The third division are the laws that they extrapolated by the ways of reasoning and a disagreement about them occurred, as we have mentioned – and the law was decided in them according to the majority. And this happens, when the investigation is given to divergence. And because of this, they say (Yevamot 76b), "If it is a [transmitted] law, we will accept it; but if it is a law [that is deduced], there is a rebuttal."
2 Rather the disagreement and the investigation occurred about something that a [transmitted] law was not heard. And you will find in all of the Talmud that they are examining the basis of the reasoning that causes the disagreement between the disputants; and [so] they say, "About what do they differ," or "What is the basis of Rabbi x," or "What is [the difference] between them?"
3 And they bring it about this matter in most places; and they mention the basis that causes the disagreement – for example, that they will say, "Rabbi x holds from claim z, and y holds from claim a," and similar to it.
4 But one who would think that the laws about which they disagree are likewise transmitted from the mouth of Moshe and they think that a disagreement occurred by way of a mistake in the laws or because one of them received the true transmission and the other made a mistake in his transmission or he forgot or he did not hear from his teacher everything he was supposed to hear – and bring [as] a proof about this, that which they said (Sanhedrin 88b), "From when the students of Shammai and Hillel – who did not serve all that was required of them – multiplied, disagreement grew in Israel and the Torah was made to be like two Torahs"; this thing is very repugnant.
5 And these are the words of one who has no intellect and does not have the fundamental principles in his hand and who disfigures the people from which the commandments were transmitted; and all of this is emptiness and naught. And what brought him to believe this faulty belief is his lack of cognition of the words of the sages that are found in the Talmud. As they found that all of the explanation that is transmitted from the mouth of Moshe is true, but they did not [take cognizance] of the difference between the transmitted fundamentals and the topical extensions that [the sages] extrapolated by investigation.
6 But [as for] you, a doubt should not enter your heart [about] the disagreement of the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel; when they said (Berakhot 51b Chapter 8), "We clean the room, and afterward rinse the hands" or "we rinse the hands, and afterward clean the room" – [that] you think that [the cause of this argument is that] one of these two things was not transmitted from the mouth of Moshe from Sinai.
7 But [rather] the basis that causes them to disagree is what is mentioned in the Talmud (Berakhot 52b); that one of them forbids being served by an ignorant person and the other permits [it]. And so [too, with] all that is similar to these disagreements, that are the elaborations of elaborations.
8 Rather, the matter of that which they said, "From when the students of Shammai and Hillel – who did not serve all that was required of them – multiplied, disagreement grew in Israel," is evident; in that when two people are of equal intellect and investigation and knowledge of the fundamentals from which reasonings extrapolate, no disagreement will occur in their reasonings in any way. And if it does occur, it will be minimal; as it is only found that Shammai and Hillel disagreed about isolated laws.
9 And that is because the thoughts of the two of them were very close – one to the other – in everything that they extrapolated by way of reasoning. And, likewise, the fundamentals that were given to this one, were like the fundamentals given to that one.
10 But when the diligence of the students towards wisdom slackened and their reasoning weakened – in comparison to the reasoning of Hillel and Shammai – disagreement occurred among them in the investigation of many things; as the reasoning of each and every one of them was according to his intellect and to what he had in hand of the fundamentals.
11 And nonetheless, there is nothing to be ashamed about; as we cannot force two sages that debate in investigation, to debate according to the intellect of Yehoshua and Pinchas. And, likewise, we have no doubt about that which they debated [just] because they are not like Shammai and Hillel or like those before them; as the Holy One, blessed be He, did not command His service in this manner.
12 But [rather] He commanded us to listen to the sages of the generation, as it is stated (Deuteronomy 17:9), "to the judge that will be in those days."
13 And it is through these ways that disagreement occurred; not because they erred in the laws, and one is saying truth and the other is saying falsehood. And how evident is this matter to all that give cognizance to it! And how precious and great is this fundamental principle about the commandments!
Toward the beginning of Maimonides' introduction to the Mishnah, he vehemently protests the idea that machloket Chazal are caused by one or both of the sides forgetting the original teaching. If one believes this, Maimonides states, one necessarily believes one side is absolutely right and the other is absolutely wrong. He says this is a terrible insult to Chazal, not only that they couldn't maintain the tradition accurately, but that one side in those machloket were wrong about the halacha (both of which would impact us in a negative way in our understanding of the integrity and authority of the halachic system).
