What's Bothering Maimonides?

The Mishna in Rosh Hashanah, 1:2, describes the event of Rosh Hashana thusly:

בראש השנה כל באי העולם עוברין לפניו כבני מרון, שנאמר (תהלים לג) היוצר יחד לבם המבין אל כל מעשיהם

On Rosh Hashnah, all the world passes before Him like Bnei Maron, as it says, "He that fashions the hearts of them all, that considers all their doings." (Psalms 33:15)

The Talmud (Rosh Hashanah 16a) records a 3-way debate as to the significance of this phrase, "bnei maron". It is summarized masterfully by Rabbi Sacks in his commentary to the Koren Rosh Hashana Machzor:

(It should be noted that the relationship between the Greek "numeron" and Bnei Maron is a late suggestion, starting in the 19th century, and seems to be supported by manuscripts of the Mishna. The other explanations are in the Talmud itself to interpret "bnei maron".)

Rambam, in his commentary to the Mishna, goes with the "sheep" explanation, and in fact many translations followed that one. After saying this, Rambam's Perush HaMishna Rosh Hashana 1:2, he writes, in the old translation,

ובני מרון: הצאן תרגום כבשים אמרנא וענינו שמחשבין על בני אדם ודנין עליהם בבריאות ובחלאים והמות והחיים וזולתם מעניני האדם והנגלה מזה המאמר מבואר כאשר תראה אבל הנסתר ענינו קשה מאד בלי ספק:

Bnei Maron: Sheep, which is translated in Aramaic as "amarna". And the point is that [God] considers human beings and judges them regarding health, sickness, death and life, and other things concerning man. The revealed matter of this statement is clear as you can see, but the hidden matter is very difficult, without a doubt.

In the Kafach translation it is like this: It is mostly the same (in Kafach's translation, Rambam Aramaic translation is "amarya"), except the last part is critical:

ופשט לשון זה ברור כמו שאתה רואה אבל סודו ענינו אין ספק שהוא קשה מאד

The simple meaning of this language is clear as you can see, but the secret of its topic is undoubtedly very difficult.

A bit different.

In Hilchot Teshuva 3:3, he seems to have an easy time explaining it, except he takes out the phrase, "bnei maron". (Perhaps there is something about that phrase that bothered the Rambam.) Let's see.: וּכְשֵׁם שֶׁשּׁוֹקְלִין זְכֻיּוֹת אָדָם וַעֲוֹנוֹתָיו בִּשְׁעַת מִיתָתוֹ כָּךְ בְּכָל שָׁנָה וְשָׁנָה שׁוֹקְלִין עֲוֹנוֹת כָּל אֶחָד וְאֶחָד מִבָּאֵי הָעוֹלָם עִם זְכֻיּוֹתָיו, בְּיוֹם טוֹב שֶׁל רֹאשׁ הַשָּׁנָה. מִי שֶׁנִּמְצָא צַדִּיק נֶחְתָּם לְחַיִּים. וּמִי שֶׁנִּמְצָא רָשָׁע נֶחְתָּם לְמִיתָה. וְהַבֵּינוֹנִי תּוֹלִין אוֹתוֹ עַד יוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים אִם עָשָׂה תְּשׁוּבָה נֶחְתָּם לְחַיִּים וְאִם לָאו נֶחְתָּם לְמִיתָה:

So what is it about this concept that bothered the Rambam? The most often quoted (since its on the page in many editions of the Mishna) is the Tosafot Yom Tov. He writes that the thing that bothered the Rambam is the concept that God looks at each person individually to judge them, yet the Talmud also says that God does this all in one glance, b'sekira achat. These are impossible and paradoxical statements, and therefore difficult to understand.

Rav Emdin in Lechem Shamayim, disagrees with Tosafot Yom Tov. He thinks these two lines are eminently understandable. One can glance at many people at the same time, but judge them individually. Rather, he says that the problem for the Rambam is not that the two lines are contradictory, but that what is the need to judge each person individually if God accomplishes this also with one glance? His language is:

אבל דעתי בקושי הענין הוא, אחר שנסקרין בסקירה אחת, לאיזה טעם יצטרכו א"כ לעבור אחד אחד, שהרי בסקירה אחת נבדקין כולם בדקדוק גדול.

