Choni Hamagil Today

Taanit 23a:

One day he [Honi the Circle Drawer] was journeying on the road and he saw a man planting a carob tree; he asked him, How long does it take [for this tree] to bear fruit? The man replied: Seventy years. He then further asked him: Are you certain that you will live another seventy years? The man replied: I found [ready grown] carob trees in the world; as my forefathers planted these for me so I too plant these for my children. Honi sat down to have a meal and sleep overcame him. As he slept a rocky formation enclosed upon him which hid him from sight and he continued to sleep for seventy years. When he awoke he saw a man gathering the fruit of the carob tree and he asked him, Are you the man who planted the tree? The man replied: I am his grandson. Thereupon he exclaimed: It is clear that I slept for seventy years.

The Onkelos-Anthropomorphism Debate And Shadal’s Third Approach

The intended audience and motives of a translation are usually closely connected for any translation for the public. If the translation is accurate and consistent, one can attempt to discern the concerns of the translator through the choices made. Onkelos, the ancient translation of the Pentateuch, should not be an exception to this rule. Yet, it has continued to perplex interpreters of Onkelos as to how to understand the reasons for seeming inconsistencies in its translation, and Onkelos’ motives as a translator. In medieval rabbinic discourse (and to some extent, today’s rabbinic discourse), there is an even stronger need to detect Onkelos’ school of thought. Traditions of Onkelos’ origins place the translator in the same time-frame as important Talmudic rabbis and even interacting with them, making Onkelos an almost “Chazal-sanctioned” translation. Thus, the identification of Onkelos’ school of thought becomes most important to the rabbis as they equate Chazal with Onkelos’ translation.¹ One major rabbinic debate, the question of Onkelos’ purpose in the sometimes inconsistent anthropomorphic changes of the translation, represents an interesting example of this need.

Maimonides, in his Guide for the Perplexed (1:27), writes:

Onqelos the Proselyte was very perfect in the Hebrew and Syrian languages and directed his effort toward the abolition of the belief in God’s corporeality. Hence he interprets in accordance with its meaning every attribute that Scripture predicates of God and that might lead toward the belief incorporeality. Thus whenever he encounters one of the terms indicative of one of the kinds of motion, he makes motion to mean the manifestation and appearance of a created light, I mean the Indwelling or the action of providence. Thus he renders, [Exodus 19:11] The Lord will descend, by the words, The Lord will manifest Himself; [Exodus 19:20] And the Lord descended, by the words, And the Lord manifested Himself. He does not translate: And the Lord came down...This occurs continually in his interpretation.²

Maimonides, a Judeo-Aristotelian, read Onkelos as sharing a similar philosophical view as to God’s incorporeality. Similarly, as stated in Guide 1:48, Onkelos never translates “hearing” literally, but rather that the matter “reached” God.

Maimonides (Guide 1:27) does deal with one inconsistency, that of Genesis 46:4, I will descend with thee into Egypt, which is translated literally. He declares that it is unnecessary to protect against anthropomorphic mentionings occurring in dreams, as is the case here, because these are not “matters having existence.”³ Thus, he sees Onkelos as writing for both the wise and the masses, supporting the appropriate views for the learned, and removing incorrect views from the unlearned. He states this explicitly in Guide 1:36:

I do not consider as an infidel one who cannot demonstrate that the corporeality of God should be negated. But I do consider as an infidel one who does not believe in its negation; and this particularly in view of the existence of the interpretation of Onqelos and of Jonathan ben Uziel, may peace be upon both of them, who cause their readers to keep away as far as possible from the belief in the corporeality of God.⁴

Again, to Maimonides, a translation written to enforce and reinforce correct ideas about God, does not need to change the literal verse when people would not make the mistake of misunderstanding God’s incorporeality.