Part of the reason he believes this to be inaccurate is that the machloket is never about fundamental aspects of halacha, but things stemming from various minutiae of halacha. If so, they successfully maintained the main points, and the rest was left for them to decide in each generation.
This is important to Maimonides, that Chazal maintained the fundamental principles of the halachic system. But what does Maimonides believe is the real reason machloket arose? He says, they weren't as good at logical deduction as their ancestors. He says that if everyone had the same principles, and the same ability at logic, no machloket would ever arrive, since they would conclude the exact same thing. Maimonides seems to believe there would be no differences of opinion, there would just be right and wrong. That may remind us of what Maimonides believes the sin of Adam and Eve were in the Garden of Eden. We will copy Pines' translation of Chapter 2 of the Guide:
Years ago a learned man propounded as a challenge to me a curious objection. It behooves us now to consider this objection and our reply invalidating it. However, before mentioning this objection and its invalidation, I shall make the following statement. Every Hebrew knew that the term Elohim is equivocal, designating the deity, the angels, and the rulers governing the cities. Onqelos the Proselyte, peace be on him, has made it clear, and I his clarification is correct, that in the dictum of Scripture, And ye shall be as Elohim, knowing good and evil, the last sense is intended. For he has translated: And ye shall be as rulers.
After thus having set forth the equivocality of this term, we shall begin to expound the objection. This is what the objector said: It is manifest from the clear sense of the biblical text that the primary purpose with regard to man was that he should be, as the other animals are, devoid of intellect, of thought, and of the capacity to distinguish between good and evil. However, when he disobeyed, his disobedience procured him as its necessary consequence the great perfection peculiar to man, namely, his being endowed with the capacity that exists in us to make this distinction. Now this capacity is the noblest of the characteristics existing in us; it is in virtue of it that we are constituted as substances. Now it is a thing to be wondered at that man's punishment for his disobedience should consist in his being granted a perfection that he did not possess before, namely, the intellect. This is like the story told by somebody that a certain man from among the people disobeyed and committed great crimes, and in consequence was made to undergo a metamorphosis, becoming a star in heaven. This was the intent and the meaning of the objection, though it was not textually as we have put it.
Hear now the intent of our reply. We said: O you who engage in theoretical speculation using the first notions that may occur to you and come to your mind and who consider withal that you understand a book that is the guide of the first and the last men while glancing through it as you would glance through a historical work or a piece of poetry-when, in some of your hours of leisure, you leave off drinking and copulating: collect yourself and reflect, for things are not as you thought following the first notion that occurred to you, but rather as is made clear through reflection upon the following speech. For the intellect that God made overflow unto man and that is the latter's ultimate perfection, was that which Adam had been provided with before he disobeyed. It was because of this that it was said of him that he was created in the image of God and in His likeness. It was likewise on account of it that he was addressed by God and given commandments, as it says: And the Lord I God commanded, and so on. For commandments are not given to beasts and beings devoid of intellect.
Through the intellect one distinguishes between truth and falsehood, and that was found in [Adam] in its perfection and integrity. Fine and bad, on the other hand, belong to the things generally accepted as known, not to those cognized by the intellect.
For one does not say: it is fine that heaven is spherical, and it is bad that the earth is flat; rather one says true and false with regard to these assertions. Similarly one expresses in our language the notions of truth and falsehood by means of the terms emeth and sheqer, and those of fine and bad by means of the terms tov and ra.
Now man in virtue of his intellect knows truth from falsehood; and this holds good for all intelligible things. Accordingly when man was in his most perfect and excellent state, in accordance with his inborn disposition and possessed of his intellectual cognitions - because of which it is said of him: Thou hast made him but little lower than Elohim - he had no faculty that was engaged in any way in the consideration of generally accepted things, and he did not apprehend them. So among these generally accepted things even that which is most manifestly bad, namely, uncovering the genitals, was not bad according to him, and he did not apprehend that it was bad. However, when he disobeyed and inclined toward his desires of the imagination and the pleasures of his corporeal senses - inasmuch as it is said: that the tree was good for food and that it was a delight to the eyes - he was punished by being deprived of that intellectual apprehension. He therefore disobeyed the commandment that was imposed upon him on account of his intellect and, becoming endowed with the faculty of apprehending generally accepted things, he became absorbed in judging things to be bad or fine. Then he knew how great his loss was, what he had been deprived of, and upon what a state he had entered. Hence it is said: And ye shall be like Elohim knowing good and evil; and not: knowing the false and the true, or apprehending the false and the true. With regard to what is of necessity, there is no good and evil at all, but only the false and the true.
