, "Why are you going to him today; it is neither the New Moon nor the Sabbath." And she said, "It's all right."

כג. וַיֹּאמֶר מַדּוּעַ אַתְּ הֹלֶכֶת אֵלָיו הַיּוֹם לֹא חֹדֶשׁ וְלֹא שַׁבָּת וַתֹּאמֶר שָׁלוֹם:

I would also add when Ezra read the Book of Moses to the people, Nehemiah 8:2.

2. And Ezra the priest brought the Law before the congregation, both men and women, and all who could hear with understanding, on the first day of the seventh month.

ב. וַיָּבִיא עֶזְרָא הַכֹּהֵן אֶת הַתּוֹרָה לִפְנֵי הַקָּהָל מֵאִישׁ וְעַד אִשָּׁה וְכֹל מֵבִין לִשְׁמֹעַ בְּיוֹם אֶחָד לַחֹדֶשׁ הַשְּׁבִיעִי:

Ehrlich continues that it seems that it wasn't just to hear from the prophets, but also to start or inaugurate holy things as well. His examples are the example of Exodus 40:17 above, but also when the Levites came to sanctify the Temple in the days of Chizkiyahu (II Chronicles 29:17):

17. They commenced on the first of the first month to sanctify, and on the eighth day of the month they came to the vestibule of the Lord; and they sanctified the House of the Lord for eight days, and on the sixteenth day of the first month, they finished.

יז. וַיָּחֵלּוּ בְּאֶחָד לַחֹדֶשׁ הָרִאשׁוֹן לְקַדֵּשׁ וּבְיוֹם שְׁמוֹנָה לַחֹדֶשׁ בָּאוּ לְאוּלָם יְהֹוָה וַיְקַדְּשׁוּ אֶת בֵּית יְהֹוָה לְיָמִים שְׁמוֹנָה וּבְיוֹם שִׁשָּׁה עָשָׂר לַחֹדֶשׁ הָרִאשׁוֹן כִּלּוּ:

As well as Ezekiel's vision for the sanctification of the Temple (Ezekiel 45:18):

18. So says the Lord God: In the first month, on the first of the month, you shall take a young bull without blemish, and you shall purify the altar.

יח. כֹּה אָמַר אֲדֹנָי יֱהֹוִה בָּרִאשׁוֹן בְּאֶחָד לַחֹדֶשׁ תִּקַּח פַּר בֶּן בָּקָר תָּמִים וְחִטֵּאתָ אֶת הַמִּקְדָּשׁ:

And also when Ezra decided to bring people back to Jerusalem (Ezra 7:9):

9. For on the first of the first month was the commencement of the ascent from Babylon, and on the first of the fifth month, he arrived to Jerusalem according to the good hand of his God upon him.

ט. כִּי בְּאֶחָד לַחֹדֶשׁ הָרִאשׁוֹן הוּא יְסֻד הַמַּעֲלָה מִבָּבֶל וּבְאֶחָד לַחֹדֶשׁ הַחֲמִישִׁי בָּא אֶל יְרוּשָׁלִַם כְּיַד אֱלֹהָיו הַטּוֹבָה עָלָיו:

(I'm sure there are many examples of this. It could be that the first of the month is easy to right, it's kind of like rounding out the numbers and seems less random. But that would mean that if the Bible specifies the day something occurred that wasn't the first, it would be ultra-significant.)

This may be significant to how we view this piece of give-and-take when the Talmud Rosh Hashanah 3a finally comes to a concluding proof-verse for the new year of kings starting in the month of Nisan from Chronicles, which is probably the weakest place to find proofs.

אלא אמר ר"א מהכא ויחל לבנות בחדש השני בשני בשנת ארבע למלכותו מאי שני לאו שני לירח שמונין בו למלכותו מתקיף לה רבינא ואימא שני בחדש א"כ שני בחדש בהדיה הוה כתיב ביה ואימא בשני בשבת חדא דלא אשכחן שני בשבת דכתיב ועוד מקיש שני בתרא לשני קמא מה שני קמא חדש אף שני בתרא חדש

"Rather, Rabbi Eliezer says: From here: (II Chronicles 3:2) "He began building on the second month, in the second, in the fourth year of his reign..." What is "in the second"? It is surely the second month from which his reign is counted from [i.e. the second month after Nisan, Iyyar]!  

Ravina asked [a logic-based question]: "I'll say it is the second of the month!"  

If that were true, it should have said explicitly "the second of the month".  

"I'll say it is the second day of the week." 

Firstly, we don't ever find it written "second day of the week". And furthermore, we make an exegetical connection between the latter "second" to the former "second". Just like the former "second" refers to a month, so too the latter "second" refers to a month [in this case, since the rosh hashana of his reign].

If Ehrlich is correct, the real actual reason we can figure it does not refer to the day of a month, is because the beginning of holy things always begins on Rosh Chodesh. The reason, presumably, the Talmud does not say that is either, they never picked up on this "fact", or that they are really trying to prove from the verses alone when Rosh Hashana for kings really starts.

