Wednesday, October 29, 2014

Can man be considered "Sinful Toward God" if he doesn't know God?

It's a simple question. Genesis 13:13 describes the reason for the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah as such:
יג  וְאַנְשֵׁי סְדֹם, רָעִים וְחַטָּאִים, לַיהוָה, מְאֹד.13 Now the people of Sodom were wicked and sinners against the LORD exceedingly.
But how can the people of Sodom sin against God, if they don't know God? Targum Onkelos provides an obvious answer:
וְאַנְשֵׁי סְדוֹם, בִּישִׁין בְּמָמוֹנְהוֹן וְחַיָּבִין בְּגִוְיָתְהוֹן, קֳדָם יְיָ, לַחְדָּא. 
And the people of Sodom, acted wrongly with their money, and were guilty with their bodies, before God, exceedingly.
That is, they sinned before God, not necessarily against God. Their acts were wicked, and God was not happy about this.

Targum Pseudo-Jonathan has a different approach. Going further than Onkelos in what their sins were, "against God" might either be interpreted as a description of how bad their sins were, or perhaps a description of yet another sin:
ואינשין דסדום בישין בממונהון דין לדין וחייבין בגופיהון בגילוי ערייתא ושדייות אדם זכי ופלחן פולחנא נכראה ומרדין לשמא דייי לחדא
And the people of Sodom, acted wrongly with their money in civil matters, and were guilty with their bodies regarding illicit sexual relations, and they shed innocent blood, and they prayed to foreign worship, and they rebelled against the name of God exceedingly.
I think, if they are to be blamed for "pulchana nichra'a", otherwise known as "avoda zara", it must mean they indeed did know God.

Targum Neofiti seems to combine the two:
ועמה דסדם בישין גבר לחבריה וחייבין בגילוי עריתה ובשפיכות אדמייה ובפלחנא נכרייה קדם ייי לחדה׃
The Peshitta is the closest to Onkelos, that is "before God", relevant word underlined:
ܘܐܢܫܐ ܕܣܕܘܡ ܒܝܫ̈ܝܢ ܘܚ̈ܛܝܝܢ ܛܒ ܩܕܡ ܡܪܝܐ/ܐܠܗܐ
 Rashi follows in the same way as Targum Pseudo-Jonathan, that they knew God and were rebelling against Him. They were probably getting it from the same midrash, Sifra, Bechukkothai 2. Rashi writes at the end of his comments to 13:13:
לה' מאוד - יודעים ריבונם ומתכוונים למרוד בו:
"Against God exceedingly" - They knew their master, and they intended to rebel against Him. 
 But we should keep in mind that "elohim" can also mean "powerful", as a description. I noted a few months ago that this was the approach of Shadal to Genesis 1:2 description of a divine spirit or wind. He comments:
ורוח אלהים מרחפת וגו': כתרגומו ורוחא מן קדם ה' מנשבא, ורוח אלהים ענינו רוח גדולה וחזקה. כמו כי רוח ה' נשבה בו (ישעיה מ' ז'), ישב רוחו יזלו מים (תהלים קמ"ז י"ח), נשפת ברוחך (שמות ט"ו י') וכמו הררי אל (תהלים ל"ו ז') ושלהבתיה (שיר השירים ח' ו').
"And the wind of God was blowing..." It is as its Aramaic translation, "A wind from before God was blowing..." 
"A wind of God" refers to a great and powerful wind. As in: "Because the spirit of God blows upon it." (Isaiah 40:7); "He causes His wind to blow, and the waters flow." (Psalms 147:18); "You blew with Your spirit...: (Exodus 15:10)
Similar to "mountains of God" (Psalms 36:7), or "flame of God." (Song of Songs 8:6)
I also noted how the Talmud Chagigah may have interpreted that verse the same way. Normally the verse would be read as God's spirit, some kind of mystical element, but the Talmud understands it as truly referring to wind. Chagigah 12a: "Wind and water [were created on the first day], as it says, "וְר֣וּחַ אֱלֹהִ֔ים מְרַחֶ֖פֶת עַל־פְּנֵ֥י הַמָּֽיִם". So what does it mean to be a "wind of God"? Must be a powerful  wind.

So too Shadal here. In dealing with the issue of how Sodom can be condemned for sinning against God if they don't know God, he agrees with how he sees the Baal HaTroup:
לה' מאד: נראה דעת בעל הטעמים כי לה' ענינו מאד (כמו עיר גדולה לאלהים יונה ג' ג') כי אנשי סדום לא ידעו את ה', ואיך יהיו חוטאים לה', ומכל מקום נ"ל כי ייתכן לומר שהיו חוטאים לה' גם אם לא ידעו שמו, כי היו עושים מעשים הרעים בעיניו...
 "Against God, exceedingly." It seems the accentuator understands "la-hashem" as referring to "exceedingly" (like "a great city to God" Jonah 3:3), for the people of Sodom didn't know God, so how could they sin against God? Still, I believe it possible that it could say that they were sinners against God even if they didn't know His name, as in they acted evilly in His eyes...
  