Reflect on the dictum: And the eyes of them both were opened, and they knew that they were naked. It is not said: And the eyes of them both were opened, and they saw. For what was seen previously was exactly that which was seen afterwards. There had been no membrane over the eye that was now removed, but rather he entered upon another state in which he considered as bad things that he had not seen in that light before. Know moreover that this expression, I mean, to open, refers only to uncovering mental vision and in no respect is applied to the circumstance that the sense of sight has been newly acquired. Thus: And God opened her eyes; Then the eyes of the blind shall be opened; Opening the ears, he heareth not; a verse that is analogous to its dictum, That have eyes to see and see not.
Now concerning its dictum with regard to Adam - He changes his face and Thou sendest him forth - the interpretation and explanation of the verse are as follows. When the direction toward which man tended changed, he was driven forth. For panim is a term deriving from the verb panoh [to turn], since man turns his face toward the thing he wishes to take as his objective. The verse states accordingly that when man changed the direction toward which he tended and took as his objective the very thing a previous commandment had bidden him not to aim at, he was driven out of the Garden Eden. This was the punishment corresponding to his disobedience; it was measure for measure. He had been given license to eat good things and to enjoy ease and tranquility. When, however, as we have said, he became greedy, followed his pleasures and his imaginings, and ate what he had been forbidden to eat, he was deprived of everything and had to eat the meanest kinds of food, which he had not used as aliment before - and this only after toil and labor. As it says: Thorns also and thistles shall it bring forth to thee, and so on; In the sweat of thy brow, and so on. And it explains and says: And the Lord God sent him forth from the Garden of Eden, to till the ground. And God reduced him, with respect to his food and most of his circumstances, to the level of the beast. It says accordingly: And thou shalt eat the grass of the field. And it also says in explanation of this story: Adam, unable to dwell in dignity, is like the beasts that speak not. Praise be to the Master of the will whose aims and wisdom cannot be apprehended!According to this change in man, previous what is true and false were known to man. Now, with the sin, he became aware of "good" and "bad", which are accepted norms, but nothing to do with the intellect.
Is this the same as what Maimonides meant in his Introduction to the Mishnah? It would seem to be a bit different. Machloket Chazal were not caused by mixing in norms and pleasures, but because their ability to do logic differed from person to person, and wasn't as perfect as it used to be. But the cause for that could certainly be this...
The point of this is that Maimonides' assumption in the Introduction to the Mishnah seems to be that logic can only land in one direction - there are no other axioms or paradigms that would allow two different people from arriving in two directions using the same intellectual capacity.
Also, the Mishneh Torah Mamrim 1:3-4:
There can never be any difference of opinion with regard to matters received through the Oral Tradition. Whenever there arises a difference of opinion with regard to a matter that shows that it was not received in the tradition from Moses our teacher.
The following principles apply with regard to matters derived through logical analysis. If the entire body of the Supreme Sanhedrin agrees with regard to them, their consent is binding. If there is a difference of opinion, we follow the majority and decide the matter according to the majority. Similarly, with regard to the decrees, edicts, and customs, if a portion of the judges perceived that it was necessary to issue a decree, institute an edict, or establish a custom for the people, and a portion perceived that it is not appropriate to issue this decree, institute this edict, or establish this custom, the judges should debate the matter back and forth. Afterwards, a vote is called, and we follow the majority and execute the matter according to the decision of the majority.
When the Supreme Sanhedrin was in session, there was never any prolonged differences of opinion among the Jewish people. Instead, if a doubt arose in a Jew's mind over any law, he would inquire of the court in his city. If not, the questioner and that court - or its agents - ascend to Jerusalem and ask the court which holds sessions on the Temple Mount. If they know, they will reply to him, if they do not know, everyone comes to the court that holds sessions at the entrance to the Temple Courtyard. If they know, they will reply to him, if they do not know, everyone comes to the Chamber of Hewn Stone, to the Supreme Sanhedrin, and presents the question. If the matter that was unresolved by all the others was known to the Supreme Sanhedrin - either as part of the Oral Tradition or because of its derivation through the principles of exegesis - they relate the decision immediately. If, however, the decision was unclear to the Supreme Sanhedrin, they deliberate about the matter at that time and debate it back and forth until they reach a uniform decision, or until a vote is taken. In such a situation, they follow the majority and then tell all the questioners: "This is the halachah." The questioners then all depart.