He adds that one cannot try to say that the "Bnei Maron" metaphor is just that, a metaphor that is meant to speak in a way that people can understand, even though the fact is that God does it with one glance, because if so, why talk as if this only happens on Rosh Hashana? This happens all the time. How is Rosh Hashana special that we are like sheep? That was what bothered the Rambam. How do we understand this metaphor, which seems to be a description of what is happening, when both are unnecessary?

In fact, some have suggested that exactly as an answer. See Rav Tzvi Hirsch Klausner, in his Sefer Ratz LeMishna, where he too disagrees with the Tosafot Yom Tov. He argues that the concept that God decides things for everyone individually, and also does it all at the same time, need not be contradictory because the metaphor of the sheep passing by as one is only to be mashber the ozen, meaning its a good metaphor to mean that each and every individual is decided who will be poor, rich, etc, like sheep being counted. To him, Rambam means to say that the concept that God does this at once is the part that is hard to understand, so the metaphor was used instead.

But we return to Rav Emdin's questions on this and we can only suggest that Rav Klausner would be forced to say, as we will see others say, that true, the sekira happens all the time. But having a set time for us is still important. There are some other suggestions that go far afield from this.

Rav Eliyahu Melikovsky, in Devar Eliyahu, also disagrees with Tosafot Yom Tov. He thinks, and see his extensive essay about this there, that the phrase sekira achat does not refer to judging everyone at the same time, which would indeed contradict the concept that God looks at each person individually. Rather, he says, it is based on the concept found in Avot and elsewhere that anyone who helps the many is considered to have the merits of the many. So one action can gain multiple and continual meriting, and this is the sekira achat. That in one judgement you can get many judgement of merit. His grand total is done besekirat achat. This is a tremendous concept, and goes to God's greatness that he can do this calculation. Thus, he reads the words as such: The nigleh, that your actions are judged, that is easy to understand. But the nistar, the grand total done by God, is difficult for us to calculate ourselves. Obviously this reading does not work at all with Kafach's translation. Interestingly, Zev Wolf Tenenbaum, in this sefer, suggests that the sekira achat was of each person's complete self, like a tree from its roots to its branches, in an instant. This is not hard to understand.

Mishneh Sachir (Genesis 22:12) seems to agree with Tosafot Yom Tov, and interprets the Akeida story this way, that God is fine with asking of us to do things that go against our intellect, such as asking us to understand him judging us as bnei maron and beskira achat, and this is something deep for the Rambam:

כי עתה ידעתי כי ירא אלקים אתה ולא חשכת את בנך את יחידך ממני [כב, יב]
כתב רש"י ז"ל בד"ה כי עתה ידעתי וז"ל, אמר ר' אבא א"ל אברהם אפרש לפניך את שיחתי, אתמול אמרת לי כי ביצחק יקרא לך זרע וחזרת ואמרת קח נא את בנך, עכשיו אתה אומר לי אל תשלח ידך אל הנער, אמר לו הקב"ה לא אחלל בריתי ומוצא שפתי לא אשנה, כשאמרתי לך קח מוצא שפתי לא אשנה, לא אמרתי לך שחטהו אלא העלהו, אסקתיה אחתיה, עכ"ד רש"י. ודברים אלו קשים להולמם, כי מה רצה בזה אברהם ומה פירש. וגם אם נאמר דהרהר בלבו ח"ו, טפי הי' מקום לדברים אלו תיכף בעת שאמר לו קח נא את בנך.
ויראה לי בס"ד לבאר דברי רש"י ז"ל כך, דהנה ידוע דעשר נסיונות נתנסה אברהם אבינו ע"ה, וזה הי' העשירי, גם הי' הגדול שבכולם כמבואר במדרש [ב"ר נו, יא]. ויראה לי דעיקר הנסיון הי' בזה במה שלא הרהר אחר מדותיו יתברך, ולא הי' עולה על לבו שום קושיא עליו יתברך אשר לפום ראות עיני בשר הי' יוכל להקשות קושיא גדולה על הקב"ה, דהיינו שאתמול הבטיח לו כי ביצחק יקרא לך זרע ועכשיו הוא מצוה לשחטו, ואיו הבטחתו, שאחר שיצחק ישחט איך יקויים בו כי ביצחק יקרא לך זרע, וא"כ טובא הי' לו להקשות, ואעפי"כ לא הקשה כלל, וגם לא עלה בדעתו שום קושיא, כי כל כך הי' לבו נאמן לפניו והי' לבו ברי באמונת הבורא, עד שהאמין לדבר פשוט דיש ביכולתו יתברך לקיים הבטחתו אף באופן שהוא ישחוט את בנו. ואף שדבר זה זר מאד בעינינו, אעפ"כ ממנו לא יבצר ויש ביכולתו לעשות דבר אף נגד שכלנו. וכמו שכתב התיו"ט בפרק א' מר"ה משנה ב' על מה שכתב הרמב"ם [בפי' המשניות שם] על המשנה כל באי עולם עוברים לפניו כבני מרון, ואמרו בגמרא [ר"ה יח, א] וכולם נסקרים בסקירה אחת, וכתב הרמב"ם ז"ל ע"ז וז"ל, הנגלה מזה המאמר מבואר כאשר תראה, אבל הנסתר ענינו קשה מאד בלי ספק. וכתב התיו"ט ע"ז, כי האדם אי אפשר לציירו שני הפכים בנושא אחד, אבל כמו שאי אפשר להשיג מהותו יתברך ויתעלה זכרו נצח, כן אי אפשר להשיג השגחתו וסקירתו, שאם היינו משיגים דרך השגחתו כבר היינו משיגים עצמותו, וזה אי אפשר בשום פנים, עכ"ד התיו"ט. 

וזכור דבריו כי הם נקודה נפלאה ואל ילוזו מעיניך. עכ"פ תראה כי אין מונע לו יתברך לעשות אף דבר שמוזר מאד לשכלנו, על כן גם הכא אחר שאברהם אבינו ע"ה הי' לבו שלם באמונת הבורא, כאשר התוה"ק העידה עליו [בראשית טו, ו] והאמין בה', גלל כן לא עלה לו שום קושיא עליו יתברך במה שצוה לשחוט בנו ואיך יקיים הבטחתו, כי הי' לו פשוט הדבר כי אין מעצור לו יתברך לקיים הבטחתו אף באופן שישחוט את יצחק בנו, ועל כן לא הרהר ורצה באמת לשחוט את בנו, כי הוא חשב באמת שרצון הבורא הוא שישחוט את בנו, על כן כאשר אמר לו אל תשלח, לא הבין הדבר למה לא ישחוט ולמה חזר הקב"ה מדבריו, כי מפני שיקיים הבטחתו כבר יש בידו לקיים אף אם ישחוט את בנו, על כן כאן עמד להקשות כי לא ידע את דעת קונו. ע"ז באה התשובה כי לעולם לא עלה על דעת הבורא לשחוט רק להעלות, ואחר שכבר העלה הוצרך להורידו משם וכבר עשה רצונו יתברך וא"ש, והבן כי דבר נפלא בס"ד.
השי"ת ישים חלקי מן המאמינים בו בכל לב אכי"ר. 

Abarbanel on Emor has a completely different understanding of the Rambam. In his first question, he states that the concept that God judges the world only in one period is difficult to understand. Doesn't God always judge the world?

