Kohelet - Universalism and Particularism, Joy and Sadness on Sukkot

Jolly or Melancholy?

Kohelet’s Role in Sukkot’s Time of Gladness

By: Aryeh Sklar

1. Genesis Rabbah 8:8

R. Shmuel b. Nahman said in R. Yehonatan’s name: When Moshe was engaged in writing the Torah, he had to write the work of each day. When he came to the verse, “And God said: Let Us make man,” etc., he said: ‘Sovereign of the Universe! Why do You furnish an excuse to heretics’ (For maintaining a plurality of gods)? ‘Write,’ replied He; ‘And whoever wishes to err may err.’

רבי שמואל בר נחמן בשם רבי יונתן אמר בשעה שהיה משה כותב את התורה היה כותב מעשה כל יום ויום, כיון שהגיע לפסוק הזה שנאמר ויאמר אלקים נעשה אדם בצלמנו כדמותנו כדמותנו אמר לפניו רבון העולם מה אתה נותן פתחון פה למינים, אתמהא, אמר לו כתוב והרוצה לטעות יטעה!

2. Kohelet 1:3

What profit has man in all his toil that he toils under the sun?

(ג) מַה יִּתְרוֹן לָאָדָם בְּכָל עֲמָלוֹ שֶׁיַּעֲמֹל תַּחַת הַשָּׁמֶשׁ:

3. Kohelet 12:13

The end of the matter, everything having been heard, fear God and keep His commandments, for this is the entire man.

(יג) סוֹף דָּבָר הַכֹּל נִשְׁמָע אֶת הָאֱלֹהִים יְרָא וְאֶת מִצְוֹתָיו שְׁמוֹר כִּי זֶה כָּל הָאָדָם:

4. Talmud Shabbat 30b

אמר רב יהודה בריה דרב שמואל בר שילת משמיה דרב: בקשו חכמים לגנוז ספר קהלת מפני שדבריו סותרין זה את זה, ומפני מה לא גנזוהו - מפני שתחילתו דברי תורה וסופו דברי תורה. תחילתו דברי תורה - דכתיב (קהלת א) מה יתרון לאדם בכל עמלו שיעמול תחת השמש ואמרי דבי רבי ינאי: תחת השמש הוא דאין לו, קודם שמש - יש לו. סופו דברי תורה - דכתיב (קהלת יב) סוף דבר הכל נשמע את האלהים ירא ואת מצותיו שמור כי זה כל האדם. מאי כי זה כל האדם? אמר רבי (אליעזר) (מסורת הש"ס: [אלעזר]) כל העולם כולו לא נברא אלא בשביל זה.

R. Yehudah the son of R.Shmuel bar Shilat, in Rav's name, said: The Sages sought to hide the Book of Ecclesiastes, because its words contradict each other. Yet why did they not hide it? Because its beginning is words of Torah, and its end is words of Torah. Its beginning is words of Torah, as it is written, (Kohelet 1:3) What profit does man have of all his labor, that he should labor under the sun? And the School of R`Jannai commented: “Under the sun” is when he has none, but he has it [regarding the thing that is] before the sun. The end is words of Torah, as it is written, (Kohelet 12:13) “The end of the matter, when all is heard, is fear God, and keep his commandments: for this is the whole of man.” What is meant by, “for this is the whole of man”? Said R. Elazar, The entire world was created only for the sake of this [type of] man.

5. Kohelet 1:3

Rejoice, O youth, in your childhood, and let your heart bring you cheer in the days of your youth, and go in the ways of your heart, and in the sight of your eyes, but know that for all these God will bring you to judgment.

(ט) שְׂמַח בָּחוּר בְּיַלְדוּתֶךָ וִיטִיבְךָ לִבְּךָ בִּימֵי בְחוּרוֹתֶךָ וְהַלֵּךְ בְּדַרְכֵי לִבְּךָ וּבְמַרְאֵה (כתיב וּבְמַרְאֵי) עֵינֶיךָ וְדָע כִּי עַל כָּל אֵלֶּה יְבִיאֲךָ הָאֱלֹהִים בַּמִּשְׁפָּט:

6. Leviticus Rabbah 28:1

R. Benjamin b. Levi stated: The Sages wanted to store away the Book of Kohelet, for they found in it ideas that leaned towards heresy. They argued: Was it right that Shelomo should have said the following: Rejoice, O young man, in your youth; and let your heart cheer you in the days of your youth (Kohelet 11:9)? Moshe said, Go not about after your own heart and your own eyes (Num. 15:39), but Shelomo said, Walk in the ways of your heart, and in the sight of your eyes (Kohelet 11:9)! What then? Is all restraint to be removed? Is there neither justice nor judge? When, however, he said, But know thou, that for all these things God will bring you into judgment (Kohelet 11:9) they admitted that Shelomo had spoken well.

אמר ר' בנימין בן לוי בקשו לגנוז ספר קהלת שמצאו בו דברים שהם נוטין לצד מינות אמרו כך היה ראוי שלמה לומר שמח בחור בילדותך בילדותך ויטיבך לבך בימי בחורותיך בחורותיך משה אמר (במדבר טו) ולא תתורו אחרי לבבכם ואחרי עיניכם ושלמה אמר והלך בדרכי לבך ובמראה עיניך, אלא הותרה רצועה לית דין ולית דיין כיון שאמר ודע כי על כל אלה יביאך הא-לקים במשפט אמרו יפה אמר שלמה.

7. Talmud Shabbat 30a

Rabbi Tanchum of Navay began his sermon: O, Solomon, where is your wisdom and where is your understanding? It is not enough for you that your words contradict the words of thy father David, but that they are self-contradictory! Thy father David said, “The dead praise not the Lord,” and you said, “But I praised the dead which are already dead.” But then you said, “For a living dog is better than a dead lion.” There is no difficulty. As to what David said: “The dead praise not the Lord”, he meant: Let a man always engage in Torah and good deeds before he dies, for as soon as he dies he is restrained from [the practice of] Torah and good deeds, and the Holy One, blessed be He, has nothing with which to praise him. … And as to what Solomon said, “But I praised the dead that are already dead,” for when Israel sinned in the Midbar, Moses stood before the Holy One, blessed be He, and uttered many prayers and supplications before Him, but he was not answered, but when he exclaimed, “Remember Abraham, Isaac, and Israel, Your servants!” he was immediately answered. Did not then Solomon well say, “But I praised the dead that are already dead”?

