Now that KolHamevaser's website is gone, I am publishing here my essay on Maimonides and synthesis of opinions. The first essay is the rewritten, reformatted, and generally cut-down version for KolHamevaser. The essay following it is the same essay, but meant for my philosophy professor and not completely prepared for print. Each one has something the other lacks, and the wise one will synthesize the two to create a middle path.
Maimonides
and the Mean of Doctrines
By:
Aryeh Sklar
Just about every essay written about
Maimonides and the contradictions apparent in his philosophic magnum opus, the
Guide for the Perplexed, begins with some pithy statement about how Maimonides’
use of contradictions created more controversy than conclusions. Arthur Hyman,
in his essay, “Interpreting Maimonides,” states that, “Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed is a difficult
and enigmatic work which many times perplexed the very reader it was supposed
to guide.”[i]
Warren Harvey writes, “Maimonides’ Guide
of the Perplexed is a book of puzzles… No one will gainsay that Maimonides
did a superb job of concealment. After almost eight centuries, students of the Guide are still trying to figure out its
puzzles.”[ii]
Menachem Kellner states, “Maimonides precipitated a cottage industry in Jewish
intellectual circles, and has kept his interpreters busy ever since for close
to a millennium.”[iii]
This serves
as a warning of sorts for the reader of interpretations of the Guide. How can
one proceed to ascertain Maimonides’ true belief? When there are multiple
interpretations which seem correct, which one should be accepted? The
discussion invariably involves Maimonides’ declaration of his use of
contradictions early in the Guide, especially the seventh contradiction. The
seventh reason for contradiction, one that Maimonides promises he will employ
in the Guide, is translated thusly by Pines (18):[iv]
In
speaking about very obscure matters it is necessary to conceal some parts and
disclose others. Sometimes in the case of certain dicta this necessity requires
that the discussion proceed on the basis of a certain premise, whereas in
another place necessity requires that the discussion proceed on the basis of
another premise contradicting the first one...The vulgar must in no way be aware
of the contradiction; the author accordingly uses some device to conceal it by
all means.
There have
been many interpretations of this passage, too many to discuss here.[v]
What I would like to focus on is an approach to some of the seeming
contradictions that I have not seen emphasized elsewhere. That is, at least at
times, when there are competing sources of truth, such as the Aristotelian and
the religious, and the conflict cannot be resolved through logical
demonstration, the position one should take is the middle path, the mean of
opinions. This means adopting aspects of the two opinions and synthesizing them
for the best of the religious and philosophical approaches to relieve the
tension between two accepted sources of truth. This is most obvious in cases
where Maimonides lists conflicting or competing opinions, such as with
providence or prophecy in the Guide, and his own opinion is obscured by other
passages in the Guide. Before attempting to apply this theory to those cases to
show its possibility as an interpretive method of some of the contradictions of
the Guide, first we will establish the philosophical and religious basis within
Maimonidean thought for such an approach.
Firstly, given Maimonides’
near-constant advocacy of the middle path as the ultimate goal of man in so
many of his writings, his approach to writing the Guide could align with this
as well. In his commentary to the Mishnah,[vi] in his
Mishneh Torah,[vii]
and in his Guide,[viii]
he repeatedly refers to a type of middle path reminiscent of Aristotle's, with
some important changes.[ix]
That is, in most cases, one should seek the middle way between two extremes of
moral vices, such as the middle way between greediness and being a spendthrift.
Similarly, one should find the middle path between cowardice and recklessness.
And so on for most moral ills. Generally, the Golden Mean is understood to be a
way of perfecting and maintaining moral attributes. How can opinions be
considered in that category? Strikingly, Maimonides seems to consider both faith
and reasoning itself as moral virtues.[x] In the
Guide, 3:53, Maimonides states (631):
[W]hen
you walk in the way of the moral virtues, you do justice to your rational soul,
giving her the due that is her right. And because every moral virtue is called
zedakah, it says: “And he believed in the Lord, and it was accounted to him as
zedakah” (Gen. 15:6). I refer to the
virtue of faith.
Thus, ideas and concepts can be included in the category of
moral perfection, to be done through the Golden Mean.
There is another way that intellect
and moral virtues converge in Maimonidean thought. Though Aristotle derived the
basis for the Golden Mean from the tendency of nature to follow the middle
path, Maimonides derives the basis instead from the religious invocation to
imitate God, imitatio dei.[xi]
As Marvin Fox put it, “Maimonides works here fully inside the Jewish tradition.
He readily adopts the outer form of the mean as his theoretical base and
principle of explanation, but the specific contents of the good life are
defined not by way of nature but by way of the imitation of God.”[xii]
Imitatio dei, another recurring theme
in Maimonides’ writings, covers two areas that Maimonides was most interested
in: the perfection of character traits, and also the perfection of one’s
intellect.[xiii]
If the perfection of the intellect occurs in the same fashion as the perfection
of character traits, it makes sense that one should seek the mean of
intellectual ideas when it would not compromise rational perfection.
Further, the very use of
contradictions itself is an expression of imitatio
dei, according to Maimonides. Maimonides states that the way the prophetic
works of the Bible are written is such that the true opinions are hidden in the
text, whether through the contradiction of differing parables, or the
contradiction of stating a proviso out of its proper place, because of a
certain necessity, such that it seems a contradiction. But he goes on to write
that the question of whether the “seventh cause” described above, that of
concealment and obfuscation, is to be found in the books of the prophets is “a
matter for speculative study and investigation” (19). Although he expresses
doubt if it was actually employed or not, he concedes its possibility. Thus, by
employing the seventh cause in his own writing, he is following after those who
have had communion with God, a God-approved style of writing.