Tuesday, October 28, 2014

"And he said" = "And he planned"

We find this sentence in II Chronicles 1:18:

יח  וַיֹּאמֶר שְׁלֹמֹה, לִבְנוֹת בַּיִת לְשֵׁם יְהוָה, וּבַיִת, לְמַלְכוּתוֹ.18 Now Solomon purposed to build a house for the name of the LORD, and a house for his kingdom.
He never said this to anyone, thus he planned. Similarly in Numbers 14:10:

10The entire congregation threatened to pelt them with stones, but the glory of the Lord appeared in the Tent of Meeting to all the children of Israel. יוַיֹּאמְרוּ כָּל הָעֵדָה לִרְגּוֹם אֹתָם בָּאֲבָנִים וּכְבוֹד יְהֹוָה נִרְאָה בְּאֹהֶל מוֹעֵד אֶל כָּל בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל:

Perhaps we can understand this when it refers to God. We find that God speaks to no one in particular, in the entire Genesis story. Obvious examples include Genesis 1:3:
ג  וַיֹּאמֶר אֱלֹהִים, יְהִי אוֹר; וַיְהִי-אוֹר.3 And God said: 'Let there be light.' And there was light.
Which could be translated perhaps as an expression, a figure of speech - God planned for there to be light, and it was light. This would remove an anthropomorphic element to God without needing to resort to metaphor or "dibra lashon". Another example, Genesis 6:7:
ז  וַיֹּאמֶר יְהוָה, אֶמְחֶה אֶת-הָאָדָם אֲשֶׁר-בָּרָאתִי מֵעַל פְּנֵי הָאֲדָמָה, מֵאָדָם עַד-בְּהֵמָה, עַד-רֶמֶשׂ וְעַד-עוֹף הַשָּׁמָיִם:  כִּי נִחַמְתִּי, כִּי עֲשִׂיתִם.7 And the LORD said: 'I will blot out man whom I have created from the face of the earth; both man, and beast, and creeping thing, and fowl of the air; for it repenteth Me that I have made them.'
Ibn Ezra feels forced to give options for whom God spoke to, and he ends with something close to out opinion:
או אמירה למלאכים. ויש אומרים: לנח. והנכון בעיני: שהוא דבוק עם לבו הכתוב למעלה:
Either he said it to angels. And some say: To Noah. But the correct opinion to me: That he attached what was written above to His heart. 
 Ramban as well seems to agree with this type of conclusion, as he mentions on 6:6 about God getting sad "to his heart":
ועניין "אל לבו", כי לא הגיד זה לנביא שלוח אליהם
And regarding "to his heart", it means that he did not relate this to a prophet that was sent to them...
Shadal, however, rejects these approaches. On Genesis 6:3
ויאמר ה' : אין ספק שאמר זה לנביא, שיאמר אל העם, כדי שישובו, ודוגמת זה באברהם, ויאמר ה' זעקת סדום ועמורה כי רבה (למטה י"ח כ' י' ) אין ספק שאמר כן לאברהם, אעפ"י שלא פירש.
"And God said": There is no doubt this was said to a prophet, that he should relate it to the people to get them to repent, and this is similar regarding Abraham, that (Genesis 18:20) "And God said, The cries of Sodom and Gomorrah are great..." undoubtedly such was said to Abraham, though this wasn't explicit.
This is possible, and it is very interesting that Shadal tries to create a relationship between this and the Sodom and Gomorrah story. It seems more interesting to me to see Noah's failing to convince the people to repent (as in he didn't try, or not enough) as a contrast to Abraham's insistent trying and challenging God. With this interpretation, this seems to fall away.

However, with our interpretation, we can see both verses as referring simply to God's introduction to His plan.

Indeed, this may be the pshat that the Talmud is disagreeing with in Talmud Megilla (14b), where the verse in Esther, "Haman said in his heart" is proof of its divine inspiration (for how could it be known what he said in his heart?). But if it simply refers to the beginnings of his plan, it does not indicate this at all.

Friday, October 24, 2014

The Missing Macabbees And Other Mishna Considerations

When the editors of the Mishna, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi or whoever else, decided to compile the various sources that made up that massive work, they had to decide what went in and what stayed out. There has been a lot of literature about these decisions. Some of these decisions are very surprising. Why is there no mesechta devoted to Tefillin, Mezuzot, Sefer Torah, Gerut, Brit Milah, Chanukah? These are mesechtot that have many complex laws, and certainly deserve to be discussed. Yet, they are usually topics relegated to a random mishnah here, or there, and when discussed by the Talmud, are usually quoted through baraitot that weren't in the canonized Mishnah.

