The intended audience and motives of a translation are usually
closely connected for any translation for the public. If the
translation is accurate and consistent, one can attempt to discern
the concerns of the translator through the choices made. Onkelos, the
ancient translation of the Pentateuch, should not be an exception to
this rule. Yet, it has continued to perplex interpreters of Onkelos
as to how to understand the reasons for seeming inconsistencies in
its translation, and Onkelos’ motives as a translator. In medieval
rabbinic discourse (and to some extent, today’s rabbinic
discourse), there is an even stronger need to detect Onkelos’
school of thought. Traditions of Onkelos’ origins place the
translator in the same time-frame as important Talmudic rabbis and
even interacting with them, making Onkelos an almost
“Chazal-sanctioned” translation. Thus, the identification
of Onkelos’ school of thought becomes most important to the rabbis
as they equate Chazal with Onkelos’ translation.1
One major rabbinic debate, the question of Onkelos’ purpose in the
sometimes inconsistent anthropomorphic changes of the translation,
represents an interesting example of this need.
Maimonides, in his Guide for the Perplexed (1:27), writes:
Onqelos the Proselyte was very perfect in the Hebrew and Syrian
languages and directed his effort toward the abolition of the belief
in God’s corporeality. Hence he interprets in accordance with its
meaning every attribute that Scripture predicates of God and that
might lead toward the belief incorporeality. Thus whenever he
encounters one of the terms indicative of one of the kinds of motion,
he makes motion to mean the manifestation and appearance of a created
light, I mean the Indwelling or the action of providence. Thus he
renders, [Exodus 19:11] The Lord will descend, by the words,
The Lord will manifest Himself; [Exodus 19:20] And the Lord
descended, by the words, And the Lord manifested Himself. He does
not translate: And the Lord came down...This occurs continually in
his interpretation.2
Maimonides,
a Judeo-Aristotelian, read Onkelos as sharing a similar philosophical
view as to God’s incorporeality. Similarly, as stated in Guide
1:48, Onkelos never translates “hearing” literally, but rather
that the matter “reached” God.
Maimonides (Guide 1:27) does deal with one inconsistency, that of
Genesis 46:4, I will descend with thee into Egypt, which is
translated literally. He declares that it is unnecessary to protect
against anthropomorphic mentionings occurring in dreams, as is the
case here, because these are not “matters having existence.”3
Thus, he sees Onkelos as writing for both the wise and the masses,
supporting the appropriate views for the learned, and removing
incorrect views from the unlearned. He states this explicitly in
Guide 1:36:
I do not consider as an infidel one who cannot demonstrate that the
corporeality of God should be negated. But I do consider as an
infidel one who does not believe in its negation; and this
particularly in view of the existence of the interpretation of
Onqelos and of Jonathan ben Uziel, may peace be upon both of them,
who cause their readers to keep away as far as possible from the
belief in the corporeality of God.4
Again,
to Maimonides, a translation written to enforce and reinforce correct
ideas about God, does not need to change the literal verse when
people would not make the mistake of misunderstanding God’s
incorporeality.
Nachmanides,
in his commentary to Genesis 46:1, mounts a formidable argument
against Maimonides interpretation of Onkelos. His objections can be
distilled into five categories:
- Cases where sometimes Onkelos translates an action of God literally, yet other times changes it from its literal meaning. For example, Maimonides spends much time praising Onkelos on his changes to the word “hearing”, yet “speaking”5 and “seeing”6 in reference to God have many cases where they are translated literally. Rather, Nachmanides posits, just as “hearing” can mean “understanding”, so do “seeing” can denote understanding, and Onkelos is consistent when the Pentateuch uses it to mean God’s discernment and when it doesn’t. Additionally, sometimes Onkelos will paraphrase God “passing over” something, as in Exodus 34:6, and other times will translate literally, such as Nachmanides’ version of Deuteronomy 31:3.
- Cases where Onkelos translates a corporeal reference to God’s “body” literally, such as Exodus 31:18, without apparent fear of corporeality, such as Exodus 14:31 “the great hand”, or Deuteronomy 33:2, “at His right hand was a fiery law.” Additionally, Onkelos translates God “standing” literally.
- Cases where sometimes Onkelos translates non-literally even for events occurring in dreams, contra Maimonides who says that dreams and visions are reasons for Onkelos translating literally.
- Cases where there is no fear of corporeality, yet Onkelos changes it anyway to distance it from God. Nachmanides posits that “their secret meaning is known to the learned student [of the mystical law of the Torah].”