It is also clear from Maimonides’
declaration of the purpose of the Guide, and the audience he is writing to,
that he sought a kind of religious
solution as well. In the very beginning of his introduction to the Guide (5-6)
he describes the student who is “a religious man for whom the validity of our
Law has become established in his soul and has become actual in his belief.” On
the other hand, the student has also “studied the sciences of the philosophers
and come to know what they signify.” Maimonides proposes to help this student
“remove most of the difficulties.” His task, then, is that this must be done in
a way that will allow the student to feel that the Torah law is still valid,
and that he is not abandoning reason by believing in and following the Torah.
Submission to one truth over another would not seem to work if Maimonides is to
be successful. Many times, not all contradictions are merely apparent, and many
seem insurmountable. Thus, when truth is unknown - when there are two competing
sources for truth - the Golden Mean must be employed. A synthetic approach can
at times be the best solution for Maimonides’ audience.
Maimonides writes regarding the
contradictions in the Guide that the masses must not be aware of their
existence. According to what we have been saying, this is because Maimonides
only wants the reader to see the synthesized version, but not out of what it
was created. To accept this synthesized version, one is required to accept two
sources of truth when dealing with doubt— the philosophical and religious—and also be willing to come to a moderate position
between both of them, which is a highly nuanced position. The ignorant
philosopher would not accept the religious truth, and the ignorant religious
person would not accept the philosophic truth,[xiv] and
the nuanced mean is where neither has to suffer.
As
mentioned previously, Maimonides’ method can be most easily seen in lists of
multiple opinions in the Guide for a given topic. In each case, there are at
least three opinions, two of which are at the extremes. It is my contention
that in each of these cases, Maimonides advocates the moderate position, the
‘mean’ of opinions. The listing of multiple possible positions occurs primarily
in three places in the Guide; regarding creation, prophecy, and providence.
Maimonides
tells us that, in some fashion, the positions regarding creation aligns with
that of prophecy. Specifically, he states in the Guide 2:32 (360), “The
opinions of people concerning prophecy are like their opinions concerning the
eternity of the world or creation of the world. I mean by this that just as the
people to whose mind the existence of the Deity is firmly established, have, as
we have set forth [in 2.13], three opinions concerning the eternity or creation
of the world, so are there three opinions concerning prophecy.” The mystery, or
puzzle, is what way did Maimonides intend that these align? A quick listing of
the positions and who believes them are such:
C1 - Creation ex nihilo (those who believe in the Torah)
C2 - Creation out of eternal matter
(Plato)
C3 - Eternal universe (Aristotle)
P1 - Prophecy is given to whomever
God chooses (the vulgar)
P2 - Prophecy is a natural process
and God has no part in who receives it (the philosopher)
P3 - Prophecy is natural but can be
hindered by God at His choosing (the Torah and our foundation)
The
maximum number of possible combinations, at the face of it, is nine in all.
However, there are a few combinations that are improbable. We have to assume
that there must be some sort of philosophical parallel, or group parallel, with
each of the correspondences. Meaning, we can say with certainty there are
specific combinations that Maimonides would never had had in mind. He never
would have thought that Aristotle's eternity of the world would correspond with
the view of prophecy that it can be presented to nearly anyone, because one
philosophically casts God as impotent, and the other omnipotent as regards to
choice and communication with man. Thus there has to be some sort of line-up
regarding the philosophical underpinnings of the positions. Similarly, it is
difficult to argue that the “philosopher” group as regards to prophecy could
line up with the vulgar group as regards to creation, simply because the groups
themselves are so incompatible.
Thus,
we seem “stuck” with three opinions about possible combinations: Harvey[xv],
Davidson[xvi],
and Kaplan[xvii].
Where Creation is the first number and prophecy the second, Harvey sees it as
1:1, 2:2, 3:3. Davidson sees it as 1:1, 2:3, 3:2. Kaplan sees it as 1:3, 2:1,
3:2. Each one has its advantages, and each one has its disadvantages.
Let
us begin with Harvey’s combination. Creation ex nihilo lines up well with ultimate freedom by God to choose
anyone as a prophet, both granting God omnipotence. This would mean, however,
that Maimonides believes Creation ex
nihilo lines up with the position of the vulgar, which defies the exoteric
reading of the Guide. The Platonic view of creation also lines up as a group
parallel with the naturalist view of prophecy, which Maimonides marks as the
position of the philosophers. But there is a great disadvantage with this view,
because Maimonides emphasizes that the naturalist view does not allow God to
step in and block prophecy from those who deserve it naturally, while the
Platonic view would allow it. Additionally, Aristotle’s view of creation should
not concur with God’s ability to prevent prophecy from someone. Harvey is
forced to explain that Maimonides would have to argue against the accepted
Aristotelian view that the eternality of the world necessitates God’s inability
to act in it—a necessity that Maimonides seems to accept within the
Aristotelian view.
Kaplan
represents a “religious” approach to Maimonides, wherein Maimonides aligns
creation ex nihilo with prophecy that
allows for God obstructing it from certain people. But Kaplan lines up Platonic
creation with absolutely free choice by God in prophecy. It is difficult to
understand why each one could not apply to the other. Meaning, it is even
easier to argue creation ex nihilo
could align with absolutely free divine choice in prophecy, and Platonic
creation with a limited divine choice.
That
is, in fact, what Davidson argues. Thus, the Platonic creation would line up
with the “Law of Moses” view of prophecy, and based on this analysis he
concludes that Maimonides believed the Platonic view of creation to be true. There
are still a few issues to work out. This interpretation relies on a rarely-held
position that Maimonides is really a Platonic philosopher, at least as regards
to creation. While it is true that he allows for the Platonic view of creation
as a “possible opinion” in the Guide, he is fairly explicit in his vehement
denial of Jewish belief to allow for the Platonic view, which he equates to the
Aristotelian one in that regard. Furthermore, the Platonic view of creation does
not appear to be obviously present in the Guide or in Maimonides’ other
writings. As Davidson himself notes, it also seems to go against the thrust of
Maimonides’ argument in the Guide for the creation of the world. Maimonides
spends a large amount of his book showing that creation ex nihilo is equal in demonstrative proof as Aristotle’s theory of
an eternal world, meaning that both do not have it. He spends very little time
on the Platonic theory. If he was hiding his theory through esotericism, it
would be the Aristotelian one, which he fights against in the Guide, if
anything. So why would he do this?
