1)
“Confrontation,” an essay which Rabbi Soloveitchik published in Tradition journal in 1964, has been subject to enormous dispute in several areas. Firstly, what is Rabbi Soloveitchik’s ultimate view on the subject of inter-faith dialogue, and does Confrontation accord with his other works or is it an anomaly? Secondly, what was his motivation for writing it, and does this impact how seriously to take his position today? Thirdly, if his position does indeed emerge from his philosophical outlook, how do we view that in terms of his halakhic position on the matter?
Rabbi Moses Meiselman takes the position that Rabbi Soloveitchik believed inter-faith dialogue to be problematic for the religious Jew. There are many statements Rabbi Soloveitchik makes that would indicate this approach. For example, Rabbi Soloveitchik states that, “The confrontation should occur not at a theological but at a mundane human level… The great encounter between God and man is a wholly personal private affair incomprehensible to the outsider - even to a brother of the same faith community. The divine message is incommunicable since it defies all standardized media of information and all objective categories. If the powerful community of the many feels like remedying an embarrassing human situation or redressing an historic wrong, it should do so at the human ethical level. However, if the debate should revolve around matters of faith, then one of the confronters will be impelled to avail himself of the language of his opponent. This in itself would mean surrender of individuality and distinctiveness." This is most obviously stating that theological dialogue is nonsensical because there is no common ground, “objective categories” for people to relate to. Indeed, it can only create a common ground where there is none, and this in turn “would mean surrender of individuality and distinctiveness.”
Rabbi Soloveitchik had spent a considerable amount of space in the essay describing the duality of man as an individual and as part of creation. Unconfronted man is part of creation, and therefore chases it insofar as it can provide him pleasure. But confronted man, sees himself as lonely, an individual, and unable to relate his unique and individual identity to others. This conflict is inside every individual, and it is also part of the Jewish people as a whole. The Jews are part of creation, and therefore related to all other nations. But, they are also unique, coming from a perspective that does not accord with other peoples, and therefore cannot relate on a non-mundane level. So, Rabbi Meiselman and others argue that Rabbi Soloveitchik was completely against any kind of theological dialogue with others.
Unfortunately, Rabbi Meiselman also goes further than this. As pointed out by Lawrence Kaplan, Rabbi Meiselman claims that the “insider’s view” of Rabbi Soloveitchik was that the latter was always “exceedingly parochial,” and that “I do not believe that one can find a single instance where the Rav was involved in any of the universal issues of his day.” Besides the fact that the quote I brought above explicitly advocates for “confrontation” at a “mundane human level,” Kaplan points to the obligation to be part of the universal community while maintaining the “covenantal community.” And, he points out, the Rav believed the lack of confrontation with the non-Jewish community was “unfortunate” and due to the way the non-Jewish community has approached the Jewish people historically. “We are opposed to a philosophy of isolationism,” writes the Rav. However, Rabbi Meiselman claims this covers all dialogue, writing, “When Pope John XXIII opened dialogue with the Jews, the Rav viewed this as a serious danger to Judaism, and declared that no such dialogue pursued…. Despite the opposition of a few Orthodox rabbis the Rav’s position carried the day and almost without exception no dialogues have been conducted between Orthodox rabbis and the Catholic Church.” Kaplan rightly argues that the Rav never meant to include all dialogue, only that which is religious, or theological in nature. But the Rav felt even ethical dialogue was appropriate. Indeed, as it came to the world of “humanitarian and cultural endeavors,” writes the Rav, communication “is desirable and even essential.”
To Meiselman, the motivation for the Rav to write “Confrontation” was what he saw as a danger of the Pope opening dialogue with the Jews, a religious concern. Others think it had to do with the Rav’s background and his dealing with his “Brisker” background. Kaplan doesn’t mention David Singer and Moshe Sokol, but they too saw “Confrontation” as not fitting in with the Rav’s general approach to modernity, chalking this up to vestiges of “Brisker” conservatism.