השאלה הא' צותה על יום התרועה וקבלו רז"ל שנצב לריב ה' ועומד לדין עמים. ובפרק (דף ט"ז) דר"ה אומרים הכל נדונין בר"ה וגזר דין שלהם נחתם ביום הכפורים. וראוי לשאול אם כן למה הגבילו יום מיוחד למשפטי השם ודיניו בעולם הזה ויום מיוחד לשוב בתשובה ולכפרת עונות כי הנה הגבלת הדין ביום זולת יום תפול בשופט שלא יוכל לשפוט את העם בכל עתוידיעתו תלויה בזמן ולקוחה מדברי בעלי דינים וחקירת העדים. ולפי שלא יוכל השופט לעשות זה בתמידות כי נבול יבול יצטרך להגבלת זמן ידוע לשבת על כסא דין אבל השופט כל הארץ יתברך לפניו נגלו כל תעלומות אין ספק שהוא ישפוט תבל בצדק בכל יום ובכל רגע ואינו צריך לחקירת עדים ולא לשמוע טענות הבעלי דינים כי עיניו על כל דרכי איש הוא העד הוא הדייןומה יהיה ענין הדין הזה הנעשה בר"ה ונחתם ביוה"כ.... ומה הוא אם כן דין יום תרועה וסליחה יום כפורים: 

While the Meiri's answer to this exact problem is that this is how the Jewish religion set up a period of teshuva, Abarbanel suggests that it is God who did it this way, like a wise doctor.

והנה עשה ממנו יתברך במצות יום תרועה ויוה"כ אשר נתן לנו כמו שיעשה הרופא החכם אל אוהבו הקרוב אליו שהוא מרפא אותו בשני רפויים. הא' רפוי כללי בזמן מיוחד מן השנה והוא רפוי ישר מסכים ונאות למזגו ומנגד לחליו אותה השנה העתיד לבא כפי הסבה השמימיית ואיכות הפרקים שעברו, והשנית הוא רפוי פרטי שמרפא אותו בעת הצורך כי הוא בבא זמן האביב כדי להעמידו על בריאת גופו ושווי ליחותו ויצוהו בתקון המזג והרקת מותרי הסתיו ורעותיו.

Interestingly, this sounds very similar to Rabbi Natan Slifkin's Meiri, who says that Rosh Hashana and Yom Kippur and the 10 days of repentance are meant for human inspiration and motivation, since it's hard to get people to change without a one-time period devoted for that. Rav Slifkin thinks its evidence for Meiri's adaptation of Necessary Belief. Rav Slifkin links the Meiri, but I have a very hard time finding the concept there. However, I found it in Bet Habechira on Yevamot 49b:

אע"פ שהתשובה יפה בכל עת ובכל זמן מכל מקום יעדו בה הדרכים הדתיים זמן מיוחד שיתעוררו הכל עליה הערה כללית והוא שאמרו כתיב כה' אלהינו בכל קראנו אליו וכתיב דרשו ה' בהמצאו הא ביחיד הא בצבור ויחיד אימת אלו עשרה ימים שבין ראש השנה ליום הכפורים כמו שהתבאר במקומו

Rabbi Dr. Chananel Sari here suggests something similar, that Maimonides was saying the nature of time itself is something very hard to understand. He shows that in the Guide, Maimonides states this several times. So, for example, in 1:73, Maimonides writes:

The Mutakallemim did not at all understand the nature of time. This is a matter of course: for if the greatest philosophers became embarrassed when they investigated the nature of time, if some of them were altogether unable to comprehend what time really was, and if even Galenus declared time to be something divine and incomprehensible, what can be expected of those who do not regard the nature of things? 

And in 2:13, in discussion of the Torah's view of creation, he states:

Many scholars do not know what time really is, and men like Galen were so perplexed about it that they asked whether time has a real existence or not...

Thus, it is hard to understand how we could have set times of judgement of the individual when time itself is something that makes no sense to us. Indeed, he points out, Maimonides believed the prohibition of seeking the "Meonen", is the prohibition of going to someone who says this time is favorable and that time in not favorable (see Sefer Hamitzvot, LT 32, and Laws of Idolatry 11:8-9):

Halacha 8

Who is a fortuneteller? A person who tries to predict auspicious times, using astrology and saying, "This day will be a good day," "This day will be a bad day," "It is appropriate to perform a particular task on a certain day"; or "This year" or "This month will not be opportune for this particular matter."

Halacha 9

It is forbidden to tell fortunes. [This applies] even though one does not perform a deed, but merely relates the falsehoods which the fools consider to be words of truth and wisdom. Anyone who performs a deed because of an astrological calculation or arranges his work or his journeys to fit a time that was suggested by the astrologers is [liable for] lashes, as [Leviticus 19:26] states: "Do not tell fortunes."