רבי תנחום דמן נוי פתח ואמר: אנת שלמה, אן חכמתך אן סוכלתנותך לא דייך שדבריך סותרין דברי דוד אביך, אלא שדבריך סותרין זה את זה דוד אביך אמר (תהלים קטו) לא המתים יהללו יה ואת אמרת (קהלת ד) ושבח אני את המתים שכבר מתו, וחזרת ואמרת (קהלת ט) כי לכלב חי הוא טוב מן האריה המת! לא קשיא, הא דקאמר דוד לא המתים יהללו יה הכי קאמר: לעולם יעסוק אדם בתורה ובמצות קודם שימות, שכיון שמת - בטל מן התורה ומן המצות, ואין להקדוש ברוך הוא שבח בו … ודקאמר שלמה ושבח אני את המתים שכבר מתו - שכשחטאו ישראל במדבר עמד משה לפני הקדוש ברוך הוא, ואמר כמה תפלות ותחנונים לפניו ולא נענה, וכשאמר (שמות לב) זכור לאברהם ליצחק ולישראל עבדיך - מיד נענה, ולא יפה אמר שלמה ושבח אני את המתים שכבר מתו?

How Should We Resolve Contradictions?

8. Maimonides, Guide of the Perplexed, Introduction

The third cause. Not all the statements in question are to be taken in their external sense; some are to be taken in their external sense, while some others are parables and hence have an inner content. Alternatively, two apparently contradictory propositions may both be parables and when taken in their external sense may contradict, or be contrary to, one another. The fourth cause. There is a proviso that, because of a certain necessity, has not been explicitly stated in its proper place; or the two subjects may differ, but one of them has not been explained in its proper place, so that a contradiction appears to have been said, whereas there is no contradiction. ... That some passages in every prophetic book, when taken in their external sense, appear to contradict or to be contrary to one another is due to the third cause and to the fourth. And it was with this in view that this entire introduction was written. You already know how often [the Sages], may their memory be blessed, say: One verse says this and another verse says that. They straightway establish that there is an apparent contradiction. Thereupon they explain that a proviso is lacking in the statement of the subject or that the two texts have different subjects. Thus they say: Solomon, is it not enough for you that your words contradict those of your father? They also contradict themselves, and so on.

הסיבה השלישית מפני שאין כל אותם הדברים כפשטן, אלא מקצתן כפשטן ומקצתן משל, ויש לו תוך. או שהיו שני הדברים אשר פשטיהן נגדיים משלים, וכאשר מבינים אותם כפשטן יהיו סותרים או נגדיים. והסיבה הרביעית שיש בהם תנאי מסוים שלא נתבאר בהם במקומם מחמת צורך כל שהוא, או שהיו שני הנושאים שונים, והאחד מהן לא נתבאר במקומו, ואז תיראה בהם סתירה ואין שם סתירה. … אבל הסתירות או הניגודים הנראים בפשטי הדברים במקצת מקומות בכל ספרי הנבואה, הרי הם לפי הסיבה השלישית והרביעית. ואל [יד] העניין הזה הייתה מטרת כל הקדמה זו.וכבר ידעת כמה רב אמרם ז"ל: כתוב אחד אומר כך וכתוב אחד אומר כך, ומעמידים נקודת הסתירה, ואחר כך מבארים שהדבר חסר תנאי, או שהנושא שונה. כגון אמרם: שלמה, לא דייך שדבריך סותרין דברי אביך, אלא שהן סותרין זה את זה וכו

9. Kohelet 9:7-9

Go, eat your bread joyfully and drink your wine with a merry heart, for God has already accepted your deeds. At all times, let your garments be white, and let oil not be wanting on your head. Enjoy life with the wife whom you love all the days of the life of your vanity, whom He has given you under the sun, all the days of your vanity, for that is your portion in life and in your toil that you toil under the sun.

לֵךְ אֱכֹל בְּשִׂמְחָה לַחְמֶךָ וּשְׁתֵה בְלֶב טוֹב יֵינֶךָ כִּי כְבָר רָצָה הָאֱלֹהִים אֶת מַעֲשֶׂיךָ: בְּכָל עֵת יִהְיוּ בְגָדֶיךָ לְבָנִים וְשֶׁמֶן עַל רֹאשְׁךָ אַל יֶחְסָר: רְאֵה חַיִּים עִם אִשָּׁה אֲשֶׁר אָהַבְתָּ כָּל יְמֵי חַיֵּי הֶבְלֶךָ אֲשֶׁר נָתַן לְךָ תַּחַת הַשֶּׁמֶשׁ כֹּל יְמֵי הֶבְלֶךָ כִּי הוּא חֶלְקְךָ בַּחַיִּים וּבַעֲמָלְךָ אֲשֶׁר אַתָּה עָמֵל תַּחַת הַשָּׁמֶשׁ:

10. Ibn Ezra, Kohelet 9:7

לך אכול: זה דבור לב בני האדם והוא הוללות

This is the folly that people say in their hearts…

What is another way to resolve contradictions?

Kohelet’s Universality in Light of Sukkot

11. Avudraham (14th century), Tefillot HaPesach

There is another reason and that is that Shlomo said these words on Sukkot as it states (Devarim 31:10) on the holiday [at the conclusion] of the shemitah year, on Sukkot, when the Jewish people come to be seen, gather the nation, the men, women and children, etc. and it states (Melachim I 8:2) they all gathered to King Shlomo during the month of Etanim, on Sukkot, etc. and it was then that he recited [Kohelet] during hakhel in order to rebuke the Jewish people. For this reason, it is logical to recite it on Sukkot. This is from the writings of Ibn HaYarchi.

ועוד טעם אחר כי שלמה בחג אמרו בהקהל כמו שכתוב (דב' לא, י) במועד שנת השמיטה בחג הסוכות בבא כל ישראל לראות וגו' הקהל את העם האנשים והנשים והטף וגו' וכתיב ויקהלו אל המלך שלמה בירח האתנים בחג וגו ' ואז אמרו בהקהל להוכיח את ישראל על כן יתכן לאומרו בחג כל זה כתב אבן הירחי

12. Netziv (19th century), Harchev Davar Bamidbar 29:12

כתב בספר זכריה י"ד דלעתיד יהיו גם אומות העולם באים בחול המועד סוכות לעמוד על קרבנם, היינו בשביל שיכירו גם המה את מלך ה ' צבאות ... וכך היה המנהג בימי שלמה, ומשום הכי היה שלמה מגיד קהלת בחול המועד סוכות לפני חכמי אומות העולם ...ומזה אנו נוהגין מדור דור לקרוא קהלת בחול המועד סוכות.