By
supposing Maimonides is seeking the middle of these opinions here, these issues
could be resolved. Within the theories of creation, there is an Aristotelian
view of eternity of the universe, and there is the religious/traditional view
of creation ex nihilo. The middle
path, then, is a Platonic view that allows for creation and miracles. The
others could not be chosen. If creation ex
nihilo is picked, Maimonides’ audience would feel it has abandoned its intellect.
If the view of an eternal world is picked, Maimonides’ audience will feel its religious
foundation crumbling, with no miracles and no revelation. Instead, Platonic
creation can take the best features of both Aristotelian eternity and religious
creation ex nihilo: eternal matter
but with the possibility of miracles.
Indeed,
Maimonides explicitly states that he agrees with Aristotle half-way. In Guide
2:29 (346) he states, “We agree with Aristotle with regard to one half of his
opinion…” He goes on to state this half as being an eternal world a parte post,
until God miraculously changes it. Is this really any part of Aristotle’s
position? It can scarcely be said to be in any semblance to Aristotle’s theory
of an eternal universe. The real half that could be agreed upon would be the
state of eternal matter. That is closer to Aristotelian philosophy than that of
agreeing to an eternal world a parte post were God never to miraculously change
it. However, he could not do this if the audience remained convinced the
philosophic demonstrable truth lies of with Aristotelian eternity. So his first
job was to lower the demonstrable truth of eternity to the same level as
Platonic creation and creation ex nihilo.
Then, and only then, could he create a successful synthesis. While not
necessarily believing in the Platonic view of creation himself, Maimonides
allows his religiously and philosophically committed reader to take a middle
path between the two.[xviii]
Similarly,
there are three opinions regarding prophecy. One is a view of prophecy that sees
it as wholly miraculous, and anyone God chooses can receive it. Another is a view
of prophecy that is wholly naturalistic, believing that God can’t choose any
particular person to receive or not receive that prophecy. Both pose a problem
to the religious philosopher. The philosopher believes in divine overflow, and
the perfection of the intellect to receive prophecy, so the first view of
prophecy cannot be true. The second position, however, poses a problem to the
religious person who believes that God has an active part in the process in
which the person to which prophecy is conveyed receives his prophecy. Thus,
Maimonides chose the opinion that represents the best of both, that prophecy is
a natural process in which God has the power to withhold prophecy should He
will it. In this synthesis model, Maimonides was not saying that there is a
correspondence of a precise nature in both discussions. Rather, there are three
opinions, two of which are at extremes, and a third opinion exists that can be
seen as a moderate view.
Another
area Maimonides discusses various views and has his own in the Guide is in
regard to divine providence. In Guide 3:17, Maimonides lists six opinions as
regards to providence, including his own. If we disregard the one he attributes
to Epicurus and quickly dismisses, there are five. The first four are:
1.
Only
permanent and ordered things have providence, but not individuals (Aristotle)
2.
Everything
has divine providence (Asharite)
3.
Man has free
will, but divine providence also acts over everything using divine wisdom
(Mutazilite)
4.
Man and God
have free will, and God is just. Divine providence acts over all humans using
divine justice. This may imply some “suffering of love.” It may also imply
violations of natural law. (Believers in the Torah)
Maimonides explains the problems he
has with each of these theories, and proposes his own that combines the Torah
theory with Aristotle’s theory. It is important to point out that Maimonides
explicitly connects Aristotle’s view with that about creation. Regarding
Aristotle’s view, he writes, “This view is closely connected with his theory of
the Eternity of the Universe and with his opinion that everything different from
the existing order of things in Nature is impossible. It is the belief of those
who turned away from our Law…” If so, it would make sense for Maimonides to
take elements of it into account as he did for creation. Thus, his own opinion
is such that he agrees with the Torah view in that Divine providence exists for
human individuals who excel in intellectual perfection. However, Aristotle is
correct about other aspects of the world, such as individual animals, the
natural world, which are left to chance. A leaf blows because of natural
chance, not because God specifically willed it. In doing this, he explicitly
combines the two approaches to form a synthesized third.
In
summation, Maimonides’ method of contradictions could be related to his
doctrine of the mean, at least in cases of unproven opinions. We have seen that
faith and reasoning are subject to the category of virtue and vice, and that
following the middle path among both moral and intellectual extremes can
fulfill imitatio dei. We proposed
that Maimonides wrote his Guide with contradictions that are resolved through
the mean because it would fulfill another aspect of imitation dei,
following God’s own use of contradictions. In some cases, where Maimonides
lists multiple opinions and obfuscates what his own opinion is, he appears to
support the position which follows the mean. In other cases, it is clear that
his own position does, in fact, combine aspects of other opinions. Thus, it can
be said that Maimonides believes not only in the doctrine of the mean, but also
the mean of doctrines.