Nachmanides, in his commentary to Genesis 46:1, mounts a formidable argument against Maimonides interpretation of Onkelos. His objections can be distilled into five categories:

1. Cases where sometimes Onkelos translates an action of God literally, yet other times changes it from its literal meaning. For example, Maimonides spends much time praising Onkelos on his changes to the word “hearing”, yet “speaking”⁵ and “seeing”⁶ in reference to God have many cases where they are translated literally. Rather, Nachmanides posits, just as “hearing” can mean “understanding”, so do “seeing” can denote understanding, and Onkelos is consistent when the Pentateuch uses it to mean God’s discernment and when it doesn’t. Additionally, sometimes Onkelos will paraphrase God “passing over” something, as in Exodus 34:6, and other times will translate literally, such as Nachmanides’ version of Deuteronomy 31:3.
2. Cases where Onkelos translates a corporeal reference to God’s “body” literally, such as Exodus 31:18, without apparent fear of corporeality, such as Exodus 14:31 “the great hand”, or Deuteronomy 33:2, “at His right hand was a fiery law.” Additionally, Onkelos translates God “standing” literally.
3. Cases where sometimes Onkelos translates non-literally even for events occurring in dreams, contra Maimonides who says that dreams and visions are reasons for Onkelos translating literally.
4. Cases where there is no fear of corporeality, yet Onkelos changes it anyway to distance it from God. Nachmanides posits that “their secret meaning is known to the learned student [of the mystical law of the Torah].”
5. Cases where sometimes Onkelos translates the motion of God non-literally as the “Divine Presence”, and other times translates it literally. Again, Nachmanides posits that “All these subjects [...are not influenced by a fear of using terms denoting corporeality but rather by secrets] of the Cabala known to Onkelos…”

Some defenders of Maimonides found it necessary to bring him closer to the thought of Nachmanides to answer these questions. Rabbi Yom Tov ben Avraham Asevilli (1250-1330), known as the Ritva, was a follower of the school of Nachmanides, as a student of the Ra’ah, a student of Nachmanides himself. Even so, he composed a book, Sefer HaZikaron, in defense of Maimonides for most of the places where Nachmanides argues against him in his commentary on the Pentateuch.” Whereas Nachmanides states that the reason for seeming inconsistencies for the most part is because of Onkelos’ knowledge of Kabbalah, Ritva posits that Maimonides believed Onkelos had knowledge of the “Work of the Chariot”, Maaseh Merkava, and used it as part of his translation. This being so, Maimonides also writes in his introduction to the Guide that Maaseh Merkava should only be expressed by way of flashing hints (which is his solution to the Mishnaic dictum not to discuss this with students more than one at a time, and even then, only chapter headings), and this is the purpose of the confusing inconsistencies found in Onkelos. As he writes, “If he would have translated everything in one way and with a single intention, he would have revealed the secret, and in another way, he would have completely hidden it. It is better regarding secrets that they be revealed in one in one aspect, and hidden in another.”⁷

So then what is Onkelos’ intended audience? While Nachmanides thinks the intended audience of Onkelos includes the kabbalist will understand the true reasons for the different translations, for the Ritva’s Maimonides, it is the philosopher. Both might allow for the surface meaning to be intended for the masses as well. But, as I wrote above, Maimonides himself definitely believed Onkelos was for both the learned and the unlearned.

Enter Rabbi Samuel David Luzzatto (1800-1865), known by the acronym Shadal (which he called himself in his lifetime), an Italian mixture of traditional and “enlightened” Jew. He could be said to be “stuck” in this case. For he believed on the one side that Maimonides’ drawing on Aristotelian philosophy was incorrect and hurtful to Judaism, and on the other, kabbalistic mysticism was not authentic. In his commentary on the Torah to Exodus 20:2, he writes, “Thank God that we have been exempted from that philosophy that was in vogue in his days, which Maimonides was inclines towards too much, even if his intentions were good,"⁸ echoing the formula pronounced by a father at his son’s bar mitzvah for God having removing his son’s spiritual responsibility from him. This is in the context of disputing Maimonides enumeration of belief (specifically belief in God in this case) as part of the commandments. Shadal also wrote an essay in the periodical Kerem Hemed 3 (1838): 61–76, criticizing Maimonides concept of the soul for, among other things, being drawn straight from Aristotelian philosophy. He discontinued his friendship with Rabbi Solomon Judah Rapoport partly because of that essay. He wrote a book on Jewish belief called “Yesodei HaTorah”, an obvious attempt at replacing Maimonides’ “Yesodei HaTorah”. In these ways and many more, Shadal is considered an “anti-Maimonidean”.⁹ He was also against kabbalistic mysticism, penning a pamphlet while still unmarried at 28, pointedly titling “Vikuach al Chochmat HaKabbalah”.¹⁰

