"Love your fellow as yourself" and seeing your future wife before marriage

The Talmud in the beginning of the second chapter of Kiddushin (41a) states that one must make sure to see his future wife at least once before he marries her - lest he marry her and find her unattractive to him.

Soncino translation:

 MISHNAH. A MAN CAN BETROTH [A WOMAN] THROUGH HIMSELF OR THROUGH HIS AGENT. A WOMAN MAY BE BETROTHED THROUGH HERSELF OR THROUGH HER AGENT. A MAN MAY GIVE HIS DAUGHTER IN BETROTHAL WHEN A NA'ARAH [EITHER] HIMSELF OR THROUGH HIS AGENT.

If he can betroth THROUGH HIS AGENT, is it necessary [to state] THROUGH HIMSELF? — Said R. Joseph: [This inclusion intimates that] it is more meritorious through himself than through his agent... Some say that in this matter there is even a prohibition, in accordance with Rab Judah's dictum in Rab's name; for Rab Judah said in the name of Rab: A man may not betroth a woman before he sees her, lest he [subsequently] see something repulsive in her, and she become loathsome to him, whereas the All-Merciful said, but thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.

The gemara uses the verse "You shall love your fellow as yourself" as a proof for this. The verse can be used in two ways toward this, in my understanding. Either, 1) it will hurt her feelings if you can't find your wife attractive, which is not how you would want to be treated as well. Therefore, you shall love her as yourself and preemptively make sure there will be no problems like that. This understanding would mean that it would violate the command of loving one's fellow to not look out for the possibility of future hurt, even if it is understandable once you're in that situation. Or, it can mean 2) that in this instance, the gemara is using the verse on a very literal level. You shall love your fellow as yourself - if you don't find your wife attractive, it means you won't love her as you would want to be loved by her, a violation of the literal expression of "ahava" the verse uses.

Be that as it may, it is curious to me that such a broad verse about being nice to others is being applied here. It makes sense according to my second explanation, but for the first, what is the connection between the broad verse and the specific case?

The Baal HaTurim writes something interesting on "You shall love your fellow as yourself." He is trying to solve for the apparently arbitrary juxtaposition of this commandment and the prohibition of forbidden mixtures, kilayim, that you shouldn't create a new animal by mixing two different ones.

He points to two different Talmudic passages, as sourced by the HaMaor Mikraot Gedolot Chumash:

וסמיך ליה לא תרביע כלאים האוהב אשתו לא ישמש עמה ועיניו באשה אחרת ולא יכפנה לתשמיש:

It juxtaposes it to "Do not mate different animals...", [because] one who loves his wife may not have sex with her while his eyes are on another woman (Nedarim 20b), and he may not compel her to have sex (Eruvin 100b).

Meaning, that when a man has in mind another women while having sex with his wife, or when he is violating both "love your fellow..." and "kilayim" (the latter in a metaphorical sense).

The quote from Nedarim 20b goes:

"And that ye seek not after your own heart." [Deducing] from this Rabbi taught: One may not drink out of one goblet and think of another. 

(Also see Bamidbar Rabbah 9:34 - אָמְרוּ רַבּוֹתֵינוּ בִּזְּמַן שֶׁהָאִשָּׁה מִיַּחֶדֶת עִם בַּעֲלָהּ וְהִיא מְשַׁמֶּשֶׁת עִמּוֹ וְלִבָּהּ לְאִישׁ אַחֵר שֶׁרָאֲתָה בַּדֶּרֶךְ, אֵין לְךָ נִאוּף גָּדוֹל מִזֶּה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (יחזקאל טז, לב): הָאִשָּׁה הַמְנָאֶפֶת תַּחַת אִישָׁהּ תִּקַּח אֶת זָרִים, וְכִי יֵשׁ אִשָּׁה שֶׁמְנָאֶפֶת תַּחַת אִישָׁהּ, אֶלָּא זוֹ הִיא שֶׁפָּגְעָה בְּאִישׁ אַחֵר וְנָתְנָה עֵינֶיהָ בּוֹ, וְהִיא מְשַׁמֶּשֶׁת עִם בַּעֲלָהּ וְלִבָּהּ עָלָיו. )