We also have to figure out why the topics were divided into 6 main sedarim of "Agriculture" "Festival" "Women" "Damages" "Holies" "Purities". Why 6?

We also must note that the order of the Mesechtot are also a mystery. Now, a given mesechta's chapter and topic orders may be random, and maybe they were not specifically ordered in one way or another, but surely the order of the mesechtot themselves should be expected to follow some order. Maimonides, in his introduction to the Mishnah, attempts to provide reasonable explanations as to this order, sometimes relying on explanations of related themes, orders of inquiry, and other such ad hoc explanations that could be explained the same way if it weren't the way it was now. For example, Maimonides explains why Gittin, divorce, precedes Kiddushin, marriage. Now, the old married man's joke goes that the Torah's way is to place the antidote before the poison, and Rav Feldman likes to talk seriously about how the gravity of divorce is important to realize before entering into marriage. The concept that the order of the mesechtot are there simply for lesson's sake, like Avot being in Nezikin to teach that middot are important and bad middot are damaging etc, is an interesting one but not serious. Maimonides here bases it off the verse, that in Deuteronomy 24:1, it describes divorce and gittin, and then in 24:2 it describes her marrying again.

Now Rav Reuven Margoliot in Yesod HaMishna V'Arichata disagrees with this approach, since the beginning of 24:1 also discribes marriage, so it's really Marriage-Divorce-Marriage, and it would therefore make more sense to have kiddushin befor gittin if we are basing it off of the verse there. For his part, he thinks that the order of the mesechtot are based simply off of chapter size. The problem he is forced to deal with is that many mesechtot don't follow this bigger-to-smaller plan, and he has to resolve these. So, he tries to prove that Sanhedrin and Makkot are really one mesechta, and obviously the Bavas are together.

The ones he cannot resolve he puts in their own category of random mesechtot, and he theorizes fascinatingly that Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi actually had 7 orders of the Mishnah. Why 7? Because it is Rabbi Yehudah who has the opinion that the 5 Books of Moses are actually 7 books of Moses, that the backward nuns surround "vayehi binsoa" are their own sefer. Thus, Rabbi Yehudah looked to the Torah as precedent for how many books he would have as well.

Rav Reuven's approach to what made it in to the Mishnah is also fascinating. He thinks that the Mishnah was, in addition to other things, motivated by political concerns. The Roman government was reasonably suspicious of this group of religious separtists who refused to join Roman society, to look like them, act like them, hold the same celebrations as them. The Roman rulers were understandably concerned for a possible fomenting rebellion. So, we find in many places in the Talmud, that laws were passed to prevent such religious activities. In order to show the Roman government that the things they learned and whispered in that queer Aramaic/Hebrew language in the Bet Midrash was not of rebellion, he published this Mishnah. So conversion would not be discussed, nor Milah, Tefillin, etc.

What we find with Maimonide's approach with the order of Gittin and Kiddushin, and Rav Reuven's approach with how many sedarim there were originally in the Mishnah, both imagine Rabbi Yehudah as looking to Scripture for precedent.

Taking that approach, we could simply say that the Torah itself has no laws about converts (other than perhaps to treat them well), so the Mishnah did not include them. The laws of tefillin, tzitzit, shechita, mezuzot, and so many other laws also were only mentioned, but never really explained what they are. In fact, the Talmud relies on Laws given to Moses at Sinai (orally) as a source for many of the aforementioned things. I wonder if this follows through with everything else, and I wonder if anyone else has mentioned this. What would come out from this is that Megillah is in the Mishnah because there is a book and several laws in Scripture, while this is not true for Chanukah, and therefore was not in the Mishna as well.

What if Scripture was sometimes set up by rabbis looking to the halachic system, sort of the other way around from what we have been discussing? Now I don't mean particular verses and how they're orders, but the order of the books, and what is included in the canon and what was kept out, could be because of halachic concerns. Not every time, but sometimes.

I have in mind at least two examples.

There is a discussion in Talmud Rosh Hashana whether the Megillat Taanit is no longer in effect or not. Now, Megillat Taanit listed holidays that were forbidden to fast and give eulogies on, as well as the day preceding it and after it.

The Talmud distinguishes between holidays that have their basis in Scripture (which are then compared to Torah holidays) and those that are purely rabbinic, that one can fast before or after Scripturally based holidays because they do not need the "chizuk" of a three day ban on fasting that rabbinic holidays do.

The Ran on the Rif there asks why we are allowed to fast on Taanit Esther, if it is before Purim, which is in Megillat Taanit, and rabbinic. He answers that since it has a basis in Scripture, it doesn't need the Chizuk.

This got me thinking that perhaps one of the reasons Megillat Esther was put into the canon was to allow for Tannit Esther to take place before it. Without the scriptural basis for the holiday, Taanit Esther would have ceased to exist. (The question remains how far back Taanit Esther goes and if it was always the day before Purim.)