So what was Shadal to do in writing a book about Onkelos? After all, he called it “Ohev Ger”, his love for Onkelos starting when he first discovered a rare manuscript of Onkelos at 13. He could never allow Onkelos to be an Aristotelian, nor a secret kabbalist. Instead, he discerned a third approach. This is almost at the very beginning, after he declares that most will not accept this truth he will now lay out:

The Targum was not made for the scholar, but for the layman. The main intention of Onkelos in his translation was to remove all stumbling blocks from before the masses, and from before the converts, so that their listening to the recitation of the Torah would be beneficial to them, and not damaging, God forbid. And without it, shallow-minded people would be able to find something in the holy Torah that is loathsome to them, and they will not ponder it in their shallow minds; they will cause an iniquitous stumbling block in whichever way it will be [interpreted], or they’ll cause the honor of the Torah to be insignificant in their eyes, allowing scornful people a context in which to mock it, God forbid. It was also for the gentiles, so that it won’t be distant to them, if their hearts lift them to come to take refuge under the wings of the Shechinah. Along with that, it was also to prevent the nation from being an object of mockery and scorn in the eyes of the gentiles, if they find things in our Torah and in the narratives of our forefathers that are not honorable and glorious in their eyes.

So, there are three audiences in mind. One is the unlearned masses and converts, who need a translation that will not take away from the glory and majesty of the biblical characters, including God. Two is those who seek to mock Judaism, to lessen their ability to do so by protecting the biblical characters. And third are for the gentiles (quite an extraordinary claim that an analysis of exceeds the scope of this paper), which is also to protect Jews from mockery as well as to make the stories acceptable so that it won’t make gentiles run away from converting because of the strange stories.

His book is made up of 32 “paths”¹¹ to understanding Onkelos’ changes in translation, along with numerous examples for each category. His third path is:

“...when Onkelos changes the words out of concern for God’s honor, removing any mention of imagery with regards to Him, and any actions [by Him] or actions toward Him, which have the effect of lessening God’s honor in the hearts of the masses… Onkelos did not flee from any mention of anthropomorphism, unless it was the kind that would cause people to view God with less respect. Even though the figure of speech of ‘the finger of God’ is anthropomorphic, it stays well with those who hear it. Instead of being damaging, it is actually beneficial, to raise up the glory of the Torah… Nachmanides, already, occupied himself with Maimonides’ opinion that Onkelos tried to remove all physicality in regards to God... [Shadal proceeds to list a dozen verses that could be brought for Onkelos’ literal translations of God’s anthropomorphism]… While Nachmanides answered for Onkelos by way of sod [kabbalah], we can go according to what we have said very simply, we do not have to veer right or left, we can just say that Onkelos did not feel the necessity to change the language of Scripture when these figures of speech only enhance and elevate the glory of God in His abilities and providence, and do not lower His glory, God forbid, in the eyes of the masses.”

Shadal certainly has an interesting theory, but does it hold up to the inconsistent verses? It is difficult to imagine why (Exodus 19:11), “The Lord will descend,” takes away from the glory of God so much so that Onkelos translates it as, “The Lord will manifest Himself,” yet His promise to Jacob, (Genesis 46:4), “I will descend with you,” did not, and is therefore translated literally. The explanation is insufficient to explain every detail. Presumably, it takes a great deal of subjectivity to determine if something would “take away from the glory of God for the masses”, and that is the weakness of this approach.¹²

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1 Some academics, in contrast, place Onkelos squarely outside of Pharasaic theology. Daniel Boyarin, for example, in Border Lines: The Partition of Judeo-Christianity (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press) 112-127, argues that Onkelos’ frequent use of “memra” - “the word”, is evidence of the “pararabbinic” doctrine of Logos theology, which has a major place in early Christian thought (as seen in the Prologue to the Gospel of John), but is also found in the Jewish Platonist Philo as well. Boyarin’s argument, as he states explicitly, relies on the presumption that the people of the synagogues had vastly different beliefs than the rabbinic elite of the time. Other scholars, such as Avigdor Shinan (“Live Translation: On the Nature of the Aramaic Targums to the Pentateuch,” Prooftexts 3 (1983) 44), argue that Onkelos and the targumim represent a version of rabbinic thought that was engineered so as to be easily understood to the layman. These will be interesting in comparison to Shadal’s view which will be analyzed.