- Cases where sometimes Onkelos translates the motion of God non-literally as the “Divine Presence”, and other times translates it literally. Again, Nachmanides posits that “All these subjects [...are not influenced by a fear of using terms denoting corporeality but rather by secrets] of the Cabala known to Onkelos…”
Some
defenders of Maimonides found it necessary to bring him closer to the
thought of Nachmanides to answer these questions. Rabbi Yom Tov ben
Avraham Asevilli (1250-1330), known as the Ritva, was a
follower of the school of Nachmanides, as a student of the Ra’ah,
a student of Nachmanides himself. Even so, he composed a book, Sefer
HaZikaron, in defense of Maimonides for most of the places where
Nachmanides argues against him in his commentary on the Pentateuch.”
Whereas Nachmanides states that the reason for seeming
inconsistencies for the most part is because of Onkelos’ knowledge
of Kabbalah, Ritva posits that Maimonides believed Onkelos had
knowledge of the “Work of the Chariot”, Maaseh Merkava,
and used it as part of his translation. This being so, Maimonides
also writes in his introduction to the Guide that Maaseh Merkava
should only be expressed by way of flashing hints (which is his
solution to the Mishnaic dictum not to discuss this with students
more than one at a time, and even then, only chapter headings), and
this is the purpose of the confusing inconsistencies found in
Onkelos. As he writes, “If he would have translated everything in
one way and with a single intention, he would have revealed the
secret, and in another way, he would have completely hidden it. It is
better regarding secrets that they be revealed in one in one aspect,
and hidden in another.”7
So then what is Onkelos’ intended audience? While Nachmanides
thinks the intended audience of Onkelos includes the kabbalist will
understand the true reasons for the different translations, for the
Ritva’s Maimonides, it is the philosopher. Both might allow for the
surface meaning to be intended for the masses as well. But, as I
wrote above, Maimonides himself definitely believed Onkelos was for
both the learned and the unlearned.
Enter Rabbi Samuel David Luzzatto (1800-1865), known by the acronym
Shadal (which he called himself in his lifetime), an Italian mixture
of traditional and “enlightened” Jew. He could be said to be
“stuck” in this case. For he believed on the one side that
Maimonides’ drawing on Aristotelian philosophy was incorrect and
hurtful to Judaism, and on the other, kabbalistic mysticism was not
authentic. In his commentary on the Torah to Exodus 20:2, he writes,
“Thank God that we have been exempted from that philosophy that was
in vogue in his days, which Maimonides was inclines towards too much,
even if his intentions were good,"8
echoing the formula pronounced by a father at his son’s bar mitzvah
for God having removing his son’s spiritual responsibility from
him. This is in the context of disputing Maimonides enumeration of
belief (specifically belief in God in this case) as part of the
commandments. Shadal also wrote an essay in the periodical Kerem
Hemed 3 (1838): 61–76, criticizing Maimonides concept of the soul
for, among other things, being drawn straight from Aristotelian
philosophy. He discontinued his friendship with Rabbi Solomon Judah
Rapoport partly because of that essay. He wrote a book on Jewish
belief called “Yesodei HaTorah”, an obvious attempt at replacing
Maimonides’ “Yesodei HaTorah”. In these ways and many more,
Shadal is considered an “anti-Maimonidean”.9
He was also against kabbalistic mysticism, penning a pamphlet while
still unmarried at 28, pointedly titling “Vikuach al Chochmat
HaKabbalah”.10
So what was Shadal to do in writing a book about Onkelos? After all,
he called it “Ohev Ger”, his love for Onkelos starting when he
first discovered a rare manuscript of Onkelos at 13. He could never
allow Onkelos to be an Aristotelian, nor a secret kabbalist. Instead,
he discerned a third approach. This is almost at the very beginning,
after he declares that most will not accept this truth he will now
lay out:
The Targum was not made for the scholar, but for the layman. The main
intention of Onkelos in his translation was to remove all stumbling
blocks from before the masses, and from before the converts, so that
their listening to the recitation of the Torah would be beneficial to
them, and not damaging, God forbid. And without it, shallow-minded
people would be able to find something in the holy Torah that is
loathsome to them, and they will not ponder it in their shallow
minds; they will cause an iniquitous stumbling block in whichever way
it will be [interpreted], or they’ll cause the honor of the Torah
to be insignificant in their eyes, allowing scornful people a context
in which to mock it, God forbid. It was also for the gentiles, so
that it won’t be distant to them, if their hearts lift them to come
to take refuge under the wings of the Shechinah. Along with that, it
was also to prevent the nation from being an object of mockery and
scorn in the eyes of the gentiles, if they find things in our Torah
and in the narratives of our forefathers that are not honorable and
glorious in their eyes.