The implication in the discussion after this is that the such sex will result in blemished children. Presumably, the Talmud believes in the concept common then (and is even held by Shadal in the 18th century in Jacob's tricking Lot and achieving the kind of sheep he wanted) that thought during intercourse affects the offspring of that coitus. By thinking of another woman, the Baal HaTurim is saying, one engages in the creation of a new species that shows his lack of love for the wife he had sex with. Relating this to the passage in Kiddusin above, one can see how someone who does not find his wife attractive would violate loving one's fellow as oneself, when that verse is related to how one should not imagine another woman when having sex with her. If he is disgusted by his wife's appearance after he marries her because he didn't know what she looked like before, he will be forced to think of someone else when he wants to perform the commandment of peru urvu.

The Baal HaTurim also reference Eruvin 100b:

Rami b. Hama citing R. Assi further ruled: A man is forbidden to compel his wife to the [marital] obligation, since it is said in Scripture: And he that hasteth with his feet sinneth. R. Joshua b. Levi similarly stated: Whosoever compels his wife to the [marital] obligation will have unworthy children.

Baal HaTurim is saying that this is another case of not loving one's wife and forcing her to create kilayim, unworthy bastard children. Again, this is related to one's love of wife, but not necessarily with how much he finds her attractive. Still, the Baal Haturim's first comment is helpful for us.

Hilarious interview between Rabbi Yair Hoffman and Haym Soloveitchik

This interview is hilarious.

YH: To begin, your great-grandfather revolutionized the Yeshiva system of learning, much in the same way that you write the Baalei HaTosfos revolutionized Gemorah study in the middle ages of Europe. Did your great-grandfather’s Brisker legacy inspire or inform at all your analysis of the impact of the Baalei Tosfos on Gemorah study?
DS: No. My interest in the Ba’lei HaTosafos stems from their centrality in the understanding of the Gemara.

...

YH: Do you have any thoughts about how the field can be promoted in terms of undergraduate texts?
DS: Not really.

...

YH: You write in one of your essays that it was mostly written for the eyes of your father, Jacob Katz and Professor Saul Lieberman. What was your relationship with Lieberman?
DS: He was very nice to me. He gave me of his time.

Chizkuni on the Cherubim in the Holy of Holies

Interesting answer by the Chizkuni on why the Torah allowed a graven image (the Cherubim) into the Holy of Holies:

"ואף על פי שאמר 'לא תעשה לך פסל וכל תמונה' (שמות כ', ג) כאן התיר צורת הכרובים שהרי לא נעשו להשתחוות אלא לישיבתו, דוגמא כרובים דכסא הכבוד (ישעיהו ו, א-ב). ודברים הרבה כאלו מצינו בתורה כמו שכתוב 'כל העושה בה מלאכה יומת' (שמות ל"ה,ב) והתיר לעשות בה תמיד, מוסף מילה. ערוות אשת אח ויבום, לא תלבש שעטנז גדילים תעשה לך"

Firstly, they weren't meant to be worshiped. Secondly, for everything the Torah prohibits, there is one thing it permits. You can't do work of Shabbat, yet you can offer the Tamid offering and the Mussaf offering. You cannot sleep with your brother's wife, yet you could through Yibum. Etc.

I always thought that was a joke! One time I asked a guy in shul why we seemingly pray to the moon in Kiddush Levana and he jokingly said this answer. This is presumably based on the Talmud Chullin 109b, but I don't think he knew either source.

Rashi, Ralbag, and Shadal on "The Evil Eye"

Rashi, Ralbag, and Shadal all believe in the concept of "the evil eye" (I was surprised about the last two), but all very differently.

Rashi believed that the evil eye was the effect of a mystical entity that damages people who single out either themselves or their possessions.

Ralbag, as a rationalist, attempted to explain the evil eye naturally, saying that there is a physical negative reaction when someone who is jealous looks at the object of his jealousy, like a poisonous gaze.