In the fourteenth chapter of Zechariah it states that in the future, the nations of the world will come on Chol HaMoed of Succot to stand next to their offering because they will also recognize the sovereignty of God, the King … This was also the tradition during the days of Shlomo and for this reason, Shlomo would recite Kohelet on Chol HaMoed Succot to the nations of the world … For this reason, we have been reciting Kohelet throughout the generations on Chol HaMoed Sukkot.

13. Talmud Sukkah 55b

א"ר (אליעזר) הני שבעים פרים כנגד מי כנגד שבעים אומות פר יחידי למה כנגד אומה יחידה

To what do the seventy bulls that were offered during the seven days [of Sukkot] correspond? To the seventy [gentile] nations. To what does the single bullock [of Shemini Atzeret] correspond? To the unique nation [of the Jewish people].

A World Unfinished - It Is Up To You and Me

14. Magen Avraham, Shulchan Aruch 490:8

On Sukkot [we read] Kohelet because they are days of joy and it states in Kohelet (2:2) "what does joy accomplish?"

ובסכות קהלת מפני שהם ימי שמחה וכתוב בקהלת ולשמחה מה זו עושה.

15. Talmud Bava Batra 60b

The Sages therefore have ordained thus. A man may plaster his house, but he should leave a little bare. A man can prepare all necessities of a meal, but he should leave out something... A woman can put on all her ornaments, but leave off one or two. What should this be? Rav said: [Not to remove] the hair on the temple. For so it says, If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, let my right hand forget, let my tongue cleave to the roof of my mouth if I remember thee not, if I prefer not Jerusalem above my head joy. What is meant by 'my head joy'? R. Yitzchak said: This is symbolised by the burnt ashes which we place on the head of a bridegroom... Whoever mourns for Zion will be privileged to behold her joy, as it says, Rejoice ye with Jerusalem etc.

כך אמרו חכמים: סד אדם את ביתו בסיד, ומשייר בו דבר מועט... עושה אדם כל צרכי סעודה, ומשייר דבר מועט... עושה אשה כל תכשיטיה, ומשיירת דבר מועט. מאי היא? אמר רב: בת צדעא, שנאמר: (תהלים קלז) אם אשכחך ירושלים תשכח ימיני תדבק לשוני לחכי וגו'. מאי על ראש שמחתי? אמר רב יצחק: זה אפר מקלה שבראש חתנים... וכל המתאבל על ירושלים - זוכה ורואה בשמחתה, שנאמר: (ישעיהו סו) שמחו את ירושלים וגו'.

16. Talmud Berachot 31a

R. Yochanan said in the name of R. Shimon bar Yochai: It is forbidden to a man to fill his mouth with laughter in this world, because it says, Then will our mouth be filled with laughter and our tongue with singing. When will that be? At the time when 'they shall say among the nations, The Lord hath done great things with these'.

אמר רבי יוחנן משום רבי שמעון בן יוחאי: אסור לאדם שימלא שחוק פיו בעולם הזה, שנאמר: (תהלים קכ"ו) אז ימלא שחוק פינו ולשוננו רנה, אימתי - בזמן שיאמרו בגוים הגדיל ה' לעשות עם אלה.

17. Rav AY Kook (20th century), Ein Ayah Berachot 31a

Laughter indicates, when it is in its fullness, that the entire mission has been completed. And a man should properly understand that his perfection isn’t finished until all humanity is perfected through Israel at its greatest, when ‘the land will be filled with knowledge of God.’ And this great goal needs to be rooted deeply, deeply in the heart of each and every Jew, until he feels that so long as humanity as a whole is not perfected, his own happiness cannot be complete…

שחוק מורה, כשהוא במילואו, שכבר הושגה התכלית כולה. והאדם ראוי שישכיל כי אין שלימותו נגמרת כ"א כאשר תשתלם האנושיות כולה ע"י ישראל בגדולתן, כשתמלא הארץ דעת את ד' . וצריך שתהי' המטרה הגדולה הזאת מושרשת עמוק עמוק בלב כ"א מישראל עד שירגיש שכ"ז שלא השתלמה האנושית כולה אין שמחתו שלימה.

Rambam's Contradiction Regarding Eating On Erev Yom Kippur

The Aruch Hashulchan OH 604:6-8 asks a gevaldig kashe on the Rambam:

סימן תרד סעיף ו

ודע דברמב"ם, בכל הלכות שביתת עשור – לא נמצא דין זה דכל האוכל ושותה בתשיעי וכו'. ולכאורה טעמו פשוט: דהנה ביומא שם נחלקו תנאי בהך קרא. דחד תנא יליף מזה לתוספת יום הכיפורים, והכי איתא התם: "ועניתם" וגו' "בתשעה לחדש" – יכול יתחיל ויתענה בתשיעי? תלמוד לומר: "בערב". אי בערב – יכול משתחשך? תלמוד לומר: "בתשעה". הא כיצד? מתחיל ומתענה מבעוד יום; מכאן שמוסיפין מחול על הקדש וכו'.

ופריך: הך תנא דדריש תוספת מקרא אחרינא, מאי עביד ליה להך קרא? ומתרץ: לכל האוכל ושותה בתשיעי כאלו התענה וכו'.

והרמב"ם בפרק ראשון משביתת עשור דין ו כתב, וזה לשונו: וצריך להוסיף מחול על הקדש וכו', שנאמר: "ועניתם את נפשתיכם בתשעה לחדש בערב", כלומר: התחל לצום ולהתענות מערב תשיעי הסמוך לו וכו'. עד כאן לשונו. וכיון דדריש הך קרא לתוספת, ממילא דלית ליה דרשא דכל האוכל ושותה וכו', ולכן השמיטה.

Know that in the Rambam, in his Laws of Yom Kippur, this law of eating and drinking on the ninth does not exist. And ostensibly, the reason is simple: In Yoma, it's a Tannaic dispute regarding the interpretation of that verse. One of the Tannaim derives from that verse the concept of adding extra time to the day of Yom Kippur [by starting earlier than sunset]. Thus we have there: 

"And you shall afflict your soul... on the ninth of the month..." Do you really think one should start fasting on the ninth? The Torah therefore says, "in the evening." But if it's the evening, one might think [this means] only once it gets dark? The Torah therefore says, "on the ninth." How does one accomplish this? He shall start fasting while it is still day. From here we have the concept of adding from the non-holy day to the holy day...