2 Translation Pines ed. Vol 1 pg 57

3 Ibid. 58. This fits into Maimonides’ understanding of angels. To Maimonides, any mentioning of angels taking on form in the Bible necessarily occurring in dreams, since angels cannot take on form in existence. Even though angels cannot be physical, he says, the Bible makes it seems so because they occur in dreams, and one can understand that something that is not actually happening can be talked about this way. This concept, too, is debated by Nachmanides on Genesis 18:1, and one cannot help but wonder if they are connected concepts.

4 Both Arthur Hyman in “Maimonides as an Exegete” and David Shatz in “The Biblical and Rabbinic Background to Medieval Jewish Philosophy,” connect this declaration with Maimonides’ categorization of anthropomorphists as heretics in Mishneh Torah, Laws of Repentance 3:7. Hyman sees this as a “response” to the opinion as expressed in the gloss of Abraham ben David (the Raabad) on that statement: “People greater and better than he have followed this opinion, based on what they saw in scriptural texts and in the words of the Aggadah, which corrupt opinions.” To Maimonides, the existence of the Targumim such as Onkelos negate that allowance, because people could trust the Targumim. Nachmanides’ disagreeance, as we shall examine soon, would also have an impact in this area as to how to categorize an anthropomorphist, since to him, people do not have the Targumists to rely on for correct philosophical opinions.

5 In the Guide 1:65, Maimonides might have provided reasons for this exception. “Now in all cases in which the words saying and speaking are applied to God… they are used to denote either will or volition...The terms in question never signify that He, may He be exalted, spoke using the sounds of letters and a voice...As regards volition and will being denoted by the word saying and speaking… [this is] because these words are equivocal...They are used by way of likening Him to us. For...man cannot understand at first how, where there is a will that a thing be done, that thing should be done by the mere will alone.” In other words, “saying” does not indicate actual verbal speech, and even were Onkelos to change the phrase to be “God wished” or some other phrase such as that, it would still be just as confusing to people in terms of what caused what. When speaking to prophets, however, Maimonides explains that God’s “speech” is meant to signify that a prophet understands His will, not that they produced the thought themselves. Since these occur in people or the world, and not in God, it is unnecessary to change them. See also Guide 1:21.

6 In Guide 1:48, Maimonides chalks up some of these exceptions to scribal errors.

7 http://www.hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=40011&st=&pgnum=43&hilite=

8 וברוך המקום שפטרנו מאותה פילוסופיאה שגברה בימיו אשר נטה אחריה הרמב"ם יותר מן הראוי גם כי לטובה היתה כוונתו. Shadal explained what he means by those last few words “his intentions were for good” in the Vikuach, that medieval sages only became interested in philosophy because people were leaving Judaism in the pursuit of it. As a stop-measure, the rabbis such as Maimonides wrote reconciliations of the two studies. Interestingly, Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook would write something very similar only a generation or two later, in L’Nevuchei HaDor chapter 2 (recently published by Yediot Acharonot), where he also claimed that it was the responsibility of the rabbis in our own generation to follow the strategy of the medieval scholars who saw their youth following after non-Jewish studies, and write new books reconciling the new ideas in his own times. Edit: I thought this was revlatory, but now I see in Nachmanides' letter to the French rabbis disagreeing with their protests of Maimonides, he claims that Maimonides saw people leaving the path for philosophy and science, and that is why he wrote his books. Although I have heard this many times about Maimonides' motivations, it seems from his introduction to the Guide that he explicitly was writing his book for those well versed both in Torah and the sciences, studiously learning and keeping the Torah, while having access to the outside world, without explanations for all the contradictions they found.

9 See also his letter to Almeda about Jewish beliefs for more relevant information about this, http://www.hakirah.org/Vol%2010%20Klein.pdf

10 A choice quote, “The haughtiness of Yerovam drove him out of the world, and the haughtiness of the kabbalists causes them to choose to deny God, and to say that God is not God, and that Ein Sof is not Ein Sof, in a way that they have no God anymore at all, rather than admitting that there is dispute between their sages, something with is clear like the sun at noon.” Translated here http://parsha.blogspot.com/2008/05/authenticity-of-kabbalah-pt-xxxii.html

11 “Netivot”, which may be a reference, or even a parody, of the 32 netivot mentioned in Sefer Yetzira.