The point being, that perhaps Megillat Esther was needed in the canon for a halachic reason/reasons, which was not true for Macabbees, which did not have a set fast before or after it.

Another example I was thinking of is that the Talmud Rosh Hashana's discussion of how we know that the count of Jewish kings begins in Nisan. After many supposedly solid proofs are thrown away, we are forced to go all the way to Chronicles for a proof. Perhaps that is why Chronicles is there?

Certainly, we find halachic concerns present for whether Ezekiel would be included in the canon, because many of his statements do not accord with the halacha, until they were able to resolve the seeming inconsistencies.

---

I had another thought about order of the Mishna. Again, my basic thought above is that the authors and editors of the Mishna were looking to the Torah as precedent for their style as well, and the rabbis editing the canon's inclusions and exclusions may have looked to Jewish law in general to make some of their determinations. In discussing this, I stayed away from specifics of each book's details, only how the composition may have gone as a whole.

But, if we want to know more about the Mishna's composition, we should look more into the style and format of the Torah as well.

The first thing to wonder is if there is any parallel, or connection, between the first chapter or chapters of Genesis and the first Mishna or Mesechet of Mishnah. Certainly the concept of Shema, a declaration of belief in God and His providence, goes hand in hand with the Creation story. But perhaps there is something more important going on here. It would seem that narrative, especially narrative that doesn't seem to give us any laws, is unnecessary to a book of laws, the Torah. Rashi's deals with this problem in relation to the land of Israel. However, there might be a much more immediate connection here. The Ramban believes that the first commandment, "Anochi Hashem", has a purpose in telling us why we should keep the rest of the commandments. It's like an introduction to why God has the authority to tell us what to do. Indeed, I think that that is what is happening in the Genesis story. The story establishes why the Torah has an authority over us as humans, and then later in the Exodus story as to why us as Jews. Meaning, Genesis helps establishe the Torah's laws as binding.

Perhaps that is also the set-up in the first Mishnah. Rabbi Yehudah picked a Mishnah that establishes the authority of the rabbis in their laws, the most fundamental reason the rabbis have any authority - to make sure people don't screw up in their religious observance. They created a fence for Shema - you must do it before midnight. Not because midnight is the cut-off point, but because of the human propensity to wait to the last minute and end up missing it.

Just like the Torah had to set up a Creation story that necessarily responded to prevalent theories of creation in order to refute them and establish the Torah's authority, the Mishna had to deal with sectarian beliefs as well, and so that first Mishna is responding to them.

This is a view of order-as-polemic.

A similar case can be made in relation to the first Mishna in Shabbat. The first Mishna deals with Hotzaa, carrying in public on the Sabbath, and many commentators deal with why this should be so, if it is actually the last in the list of 39 main ones later on in the mesechet. The majority deal with the concept of "melacha gerua", a "weak" melacha, and exactly what that means is also up to debate. It is meant to mean that it is an unusual melacha in its application, and therefore begins the mesechet. But there could be a different consideration here. The New Testament passages dealing with the keeping of the Sabbath deals with issues where it is hard to keep the Sabbath. For example, some hungry people can't eat on the Sabbath because they can't pick off grain to eat? They can't carry some grain from their silo to their house? Mark says "The Sabbath was made for man, not man for the Sabbath." This is indeed very different than the Pharisaic concept of the Sabbath.

It could be this was an issue that Rabbi Yehuda had to deal with. So he put a mishna in the beginning of Mesechet Shabbat that deals with carrying, specifically a case where a poor man and a rich man are interacting with the transfer of food on the Sabbath. EVEN THEN, the laws apply. However, even in the law there are some allowances, and these are discussed as well. This is very important to establish for the Pharasaic concept of the Sabbath.

Order-as-polemic might exist in the Mishna Torah of Maimonides as well. This will be discussed soon.



Monday, October 20, 2014

Some Derashot for Simchat Torah

In these next few minutes, I’d like to talk about something that should concern us all after the intense days of awe experienced only a week and a half ago: that is, what does it mean to be religious? To unpack this question, we will look at it through the prism of this holiday, Sukkot.

We must ask a simple question. In a day’s time, we will be dancing with the Torah, all together here in Shul, on Simchat Torah. What is the connection between Simchat Torah, and Sukkot? How can it be that on the day celebrating the historical giving of the Torah, Shavuot, where the Jewish people are described as standing at a mountain, one nation, one soul, in awe at the revelation, and on that night we mostly sit and learn, eat donuts and drink coffee all night, yet on the holiday of Sukkot, on the celebration of having sat in huts, we get up and dance? It should be the opposite! On a simple level, our celebration is the finishing of the reading of the Torah, the full five books of Moses, and starting anew. But I think there is something deeper here, a closer connection to the holiday we find ourselves in.