And [the gemara] questions this: But the Tanna who derives the concept of adding extra time to Yom Kippur from a different verse, what does he do with this verse? And [the gemara] answers: That anyone who eats and drinks of the ninth is as if he fasted for both days...

And so the Rambam in Laws of Yom Kippur 1:6 writes, "And one must add from the non-holy day onto the holy day... as it says, 'And you shall afflict your souls on the ninth of the month in the evening,' meaning, you shall start to fast from the end of the ninth close to it..." And since he uses this verse for the concept of adding time to Yom Kippur, he therefore doesn't use it for the derivation of "Anyone who eats and drinks..."

And that's why he leaves it out.

סימן תרד סעיף ז

אבל אם כן, למה הזכיר הרמב"ם זה בהלכות נדרים פרק שלישי דין ט, וזה לשונו: הנודר שיצום יום ראשון או יום שני וכו', והרי הוא יום טוב או ערב יום הכיפורים – חייב לצום וכו'. פגע בו חנוכה ופורים – ידחה נדרו וכו', הואיל האיסור בהם מדברי סופרים – צריכין חיזוק.

עד כאן לשונו, ומשמע להדיא דערב יום הכיפורים אסור להתענות מן התורה, כביום טוב, ואינו צריך חיזוק. וכן תפסו מפרשי דבריו.

But if so, why does the Rambam mention it in the Laws of Vows 3:9, "One who vows to fast on Monday or Tuesday, and it turns out it is Yom Tov or Erev Yom Kippur, he is obligated to fast... If it turns out it is Chanukah or Purim, he should push off the fast [til afterward]. since it is a rabbinical prohibition to fast on those days, it needs bolstering [and therefore fasting on it to fulfill a vow is forbidden]."

It is explicitly implied that Erev Yom Kippur is forbidden to fast on from the Torah, like Yom Tov, and doesn't need bolstering. And that's how the commentators have understood his words.

סימן תרד סעיף ח

ואני תמה מאד על זה. דאי סלקא דעתך דהרמב"ם סבירא ליה דאסור להתענות בערב יום הכיפורים מדאורייתא, או אפילו מדרבנן, ושהוא מחוייב לאכול בו ולשתות – איך לא היה מזכיר במקומו בהלכות שביתת עשור, ולסמוך על מה שיזכיר בדרך אגב בהלכות נדרים ולהיפך, שחייב להתענות?

ולכן נראה לעניות דעתי ברור כמו שכתבתי, שהרמב"ם דחה זה מהלכה, מטעמא דכתיבנא. וזה שכתב בהלכות נדרים שחייב להתענות – אין הטעם כמו ביום טוב, משום דהוי דאורייתא או סמך דאורייתא. ואינו צריך חיזוק, אלא אדרבא, משום דאין בה מצוה כלל לאכול, לא מדאורייתא ולא מדרבנן. ולכן ממילא דחל הנדר.

והא שהוצרך להזכיר זה כלל – משום דמנהג העולם להרבות בסעודה בערב יום הכיפורים. וכמבואר במדרש, במעשה דההוא חייטא שסילק מעות הרבה בעד דג בערב יום הכיפורים, והובא בטור. ובסוף פרק חמישי דחולין (פג א) מצינו גם כן, שבגליל היו מרבין בסעודות בערב יום הכיפורים. ולבלי לטעות שיש בזה על כל פנים מצוה דרבנן, ואין הנדר חל כבחנוכה ופורים – קא משמע לן דאין בה מצוה גמורה דרבנן, והנדר חל. ואין הרמב"ם יחיד בזה, כי גם ברי"ף וסמ"ג לא מצאתי דין זה, שמצוה לאכול בערב יום הכיפורים. וטעמם גם כן משום דהביאו הך קרא לתוספת, עיין שם.

I am very puzzled by this! If one thinks that the Rambam holds that it is forbidden to fast on Erev Yom Kippur on a Torah level, or even on a rabbinical level, and that one must eat on it and drink - how could he not mention it in the appropriate place, in the Laws of Yom Kippur, but instead rely on the fact he mentioned it by-the-by in the Laws of Vows, through the opposite fact where one would be obligated to fast [if one took a vow].

And so, it seems in my humble opinion that it is clear according to what I have said, that the Rambam discarded this law, as I wrote. And the fact that he wrote in the Laws of Vows that one is obligated to fast [if one took a vow for Erev Yom Kippur], the reason isn't because it is a Yom Tov, whether on a Torah level or close to it, and it doesn't even need bolstering. Just the opposite - [the reason one must fast on it if one took a vow to do so is] because there is totally no mitzvah to eat, either on a Torah level or rabbinical. That's why the vow takes effect.

And the reason why it was mentioned at all is because the custom of everyone is to eat a lot on Erev Yom Kippur. And there is a Midrash of a tailor who spent much money for a fish on Erev Yom Kippur, brought by the Tur. And we find it similarly in the end of the 5th chapter of Chulin 83a that they would have much for meals on Erev Yom Kippur. And so that one will not be mistaken that there is some rabbinical mitzvah, and therefore the vow shouldn't take effect on that7 day like Chanukah and Purim - [the Rambam] teaches us that there is no rabbinical command at all, and the vow takes effect. And the Rambam is not alone on this, for I didn't find this law in the Rif and the Smag the command to eat on Erev Yom Kippur. And their reasoning is because that verse is used for adding time to Yom Kippur, see there.

I told over this Aruch Hashulchan at the Seudat Hamfseket right before Yom Kippur, and my family generally found it a weak answer. The Rambam puts a day people eat among holidays, because one would think its a holiday, and a d'rabbanan at that? People would need a lot of pilpul to learn it not only as a d'rabbanan, but that it requires chizuk like Chanukah and Purim. Surely, the people capable of thinking of these implications would know better anyway? Also, what about the day before Tisha B'Av? People don't eat then?

My father had a different, more ingenious answer. It goes like this:

The Aruch Hashulchan demonstrated well that the Rambam uses the verse of the "ninth" for learning out Tosefet Yom Kippur, not for eating on the ninth. So definitely he believes that the eating on the ninth is not the derasha we pasken by. That said, you still would think you cannot do the opposite - which is fast on it. Why? Because the day is set aside for the ability to add Yom Kippur into it. It may be true that you can only add from a certain point (plag, or whatever it is), but you cannot take away the day from Yom Kippur and give it to something else. You would think you cannot allow Erev Yom Kippur to be its own fast day, because if you do, you cannot add the fast of the tenth from the ninth, since you are fulfilling a separate vow.