So, there are three audiences in mind. One is the unlearned masses
and converts, who need a translation that will not take away from the
glory and majesty of the biblical characters, including God. Two is
those who seek to mock Judaism, to lessen their ability to do so by
protecting the biblical characters. And third are for the gentiles
(quite an extraordinary claim that an analysis of exceeds the scope
of this paper), which is also to protect Jews from mockery as well as
to make the stories acceptable so that it won’t make gentiles run
away from converting because of the strange stories.
His book is made up of 32 “paths”11
to understanding Onkelos’ changes in translation, along with
numerous examples for each category. His third path is:
“...when Onkelos changes the words out of concern for God’s
honor, removing any mention of imagery with regards to Him, and any
actions [by Him] or actions toward Him, which have the effect of
lessening God’s honor in the hearts of the masses… Onkelos did
not flee from any mention of anthropomorphism, unless it was the kind
that would cause people to view God with less respect. Even though
the figure of speech of ‘the finger of God’ is anthropomorphic,
it stays well with those who hear it. Instead of being damaging, it
is actually beneficial, to raise up the glory of the Torah…
Nachmanides, already, occupied himself with Maimonides’ opinion
that Onkelos tried to remove all physicality in regards to God...
[Shadal proceeds to list a dozen verses that could be brought for
Onkelos’ literal translations of God’s anthropomorphism]… While
Nachmanides answered for Onkelos by way of sod [kabbalah], we
can go according to what we have said very simply, we do not have to
veer right or left, we can just say that Onkelos did not feel the
necessity to change the language of Scripture when these figures of
speech only enhance and elevate the glory of God in His abilities and
providence, and do not lower His glory, God forbid, in the eyes of
the masses.”
Shadal
certainly has an interesting theory, but does it hold up to the
inconsistent verses? It is difficult to imagine why (Exodus 19:11),
“The Lord will descend,” takes away from the glory of God so much
so that Onkelos translates it as, “The Lord will manifest Himself,”
yet His promise to Jacob, (Genesis 46:4), “I will descend with
you,” did not, and is therefore translated literally. The
explanation is insufficient to explain every detail. Presumably, it
takes a great deal of subjectivity to determine if something would
“take away from the glory of God for the masses”, and that is the
weakness of this approach.12
---
1
Some academics, in contrast, place Onkelos squarely outside of
Pharasaic theology. Daniel Boyarin, for example, in Border
Lines: The Partition of Judeo-Christianity
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press) 112-127, argues
that Onkelos’ frequent use of “memra”
- “the word”, is evidence of the “pararabbinic” doctrine of
Logos theology, which has a major place in early Christian thought
(as seen in the Prologue to the Gospel of John), but is also found
in the Jewish Platonist Philo as well. Boyarin’s argument, as he
states explicitly, relies on the presumption that the people of the
synagogues had vastly different beliefs than the rabbinic elite of
the time. Other scholars, such as Avigdor Shinan (“Live
Translation: On the Nature of the Aramaic Targums to the
Pentateuch,” Prooftexts 3
(1983) 44), argue that Onkelos and the targumim represent a version
of rabbinic thought that was engineered so as to be easily
understood to the layman. These will be interesting in comparison to
Shadal’s view which will be analyzed.
2
Translation Pines ed. Vol 1 pg 57
3
Ibid. 58. This fits into Maimonides’ understanding of angels. To
Maimonides, any mentioning of angels taking on form in the Bible
necessarily occurring in dreams, since angels cannot take on form in
existence. Even though angels cannot be physical, he says, the Bible
makes it seems so because they occur in dreams, and one can
understand that something that is not actually happening can be
talked about this way. This concept, too, is debated by Nachmanides
on Genesis 18:1, and one cannot help but wonder if they are
connected concepts.