Another question, somewhat more complex. Tonight starts the day of Shemini Atzeret, the 8th day of Sukkot. The difficulty in understanding this day is manifold. Just looking at the Torah, there are three times in the Torah that the shalosh regalim, the three major holidays of Sukkot, Pesach, and Shavuot, are mentioned. In only one place is Shemini Atzeret, in Leviticus 23, described as another day of rest added on to Sukkot. In the rest, it isn’t mentioned at all. Does this holiday exist? This is a great mystery, a whodunnit. The case of the missing Shemini Atzeret. Is it part of Sukkot, or completely separate, a “regel bifnei atzmo”, a holiday unto itself? This ambiguous and ill-defined nature of the holiday is the cause of much debate, going back all the way to the Talmud (for example Sukkah 64b). The question dealt with there is whether one eats in the Sukkah on Shemini Atzeret or not. The conclusion of the Talmud there seems to be a compromise, almost like the Talmud isn’t willing to pick sides about this, that we do eat in the Sukkah, but do not make a blessing for performing the mitzva. This is the way most conclude, such as Maimonides, the great medieval halachist, and Rabbi Yosef Karo, the author of Shulchan Aruch. However, there is a stream of Judaism, particularly many chassidic sects, who do not eat at all in the Sukkah on Shemini Atzeret. We can’t help but feel this holiday lacks structure, halachic rigor, as if the Sukkah shimmers in and out of existence at every angle like a holographic image. What are we to make of this seemingly ill-defined holiday we find ourselves in?

So, 1) What is the connection between Simchat Torah and Sukkot, and 2) what are we to make of Shemini Atzeret?

Using an idea of Rav Kook, I think we can answer these questions.

Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook, the first Chief Rabbi of Palestine at the turn of the 20th century, was a dynamic and charismatic individual, and his writings span the gamut of Jewish literature. One of his works is a commentary on the aggada, the non-legal portions of the Talmud, called Ain Aya. In it, he uses the aggadas as jumping off points toward broad ideas about life, religion, and philosophy.

We find in Tractate Berachot 48a, an interesting aggada.

אמר רב נחמן קטן היודע למי מברכין מזמנין עליו
R. Nachman said: A boy [not yet 13] who knows “lemi mevorchin” to Whom we bless may be counted for zimmun.

According to this statement (although its interpretation is debated in later halachic literature), a boy before bar-mitzva age can participate in the blessing after meals involving bread, as long as he knows lemi mevorchin, who he is blessing, God.

The Talmud goes on to illustrate this with a seemingly strange story. Rabbah (with a heh) was the father of Abaye, and had adopted Rava. They’re all having family meal time, and Rabbah asks them a question: Lemi mevorchin, To whom are we blessing?

They reply as we would probably expect our children to reply: To God.

But Rabbah has a follow up question, a tough one. “And where does God abide?”

Their responses could not be more different.

Rava pointed to the roof; Abaye went outside and pointed to the sky. Rava - roof; Abaye -
sky.

Rabbah apparently was impressed with these answers. He says to them: Both of you will become great rabbis. This, he says, is the popular saying: “Botzin botzin me’katfei yadei” - Every pumpkin can be told from its stalk. He meant he could tell from these somehow amazing answers that they had the makings of great people.

How are we to understand this story?

Rav Kook, commenting on this, writes that humans have a natural yearning for the divine. But this yearning, this seeking, this feeling of something bigger and grander than ourselves, can take two very different paths. Some find God in definitions and measurements. They find structure in stricture. This personality can be called “the scientist”. The scientists looks at the physical world, clarifying the properties of everything, seeing how everything fits into categories and definitions. The same kind of person studies the Torah, create categories and examines its halachic system, and through that he cleaves to God.

For some people, however, seeking logic and definitions are not enough for them. They want to think ideas loftier than that, to imagine with a kind of higher sense. They don't limit themselves to specificity within definitions. They want to reach higher than what can be expressed, they want to speak in the language of feeling, the heart's language. They are the prophets and poets. Yet, somehow this rising up, says Rav Kook, also causes them to stay grounded. Through this lofty inner sense, they recognize that there's a need, an obligation towards the perfection of humanity. They come to realize that humanity's perfection comes through them upholding definite definitions, meaning the Torah's halacha. They realize that the only way to achieve this lofty ideal is through the anchor of the real world. This is why we find that the prophets of the Bible, instead of meditating as hermits on an island, are driven to improve the lot of man in this world, to fix that which has been broken in society and to mend the seemingly irreparable damage wrought by cruelty and injustice.

Says Rav Kook, Rava was asked whom we bless, and he answered according to his scientist personality. He was a person who found God in the details, whose inclination was towards diligence and industry in the confines of the particular. This manifested itself even in his youth, to find peace of mind in the shade of the tent, to use this to bring himself towards a higher purpose. He pointed to the ceiling, to definition, categories and limits, the comforts of logic and scientific rigor. That’s where God is. In the Halacha, the Torah.