Aryeh Sklar is a student at Bernard
Revel School for Jewish Studies majoring in Jewish Philosophy
[ii] Harvey, “A Third Approach To Maimonides'
Cosmogony-Prophetology Puzzle”, The
Harvard Theological Review, Vol. 74, No. 3 (July, 1981), 287
[iii] Kellner, Menachem, “Reading Rambam: Approaches to the
Interpretation of Maimonides,” Jewish
History Vol. 5, No. 2 (Fall, 1991), 75
[iv] All translations of the Guide of the Perplexed and
pagination are from the Pines translation of The Guide of the Perplexed,
Chicago: University of Chicago, 1963
[v] See for example, Leo Strauss, Persecution and the Art of Writing (Glencoe, IL: Free, 1952) 38-94;
and his "How to Begin to Study The Guide of the Perplexed," Pines’
Guide of the Perplexed, xi-lvi, and Joseph Buijis’ response, “The Philosophical
Character of Maimonides’ Guide - A Critique of Strauss’ Interpretation,” Judaism, Vol. 27 (1978), 448-457. For an
approach not too dissimilar from the one argued in this article, see especially
Marvin Fox, Interpreting Maimonides:
Studies in Methodology, Metaphysics and Moral Philosophy (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1990), 67-90, and Yair Lorberbaum, “On
Contradictions, Rationality, Dialectics, and Esotericism in Maimonides' ‘Guide
of the Perplexed’”, The Review of Metaphysics,
Vol. 55, No. 4 (Jun., 2002), 711-750
[ix] See Fox’s “The Doctrine of the Mean in Aristotle and
Maimonides” in Interpreting Maimonides:
Studies in Methodology, Metaphysics and Moral Philosophy (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1990), 93-123, also found in Maimonides: A Collection of Critical Essays (IN: Notre Dame Press,
1998), 234-263
[xi] See Maimonides’ Mishneh Torah, Laws of Temperaments
1:6, and his Book of the Commandments: positive commandment #8
[xiii] See Howard Kreisel, “Imitatio Dei in Maimonides'
Guide of the Perplexed,” AJS Review Vol. 19, No. 2 (1994), 169-211
[xiv] Indeed, this is what drives Maimonides to write in
his introduction to Avot that he will censor the names of the philosophers he
has in mind, as the masses would throw out the very valid ideas just based on
where they came from.
[xv] Harvey, “A Third Approach To Maimonides'
Cosmogony-Prophetology Puzzle”, The
Harvard Theological Review, Vol. 74, No. 3 (July, 1981), 287-301
[xvi] See Herbert Davidson, "Maimonides' Secret
Position on Creation," in Isadore Twersky, ed., Studies in Medieval Jewish History and Literature (Cambridge:
Harvard University, 1979) 16-40
[xviii] Presented here are only a few positions regarding
Maimonides on creation. For further study into the topic, see Jewish Philosophy: Perspectives and
Retrospectives, Academic Studies Press, 2012, 157-232
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[Class version]
Maimonides and
the Mean of the Doctrines
Just about every
essay written about Maimonides and the contradictions of the Guide begins with
some pithy statement about how Maimonides’ use of contradictions created more
controversy than conclusions. Arthur Hyman, in his essay, “Interpreting
Maimonides,” states that, “Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed is
a difficult and enigmatic work which many times perplexed the very reader it
was supposed to guide.”[i] Warren Harvey
writes, “Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed is a book of
puzzles… No one will gainsay that Maimonides did a superb job of concealment.
After almost eight centuries, students of the Guide are still
trying to figure out its puzzles.”[ii] Menachem
Kellner states, “Maimonides precipitated a cottage industry in Jewish
intellectual circles, and has kept his interpreters busy ever since for close
to a millennium.”[iii]
This
fact cannot be avoided, and serves as a warning of sorts for the reader of
scholarly interpretations of the Guide. These statements are a testament to the
inability for interpreters of Maimonides to definitively derive Maimonides’
position about nearly anything. Maimonides has been variously cast through the
centuries as, at times, a master kabbalist on one side, an uber-Aristotelian on
the other, and more still. Harvey, in offering yet a third approach to one such
esoteric puzzle of Maimonides (which we will look at more closely later) said
it best when he first frames his argumentation as, “The current discussion of
this puzzle would, I think, be lacking if some words were not said in favor of
the most obvious correspondence…”[iv] Although
he continues to say he believes this is the correct correspondence, he frames
it first as though given the possibility for this approach, the argument should
at least be made, and the discussion would “be lacking” otherwise. This is
quite interesting indeed - the way it is phrased shows how scholars have begun
to approach Maimonidean puzzles. Maimonides, in his use of contradictions,
opened himself up so wide that the mere possibility of approach could be a
valid one[1] .
It
is with this in mind that I would like to produce another reading of
Maimonides’ seventh contradiction, and I think the discussion would be lacking
without it. The seventh contradiction, one that Maimonides promises he will
employ in the Guide, is translated thusly by Pines (18):[v]
In speaking about
very obscure matters it is necessary to conceal some parts and disclose others.
Sometimes in the case of certain dicta this necessity requires that the
discussion proceed on the basis of a certain premise, whereas in another place
necessity requires that the discussion proceed on the basis of another premise
contradicting the first one...The vulgar must in no way be aware of the
contradiction; the author accordingly uses some device to conceal it by all
means.
There
have been many varied types of readings of this passage.[vi] While
Fox,[vii] Lorberbaum,[viii] and
others take a “dialectic” approach, I will take a “synthesis” approach, quite
to the opposite. That is, at least at times, when there are multiple
interpretations of truths, such as the Aristotelian and the Torah, and the
conflict is not capable of being resolved through demonstration, the position
one should take is the middle path, the mean of opinions. This means adopting
aspects of the two opinions and synthesizing them for the best religious and
philosophical approach to the tension between two accepted truths. This is most
obvious in cases where he lists conflicting or competing opinions, such as with
providence or prophecy in the Guide, and his own opinion is obscured by other
passages in the Guide. Before attempting to apply this theory to those cases to
show its possibility as an interpretation of the many contradictions of the
Guide, it is important to establish the philosophical and religious basis
within Maimonidean thought for such an approach.