So how can Rosh Hashana and Yom Kippur be considered times of judgement? Maimonides, he writes, believes that God doesn't judge in this particular time, but rather we need this particular time to repent, and if we didn't have this, most people wouldn't ever. Indeed, Meiri states this as well, as referenced by Rabbi Sari.

And see http://hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=55614&st=&pgnum=42

My own answer (and as I expected, suggested by others once I started investigating) is that the concept that God, whose knowledge is one with Him, can look at people on an individual level, is difficult for the Rambam. Indeed, in Hilchot Teshuva 5:5 he uses this concept to answer how man can have free will and still God knows all. He realized that this is impossible for us to comprehend:

Halacha 5

One might ask: Since The Holy One, blessed be He, knows everything that will occur before it comes to pass, does He or does He not know whether a person will be righteous or wicked?

If He knows that he will be righteous, [it appears] impossible for him not to be righteous. However, if one would say that despite His knowledge that he would be righteous, it is possible for him to be wicked, then His knowledge would be incomplete.

Know that the resolution to this question [can be described as]: "Its measure is longer than the earth and broader than the sea." Many great and fundamental principles and lofty concepts are dependent upon it. However, the statements that I will make must be known and understood [as a basis for the comprehension of this matter].

As explained in the second chapter of Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah, The Holy One, blessed be He, does not know with a knowledge that is external from Him as do men, whose knowledge and selves are two [different entities]. Rather, He, may His name be praised, and His knowledge are one.

Human knowledge cannot comprehend this concept in its entirety for just as it is beyond the potential of man to comprehend and conceive the essential nature of the Creator, as [Exodus 33:20] states: "No man will perceive, Me and live," so, too, it is beyond man's potential to comprehend and conceive the Creator's knowledge. This was the intent of the prophet's [Isaiah 55:8] statements: "For My thoughts are not your thoughts, nor your ways, My ways."

Accordingly, we do not have the potential to conceive how The Holy One, blessed be He, knows all the creations and their deeds. However, this is known without any doubt: That man's actions are in his [own] hands and The Holy One, blessed be He, does not lead him [in a particular direction] or decree that he do anything.

This matter is known, not only as a tradition of faith, but also, through clear proofs from the words of wisdom. Consequently, the prophets taught that a person is judged for his deeds, according to his deeds - whether good or bad. This is a fundamental principle on which is dependent all the words of prophecy.

And we know in the Guide 1:52 he states:

It is quite clear that there is no relation between God and time or space. For time is an accident connected with motion, in so far as the latter includes the relation of anteriority and posteriority, and is expressed by number, as is explained in books devoted to this subject; and since motion is one of the conditions to which only material bodies are subject, and God is immaterial, there can be no relation between Him and time. Similarly there is no relation between Him and space. 

Thus, I believe he is saying that although it is easy enough to say God judges us individually and personally, God's interaction between time and space, and the way he has knowledge, does not change. So how are we to understand our actions in relation to His judgement? This is indeed difficult.

And whadaya know, Rav Kook says something pretty similar. As quoted by Tov Ro'i compilation of Rav Kook's comments on the Talmud (sourced to Tov Riyah):

בראש השנה כל באי עולם עוברין כבני מרון בפירוש המשניות לרמב"ם הנגלה מזה המאמר מבואר כאשר תראה אבל הנסתר ענינו קשה מאד בלי ספק מה שקשה הוא יחס הזמן אל משפטי השם יתעלה שאי אפשר להבין כי אם בידיעות גדולות מנסתרות התורה 

And they quote also from his letters:

אגרות הראיה ב אגרת שעח עמוד לח 

כבר נתברר למדי במושגי העיון העליון שכל תוכן של זמן אפילו המושג של עבר ועתיד בכלל הוא רק אחד מדרכי התבונה האנושית וכלפי גבוה אין כל זה שייך על כן אין מציאות לשום דבר של כח החסר פועל מצד המציאות המוחלטת העליונה שהרי כל מה שבכח יוצא הוא אל הפועל בהמשך הזמן והמשך הזמן אין שייך כלפי מעלה ממילא אנו יכולים לומר מה שיהיה הוא כבר היה 

Where Did the Blessings Go?