In a different way to say it: You cannot vow to keep a mitzvah, since it's already obligated for you to do. So too, you would think cannot vow to fast on Erev Yom Kippur since the derasha of adding from the ninth to the tenth means that Erev Yom Kippur has the obligation of fasting set on it, though it's on you when to start that.

Thus, the Rambam's innovation is that you would be obligated to fast anyway, regardless that its for the vow instead of for Yom Kippur.

I had a different answer, but it was more in the strain of the Aruch Hashulchan's. It goes like this:

Many mitzvot have a hechsher mitzvah, a necessary preparatory activity to accomplish the mitzvah. So, to be able to dwell in one's sukkah, one must build a sukkah before the holiday. In fact, in the case of a sukkah, there is a question if in the case of sukkah it is a hechsher mitzvah or a mitzvah on its own. Similarly, to be able to successfully fast on Yom Kippur, which is a mitzvah, one must eat the day before. Is it a mitzvah, to eat the day before, or a hechsher mitzvah to be able to fast the day after?

I believe the derasha of "Eat on the ninth" is to make it a mitzvah of its own. The Rambam does not pasken like this derasha, but rather, "Tosefet Yom Kippur." However, that means he considers eating on the ninth not as a mitzvah but a hechsher mitzvah. You need to be able to fast successfully. There is no reason to have this in the section of Yom Kippur, since it's not a command itself.

But what if someone makes a vow to undo the hechsher mitzvah and fast on the ninth? The huge innovation of the Rambam is that he can do so, since it is only a hechsher mitzvah and not the mitzvah itself. 

The tzaruch iyun is if there is evidence the Rambam supports removing a hechsher mitzvah, resulting in an unsuccessful performance of the mitzvah. It could be that Rambam the doctor knew that one could survive two days without eating or drinking, and therefore the removing of the hechsher mitzvah doesn't necessarily spell an unsuccessful fasting on Yom Kippur itself. In fact, Rava would regularly fast 2 days for Yom Kippur because of safek yom (Rosh Hashana 21a):

רבא הוה רגיל דהוה יתיב בתעניתא תרי יומי זימנא חדא אשתכח כוותיה ר"נ יתיב בתעניתא כוליה יומי דכיפורי לאורתא אתא ההוא גברא א"ל למחר יומא רבה במערבא א"ל מהיכא את א"ל מדמהריא א"ל דם תהא אחריתו קרי עליה קלים היו רודפינו

Rava was accustomed to fast two days [on the Day of Atonement]. Once he was found to be right. R' Nachman had once fasted the whole of the Day of Atonement, when in the evening a man came and told him, "Tomorrow is the Great Day [of atonement] in the West. He said to him, "Where are you from?" He replied, "From Damharia." 'Blood (dam) will be his end', applying to himself the verse, "Swift were our pursuers."

I'll add to this that the concept of being able to cancel a hechsher mitzvah through a vow has some traction in the Acharonim. For example, the Avnei Nezer (OH 535:10) discusses this in the context of making Aliyah:

י ובמה שכתבתי נראה לי לדחות מה שכתב הרשב"ש בתשובה נסי' א' דנשבע שלא יעלה לארץ ישראל לא חשוב נשבע לבטל את המצוה דאין המצוה העלי' רק הישיבה והעלי' מכשירין והביא מהא למפורש במשנה נדרים דף ט"ז נשבע לבטל את המצוה סוכה שאיני עושה לולב שאיני נוטל ובגמרא שם מפרש הא דסוכה שאיני עושה דאמר שבועה שלא אשב בסוכה משמע שאם נשבע שלא יעשה סוכה לא חשוב נשבע לבטל ומשום דמצוה הישיבה והעשי' מכשירין הכי נמי בעלי' לארץ ישראל עכ"ל ולפי מה שכתבתי אין הנידון דומה לראי' לסוכה אין המצוה לישב בסוכה זו דווקא ואילו הי' לו סוכה אחרת לא הי' מחוייב לעשוח סוכה זו אין העשי' מצוה מה שאין כן העלי' לארץ ישראל שאי אפשר לישב בארץ ישראל אלא אם כן יעלה אס כן העלי' גופה מצוה 

According to what I wrote, I can discard that which the Rashbash wrote that one who vows not to make aliyah to Israel is not considered someone who vows to cancel a mitzvah, since Aliyah is not a mitzvah, rather settling it is, and Aliyah is but a hechsher mitzvah. And he brought a proof from an explicit Mishnah in Nedarim that someone who vows not to make a Lulav, or not to take a Lulav. And the gemara explains that someone who says [to be continued]

One of the many nafka minas is if it is a hechsher mitzvah, then people exempt from fasting on Yom Kippur (a sick person or the like) would not be obligated in the hechsher mitzvah. If it is a mitzvah of its own, even the exempt person should keep it. Conversely, if it is a mitzvah of its own, women should ostensibly be exempt since it would be a mitzvat aseh shehazeman gerama. But if it is a hechsher mitzvah, and women are obligated to fast on Yom Kippur, they are obligated to eat on the ninth.

This precise issue isn't taken up by Rav Yechiel Michel Epstein's son, Rav Baruch Epstein in his commentary Torah Temimah to Leviticus 23:32:97, but he does approach the various issues and nafka minas of what I just raised. I want to note especially that he talks about the purpose of eating on the ninth. There, he suggests that it's to make the fast harder, and he quotes a passage in Taanit that people would not fast on Sunday, since going from feasting on Shabbat to nothing is hard. The Aruch Hashulchan also states this. So the Torah Temimah seems not to have known his father said the same thing... Or he quoted him without attribution, which the Torah Temimah does a lot.

וטעם הדבר שמצוה לאכול ולשתות בתשיעי - לא נתבאר, וי"ל ע"פ מ"ד בתענית כ"ז ב' דאנשי משמר שבמקדש לא היו מתענין באחד בשבת, ואמרו על זה בגמרא הרבה טעמים, ואחד מהם הוא כדי שלא יצאו ממנוחה ועונג לצער ותענית, וכתבו המפרשים בבאור טעם זה, מפני שתענית הבא לאחר יום רבוי אכילה ושתיה קשה התענית יותר מכפי תענית אחר יום בסדר רגיל, ולכן מכיון שבשבת מרבים לאכול ולשתות והוי התענית שביום הראשון קשה יותר לכן לא היו מתענין אז, ולפי"ז מבואר שכל האוכל ושותה בתשיעי מעלה עליו הכתוב כאלו מתענה תשיעי ועשירי, והוא מפני שתענית יום עשירי קשה לו ע"י רבוי אכילה בתשיעי, ונמצא שאכילה בתשיעי הוי הכנה לקושי התענית, ולכן עולה לו התענית של יום העשירי בערך תענית של שני ימים.