As I have alluded
to earlier, such an approach could fit with Maimonides’ general advocation of
the middle path as the ultimate goal of man. In the introduction to his
Commentary to Avot, in his Mishneh Torah, and in his Guide, he repeatedly
refers to a type of middle path reminiscent of Aristotle's, with some important
changes.[ix] For the most part,
Maimonides applies this to moral perfection. That is, the middle way between
two extremes of moral vices, such as cowardice and recklessness, is courage,
and that is to be sought. The middle way between the extremes of arrogance and
self-abasement is humility. And so on. However, it is my contention that this
applies to uncertain opinions as well.
Generally, the
Golden Mean is understood to be a way of perfecting and maintaining moral
attributes. How can opinions be considered in that category? Strikingly,
Maimonides seems to consider both faith and reasoning itself as moral virtues.[x] In the Guide, 3:53, Maimonides states
(631):
[W]hen you walk
in the way of the moral virtues, you do justice to your rational soul, giving
her the due that is her right. And because every moral virtue is called zedakah,
it says: “And he believed in the Lord, and it was accounted to him as zedakah”
(Gen. 15:6). I refer to the virtue of faith. This applies likewise
to His dictum, may He be exalted: "And it shall be zedakah to
us if we take care to observe" (Deut. 6:25), and so on...
It is unclear how
faith “does justice to your rational soul.” However, Maimonides in one of his[2] earliest
writings, his Treatise on Logic, in the 14th chapter, writes that, “Reasoning,
the act of conceiving ideas,” can, like moral actions, be described as “either
excellent or defective. We thus speak of intellectual virtues and vices.” Thus,
the act of reasoning is a moral action to the self, the perfecting of the
rational soul through repeated efforts, like other moral deeds.
In the second
chapter to his introduction to Avot, “Eight Chapters”, Maimonides provides some
more information about the rational soul, distinguishing between moral virtues
and intellectual virtues:[xi]
Now, as for the
virtues, they are of two kinds, moral and intellectual, with the corresponding
two classes of vices. The intellectual virtues belong to the rational faculty.
They are (1) wisdom, which is the knowledge of the direct and indirect causes
of things based on a previous realization of the existence of those things, the
causes of which have been investigated; (2) reason, consisting of (a) inborn,
theoretical reason, that is, axioms, (b) the acquired intellect, which we need
not discuss here, and (c) sagacity and intellectual cleverness, which is the
ability to perceive quickly, and to grasp an idea without delay, or in a very
short time. The vices of this faculty are the antitheses or the opposites of
these virtues.[xii]
Earlier in the
chapter, Maimonides considers the possibility of transgression when it comes to
believing false doctrines, though he is not firm on that point:
As regards the
rational faculty, uncertainty prevails (among philosophers), but I maintain
that observance and transgression may also originate in this faculty, in so far
as one believes a true or a false doctrine, though no action which may be
designated as an observance or a transgression results therefrom.[xiii]
Thus, like moral
actions, doctrinal errors are also subject to the category of sin. In the next
chapters, Maimonides states that the soul can only be perfected when achieving
the goal of the mean in action. Since rational mistakes are not only immoral in
terms of action, as seen in the Guide and the Treatise on Logic,[xiv] but also subject to sin as seen in
his Eight Chapters, it emerges that Maimonides would understand thoughts and
beliefs as having a similar to solution to its vices as moral actions do, some
kind of doctrine of the mean.
What is, after
all, the basis for the doctrine of the mean? Maimonides himself does not
discuss this aspect of the mean, and he seems to assume its truth without
inquiry into its philosophical basis. Aristotle, on the other hand, uses nature
as one of the indications of the truth of this ideal. Nature, to Aristotle,
follows the doctrine of the mean as much as possible for the greatest purpose.
For example, “Eyes may be large or small, or medium-sized. The medium-sized are
the best.”[xv] If, as Fox points out,[xvi] Maimonides seems to completely
assume the doctrine of the golden mean as philosophically and empirically true,
it would make sense that this could apply to areas outside of that of moral
actions, which is what Maimonides discusses most directly. Thus, Maimonides, in
forming his own opinion of philosophical questions, when demonstrable truth is
not attainable, would also seek a moderate positions between two possible
extreme ones[3] .
The doctrine of
the mean, for Maimonides, goes further than nature itself being a general
indication of the good life. More than that, it is knowledge and therefore the
imitation of God, imitatio dei, that is the middle way of the good
life. As Fox puts it, “Maimonides works here fully inside the Jewish tradition.
He readily adopts the outer form of the mean as his theoretical base and
principle of explanation, but the specific contents of the good life are
defined not by way of nature but by way of the imitation of God.”[xvii] (According to this, even as regards
to the doctrine of the mean itself, Maimonides synthesizes two traditions to
arrive at his own opinion.) Fox thinks it significant that the first of 11
commandments stated in Maimonides Hilkhot Deot, dedicated to actional
perfection, is the obligation to imitate God, and that he devotes the first
five of seven chapters to this topic. And Maimonides understands imitatio
dei as not only achieved through ethical perfection of action, but
also through intellectual perfection. Bringing these together, it would seem
that when intellectual truth is unattainable through rational inquiry, it seems
necessary that, forced to make choices, one should seek the middle path between
opinions, the moderate position among extremes, in the same way as one seeks
the middle path between temperaments.
The very use of
contradictions itself is an expression of imitatio dei, to
Maimonides. Maimonides states that the way the prophetic works of the Bible are
written is such that the true opinions are hidden in the text, whether through
the third cause of differing parables, or the fourth cause of stating a proviso
out of its proper place, because of a certain necessity, such that it seems a
contradiction. But he goes on to write that the question whether the seventh
cause, of concealment and obfuscation, is to be found in the books of the
prophets is “a matter for speculative study and investigation” (19). Thus, by
employing the seventh cause in his own writing, he is following after those who
have had communion with God, a God-approved style of writing.