Hartman, on the other hand, believed that the Rav meant to limit not theological dialogue, but theological dialogue by certain people. Perhaps this could be considered a “social policy” approach. For Hartman, people who do not recognize the dual nature of the Jews, who have a unique perspective, are in danger of running Judaism’s uniqueness aground with acquiescence to certain principles that Judaism does not in fact share with other faiths. This is why the Rav is concerned about the “unfortunate” state of events that Christians have approach Jews with enmity, which to Hartman means they approached Jews with the single confrontation which is the assumption that everything can be subject to finding common ground between faiths. It was only people like the Rav himself who could maintain Jewish singularity while discussing even theological matters between faiths.
However, it seems to me, as discussed in class, that the Rav’s conservative approach to interfaith emerges from his philosophy, and would apply to all members of religious faiths. Meaning, it is very much in line with his general philosophical take on Judaism and perspectivism, and this extends to the notion of the very inability to talk about faith with any degree of similarity between two people of faith. The engagement in faith dialogue is a philosophical error. Indeed, the Rav applies this even to talking to people of one’s own faith community! The first quote above says this exactly, “The great encounter between God and man is a wholly personal private affair incomprehensible to the outsider - even to a brother of the same faith community.” What does this mean?
The Rav consistently apologizes for describing his own perspective on Jewish philosophy. In introduction to prayer he says that he does “not claim universal validity for my conclusions.” He hopes only to allow people to gain insight from his “clear language”, describing his individual experiences of prayer in such a way that it would allow others to gain benefit. He does this too in Lonely Man of Faith, where he states, “Before I go any further, I want to make the following reservation. Whatever I am about to say is to be seen only as a modest attempt on the part of a man of faith to interpret his spiritual perceptions and emotions in modern theologico-philosophical categories. My interpretive gesture is completely subjective and lays no claim to representing a definitive Halakhic philosophy.” It seems to me that this is one aspect of his perspectivist philosophy. Thus, I believe, even among other Jews, it is impossible to relate the perspective of one to another. Yet the Rav does not hold back from doing so in this sense, because it can inform the other Jew about his own observance through the delineation of clear categories. But what can the Jew do in this to help a Christian, who bears no similarity in his conception, let’s say, to what prayer is and its experience. Creating Jewish categories of prayer and typological categories would not aid the Christian very much. But it goes beyond that as well.
This is most fully expressed in Halakhic Mind. This is where the Rav understand religious philosophy as similar in process to the process of scientific theory, where data creates a theoretical framework, and then the data is reinterpreted using that theoretical framework. He sees this especially apparent in quantum physics. For Jews, it is the Halakha that is the data, the parts, in which the whole can be formulated, the theory of Judaism, and thus the data can then be “reconstructed”. The implication of this is that no other system can impinge on the Halakhic-philosophic system. Dialogue, in this sense, would be nonsensical and cannot be pursued.
It should be noted that “Confrontation” quotes nary a single halakhic source. It would seem that this is not a halakhic issue, but an issue that faces the system as a whole.
2)
Yoram Hazony, in his article, “A Bombshell from the Rav,” posits that “Emergence of Ethical Man” connotes a completely naturalistic religious approach from the Rav. He marshals several quotes and concepts from the book to prove this. What we shall do in this response is discuss two of his proofs, and see if it aligns or disaligns with other works of the Rav.
The first question is what the Rav meant by saying that the naturalist philosophy of man provides space for the religious act. As Hazony quotes from the beginning of the book, “[T]he widespread opinion that within the perspective of anthropological naturalism there is no place for the religious act, for the relatedness of man to eternity and infinity, is wrong…. [M]an-as-animal needs religious faith and commitment to a higher authority.” To Hazony, this is a break from many religious thinkers before the Rav, who saw man as a break from the order of nature. This already indicates that man is not special.
It is my opinion (and I have not seen this stated elsewhere), that part one of Emergence of Ethical Man is referring to only one typological category, as he is wont to do in so much of his writings. It is “natural man.” We must note that Hazony sneakily leaves out the preceding clause that “Perhaps more than man-as-a-divine person [needs religious faith]...” That is, he is merely saying that religious faith exists for both aspects of man. We are thus shown that the Rav acknowledges two typologies. Given the typological categories that the Rav creates in Lonely Man of Faith, it seems that “natural man” is mostly parallel to Adam the first, who is creative man but very much based in creation. Indeed, the Rav conspicuously completely skips over explaining man according to Genesis 2 in the first part of Emergence of Ethical Man! Notice, he only explicates Genesis 1 on page 9 and on, and 70-76.