In Deuteronomy 27:11-28:6, the 5th aliyah of Ki Tavo, we find a strange progression.

First we are told the set-up of the tribes for the announcement of the blessings and the curses. Immediately following this we are told what the curses are. Where did the blessings go?

Rashi (27:12) suggests, following the Talmud Sotah 32a, that each of the curses, which are explicitly there, had a converse blessing that was implicitly there. So if the curse was, "Cursed be he who degrades his father and mother", the blessing was "Blessed be he who does not degrade his father and mother."

"...The Levites turned their faces towards Mount Gerizim and began with the blessing: “Blessed be the man who does not make a graven or molten image…,” and these [the tribes on Mount Gerizim] and these [the tribes on Mount Ebal] answered “Amen!” Then [the Levites] turned their faces towards Mount Ebal and began with the curse, saying: “Cursed be the man who makes any graven [or molten] image…,” and these [the tribes on Mount Gerizim] and these [the tribes on Mount Ebal] responded “Amen!” The Levites then turned their faces once again towards Mount Gerizim, and said: “Blessed be he who does not degrade his father and mother,” [and the tribes on Mount Gerizim and those on Mount Ebal responded “Amen!” The Levites] would then turn their faces once again towards Mount Ebal, and say: “Cursed be he who degrades his father and mother,” [and the tribes on Mount Gerizim and those on Mount Ebal responded “Amen!”]. Thus [it would continue] in this manner for all of them [the blessings and curses] until [the very last curse, namely (verse 26)]:“Cursed be the one who does not uphold [the words of this Torah].”

Seforno says very similarly. He opines that the reason the blessings weren't mentioned explicitly was because the emphasis was the curses, in that each person who violates it is punished individually for their crime, the community isn't punished for it. Keli Yakar suggests a different, perhaps more midrashic answer, that since the essential part of blessings are meant for the next world, which is hidden, and only the perot are in this world, so too the blessings are hidden and is there implicitly.

Ibn Ezra (27:14), after noting the Talmud's answer, suggests that on a pshat level, the curses listed here are not the curses referred to as "the blessings and the curses", but rather the blessings are located in the beginning of the next chapter, "Baruch Ata Ba'Ir..." And he thinks that the mentioning of the blessing and curse in Joshua 8:33-34 proves this to be true, because only the blessings of Deuteronomy 28 would be relevant to the Israelites finally entering Israel. And see the Malbim and Ralbag to Joshua 8:33.

Shadal agrees with the Ibn Ezra, and disagrees with Rashi and the Talmud. Without naming them, he says that "the mind cannot tolerate" a suggestion that was made by earlier sages, "kadmonim", that the blessings were the converse of the curses listed. For why would there be a need to bless people for not sleeping with animals, or for not hitting their fellow?

However, he notes that Ibn Ezra is difficult, for what are these curses doing here interrupting the announcements of the blessings and the curses mentioned previously? These curses shouldn't be here! He answers that after much thought, he has come up with something wonderful and correct. That is, why is there blessings and curses being announced anyway? What is their purpose? He proposes that generally, the blessings and curses in the Torah were telling the Israelites that so long as everyone acts appropriately, everyone gets blessed. If people don't act appropriately, everyone gets cursed. That's scary! This would freak the people out. What if someone sins in private? Are we required to knock down everyone's doors to make sure that people aren't sinning?

These curses here teach that the private sinner is the only one who gets punished, it does not reflect badly on the community. Later on in Deuteronomy, that Torah tells us that "the hidden things are for God". Indeed, it is to tell us that we are not required to interrogate and harass every person. Thus, we are told to start that "Arur Ha'Ish" - only the person who sins is cursed.

This has two advantages at this point. First, let no one say that if I sin in private, so what? I won't get punished because the community is good. This is wrong, you will get punished individually even if the community in general is good. Secondly, the nation should not despair that they are being asked to maintain a police state to prevent any one person from sinning in private. This is incorrect - they are not required to do so, each person will get his own if this is done in private.