ויתבאר מאד לפי"ז מש"כ רש"י בר"ה ט' א' בענין זה כל האוכל ושותה בתשיעי - כל דמפיש טפי באכילה ושתיה עדיף, עכ"ל, וכ"מ בחולין פ"ג א' וק"י א', ולכאורה אינו מבואר איפה מרומז רבוי אכילה ושתיה, אבל לפי מש"כ מבואר היטב, דכיון דכל מה שמרבה להתענג בערב יום התענית בערך כזה קשה התענית שלמחר, א"כ ממילא כל מה שמרבה לאכול ולשתות עדיף, דבזה הוא מקבל עליו יותר קושי התענית.

ואף יתבאר עוד לפי"ז מש"כ בשאלתות דרא"ג סי' קס"ז דמצות אכילה בתשיעי היא רק אז כשמתענה בעשירי, וכן ביאר דעתו מרן דודי בבאורי הע"ש שם, ולכאורה אינו מבואר מאי שייכות שתי מצוות אלו להדדי, אבל לפי מש"כ דהטעם הוא דהרבוי אכילה ושתיה הוא רק הכנה לקבלת קושי התענית, ממילא מסתבר דמי שאינו מתענה בעשירי כגון חולה אינו מחויב באכילה בתשיעי.

והנה לפי"ז יוצא לנו, דמי שאינו מחויב בתענית יוהכ"פ כמו חולה אינו מחויב באכילה בערב יוהכ"פ, והוא דין מחודש מאוד, וצ"ע למעשה.

ורבנו עקיבא איגר בתשובה סי' ט"ז נסתפק אם נשים מצוות לאכול בערב יוהכ"פ, יען כי יש סברא לומר דזה הוי מ"ע שהז"ג ונשים פטורות, ונשאר בספק, ולפי מה שבארנו בטעם מצות אכילה בערב יוהכ"פ ובשייכות מצוה למצות התענית, הלא ממילא מתבאר דגם נשים מחויבות באכילה בערב יוהכ"פ כיון שמחויבות בגוף התענית, והרי חיובן בפרט זה כמו הגברים.

גם יש להביא ראיה למצות נשים באכילה בערב יוהכ"פ ולבאר ע"פ סברא זו שכתבנו דברי הגמרא בביצה ל' א' בענין תוספת יוהכ"פ, הני נשי דאכלי ושתי בערב יוהכ"פ עד חשיכה לא אמרינן להו מידי, משום דמוטב שיהיו שוגגין וכו', וכן קיי"ל. והנה הדבר בכלל הוא פליאה גדולה, דהרי הדבר ידוע שהנשים בכלל זהירות הן גם במצות קלות ואפילו מאלה שפטורות מהן, ומכש"כ שזהירות ומדקדקות במצות יוהכ"פ, ואיך זה יאכלו בערב יוהכ"פ עד חשיכה, ויותר מזה ברור לנו שלא תשמענה גם אם נמחה בהן, כמ"ש מוטב שיהיו שוגגין ואל יהיו מזידין, ודבר פלא הוא.

אך לפי מש"כ דגם הנשים מצוות ברבוי אכילה ושתיה בערב יוהכ"פ, ומפני דכל מ"ע שהז"ג הן פטורות ורק בזו חייבות, לכן חביבה עליהן מצוה זו ומוסיפות בה עד שתחשך, ולכן יש לחוש שגם לא תשמענה אם נמחה בהן, ודו"ק.

ולפי זה יש להעיר במש"כ הרא"ש והר"ן פ"ד דביצה והרמ"א באו"ח סי' תר"ח לילף מסוגיא זו דביצה, דבכל דבר איסור אמרינן מוטב שיהיו שוגגין וכו' ולא מחינן בנשים, דלפי מש"כ אין ראיה מכאן לדעלמא, דהכא עוברין על איסור זה בטעם ובכונה שתחשובנה למצוה, כמבואר, אבל בשאר איסורין למה לא נגיד ונמחה בהן, כי מהיכי תיתא לא תשמענה להמנע מאיסור.

ודע כי הב"י באו"ח סי' תר"ח ובכ"מ פ"ג ה"ט מנדרים כתב דכל דרשה זו דכל האוכל ושותה בתשיעי היא אסמכתא בעלמא, ועיקר הדרשה אתיא לענין תוספת יוהכ"פ כמבואר בדרשה הבאה, יעו"ש. אבל צל"ע בזה ממה שכתבו התוס' במו"ק ח' ב' בענין הדין שאין נושאין נשים במועד משום דאין מערבין שמחה בשמחה דכתיב ושמחת בחגך ולא באשתך, וכתבו התוס' עיקר דרשה היא זו ולא אסמכתא משום דאמרינן בחגיגה ח' ב' ורב אשי האי ושמחת בחגך מאי עביד ליה, ומשני אצטריך להא דבחגך ולא באשתך, עכ"ל. ור"ל אי הוי אסמכתא לא שייך לומר דאצטריך הפסוק לזה, והנה כלשון זה מצינו בענין שלפנינו בר"ה ט' א' וביומא פ"א ב' והאי תנא האי ועניתם בתשעה לחודש מאי עביד ליה ומשני אצטריך להא דכל האוכל ושותה בתשיעי וכו', ולדברי התוס' הלא לא אמרינן כזה בדרשה אסמכתית, אלא עקרית. והנה הרמב"ם השמיט כל ענין דרשה זו, וכבר נתעוררו על זה המפרשים ואין להאריך עוד:

Gersonides versus Maimonides on Psalms 33:15

I read Gersonides’ discussion regarding divine knowledge with much interest, as it is so against the tenor of common Orthodox Jewish belief regarding God’s omniscience. Looking around the Orthodox world today, I think we can safely declare Maimonides the victor in his position of God’s absolute knowledge, even with all his mystery regarding the nature of God’s knowledge.

As I continued through the chapters, I thought to myself, this is well and good, to say that God is ignorant of particulars, but this cannot possibly be aligned with the Torah. In fact, like we saw last time in class when it came to divine attributes, Gersonides accuses Maimonides of falling prey to theological needs, rather than philosophical truths. Indeed, he does so again somewhat backhandedly when he writes at the very beginning of our section (116), “Now that we have philosophically proven that Maimonides’ counterargument against the objections of the philosophers is not satisfactory - it is evident that the dispute with them should be philosophical and not from the Torah…” This implies, again, that Maimonides was making a purely Torah argument without philosophical basis at all, which is quite interesting.