But Abaye went outside. Abaye, the poet, though he was broad-minded, though his inner understanding reached higher than any confine, though it was against his inner nature to attempt to express an answer to a question like "Where does God abide?", he went outside and pointed to the heavens, pointed to somewhere vast, an endlessness.

He went outside. Pointed toward the vastness of the divine, yet his feet stayed firmly planted on the ground.

In the debates of Rava and Abaye, hundreds recorded in the Talmud, the halacha almost always accords with Rava, for Rava was a roof-man, he concentrated on the halacha and all its logic and categories. But Abaye was pulled toward the ineffable, he could not be considered the expert halachist in the sense Rava was.

There is a beautiful idea here, one that we should apply to ourselves when we seek out God, especially coming out of the days of Awe. For the last seven days, we have sat in a temporary hut outside. When we are asked, “Lemi mevorchin”, we can point to our Sukkah roofs, but we must realize that we are required to see the sky and stars through them, the vastness beyond our halachic mindsets. We realize the roofs of the sukkah are but temporary.

On Shemini Atzeret, we see this realized in full. Our sukkahs shimmer. Perhaps we sit in them, and perhaps we don’t. This doubt, this ambiguity, inspires us to reach beyond the logic and definition in our everyday lives. When we come back home, out of our Sukkot, on Simchat Torah, we should take this lesson with us. We celebrate the Torah, the halacha as religious Jews. But we also remember the lesson of the shimmering sukkah, the ambiguity and inability to express ourselves in the face of the Ein Sof, of eternity. Simchat Torah is there to remind us that by realizing there is an infinity beyond us we reach toward, we are pulled back to the present by realizing how much fixing of the world needs to take place. Sukkot is the perfect time to celebrate the Torah, to celebrate our connection to it, and its place in our community.

Through this, may we all strive to be the scientist and the poet, the religiously bound yet spiritually boundless, as we celebrate these last days of Sukkot together.

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Rabbinic nicknames are powerfully meaningful. Take for example, the rabbinic word for marriage, kiddushin. Every Jewish marriage has the groom saying to the bride under the wedding canopy, “Harei At Mikudeshet Li” - “Behold, you are betrothed to me.” Now, the Torah itself does not use this word, kiddushin, but uses a word related to acquiring - yikach, “ki yikach ish isha”, to show the seriousness and pledge of commitment like a business deal, a give and take, a promise of mutual responsibility for each other. But why did the rabbis change the name of marriage, from yikach, to kiddushin? Is there a broader meaning the rabbis were trying to bring to the fore?

The Talmud itself asks this question in the beginning of Tractate Kiddushin. What did the rabbis try to relate with this name switch? “D’Asar La Akulei Alma K’hedkdesh” - That she is like something holy, consecrated, forbidden to everyone except her husband. What powerful imagery! A husband must see his wife as a piece of the Holy Temple, belonging to that of God! Is it any wonder that the rabbis of the Talmud understood Solomon’s Song of Songs, which describes a wonderful relationship of love between a man and a woman, as being a metaphor for our relationship to God Almighty? Is it any wonder that the Talmud records Rabbi Akiva using using Temple names for that book, calling Song of Songs the “Holy of Holies”, the most innermost and sanctified place of the Temple? Is it any wonder that the Talmud Gittin 90b thinks of the imagery of the Temple when it says that when a divorce occurs, the altar of the Temple sheds a tear?

There is tremendous meaning in this rabbinic switch, this new nickname for marriage! The relationship between husband and wife goes from a business transaction (though that has meaning of its own), to a communion with something close to godliness! The Holy of Holies!

That is just one example. There is another example of this I would like to speak about concerning the holiday we have been celebrating for the last week, that of Sukkot. What is the name of Sukkot in the Torah? It’s easy to know, we have been saying it in our Yaaleh Vyavo prayer - “Chag HaSukkot”, and sometimes the Torah also calls it “Chag HaAsif”. Yet, the rabbis of the Talmud changed the name. When the Talmud refers to Sukkot, it calls it simply, “Chag” - celebration. As if this is the most quintessential example of a holiday. What were the rabbis trying to relate with this new nickname? What did they see in Sukkot that makes it the most fundamental form of celebration?

Perhaps if we look at the first mentionings of “chag” in the Torah, we can catch a glimpse of what the rabbis had in mind.

This is the scene. God tells Moses to go to Pharoah and to ask to Let My People Go. But it isn’t an outright request to be freed from slavery. Moses says in Exodus 5, So says God, Let my people go just for three days “vayachogu li bamidbar”, so that they may celebrate me in the desert. Pharaoh, for his part, asks “Who is this God?” And refuses to let them go. But this celebration mentioned by Moses remains a mystery. What is the nature of this planned celebration in the desert?