Thus, the curses here are actually a blessing in disguise. The "blessing and the curse" are indeed this one list of curses. And Joshua wanted to emphasize this as well.

He says this may explain the question even children ask - why was the entire nation plagued for the one sin of Achan, who stole the spoils? His answer is that true, the community was not required to investigate and knock down doors to find who is sinning, and if Reuven sleeps with his step-mother that is his own issue, others are not responsible for this. But once the people start offering gifts to God, they better investigate how these funds were acquired, to make sure it didn't come from stolen property etc, that is their responsibility. The fact they didn't is a sin of the community as a whole.

Interestingly, my grandfather, Rabbi Chaim Zev Bomzer, believes the exact opposite idea - that we were responsible even for the hidden sins of our fellow, and to make sure that we can influence for good instead. If we let the hidden things fester, we will all be punished. In a dvar Torah on Nitzavim addressed to Joel Bloom (now Rabbi Joel Bloom) I assume for his Bar Mitzvah, my grandfather writes:

In the beginning of Parshat Nitzavim, we find:(Deuteronomy 29:9-14) “You are standing this day all of you before the Lord your G-d: your leaders, your tribes, your elders, and your officers, even all the men of Israel. Your little ones, your wives, and your stranger that is in the midst of your camp, from the hewer of your wood unto the drawer of your water. That you should enter into the covenant of the Lord your G-d--and into His oath--which the Lord your G-d makes with you this day. That He may establish you this day unto Himself for a people, and that He may be unto you a G-d, as He spoke unto you, and as He swore unto you fathers, to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob. Neither with you only do I make this covenant and this oath. But with him that stands here with us this day before the Lord our G-d, and also with him that is not here with us this day.” 

The chapter ends with (Deuteronomy 29:28) “The hidden things belong to the Lord, our G-d, but the revealed things apply to us and to our children forever: that we must fulfill all the words of this Torah.” In this parsha, Moses before his passing gathered Israel in the Plains of Moab on the banks of the Jordan River before they would enter the land of Canaan. Moses entered into a covenant with G-d in addition to the previous covenants. This covenant was made with all Jews - children, men, women, and even with all future generations. On the words, (Deuteronomy 29:14) “also with him that is not here with us this day,” Rashi comments, “Af im dorot ha’atidim lihyot - Even with future generations.” (And see Nachmanides as well.) The need for this new covenant is described dramatically to warn Jews who will be in exile and will be influenced by idolatry, that there will be dire consequences the Torah delineates who will sin, (Deuteronomy 29:17) “lest there should be among you man, or woman, or family, or tribe, whose heart turns away this day from the Lord our G-d, to go to serve the gods of those nations…” So, it is an individual, a family, or even a tribe that sins. But who will go into exile? The entire people! Why? This covenant ties the responsibility upon every individual who affects Klal Yisrael. This adds a new dimension of responsibility. Even if the majority will not nullify the covenant, and there continues to be many who continue to connect themselves to the tradition of the covenant, whether many or a few sin, the entire people will suffer. If the sinner is a man, woman, or even a whole family, it is probable that the entire people did not pay attention, doesn’t even know about it, and it is among the “nistarot” - “hidden [sins]” (Deuteronomy 29:28) that G-d knows, and they imagine that G-d will not punish the klal because of that. But if a whole tribe rejects the covenant of G-d, then surely this is known and “niglot” - “revealed” (ibid.), revealed to us and our children and we must get rid of this evil, and if not, then surely all will suffer the consequences - this is the halakhic concept of “kol yisrael arevim zeh la’zeh - all of Israel are responsible for each other.” The law of “arevut” is applied halakhically in many cases. The principle applies to the sheliach tzibbur who leads the prayers, to tekiat shofar - the blowing of the Shofar for everyone in synagogue, the concept of being “motzei” others, and some say even to the concept of “shelichut” in general which affects kiddushin, gittin, hakravat korbanot, hafrashat terumah, and many more. 