Shadal believed not so much in the evil eye, but in the concept behind it, that when someone who has something singles it out, it creates arrogance in its possessor, and God wants to knock him down a peg. He calls this a concept that the Torah is founded upon. Instead of being a mystical force, Shadal believes it is God's providence in this world, to prevent us from being haughty and becoming overly confident in our own strength and possessions, thereby forgetting God. However, he says, God didn't want to throw away this great concept, even though the masses attribute it to the evil eye. So He commands them to count themselves by giving coins to the Mishkan, showing them that not only will nothing bad happen to them when they do it this way, but they can always use the Mishkan as a place for atonement to avoid what they believe is the evil eye, but is really God's providence. However, Shadal says, God is saying that counting the people like this must be for a purpose. David, at the end of his life, decided to count the people out of sheer arrogance of power, and he brought plague upon the people. For this reason, he was inspired to begin the building of the Holy Temple, a direct outgrowth of this concept of the Mishkan as a way to atone and not get the wrath of God's providence when one gets haughty.

First Milchamot Hashem on Mesechet Shabbat

Here's the rabbinic attack pun breakdown.

The Rif asks a question "Mai Taama..."

The Baal Hamaor thinks the question is nonsense, writes, "ein bah taam v'rei'ach."

The Ramban (the first one in mesechet Shabbat) defending the Rif, writes "yesh bah taam k'ikkar".

Good stuff.

What does "Fear of God" mean?

Nechama Leibowitz makes an amazing observation: Every time someone is described as "God-fearing" or not "God-fearing" in the Torah, it refers to how they treat the weak or defenseless. For example, Genesis 42:18 in reference to Joseph being kind to the brothers, or Exodus 1:17 regarding to the midwives saving the babies, or Deuteronomy 25:17-18, in reference to Amalek attacking the weak of the Jewish people.

Meaning, the definition of "fearing God" in the Biblical sense is directly correlated with how you treat people who need your help.

Incidentally, she "paskens" that the war against Amalek is no longer an ethnic or racial one, but against those who do not fear God in this sense. She quotes Rashi on Exodus 17:16 which becomes so much more powerful when read that God's throne is incomplete while "Amalek" (cruelty to the defenseless) still lives.

However, as some of my friends point out, there are many times that the phrase "fear of God" does not seem to refer to the protection of the weak. See, for example, the angel stopping Abraham from slaughtering Isaac, declaring that now he can see that he fears God, Genesis 22:12

"Do not lay a hand on the boy," he said. "Do not do anything to him. Now I know that you fear God, because you have not withheld from me your son, your only son."

 But perhaps Professor Schrader is correct in this very interesting article, and the true test of the sacrifice of Isaac was how he withheld the slaughtering of his son, despite the social acceptance of it, by the word of God. So the "fear of God" was that he protected his defenseless son.

Alternatively, I'd say that now God "knows" he was willing to sacrifice the son he loved and allow his older and less loved son to be his heir to the nation, a function of his fear of God to care about the weak. But that is a big chiddush.

A friend asked about Deuteronomy 10:12-13, "And now, Israel, what does the Lord your God require of you, but to fear the Lord your God, to walk in all His ways and to love Him, to serve the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul, and to keep the commandments of the Lord and His statutes which I command you today for your good?"

This doesn't preclude the above definition, in fact in 10:18, Moshe continues by describing God as the helper of the needy and the defenseless, and caps it off in 10:20 by repeating the need to fear the Lord.

It should be noted that Nechama Liebowitz was very careful with her words and said this interpretation only on regard to descriptions of people or groups as God-fearing, so these verses don't have to do with that at all.

The counterpart to the Rasha

We often think of the counterpart to the Chacham child is the Rasha, but it seems more like the counterpart to a wise child is a simple child, the Tam. Does that make the wicked child's counterpart the child that doesn't know to ask, the "eino yodea lishol"?

Perhaps the purpose is to show that the "eino yodea lishol" knows that he can't ask, so doesn't. Meaning, in his ignorance, he has not enough information to even formulate a question. Therefore, the response is to start him off. Give him information so that he could ask.

What makes the rasha a rasha is that he asks questions, even though he is ignorant. Meaning, he's aware that he lacks the information necessary to put forward a valid question, yet he is brazen enough to ask anyway. This type of personality requires you to cast him lower, take away some of his ego, by declaring him a person who would not have been freed in Egypt. Though this seems harsh, the solution is for his own good. Knock down his ego just a bit, the purpose being to show that he lacks the ability to really ask the question.

Although I suspect this educational suggestion would have an opposite effect today.