We find out the answer to this later in the story, when God promises to bring an eighth plague, a plague of locusts. The people of Egypt cry out to Pharaoh to just let the Israelites go, for Egypt is destroyed already. Pharaohs response is to ask Moses, so maybe I should let you guys go. But, he ask, who and what is going to go out there anyway, for your celebration? And in Exodus 10:9, Moses answers, “Binareinu u’v’zikneinu nelech”, our young and old will go, “ki chag hashem lanu” - for it is a celebration of God for us.

My grandfather, Rabbi Chaim Zev Bomzer, may the memory of the righteous be a blessing, notes that the phrase here is not that it is a celebration to God, but rather, “chag hashem”, God’s celebration. There is something in this verse that makes God happy, makes him celebrate, so to speak. What is it?

The answer, he says, is the phrase earlier in the verse, when the young and old come together, when they walk together. When the seemingly unbridgeable gap of generations is joined, when youths walk with their elders toward redemption - that is what makes God want to celebrate.

It was this thought that drove him to decry the existence of the “youth minyan”, youth programming for prayers, when the congregation is divided between the older members and the younger. Why, he asks, can’t prayer form an intergenerational bond? He saw this as a sad development. He envisioned the synagogue, and religious life, as a link between all. Needless to say, that message should still resonate with us.

The joke goes that an old synagogue in Cleveland had just gotten a new rabbi, and his first service at the shul was on Simchat Torah. Used to rowdiness by his congregations during Simchat Torah, he wasn’t terribly bothered that when the Shema prayer was said, half the congregants stood up and half remained sitting, and the half that was seated started yelling at those standing to sit down, and the ones standing yelled at the ones sitting to stand up. But when the same thing happened at services on the following Shabbat, he knew something was wrong.

The rabbi, educated as he was in the law and commentaries, didn't know what to do. He asked the president and board members about the shul’s tradition for the Shema, but they couldn’t answer. Then someone suggested that the rabbi consult one of the original founders of the shul, a 98-year-old man. The rabbi went to the man’s nursing home with a representative of each faction of the congregation.

The person representing those who stood during the Shema asked the old man, “Is it the tradition to stand during this prayer?”

“No, that is not the tradition.”

The one representing those who remained seated asked, “Is it the tradition to sit during Shema?”

“No, that is not the tradition.”

“But,” said the rabbi to the old man, “the congregants fight all the time, yelling at each other about whether.....”

The old man interrupted, exclaiming, “Yes, yes: THAT is the tradition!”

All these people here tonight, joining together for a celebration of Torah, that is our tradition.

Perhaps the tradition of togetherness was what the rabbis saw in Sukkot. It is a “chag ha’asif”, a festival of gathering, and although the Torah saw that as referring to an agricultural gathering, the holiday transformed even in rabbinic times to emphasize the ingathering of all people to the Temple, to celebrate the Simchat Beit Hashoeva, the water libations and the hopes for a good rainy season this year. We take the four very different species together, representing all the different types of Jews. We make our dwellings outside, so we can see our neighbors and say hi, so we can welcome the outside world in. Tonight, we will dance with the Torah, all together. All ages will be present, dancing and singing around the rock of our religious life, the Torah. We form a link, a circle, one youthful hand on the shoulder of those wise in age, and vice versa.

It is the quintessential chag, the true holiday experience, one that even makes God happy.

Let us walk together, young and old, toward redemption, and let us form a circle together when we dance together this Simchat Torah. And we should see the Messiah in our days, bimheira byameinu amen.

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The last chapter of Mishnayot Sukkah deals with the different “watches”, the “mishmarot” of the priestly class who would offer the sacrifices of that time in the Holy Temple for the Sukkot holiday. After detailing all the different mishmarot, we are told, the very last line of all of Mishnayot Sukkah, that there is one exception, the mishmar of “Bilga”, the family mishmar named after their father, Bilga. They are very different from the rest, in three main ways. Normally, each priestly family served in the Holy Temple for a week. At the end of the week, the incoming and outgoing families would divide the lechem hapanim (showbread) between themselves. Usually the incoming family would divide it in the north of the Temple courtyard, while the outgoing family would do so in the south. The Bilga family always had to divide their share of the lechem hapanim on the southern side. Additionally, each family had its own ring affixed to the floor, in which the head of the animal was enclosed to hold it down during slaughter. Each family also had their own cubbies for storage. The Bilga family’s ring and cubby were permanently closed, forcing them to borrow these needed items from the other priestly families; because of this, they suffered great embarrassment.

Why is this? The Talmud, at the very end of the entire Tractate Sukkah, gives an explanation (among others) of this mysterious statement in the Mishnah. There, it tells the terrible tale of Miriam, the daughter of Bilga the Kohen who, as soon as she saw that the Greco-Persians had overtaken the city of Jerusalem in the fall of the second Temple, immediately apostatized, and went and married one of the Greek commanders. Moreover, when the Greeks went in to desecrate the Temple, she went to the Altar, kicked it, and said, (and I quote), “Wolf! Wolf! For how long will you devour the money of Israel, and not protect them in their time of distress?”