We find their affinity for straight verse proofs from their hava amina suggestion on 2b that perhaps Moses' speech in Deuteronomy preceded Aaron's death, even though Aaron's death in described many chapters earlier in Numbers. We could say that "ein mukdam" is assumed by the Talmud, but if its debatable amongst the rishonim, its difficult to assume that the Talmud takes a definite stand on it. Rather, I believe the Talmud is really just trying to find based on the verses itself the strongest possible proof. In the end, it needs to rely on a hekesh, which is not the best for what they're searching for, but it will do.

If you look at the Yerushalmi, it first states where it is from, Chronicles, and the hekesh, and then goes through some rigamarole, but it stands in stark contrast to the whole give and take of the Bavli. I used to say that halacha l'moshe misinai can be seen as a last resort something the rabbis were sure was quite ancient. Rabbi Herschel Schachter had said as much in a Q&A. Why would he say that? Because if you look for example at the gemara trying to source the various halachot of tefillin in the Bavli, it searches for verse after verse and ends up with halacha l'moshe misinai. So it seems like a giving up tactic. However, having see the Yerushalmi, I can suppose that it is simply the Bavli's style to look for verses first, describe really why it rejects them, before it arrives at the answer it knew all along.

How Far A Rashi Pashtan Must Go

In a previous post, I wrote about some adherents to the view that Rashi only ever comes to solve for pshat questions, no exceptions. As was rightly pointed out to me by Rav Herczeg in an email, I made it seem as if Nechama Leibowitz was an innovator of this method of analyzing Rashi, when in fact it preceded her by many generations, and this is the method of many meforshei Rashi. I have since corrected that, but it is definitely true that she popularized it. Anyway, I call such a commentary, a "Rashi Pashtan". If one examines the footnotes in the Artscroll Rashi, one can see the great deal of work Rav Herczeg put into answering many of the questions by using these meforshim to answer these questions.

Maskil L'David was such a Rashi Pashtan. His commentary to Rashi on Leviticus 19:18 is very instructive to us to show how sometimes commentaries have to go far afield to answer the questions on Rashi.

So let's see this Maskil L'David. But first, a reminder of the question:

Rashi writes:

You shall love your neighbor as yourself: Rabbi Akiva says: “This is a fundamental principle of the Torah.”

ואהבת לרעך כמוך: אמר רבי עקיבא זה כלל גדול בתורה:

 What pshat question is Rashi dealing with? Is there something wrong with the verse that this comment is correcting, and if so, how?

The Maskil L'David says something that is a chiddush on many levels. Not only for Rashi, but for the verse, and for Rabbi Akiva's statement as well.

He writes:

ואהבת ללעך כמוך: אמר ר״ע וכו׳ פירש״י בפ׳ במה מדליקין שכל המצות הנאמרות בתורה נכללו בזה דרעך זה הקדוש ברוך הוא דכתיב רעך ורע אביך אל תעזוב ואל תעבור על דבריו שהרי שנאוי לך שיעברו על דבריו ע״ש ולפי״ז מובן למה הוצרך רש״י להביא הרבר בשם בעליו לפי שבא לפ׳ דלרעך זה הקב״ה ואי לאו לאמרוה רז״ל לא הוה מפ' הכי מדדיה דלאו אורח ארעא אלא שרז״ל ברוח קדשם קבלו שזו כוונת הכתוב והיינו דאמר מה אמר רבי עקיבא זה כלל וכו׳ כלומר ואי לאו לאמרה ר״ע לא הוה אמינא לה

The Talmud Shabbat 31a has the famous differences between Shammai's method and Hillel's method. When a guy came to Shammai wanting the entire Torah on one foot, Shammai pushed him away with a ruler. Hillel told him,

דעלך סני לחברך לא תעביד זו היא כל התורה כולה ואידך פירושה הוא זיל גמור

That which is hateful to your friend you shall not do, that is the entire Torah, the rest is its commentary, go and learn.

Rashi writes on those words,

ריעך וריע אביך אל תעזוב (משלי כז) זה הקב"ה אל תעבור על דבריו שהרי עליך שנאוי שיעבור חבירך על דבריך ל"א חבירך ממש כגון גזלה גנבה ניאוף ורוב המצות: 

(Proverbs 27:10) "Your fellow and the fellow of your father do not forsake." That is God. Do not transgress his word, that it would be hateful to you for your fellow to trasgress your word. Alternatively, literally "your fellow", meaning [don't] steal, rob, have adultery, and most commandments.

Rashi is answering the question of why Hillel changed the phrase of the verse into a negative commandment, by giving two options of what he is saying. The second one we are familiar with, that he is paraphrasing the verse and makes it refer to negative commandments bein adam lechaveiro such as stealing. 

But the first one has Hillel saying that the entire Torah is not to transgress God's word!

The Maskil L'David thinks that's what Rashi is doing on our verse. He is quoting Rabbi Akiva to say that the verse is referring to God! You shall love God as yourself, and not violate his command because you would not want your friend to violate your command! And the reason why he felt the need to quote Rabbi Akiva in name is because had Chazal not said it, you would not have believed that was the meaning of the verse!