12 An interesting note: In his flight from Maimonides, Shadal still agrees with one of his premises: Onkelos intended to protect people from erroneous understandings of Scripture. Nachmanides is properly disagreeing; there is nothing similar about their approaches. Another approach, as seen in Maharal Tiferet Yisrael 33, is that it cannot be that the verse as translated literally would be made in a way to cause man to have erroneous ideas. Rather, when a verse mentions God “going down”, it means that that is literally how Israel experienced it, and the Torah speaks from the perspective of man’s experience of events (see Rav Kook on the creation story, as well). Why, then, did Onkelos differ? Because, while the Torah can speak however it would like in its references to God, Onkelos felt a need to be more respectful than that. Since I have looked at this inside, it remains to be seen how he deals with exceptions.

Shot Analysis of a Scene from Hitchcock's Rear Window

Confrontation and Defenestration: A Shot Analysis of Hitchcock's Rear Window

The 1954 Alfred Hitchcock film Rear Window tells the story L.B Jeffries (played by James Stewart) who, after breaking his leg on the job as a photographer, must entertain himself while holed up in his apartment by looking out his window into the lives of others. An observer (at least for most of the movie), his life is not affected by the lives of the others he watches. Only at the end, when the world of his window and that of the other windows collide, does he become involved in the story unfolding, and his life even becomes endangered. We reach the climax of the film when he is confronted by the suspected murderer, Lars Thorwald (played by Raymond Burr), who, quite literally, pushes Jeffries out of his own window into the world of everyone else. It pays to give attention to the build-up to this climax, the confrontation itself. There are several shots here which symbolize Jeffries’ transfer from observer to participant, and every detail is related to that transfer.

In the previous scene, Thorwald looks into Jeffries’ window and see Jeffries, a reversal from most of the film. Frightened, Jeffries asks his detective friend, Tom Doyle (Wendell Corey), to come and see the evidence he has, and to hurry. Jeffries looks back at Thorwald’s apartment, but it is dark. He can’t see inside. He gets another call, thinking it’s Doyle, says that he thinks Thorwald has left his apartment, but no one is on the other end. Jeffries realizes that the phone call is from Thorwald, who now knows where he is and that he knows about Thorwald. We wait in anticipation as we hear the thump-thump of Thorwald’s walk up the steps to Jeffries’ apartment. Jeffries struggles to find a spot to hide, but is restricted by his cast. He waits by the window, his only weapon his camera and bulbs, something he only used previously in the film to view through, but not to use to photograph. Now his tool for voyeurism will be his tool of involvement. The light is turned off in the hallway. Thorwald appears at the door.

Everything in this scene is a study in opposites. Thorwald stands at the door, his body slightly left of center in the frame, the closed, dark door on his left. We can only see his legs in the light, emphasizing his mobility. We see just a bit of his shoulders, emphasizing his massive frame and his ability to easily crush Jeffries. This is why he takes up so much of the frame. The shot is from Jeffries’ perspective, at the window looking up at the monster at the door. Contrast this to the shot of Jeffries from Thorwald’s perspective from the door. Jeffries sits at the window, his body slightly right of center in the frame, the open, moon-lit window on his left. We can only see his legs in the light, emphasizing his lack of mobility. We see a slight glint of light from his camera, right in the center of the frame. It is his only hope. The shot is from Thorwald’s perspective at the door, looking down at the much smaller Jeffries, who does not take up the frame at all. We, the audience, anticipate a murder about to take place, because the compositions of these two shots are so unbalanced. Lighting is unbalanced, as are the characters in them.

Thorwald stands apart from the door, indicating he is now in the apartment, while Jeffries sits in the area of the frame with the window, foreshadowing his defenestration. His position at the window indicates his wish to remain an observer. However, his back is now to the window, his face to his door. As indicated previously, his camera no longer takes on the role of viewer, but of action. This is reminiscent of the opening scene, when we find out how he got his cast. “I got myself half-killed for ya,” he says to his editor, Gotteson, on the phone, while watching the other people. “And you reward me by stealing my assignments.” The editor protests, “I didn’t ask you to stand in the middle of that racetrack.” Jeffries responds, “You asked for something dramatically different. You got it.” The editor says back, “So did you,” referring to his cast and confinement to his apartment. A bit later, Jeffries says, “If you don’t pull me out of this swamp of boredom, I’m going to do something drastic.” “Like what,” asks Gotteson, as the shot shows Jeffries beginning to view the unhappily married Thorwalds. Jeffries responds by talking about marriage, something he talks about with disdain. The foreshadow is there, indicating his drastic action will involve the Thorwalds. We see several things in that scene for sure, but principal among them is that he got a broken leg in the first place by getting involved with his camera in the middle of something dangerous, a racetrack. And he is about to get a second one by doing it again. This is why the camera takes a center position in the shot.