4
Both Arthur Hyman in “Maimonides as an Exegete” and David Shatz
in “The Biblical and Rabbinic Background to Medieval Jewish
Philosophy,” connect this declaration with Maimonides’
categorization of anthropomorphists as heretics in Mishneh Torah,
Laws of Repentance 3:7. Hyman sees this as a “response” to the
opinion as expressed in the gloss of Abraham ben David (the Raabad)
on that statement: “People greater and better than he have
followed this opinion, based on what they saw in scriptural texts
and in the words of the Aggadah, which corrupt opinions.” To
Maimonides, the existence of the Targumim such as Onkelos negate
that allowance, because people could trust the Targumim.
Nachmanides’ disagreeance, as we shall examine soon, would also
have an impact in this area as to how to categorize an
anthropomorphist, since to him, people do not have the Targumists to
rely on for correct philosophical opinions.
5
In the Guide 1:65, Maimonides might have provided reasons for this
exception. “Now in all cases in which the words saying
and speaking are
applied to God… they are used to denote either will or
volition...The terms in question never signify that He, may He be
exalted, spoke using the sounds of letters and a voice...As regards
volition and will being denoted by the word saying
and speaking… [this
is] because these words are equivocal...They are used by way of
likening Him to us. For...man cannot understand at first how, where
there is a will that a thing be done, that thing should be done by
the mere will alone.” In other words, “saying” does not
indicate actual verbal speech, and even were Onkelos to change the
phrase to be “God wished” or some other phrase such as that, it
would still be just as confusing to people in terms of what caused
what. When speaking to prophets, however, Maimonides explains that
God’s “speech” is meant to signify that a prophet understands
His will, not that they produced the thought themselves. Since these
occur in people or the world, and not in God, it is unnecessary to
change them. See also Guide 1:21.
6
In Guide 1:48, Maimonides chalks up some of these exceptions to
scribal errors.
7
http://www.hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=40011&st=&pgnum=43&hilite=
8
וברוך המקום שפטרנו מאותה
פילוסופיאה שגברה בימיו אשר נטה אחריה
הרמב"ם יותר
מן הראוי גם כי לטובה היתה כוונתו.
Shadal explained what he means by those last few words “his
intentions were for good” in the Vikuach, that medieval sages only
became interested in philosophy because people were leaving Judaism
in the pursuit of it. As a stop-measure, the rabbis such as
Maimonides wrote reconciliations of the two studies. Interestingly,
Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook would write something very similar only a
generation or two later, in L’Nevuchei HaDor chapter 2 (recently
published by Yediot Acharonot), where he also claimed that it was
the responsibility of the rabbis in our own generation to follow the
strategy of the medieval scholars who saw their youth following
after non-Jewish studies, and write new books reconciling the new
ideas in his own times. Edit: I thought this was revlatory, but now I see in Nachmanides' letter to the French rabbis disagreeing with their protests of Maimonides, he claims that Maimonides saw people leaving the path for philosophy and science, and that is why he wrote his books. Although I have heard this many times about Maimonides' motivations, it seems from his introduction to the Guide that he explicitly was writing his book for those well versed both in Torah and the sciences, studiously learning and keeping the Torah, while having access to the outside world, without explanations for all the contradictions they found.
9
See also his letter to Almeda about Jewish beliefs for more relevant
information about this, http://www.hakirah.org/Vol%2010%20Klein.pdf
10
A choice quote, “The haughtiness of Yerovam drove him out of the
world, and the haughtiness of the kabbalists causes them to choose
to deny God, and to say that God is not God, and that Ein Sof is not
Ein Sof, in a way that they have no God anymore at all, rather than
admitting that there is dispute between their sages, something with
is clear like the sun at noon.” Translated here
http://parsha.blogspot.com/2008/05/authenticity-of-kabbalah-pt-xxxii.html
11
“Netivot”, which may be a reference, or even a parody, of the 32
netivot mentioned in Sefer Yetzira.
12
An interesting note: In his flight from Maimonides, Shadal still
agrees with one of his premises: Onkelos intended to protect people
from erroneous understandings of Scripture. Nachmanides is properly
disagreeing; there is nothing similar about their approaches.
Another approach, as seen in Maharal Tiferet Yisrael 33, is that it
cannot be that the verse as translated literally would be made in a
way to cause man to have erroneous ideas. Rather, when a verse
mentions God “going down”, it means that that is literally how
Israel experienced it, and the Torah speaks from the perspective of
man’s experience of events (see Rav Kook on the creation story, as
well). Why, then, did Onkelos differ? Because, while the Torah can
speak however it would like in its references to God, Onkelos felt a
need to be more respectful than that. Since I have looked at this
inside, it remains to be seen how he deals with exceptions.
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