When the sages saw this, says the Talmud, they penalized the entire mishmar group that they would forever have this threefold penalty of dividing in the south, having a set ring, and a locked cupboard.

A question that immediately comes to mind is how can an entire mishmar group, an entire family, be blamed for the sins of just one person? The Talmud is also concerned about this. The Talmud answers that this is a case of monkey see, monkey do, so to speak. She only did what she was taught at home. The line of the Talmud goes, “What a child says in the marketplace, it heard from its parents.” She left home, intermarried, and blasphemed God’s providence, because she heard her parents talk this way, and live this way. But, the Talmud objects, that only makes her parents culpable. Why is it that the entire mishmar is penalized? And it answers enigmatically, “Woe to a wicked person, woe to his neighbor. Joy to a righteous person and joy to his neighbor.”

How are we to understand this story? And why is it that Tractate Sukkah should end with this terrible story? Is it random, or is there a message to be derived from this? And do we not still feel the twinge of unfairness at an entire mishmar being punished randomly for this?

  1. The connection between Sukkot and Chanukah with the victory of the Hasmoneans (see II Maccabees 10)
  2. The fact that Sukkot is the most universlaistic of the holidays (70 sacrifices for the 70 nations, Neztiv in Bamidbar says that Solomon read Kohelet on Sukkot because it spoke to a worldwide human-religious problem - only uses the general word for God elohim, also the prayer for rain affects everyone). Since its univeralistic, we may be tempted to convert to complete cosmopolitans, people of the world, who can take in all cultures andhave no true central identity. We may think we can be Miriam, daughter of the kohen Bilga, who can marry a Greek and still go to the altar, still be concerned for Jewish problems even as we abandon it for another value system. The story is put here to remind us that Sukkot unites the Jews more than it should unite the world, and its important to hold onto our religion in the face of the nations.
  3. We learn an important lesson from the punishment. “Oy lerasha, oy leshcheno”. The entire mishmar gets punished for a bad egg or two. But more importantly, the gemara sees fit to end with the verse having nothing to do with the proof, “Tov letzaddik tov leshcheno.” Meharsha suggests the gemara simply wanted to end on a good note. But maybe the lesson, and why this is connected to sukkot, is that we go outside, to the world, and we can hear our friends next door. We are more influenced by them. When we join with good friends, we become better. The mishmar of bilga, having some bad roots in their culture, needed to be more influenced by the other mishmar. So their cupboards and rings were locked. They had to go to others for help, say hello, talk to them a bit. They had to divide in the south, as people were leaving, so that they may see them and socialize. If theproblem was bad influence among themselves, then the solution is to bring good influence in. This is a lesson of extreme importance for after the days of awe. Not only that, but the arba minim symbolize all types of jews. The only way to bring in others who are more estranged from Torah is to be better neighbors, good friends. The mishnah in pirkei avot states that Hillel said, Be like the followers of Aaron, lover of peace and pursuer of peace, and bring close people to Torah. The famous explanation of Aaron as a pursuer of peace comes from Pseudo Rashi on Avot, who says that Aaron would go to people who were fighting and tell them the other one wants to apologze. He’d get them together in a room and they would apologize to each other. However, it’s hard to imagine this would actually work in real life. It also doesn’t explain the last clause, “and bring people close to Torah.” I like the Rambam’s explanation more, that if he saw someone was falling away from Judaism and wasn’t doing well religiously, he would befriend him. When you have Aaron as your friend, you feel the guilt of disappointing your friends. It leads people back to Torah and mitzvot. It is significant that it is Aaron, THE kohen, who is the leader of this movement. He would befriend people who needed a good influence, who needed guidance and understanding, and that is what the sages wanted Bilga to do.

The Difference Between Lot and Noah

Rabbi Yehudah Henken wrote a book called New Interpretations on the Parsha a few years ago, and its aptly named because some of the interpretations are quite novel.

This week's parsha is particularly interesting. He asks how Noah can be described as a "tzaddik" - a righteous man, and yet toward the end of his story, he gets black out drunk and (according to some interpretations) allows himself to be molested by one of his sons. That doesn't sound like the actions of a tzaddik!

But, he writes, if we compare it to another story where another man gets drunk and gets molested, we can see a vast difference, and where true righteousness lies.

Lot and his daughters escape the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah, and take refuge together. His daughters, thinking they must repopulate the world, get their father drunk, twice, and get pregnant from him. Each time when he wakes up, the verses (19:33 and 19:35) emphasize that he was not aware of what occurred the night before.

Compare this to Noah when he woke up, (9:24) "When Noah awoke from his wine, he knew what his youngest son had done to him."

The righteous person is one who recognizes when he makes mistakes. It is the pseudo-righteous who act as if they are righteous individuals, but can't see their own faults.