So when I came upon the last chapter for this section, how Gersonides plans to accord the Torah with his philosophically proven (to him anyway) theory that God knows the generalities and not the particulars, I knew I was in for a treat. As I expected, his proofs from the Torah are hardly proofs, and most interesting of all is that he makes no recourse for the Talmud or any other rabbinic work, since I doubt he could. I cannot think of a single passage of the Talmud that could support this theory.

But even if there was, he explains why he stuck to biblical passages - he wanted to show that the Torah does not necessarily disagree with it. He says, there is no reason to deny a valid theory, and in fact (136) “it is proper to interpret these passages according to the philosophical understanding, so long as none of the fundamental principles of the Torah are destroyed.” (I’m fairly curious if Gersonides explicitly states what he believes the “fundamental principles of the Torah are.” At least, we can see what he was fighting for was important to him, so things like free will and prophecy seem fundamental to him.) And interestingly, he marshalls Maimonides as a support for the concept that divine knowledge could be only general, or at least it doesn’t contradict the Torah. I expected him to find support in Maimonides for the idea that you need not deny a philosophical principles if it doesn't contradict fundamental principles, which Maimonides explicitly says regarding creationism and the Torah, but I think Gersonides found that as obvious, and didn’t feel the need to look to Maimonides for that.

I say this all as a preamble for an interesting thing I found, where there seems to be a convergence between Gersonides and Maimonides on one particular verse - that of Psalms 33:15. It is: “He who fashions the hearts of them all, who discerns all their doings.” Gersonides argument seems to be (and this is why Feldman italicized it) that the verse says multiple times, “all”, in order to show that all of this happened at once, in that God knows the generalities and the the particular occurrences. He writes, (135) “In this way God considers all their deeds, i.e. simultaneously, not in the sense that His knowledge refers to the particulars as particular.”

This is a pretty weak interpretation, as I’m sure he was aware. I think there was a reason he needed to figure out an interpretation of this passage. I think he saw something in rabbinic literature and he wanted to answer for it. Perhaps, he knew of a passage of Maimonides about that piece of rabbinic literature, and wanted to show he could answer it. I think that’s why he put this here, and why he offered something, anything, so that he could respond.

I refer to Mishnah Rosh Hashanah 1:2, and Maimonides’ Commentary to the Mishnah there. The Mishnah states, “On Rosh Hashanah, all the world passes before Him like Bnei Maron, as it says, (Psalms 33:15) ‘He that fashions the hearts of them all, that considers all their doings.’” Well, there you have it. A fairly explicit rabbinic passage that speaks of God as if God knows particulars. The Talmud seeks to interpret “Bnei Maron”, all interpretations that conceive of God peering into every person individually, on their own. And to prove it, the Mishnah uses the very verse that Gersonides seeks to use to its opposite. So this is one hurdle that perhaps Gersonides sought to overcome - the rabbinic interpretation. By leaving out any rabbinic sources, and showing why the Torah doesn’t contradict his theory, he implicitly says that the rabbis could be wrong about this. This isn’t a problem - Maimonides says this several times.

However, perhaps Gersonides was responding to something Maimonides says there. Maimonides writes, (I’m translating from Kafih’s version) “The simple meaning of this language is clear as you can see, but the secret of its topic is undoubtedly very difficult.” What did Maimonides find difficult to explain?

Many have attempted to explain this. Perhaps more well-known is Yom-Tov Lipmann Heller in his commentary to the Mishnah, Tosafot Yom Tov, where he writes that the thing that bothered the Rambam is the concept that God looks at each person individually to judge them, yet the Talmud also says that God does this all in one glance. These are impossible and paradoxical statements, and therefore difficult to understand. I saw that Abravenel, on Emor, suggests that Maimonides couldn’t understand why there is such a thing as Rosh Hashanah for judgement is judgement day is every day, not one day a year. Rav Kook writes in several places (I saw one quoted in Tov Ro’i on the Talmud Rosh Hashanah 16a) that Maimonides had a hard time understanding how the passage of time, viewing each person individually, could be related to God.

But I think this is just one more time that Maimonides was saying that we cannot understand the nature of God’s knowledge. He writes this in several places, for example, Laws of the Foundation 2:10, Repentance 5:5, and it’s almost his go-to to explain all of the problems he encounters with his theory of God’s absolute knowledge. By throwing this out there, he is just trying to get more traction to his declaration of the differences in God’s knowledge to our own. That is, that the Mishnah shows us God must have knowledge of particulars, but we can’t fathom the nature of it.

Gersonides explicitly frowns upon this “move”. He writes (132) “It is evidently not necessary for us to accept the difference between divine and human knowledge postulated by Maimonides.” So what does he do? He reinterprets the verse to its complete opposite, in order to render Maimonides’ comment, and the plain meaning of the Mishnah, obsolete. Perhaps that explains why he introduces this interpretation that seems quite weak.

Observation as an Argument in Gersonides’ Section on Prophecy

As I read through Gersonides’ section on prophecy and divination, I have noticed something quite interesting. Medieval Aristotelian natural science often seems like philosophical guesswork. Instead of being a study of the world through observation and empirical data, the greatest scientist in medieval times seems to be the philosopher, who attempted more so to apply logical principles to the world, such as deductive and inductive reasoning, to determine its nature. The problem was, the facts of the behavior of nature and those principles did not always align. One of these areas of contradiction was astrology. Astrology claimed that the stars and planets influenced the way people acted, and determined their nature. If a man was born under one star, he would act in a certain way and certain events would happen to him, differently than if he was born under another. However, the predictions were so often in error, and the mechanisms of influence were difficult to determine logically.

However, over and over again we find Gersonides appeal to an interesting type of proof for his arguments for astrology and prophecy. And that is, the reality of its occurrence to him and others. Early on, to fight against the claim that prophecy of chance events in dreams could not occur, Gersonides writes about Averroes’ denial (32-33), “This is contrary to what sense-experience testifies… Indeed we ourselves have had such communications many times in dreams, and this has occurred to others, according to what we have heard from them.” In case you missed it, Gersonides rejects objections against prophecy of chance-events since, among other reasons, he himself(!) has had them!