It is also clear
from Maimonides’ declaration of the purpose of the Guide, and the audience he
is writing to, that he sought a kind of religious solution as
well. He recognized that the conflict between philosophic and religious
opinions were at the root of the problem he wished to solve, and that this
tension was impacting people’s faith in Judaism. In the very beginning of his
introduction to the Guide (5-6) he describes the student who is “a religious
man for whom the validity of our Law has become established in his soul and has
become actual in his belief.” On the other hand, the student has also “studied
the sciences of the philosophers and come to know what they signify.”
Maimonides then states that only two resolutions appear to face a person in
this state of perplexity. Either he eschews the Law, something he cannot do, or
he eschews the intellect and feels “a loss to himself and harm to his
religion.” This is significant. Maimonides proposes to help this student
“remove most of the difficulties.” His task, then, is that this must be done in
a way that will allow the student to feel that the Torah law is still valid,
and that he isn’t abandoning reason to do so.
There is really a
limited number of ways that Maimonides could make this attempt. One is to show
how a certain philosophical theory does not, in fact, contradict the Torah. For
example, one perplexity Maimonides spends much of the beginning of the Guide
discussing is the problem of anthropomorphisms in the Torah. The Torah seems to
describe a god that is physical, and the accepted philosophical approach is an
incorporeal god. Maimonides’ solution is to show how the words that contain
these descriptions are simple anthropomorphic metaphors and the conflict is
resolved with no worse for philosophic or religious wear.
But what of cases
where religious thought is indeed negatively affected by the competing accepted
philosophic position? Intellectual perfection demands the seeking of truth
above all else. But this becomes difficult when the philosophic idea competes
with the very foundations of religion - miracles, providence, and the like, are
founded upon an active and creative god. Not only that, but many of these
topics are predicated on certain premises not demonstrable, or at least can be
argued so. It isn’t as much a search for truth as a search for what seems more
true than something else. It is in these cases that it could be religiously
problematic, and his goal to “remove most of the difficulties”, including preserving
the important religious feelings of his learned Jewish audience, can find a
solution in synthesis of ideas. Thus, he would need to find a solution that
would take this into account. It is here that a kind of synthesis would be
possible, and necessary[4] .
Maimonides
doesn’t want the masses to be aware of the contradictions. According to what we
have been saying, this is because Maimonides only wants the reader to see the
synthesized version, but not out of what it was created. To accept the
synthesized version that Maimonides creates, one is required to accept two
modes of truth when dealing with doubt: philosophic and religious, and also be
willing to compromise on both of them[5] , which is a very nuanced position. The
ignorant philosopher doesn’t accept the religious truth, and the ignorant
religious person doesn’t accept the philosophic truth,[xviii] and
nobody wants to compromise on their convictions.
As
mentioned previously, Maimonides’ method can be most easily seen in lists of
multiple opinions in the Guide for a given topic. In each case, there are at
least three opinions, two of which are at the extremes of positions. It is my
contention that the real Maimonidean position in these cases is the moderate
position. The listing of multiple possible positions occurs in three main
places in the Guide, those being in regards to creation, prophecy, and
providence. Additionally, he famously lists three types of readers of the Torah
in his introduction to his commentary to the 10th chapter of Mishnah Sanhedrin.
We will also examine Maimonides’ approach to the question of divine will versus
divine wisdom in the Law.
Maimonides
tells us that, in some fashion, the positions regarding creation aligns with
that of prophecy. Specifically, he states in the Guide 2:32 (360), “The
opinions of people concerning prophecy are like their opinions concerning the
eternity of the world or creation of the world. I mean by this that just as the
people to whose mind the existence of the Deity is firmly established, have, as
we have set forth [in 2.13], three opinions concerning the eternity or creation
of the world, so are there three opinions concerning prophecy.” The mystery, or
puzzle, is what way did Maimonides intend that these align? A quick listing of
the positions and who believes them are such:
C1 -
Creation ex nihilo (those who believe in the Torah)
C2 - Creation out
of eternal matter (Plato)
C3 - Eternal
universe (Aristotle)
P1 - Prophecy is
given to whomever God chooses (the vulgar)
P2 - Prophecy is
a natural process and God has no part in who receives it (the philosopher)
P3 - Prophecy is
natural but can be hindered by God at His choosing (the Torah and our
foundation)
The maximum
number of possible combinations, at the face of it, is nine in all. However,
there are a few combinations that are improbable. We have to assume that there
must be some sort of philosophical parallel, or group parallel, with each of
the correspondences. Meaning, certainly there are specific combinations that
Maimonides would never had had in mind. He never would have thought that
Aristotle's eternity of the world would correspond with the view of prophecy
that it can be presented to nearly anyone, where one philosophically casts God
as impotent, and the other omnipotent as regards to choice and communication
with man. Thus there has to be some sort of line-up regarding the philosophical
underpinnings of the positions. Similarly, it is difficult to argue that the
“philosopher” group as regards to prophecy could line up with the vulgar group
as regards to creation, because the groupings represent two very different
outlooks.
Thus,
we seem “stuck” with actually three opinions about possible combinations:
Harvey[xix], Davidson[xx],
and Kaplan[xxi]. Where Creation is the first
number and prophecy the second, Harvey sees it as 1:1, 2:2, 3:3. Davidson sees
it as 1:1, 2:3, 3:2. Kaplan sees it as 1:3, 2:1, 3:2. Each one has its
advantages, and each one has its disadvantages.
Let’s take
Harvey’s combination, for example. Creation ex nihilo lines up
well with ultimate freedom by God to choose anyone as a prophet, both granting
God omnipotence. This would mean, however, that Maimonides believes
Creation ex nihilo lines up with the position of the vulgar,
which defies the exoteric reading of the Guide. The Platonic view of creation
also lines up as a group parallel with the naturalist view of prophecy, which
Maimonides marks as the position of the philosophers. But there is a main
disadvantage with this view, because Maimonides emphasizes that the naturalist
view does not allow God to step in and block prophecy from those who deserve it
naturally, while the Platonic view would allow it. Additionally, Aristotle’s
view of creation should not concur with God’s ability to prevent prophecy from
someone. Harvey is forced to explain Maimonides as arguing against the accepted
Aristotelian view that with eternity of the world God cannot act[6] .