There is no music, only a howl of wind from the open window. Throughout the movie, music is playing, whether from the pianist or the radio. All of that audio ceases to exist, indicating that all others do not play a role in what happens within Jeffries’ window. Only when Jeffries is being pushed out his window, do all the other neighbors look out theirs. All audio is diagetic. These shots are cuts, which is supposed to be sudden and jarring. In both shots, the actors are still in their respective places, and the camera stays still because it is from their respective perspectives (say that five times fast).

For the shot we are looking at, there is no dialogue. Thorwald says nothing, and Jeffries says nothing. The silence emphasizes the lack of lighting. For Thorwald, the lighting (or lack thereof) is his friend - no one can see him from the other windows as he confronts Jeffries. For Jeffries, the lighting (or, once again, lack thereof) is his friend - his only defense is to momentarily stop Thorwald through the use of his camera flashes. No dialogue occurs as we realize that the scene operates and hangs on the lighting. Eventually, both will be thrown into the light as Thorwald lunges at Jeffries, pushing Jeffries out the window.

Works Cited

Rear Window. Dir. Alfred Hitchcock. Paramount, 1954.

Piskei teshuvot on Rebuking Chilonim

A surprising almost Kookian moment from Halacha Sefer Piskei Teshuvos, on rebuking the Chilonim (Shulchan Aruch 608:2):

מצוות תוכחה לחילונים שבימינו 

סﬠי' ב', רמ"א: ואם יודﬠ שאין דבריו נשמﬠים לא יאמר ברבים להוכיחם וכו' אבל ביחיד חייב להוכיחו ﬠד שיכנו או יקללנו. וﬠיין היטב במ"ב וביה"ל. והﬠולה למﬠשה לﬠנין החילונים שבימינו שבﬠוה"ר מופקרים לגמרי ר"ל מﬠול תורה מצוות, ואף שﬠושים לתיאבון וכתינוקות שנשבו, והולכים לביהכ"נ בימים הנוראים וכדו' מחמת הרגילות בזה, מ"מ ﬠוברים ﬠל כל התורה כולה, וממש לשחוק בﬠיניהם אם יאמר לו ﬠל דבר אחד בחן ובתחנונים למה תﬠשה כך. וﬠ"ז אמר הכתוב אל תוכח לץ וכו, ופטורים מלהוכיחם ﬠל חילול שבת שﬠושים כנסיﬠה במכונית וכיוצ"ב ﬠד שיראה בהם קצת נטיה ליהדות ﬠ"י שבאים לשאול כפﬠם בפﬠם ﬠל ההיתר וﬠל האסור ﬠ"י רוח טהרה שמתנוצץ בהם, כאשר יארﬠ כמה פﬠמים. אז יוכל לקיים מצוות תוכחה כמשמﬠותה.

The Commandment to Rebuke the Chilonim of Today 

Seif 2, Rama: If he knows his words will not be heeded, he should not rebuke them in public, but privately he is obligated to rebuke to the point that they strike him or curse him. 

And investigate well the Mishnah Berurah and Biur Halacha. 

And this becomes practical today regarding the chilonim of today who have completely cast off, God have mercy, the yoke of Torah and mitzvot. Even as they act as they desire and are like "children taken captive", they go to synagogue during the Days of Awe etc because they are used to doing so, nevertheless they transgress the whole Torah, and its actually a joke to them if someone would say a word to them nicely and pleadingly as to why they act this way. Scripture writes about this (Proverbs 9:8) "Do not rebuke a scorner..." We are exempt from rebuking them about the desecration of Shabbat when they travel by car and other things. That is, unless we see they lean a bit toward Judaism, when they come to ask once in a while about what is prohibited and what is permitted because of the pure spirit that sparks within them, which has happened many a time. Then one can fulfill the mitzvah of rebuke as is stated.