Adam the first, of course, has religious faith. But he is not beyond creation itself. He is of the naturalist sort, where the Rav’s careful words in describing Adam the first’s “image of God” fit into. He writes in Lonely Man of Faith, “There is no doubt that the term “image of God” in the first account refers to man’s inner charismatic endowment as a creative being.” Notice his deliberate avoidance of mentioning who endowed him with such. He is drawn to community, “a natural one” according to the Rav. Within Adam the first, “the primordial urge to come together in face of opposition is shared by both animal and biological man.” Adam the first finds dignity in his control of nature. This is consistent with his description of the role of the image of God on page 75 that it “signifies man’s awareness of himself as a biological being and the state of being informed of his natural drives,” and on page 47, that he is merely a more advanced being on the continuum of “plant-animal-man.”
We might also accord this with his typological category of cognitive man in Halakhic Man. Cognitive man, with his scientific mind searching out reality, would also conclude that man is merely on the continuum among other forms of life. There is no indication he is bereft of religious faith, or that the door of “commitment to a higher authority” is closed to him. The Rav compares cognitive man with the man of Greek philosophy (page 6). The Greek philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle had religious faith. Also, he recognizes that the paradox exists within philosophies like Maimon and Cohen that acknowledges an absolute existence, even though it would seem outside the realm of cognitive man. However, Adam the second/man-as-a-divine person is ostensibly homo religiosus. And that type within man is not naturalist at all. He seeks transcendentalism, to go beyond this world to the next. It is true that the Rav criticizes this aspect, but he seems to incorporate it into what we could see as the ideal person according to the Rav, Halakhic Man, who seeks to use the world for divine, Halakhic purposes.
And indeed, in And From There You Shall Seek, towards the beginning, the Rav writes of two types of religious experiences, that of natural scientific progress and gaining knowledge of the world. But there is an unnatural type of revelation that shocks us. Thus, one can be a natural being, conquering earth, and gaining religious experience in the process. But it is not the whole of man.
Thus, Hazony is trying to use just the naturalistic aspect of man as proof that the Rav saw the whole of man this way, which ignores the Rav’s typological categories that are not explicitly presented in Emergence.
Only once he begins with the second part, the emergence of ethical man, does the Rav begins with Genesis 2, and therefore with man-as-divine person. This is why he states that because “biological motivation is neutral as far as ethical standards are concerned,” God must involve Himself in the process of guiding man. This is not naturalistic. Man is unique in terms of ethical standards that are God-driven. The Rav states that the ethical imperative is “unknown to natural man.”
Ethics, which the Rav states is God-given, only makes sense within Lonely Man of Faith’s Adam the second. The Rav states there that regarding Adam the first, “His mind is questing not for the true, but for the pleasant and functional, which are rooted in the esthetical, not the noetic-ethical, sphere.” It is true that he can formulate an ethical standard, but the Rav criticizes it as purely hedonistically based: “Adam distinguishes himself not only in the realm of scientific theory but in that of the ethico-moral and aesthetic gestures as well. He legislates norms which he invests with validity and great worth. He fashions beautiful forms and considers the encounter with them ennobling and cleansing, exhilarating and enriching.” This reminds us of unconfronted man of “Confrontation”, who applies his mind to beauty and pleasure. But Adam the second is the only one that is concerned with ethics in terms of a God-given message, and therefore, is the only one that it would make sense to refer to when referring to its emergence in man. Thus, we must say that insofar as the Rav made statements that seem naturalistic, we should be careful when examining which aspect of man he is dealing with.
(I wrote a response paper with a similar point)-
There is some argument between Yarom Hazony and R. Gil Student as to what could change a major position of the Rav. Hazony points out that in Halakhic Mind, the Rav set course to create a philosophy of religion out of the Halakha, having written there that, “Out of the sources of halacha, a new world view awaits formulation.” The Rav knew that he was differing from almost every other religious Jewish thinker on this, because he was willing to eschew medieval philosophical argumentation and get back to what he considered the only authentic Jewish documentation of Jewish belief: the Halakha. He writes,
“[M]ost modern Jewish philosophers have adopted a very unique method. The source of knowledge, for them, is medieval Jewish philosophy…. [However,] we know that the most central concepts of medieval Jewish philosophy are rooted in ancient Greek and medieval Arabic thought and are not Jewish in origin at all. It is impossible to reconstruct a unique Jewish world perspective out of alien material.”