Kaplan represents
a “religious” approach to Maimonides, wherein Maimonides aligns creation ex
nihilo with prophecy that allows for God obstructing it from certain
people. But Kaplan lines up Platonic creation with absolutely free choice by
God in prophecy. It is difficult to understand why each one couldn’t apply to
the other. Meaning, it is even easier to argue creation ex nihilo could
align with absolutely free divine choice in prophecy, and Platonic creation
with a limited divine choice.
That is, in fact,
what Davidson argues. This would line up Platonic creation with the “Law of
Moses” view of prophecy, and suppose Maimonides believed this to be the truth..
But there are a few issues to work out. It relies on a rarely-held position
that Maimonides is really a Platonic philosopher, at least as regards to
creation. It is true that he allows for the Platonic view of creation as a
“possible opinion.” Though he is fairly explicit elsewhere in his vehement
denial of Jewish belief to allow for the Platonic view, which he equates to the
Aristotelian one. And holding like the Platonic view of creation is not at all
obviously present in the Guide or in Maimonides’ other writings. It also seems
to go against the thrust of Maimonides’ argument in the Guide. Maimonides
spends a large amount of his book showing that creation ex nihilo is
equal in demonstrative proof as Aristotle’s theory of an eternal world, meaning
that both don’t have it. He spends very little time on the Platonic theory. If
he was hiding an esoteric theory, it would be the Aristotelian one, which he
fights against in the Guide, if anything. So why would he do this?
By supposing
Maimonides is seeking the middle of these opinions here, these issues could be
resolved. Within the theories of creation, there is an Aristotelian view of
eternity of the universe, and there is the religious/traditional view of
creation ex nihilo. The middle path, then, is a Platonic view that
allows for creation and miracles. The others could not be chosen. If
creation ex nihilo is picked, Maimonides’ audience would feel they
have abandoned their intellect. If eternal world is picked, Maimonides’
audience will feel their religious foundation crumbling, with no miracles and
no revelation. Instead, Platonic creation can take the best features of both
Aristotelian eternity and religious creation ex nihilo: eternal
matter but with the possibility of miracles.
Indeed,
Maimonides explicitly states that he must agree with Aristotle half-way. In
Guide 2:29 (346) he states, “We agree with Aristotle with regard to one half of
his opinion…” He goes on to state this half as being an eternal world a parte
post, until God miraculously changes it. Is this really any part of Aristotle’s
position? It can scarcely be said to be in any semblance to Aristotle’s theory
of an eternal universe. The real half that could be agreed upon would be the
state of eternal matter. That is closer to Aristotelian philosophy than that of
agreeing to an eternal world a parte post were God never to miraculously
change it[7] .
However, he could not do this if the audience remained convinced the philosophic
demonstrable truth lies of with Aristotelian eternity. So his first job was to
lower the demonstrable truth of eternity to the same level as Platonic creation
and creation ex nihilo. Then, and only then, could he create a
successful synthesis for his audience, and follow the middle path.
Similarly, there
are three opinions as regards to prophecy. One is a type of prophecy that is
wholly miraculous, and anyone God chooses can receive it. Another is a type of
prophecy that is wholly natural, and God can’t choose any particular person to
receive or not receive that prophecy. Both pose a problem to the religious
philosopher. The philosopher believes in divine overflow, and the perfection of
the intellect to receive prophecy, so the first type of prophecy cannot be
true. The second type, however, poses a problem to the religious person who
believes that God has an active part in the process in which the person to
which prophecy is conveyed receives his prophecy. Thus, Maimonides chose the
opinion that represents the best of both, that prophecy is a natural process in
which God has the power to withhold prophecy should He will it. In this
synthesis model, Maimonides was not saying that there is a correspondence of a
precise nature in both discussions. Rather, there are three opinions, two of
which are at extremes, and a third opinion exists that can be seen as a
moderate view.
This is where a
third opinion exists to be a moderate that he could choose. But sometimes, he
had to create a third middle opinion. Regarding will vs. wisdom as applied to
the Law, Maimonides lists two opinions on the extreme, and then proceeds to
offer his own. In the Guide 3:26 (506), Maimonides states:
Just as there is
disagreement among the men of speculation among the adherents of the Law
whether His works, may He be exalted, are consequent upon wisdom or upon the
will alone without being intended toward any end at all, there is also the same
disagreement among them regarding our Laws, which He has given to us. Thus
there are people who do not seek for them any cause at all, saying that all
Laws are consequent upon the will alone. There are also people who say that
every commandment and prohibition in these Laws is consequent upon wisdom and
aims at some end, and that all Laws have causes and were given in view of some
utility.[xxii]
Yet, as
Maimonides goes on, it becomes clear he is much more nuanced in his approach
than “all or nothing.” Though he agrees that the generalities of the
commandments have some cause, he posits that for many, the particulars do not
have any cause whatsoever. He writes, “Know that wisdom rendered it
necessary... that there should be particulars for which no cause can be found;
it was, as it were, impossible in regard to the law that there could be nothing
of this class in it” (506). Thus, elements of the extreme opinions are included
in his own belief[8] .