After the Supreme Sanhedrin was nullified, differences of opinion multiplied among the Jewish people. One would rule an article is impure and support his ruling with a rationale and another would rule that it is pure and support his ruling with a rationale. This one would rule an article is forbidden and this would rule that it is permitted.
However, in the Guide, this seems to be different. Let us quote Maimonides directly on this, in his Guide for the Perplexed, 1:31:
Alexander of Aphrodisias says that there are three causes of disagreement about things.
One of them is love of domination and love of strife, both of which turn man aside from the apprehension of truth as it is.
The second cause is the subtlety and the obscurity of the object of apprehension in itself and the difficulty of apprehending it.
And the third cause is the ignorance of him who apprehends and his inability to grasp things that it is possible to apprehend. That is what Alexander mentioned.
However, in our times there is a fourth cause that he did not mention because it did not exist among them. It is habit and upbringing. For man has in his nature a love of, and an inclination for, that to which he is habituated.
Thus you can see that the people of the desert - notwithstanding the disorderliness of their life, the lack of pleasures, and the scarcity of food - dislike the towns, do not hanker after their pleasures, and prefer the bad circumstances to which they are accustomed to good ones to which they are not accustomed. Their souls accordingly would find no repose in living in palaces, in wearing silk clothes, and in the enjoyment of baths, ointments, and perfumes.
In a similar way, man has love for, and the wish to defend, opinions to which he is habituated and in which he has been brought up and has a feeling of repulsion for opinions other than those. For this reason also man is blind to the apprehension of the true realities and inclines toward the things to which he is habituated. This happened to the multitude with regard to the belief in His corporeality and many other metaphysical subjects as we shall make clear. All this is due to people being habituated to, and brought up on, texts that it is an established usage to think highly of and to regard as true and whose external meaning is indicative of the corporeality of God and of other imaginings with no truth in them, for these have been set forth as parables and riddles. This is so for reasons I that I shall mention further on.
Do not think that what we have said with regard to the insufficiency of the human intellect and its having a limit at which it stops is a statement made in order to conform to Law. For it is something that has already been said and truly grasped by the philosophers without their having concern for a particular doctrine or opinion. And it is a true thing that cannot be doubted except by an individual ignorant of what has already been demonstrated.
He states here his intention is not to express that people should follow the law because of his explanation for how machloket started. Specifically, that it is insufficiency of the human intellect. Why? Because that is not his motivation, as others have come up with this without trying to defend Judaism or any other religious system. His point, at least at this point, is to show why people believe in incorrect beliefs and refuse to believe the truth. I bet Maimonides was getting, "If that's true, why doesn't anybody agree with you in the Jewish community?" And I bet he was answering, because they're stupid and stuck in their own ways.
Narboni on this passage suggests that Maamad Har Sinai, and God's placing a gevul, is a metaphor for the limits of the intellect, and that certain things are truly beyond one's intellect. More interestingly for us, he thinks that these four causes for Machloket are represented by the four who went to Pardes. The only one he explains really (although he mentions that he explains this fully elsewhere, maybe the introduction?) is Elisha ben Avuya, who he says (quoting the gemara) that "He did not have mercy on his Creator," meaning that he did not recognize his intellectual limits.
Shem Tov says the same thing, but breaks it up differently. Elisha is the first cause, love for power. Akiva is represented by the second cause, since he understood the limits of the human mind to perceive certain things by the nature of the thing, which is why he entered and exited peacefully. The third cause, inability of the person himself, is represented by "the one" who glanced and died, alluding to Ben Azzai (without saying it outright). He doesn't say explicitly who is represented by the last one, Maimonides' own, probably for two reasons. Firstly, it makes no sense, since Maimonides is referring to a new problem in his own time, which presumably didn't apply to Chazal's time. Secondly, because the fourth problem is that people are used to what they're used to, and therefore people are used to corporeality when it comes to God, and that's why they refuse to listen to reason. And to say that about Ben Zoma, and why he went insane, is difficult to say out loud. But, I do think it is funny to reach this metaphor's conclusion, that those who believe the corporeality of God, and other mistakes, are considered insane according to this.
The Derech Emunah on the Haggadah tries to line it up with the Four Sons of the Haggadah - the Rasha wants power, the Chacham understands what can't be understood easily, the Tam doesn't have the ability to understand, and the She'eino yodea lish'ol is stuck in his background and can't leave it.