In the essence of arevut there is a well-known argument in the Talmud (TB Sanhedrin 43b) between Rabbi Yehudah and Rabbi Nechemia on the verse we quoted, “The hidden things belong to the Lord, our G-d, but the revealed things apply to us and to our children forever...” The question is why there are dots on the word “to us and our children” and on the first letter, ayin, of “ad” - “until”? 

Rabbi Yehudah says: This teaches us that there was no punishment for the nistarot until Israel crossed the Jordan. The peshat is - G-d will punish the sinners for their hidden sins, but rest of the nation will not suffer for them. Once, however, it becomes niglot, then they are “to us and our children” - we all pay. The dots are necessary to teach is that we were exempt from the nistarot until we crossed the Jordan! 

So Rabbi Nechemia said to him: Could there be punishment on the nistarot at all? Doesn’t it say “ad olam”, that the nistarot done now [before crossing the Jordan] will be punishable forever [only to the person who committed the sin]? Rather, it means that just as there is never public punishment for nistarot, so too there was no public punishment for the niglot until they crossed the Jordan. The Talmud asks, why, then, was all of Israel punished for the sin of Achan who stole the spoils? The answer: Because it was not completely private - his wife and children knew! 

The result is that according to Rabbi Yehudah, now, as they are in the plains of Moab, they entered the covenant and became responsible for even the nistarot, which wasn’t true in the desert. In the land of Israel, they were culpable, the whole nation, even on the nistarot.Rabbi Nechemia asks: How can one ever be punished for the hidden sins of another? How can that be fair? Rather, people are never punished for the nistarot of the other. But after they cross, the brit arevut would apply to the niglot, and all are punished for the niglot sins of the individual. 

Truthfully, each opinion is difficult. 

According to Rabbi Yehudah, how could the Just Judge punish the whole nation for the evil deeds of individuals? 

According to Rabbi Nechemia, even the Talmud points out his position is difficult because of the story of Achan in Joshua, which proves that the individual can cause everyone to be punished. And even with the answer the Talmud gives that his wife and children knew, seems insufficient, for how can their knowledge make it the fault of nation, that the whole nation could be punished because of them? 

It is most difficult to understand. At least let us discuss the common denominator between these two positions. Both agree that arevut is applicable only upon entering into the Land of Israel. But should the concept of arevut apply to nistarot? There are four explanations, four sevaras for Rabbi Yehudah’s position that once they enter the land, they are all responsible even for the nistarot of the individual: 

1. All Jews are one unit, one body. When one sins, the whole body is hurt. 

2. The basis of Am Yisrael is bound to G-d and the relationship between the individual and the people. When one sins, the “Am Yisrael” relationship to G-d is hurt. 

3. Jewish leaders are obligated to look for individuals and their hidden problems. When they fail, everyone fails. 

4. We must educate the generation to avoid sin. If people sin, we haven’t done enough to educate. 

When Israel crossed the Jordan to become a sovereign people, then the mutual responsibility took effect. It is the kedusha of the Land of Israel which charged up the people of Israel to be responsible for each individual who is considered a limb of the body of Israel.

Arnold Ehrlich, the 19th century koifer and genius, takes a completely opposite approach to that of Shadal in his Mikra Kepshuto. It's amazing how contemporaries like Shadal and Ehrlich could differ just based on religious orientation!

Ehrlich suggests a very simple answer based on Wellhausen's Documentary Hypothesis. That is, the rabbis later on wanted to focus on the curses to get people to stay in line. People keep the commandments much better because of negative reinforcement than positive reinforcement. And we know that they had these blessings in the time of Joshua, as they were read before entering the land of Israel. Thus, rabbis at some later time removed the blessings to scare the people through the curses to focus on repenting.

He even suggests in a footnote that this occurs many times in ancient times and also the rabbis of the Talmud - where there are many stories filled with tragedy and not so many positive stories. His example is the Talmudic history of the Hasmoneans vis a vis Hanukkah, which is overwhelmingly negative. Indeed, the Hasmoneans are clearly removed from the Hanukkah story, only a short line of their victory given to them, and the focus becomes of the oil and the miracle, which to them was really was saved them!