Another area
Maimonides discusses various views and has his own in the Guide is in regard to
divine providence. In Guide 3:17, Maimonides lists six opinions as regards to
providence, including his own. If we disregard the one he attributes to
Epicurus and quickly dismisses, there are five. The first four are:
1. Only
permanent and ordered things have providence, but not individuals (Aristotle)
2. Everything
has divine providence (Asharite)
3. Man
has free will, but divine providence also acts over everything using divine
wisdom (Mutazilite)
4. Man
and God have free will, and God is just. Divine providence acts over all humans
using divine justice. This may imply some “suffering of love.” It may also
imply violations of natural law. (Believers in the Torah)
Maimonides
explains the problems he has with each of these theories, and proposes his own
that combines the Torah theory with Aristotle’s theory. It is important to
point out that Maimonides explicitly connects Aristotle’s view with that about
creation. Regarding Aristotle’s view, he writes, “This view is closely
connected with his theory of the Eternity of the Universe and with his opinion
that everything different from the existing order of things in Nature is
impossible. It is the belief of those who turned away from our Law…” If so, it
would make sense for Maimonides to take elements of it into account as he did
for creation. Thus, his own opinion is such that he agrees with the Torah view
in that Divine providence acts over humans and rewards them for good deeds and
punishes them for the bad[9] . However, Aristotle is correct about other
aspects of the world, such as individual animals, the natural world, which are
left to chance. A leaf blows because of natural chance, not because God
specifically willed it. In doing this, he explicitly combines the two
approaches to form a synthesized third.
This method is
not limited to the Guide. In his commentary to the 10th chapter of Mishnah
Sanhedrin, known as Perek Helek, Maimonides delineates three groups of
interpreters of Torah and aggadic portions of the Talmud.[xxiii] The
first group believes in the Torah and the rabbis, and reads the texts, even the
fantastic ones, literally, and are happy to do so in what they consider
religious faith. The second group does not believe in the Torah and the rabbis,
and also reads these texts literally, but in order to mock them. Both these
groups are large. The last group, smallest of them all, are people who take a
middle path: they believe in the Torah and the rabbis, and therefore read the
text in such a way that though the usual way is to read it literally, when it
comes to the impossible, it is read figuratively. Again, this is the
Maimonidean middle way, taking the moderate position among a few when it does
not come to demonstrable facts.
In summation,
Maimonides’ method of contradictions could be related to his doctrine of the
mean, at least in cases of non-demonstrable opinions. We have seen that faith
and reasoning are subject to the category of virtue and vice, and that the mean
is fulfilling imitatio dei, as is God’s own use of contradictions.
This can be applied to cases where Maimonides lists multiple opinions, and
sometimes obfuscates what his own is among them. In other cases, it is clear
what his position is, and it combines aspects of others. Thus, it can be said
that Maimonides believes not only in the doctrine of the mean, but also the
mean of the doctrine.
i.
[ii] Harvey, “A Third Approach To Maimonides'
Cosmogony-Prophetology Puzzle”, The Harvard Theological Review,
Vol. 74, No. 3 (July, 1981), 287
[iii] Kellner, Menachem, “Reading Rambam:
Approaches to the Interpretation of Maimonides,” Jewish History Vol.
5, No. 2 (Fall, 1991), 75
[v] All translations of the Guide of the
Perplexed and pagination are from the Pines translation of The Guide of the
Perplexed, Chicago: University of Chicago, 1963
[vi] See for example, Leo Strauss, Persecution
and the Art of Writing (Glencoe, IL: Free, 1952) 38-94; and his
"How to Begin to Study The Guide of the Perplexed," Pines’ Guide of
the Perplexed, xi-lvi, and Joseph Buijis’ response, “The Philosophical
Character of Maimonides’ Guide - A Critique of Strauss’ Interpretation,” Judaism,
Vol. 27 (1978), 448-457
[vii] See Marvin Fox, Interpreting
Maimonides: Studies in Methodology, Metaphysics and Moral Philosophy (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1990), 67-90.
[viii] See Yair Lorberbaum, “On
Contradictions, Rationality, Dialectics, and Esotericism in Maimonides' ‘Guide
of the Perplexed’”, The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 55, No. 4
(Jun., 2002), 711-750
[ix] See Fox’s “The Doctrine of the Mean in
Aristotle and Maimonides” in Interpreting Maimonides: Studies in
Methodology, Metaphysics and Moral Philosophy (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1990), 93-123, also found in Maimonides: A Collection of
Critical Essays (IN: Notre Dame Press, 1998), 234-263
[xi] All translations of the Eight
Chapters follows Isidore Twersky’s A Maimonides Reader, (NY:
Library of Jewish Studies, 1972)
[xiv] And indeed, as Kellner ibid (172)
notes, Ibn Tibbon includes “emunah” as part of Maimonides list of examples of
moral virtues in that chapter, although other translations do not and Al
Farabi, whom Kellner believes Maimonides based his Eight Chapters on, does not
include it.
[xv] Quoted in Fox, “The Doctrine of the
Mean in Aristotle and Maimonides”, Maimonides: A Collection of Critical
Essays (IN: Notre Dame Press, 1998), 242
[xviii] Indeed, this is what drives
Maimonides to write in his introduction to Avot that he will censor the names
of the philosophers he has in mind, as the masses would throw out the very
valid ideas just based on where they came from.
[xix] Harvey, “A Third Approach To
Maimonides' Cosmogony-Prophetology Puzzle”, The Harvard Theological
Review, Vol. 74, No. 3 (July, 1981), 287-301
[xx] See Isadore Twersky, ed., Studies in
Medieval Jewish History and Literature (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1979)
16-40
[xxii] Interestingly, Masha Turner suggests
this as proof that when Maimonides connected the opinions of prophetology and
cosmogony, he only meant to say they were groups of three, contra Abravanel and
most academics, see Turner, Masha, “Examining the Relationship Between the
Opinions on Creation and the Opinions on Prophecy in the Guide of the
Perplexed" (Heb.), in Daat: A Journal of Jewish Philosophy &
Kabbalah, No. 50/52 (2003), pp. 73-82