What is unique for the Rav was finding in the halakha itself some philosophy of religion. On this, Hazony notes that the Rav does not, in fact, base his anthropological worldview on halakha, but rather on Scripture. He writes,
“Yet the new concept of man so carefully constructed in The Emergence of Ethical Man is not, for the most part, derived from what we would usually consider Jewish legal sources. Instead, R. Soloveitchik relies overwhelmingly on the teachings of the narrative portions of the Hebrew Bible, especially Genesis and Exodus.”
Hazony argues that the Rav did not mean it when he said that Halakha was the sole material to be used when reconstructing Judaism’s religious philosophy. Instead,
…[T]he Jewish law is understood as an extensive, practical elaboration of a concept of man that is already fleshed out in the biblical narratives prior to the giving of the law. Biblical narrative is thus found to be the primary vehicle for giving expression to Jewish philosophy, which serves as the original source and wellspring for what later becomes halacha, Jewish law.
This is a major point, said in just a few lines. Hazony argues the Rav believes Scripture as the “primary vehicle” for Jewish philosophy, and in some sense inspires halacha which came later. Halakha is somehow informed by Scripture’s worldview. The general question is how the Rav defined “halakha”, how he defined “Scripture’s worldview”, and if such a statement holds up philosophically and historically. I am still unsure about this.
R. Gil Student disputes the claim that the Rav was necessarily saying anything about the halakha when he decided to interpret Scripture in the Emergence of Ethical Man. Firstly, he states, the book does indeed deal with some laws, such as zeraim and tumah. So halakha is not completely absent from the book. Secondly, this claim can be said about other writings of the Rav that no one claims about. As he puts it, “Isn’t The Lonely Man of Faith based on the two Creation narratives and Kol Dodi Dofek on Shir Ha-Shirim?... Where is this proposed new worldview that supposedly emerges from halakhah?”
In my own opinion, I agree with Hazony that the Rav believed that Scripture is the interpretive basis upon which halakha is formulated. However, I would argue that Scripture is not “the primary vehicle” for Jewish philosophy. As the Rav made clear in Halakhic Mind, it is only halakha that has this role. However, it cannot be denied that halakha is anchored into Scripture. The Talmud seeks out support from it to accept or reject certain laws in Judaism, and so Biblical tales inform halakha. But what I posit the Rav is expressing here is that halakha is independent of Scripture. Halakhic Man, for the Rav, takes reality and accords it through the a priori conclusions of halakha. Scripture for the Rav, I posit, only describes man’s nature as it is and does no further work. But halakha, and halakhic man, must deal with that reality and transform man from simply cognitive man, or simply homo religiosus, and (perhaps unsuccessfully) synthesize it into the Halakhic Man.
The Rav, in many places, denies Scripture any place in scientific debate. Indeed, in Emergence of Ethical Man itself, page 5, he thinks it is a task in vain, easily done but purposeless in nature: “Indeed, one of the most annoying scientific facts which the modern homo religiosus encounters is the problem of evolution and creation.” I think that he uses “homo religiosus” specifically here, because this would not present a problem for the Halakhic Man.
Indeed, I believe that is why the Rav states in Lonely Man of Faith,
“I have never been seriously troubled by the problem of the Biblical doctrine of creation vis-a-vis the scientific story of evolution at both the cosmic and the organic levels, nor have I been perturbed by the confrontation of the mechanistic interpretation of the human mind with the Biblical Spiritual concept of man. I have not been perplexed by the impossibility of fitting the mystery of revelation into the framework of historical empiricism…”
Yet, the Rav considers Lonely Man of Faith to be one of “Halakhic philosophy,” which he states explicitly in his “apology” before he begins, stating, “My interpretive gesture is completely subjective and lays no claim to representing a definitive Halakhic philosophy.” I believe that though he lays out the typological figures of Adam one and Adam two through a reading of Scripture, what he refers to with that is the last part of the essay, which focuses on halakha itself.