In his next discussion, regarding the nature of chance events, he goes on to note that chance events have some kind of order to them. That’s why, he says, people can predict chance events with some accuracy, and can profit from their knowledge, giving rise to the notions of (33) “men of good fortune” and those who don’t profit from them, “men of bad fortune.” Again, he uses observable occurrences to demonstrate the nature and reality of certain things. And the most astounding thing is that he admits, (33) “Would that I knew how this is possible!”

He does this again, i.e. pitting philosophical knowledge against his own observance of the world, in reference to astrology. Though he admits that there is (36) “little we know about astrology”, he writes that people who were born in a certain place can be seen to tend toward certain crafts and skills. He writes, “We therefore observe that men who work in trivial or despised crafts do not leave these jobs for other work, although they have the capacity to transfer jobs. Indeed, we see people beginning to learn such lowly and despised jobs in preference to better jobs.” There is always this emphasis on observation to prove his point, despite the fact it cannot be explained.

Indeed, he relies on this point to argue that astrology is correct, despite the fact that the astrologists so often err. He writes that “frequently”, astrologists accurately predict “the thoughts and actions of men.” However, he notes that they “often” are incorrect in their predictions. He ascribes this to the difficulty in obtaining knowledge in this area, emphasizing “the inadequate procedures of verification characteristic of this discipline.” For example, he says, is that “the zodiac position of a heavenly body at any given time is only repeated once in many thousand years.” Additionally, “the movements of the heavenly bodies are not sufficiently known.” Thus, Gersonides says, we see astrology is correct with our own eyes. But if only we could observe reality more, we would see more accurate results. Again, this is a very modern scientific mindset, albeit with a debunked assumption of natural phenomena that is astrology.

There are more examples to add to this. As he continues through his arguments regarding prophecy, he deals with the types of prophecy that could be communicated. Can one prophesy regarding theoretical matters, even without knowing the causes? For example, can one have prophecy regarding medical cures without possessing any knowledge of why it would work? Again we find Gersonides appeal to what has been reported to have occurred to others. He writes, (42) “We see that many principles of medicine are communicated in sleep without their reasons…” He emphasizes great and famous doctors such as Galen and ibn Zohar write about this fact. He goes on to further note that this has happened “in my own lifetime.”

This is all to buttress his argument that theoretical matters can be communicated without their cause - because it’s happened! But he notes that logically, it shouldn’t work. He thus poses the problem quite poignantly: (44) “We are now in a quandary. Our experience testifies that there is knowledge of theoretical matters in this kind of communication, whereas logical argument indicates the opposite.” He notes that Maimonides sides with logic over experience, and therefore denies that Galen truly received this knowledge in dreams. But Gersonides objects, “To deny this is to deny empirical evidence.” Nevertheless, though he attempts to explain how communication works with theoretical knowledge in dreams, he cannot use his explanations for medical knowledge. He declares, (46) “Would that I knew!”

He is forced to use creative and wide-reaching conclusions as to the way medicine works, declaring that it must be “determined by the heavenly bodies.” How does he prove this as being so? “When you examine all these stories of doctors concerning this phenomenon, you will see that the knowledge of these cures is transmitted in this way… It is in this way that a great deal of knowledge of medicine arises, as has been related by the physicians.” Again, appeal to experience and observation toward the efficacy of the cures is how he demonstrates truth!

These are just some examples that show how Gersonides relies on experience to prove the truth of certain principles of reality.

Chiastic Structure of Datan and Aviram's Argument

Numbers 16:12-6:14

Moses then sent word to summon Dathan and Aviram, the sons of Eliav. They said:

A. We won't go up!
      
        B. Isn't it enough that you brought us out [of Egypt], a land flowing with milk and honey - just to kill us in the desert! 
                
                  C. But you have made yourself an authority over us - yes, made yourself an authority.
     
         B. You didn't bring us to a land flowing with milk and honey, or give us inheritance of fields and vineyards. Do you think that you can pull something over our eyes? 

A. We won't go up!


How do we explain this structure? It seems to me there is an obvious element of chiasm here, from the very fact that it begins and ends with "we won't go up", and has a parallel "land of milk and honey" as well. But usually the middle C is to emphasize or inform in a way that we would not have known before. Isn't their claim of authority obvious? Didn't we know that before?

Maybe we have to dig deeper to find the true chiastic structure. Maybe there is a hidden, subconscious message that Datan and Aviram may not have even known about their complaint, but is deeply embedded in it.

On the outside, externally, it looks like Datan and Aviram are upset because Moshe has the gal to lead them, and yet has led them badly. Is this the same claim as Korach? Korach had said, "כִּי כָל הָעֵדָה כֻּלָּם קְדשִׁים וּבְתוֹכָם יְהֹוָה וּמַדּוּעַ תִּתְנַשְּׂאוּ עַל קְהַל ה," that everyone is holy, and therefore there should be no authority structure (alternatively: anyone should have the chance to lead the people). And Datan and Aviram seem very similar to that - why do you lift yourself up? Let's look closer, though.

A. We won't go up!
      
        B. You took us from Egypt with milk and honey to die in desert
                
                  C. But you have made yourself an authority 
                                 
                                      D. On us 
                
                  C. Yes, made yourself an authority.
     
         B. You didn't bring us to a land flowing with milk and honey, or give us nice land

A. We won't go up!

The main difference between Korach's claim and Datan and Aviram's claim is, "עָלֵינוּ." Korach had said that there is no reason Moshe should lord himself "עַל קְהַל ה." But that is not what Datan  and Aviram say. They say, "כִּי-תִשְׂתָּרֵר עָלֵינוּ, גַּם-הִשְׂתָּרֵר". The Torah wants to show that, deep down, their problem of Moshe's authority was not like Korach's. Not the noble intentions of Korach that you have too much power over the people, Datan and Aviram were upset that you have too much power over us, Datan and Aviram. We couldn't care less about the rest of Israel - but us, we don't want you to be able to command us in any way. We want to be able to do what we want without your authority.

In doing this exercise, I thought of an "out-there" interpretation that might work.

Perhaps the claim was that, by what right can you lead us - if your leading has gotten us into such trouble that we are cursed to die here? This is obviously your fault! We would never be in this mess if it weren't for you.

Blaming Moshe for their sins! But the Torah hides in their speech what they really knew - a Freudian slip in their mouths. They knew they were themselves at fault, and are lashing out at Moshe because it's easier than blaming themselves. So even though it sounds like, how could you cause us to die here in the desert and continue to be our leader, they were really, deep down, acknowledging that it was not on Moshe, but, "on us." It's our fault. It was a subconscious confession, realization, which the Torah hides in a chiastic structure.