Rabbi Shimon Shkop and the Value of Fun

Printed in Kol Hamevaser 2015

Rabbi Shimon Shkop’s Imitatio Dei and the Value of Fun          

Of the lesser-known teachers of RIETS’ past, Rabbi Shimon Shkop (1860-1939) definitely ranks near the top of the list. That isn’t to say that Rabbi Shimon Shkop is less-known. Far from it, as a close colleague of Rabbi Israel Meir Kagan (the “Chofetz Chaim”) and Rabbi Chaim Ozer Grodzinski, the two preeminent authorities of pre-war Europe, his name is oft-mentioned in the circles of Talmudic analytics. His position as the head of the Telze Yeshiva allowed him to craft a curriculum that combined the complex Talmudic approach of Brisk and the “simple” approach of Rabbi Naftali Tzvi Yehuda Berlin at Volozhin, to create the “Telze approach”, producing many Torah greats, including Rabbi Elchonon Wasserman. He headed a very successful yeshiva in Grodno called “Shaar HaTorah”, where the famous Rabbi Chaim Shmuelevitz taught. The very different worlds of Telze and Yeshiva University colliding in Rabbi Shimon Shkop is nothing less than shocking, more so today than before.

It doesn’t help that many of his students tried to erase the history of his time at YU. In a Jubilee volume published by his Shaar HaTorah students after Rabbi Shkop returned from America to Grodno to continue as head the yeshiva there, the publication provides a description of Rabbi Shkop’s accomplishments, including his time in America in 1928-1929. Conspicuously missing from this is any mention of his time teaching at Yeshiva University. Instead, they write (my translation):^[i]

“In the year 5689 [1928] when the material situation of the yeshiva was extremely stricken, and the yeshiva’s income had shriveled, our rabbi took his wandering staff and wandered to America to save the yeshiva from its tangle of debt and to set the yeshiva on its proper basis. This traveling during his old age was literally self-sacrifice (mesirat nefesh), but our master shlita cast in his life despite that, for this was regarding the life and survival of the yeshiva. The appearance of our rabbi shlita in America had an enormous impact, and everywhere he went they came and greeted him with great reverence and admiration. His many and scattered students, in the hundreds, flocked to him and made their great love and appreciation known to their rabbi. While still 5689 (1929), he returned to Grodno to the joy of his students...

This is yet more evidence that even in a rabbi’s lifetime can his history be rewritten by people from his circle, in order to “protect” the reputation of their greats.

RIETS, for its part, was extremely respectful and cognizant of Rabbi Shkop’s standing. As R. Aaron Rakeffet in Bernard Revel: Builder of American Jewish Orthodoxy, describes how Revel wrote a press release describing the importance of Rabbi Shkop’s appointment:

The coming of the Gaon, Rabbi Shimon Shkop to the Yeshiva is not only a matter of great importance to the Yeshiva... but it is an important event for all American Jewry. He will, with the help of God, aid in planting the seeds of Torah in this land, just as he propagated the study of Torah in our old home.^[ii]

The students themselves revered Rabbi Shkop. R. Rakeffet continues:

In the December 30, 1928, issue of the student publication, Hedenu, a student described his emotions and thoughts when Rabbi Shkop entered to lecture:

"Reb Shimon" is walking slowly. An electric current seems to pass through those assembled, and all eyes focus upon Rabbi Shkop. One thought seems to be uppermost in everyone's mind: this elderly man--who possesses keen eyes that move quickly, and a gentle smile on a delicate face that is surrounded by a clean, white beard--is "Reb Shimon." This is the same "Reb Shimon" of Telshe, Maltsh, Bryensk, and Grodno--whose deeds and accomplishments in each of these stations in his life, have gained for him the respect and love of all.^[iii]

Although the Yeshiva University website describes his stay as Rosh Yeshiva as lasting a full year,^[iv] in reality his stay was short-lived, lasting only from March of 1929 to August of that year. And although the Yeshiva University website states that the reason why he left was due to the urging of the Chofetz Chaim and Rabbi Chaim Ozer Grodzinski despite his misgivings, this seems to be inaccurate as well. There, whoever wrote the description, describes his leaving Yeshiva in such a manner:

Although he wanted to remain, the leading rabbis of Europe, led by the Chofetz Chaim zt”l and Rabbi Chaim Ozer zt”l, felt it imperative for him to return to Grodna and to his yeshiva there. Rabbi Shkop answered their call, albeit with some misgivings.

 However, R. Revel’s invitation to Rabbi Shkop to stay the next year was met with adamant refusal and a clear rationale for it, indicating that Rabbi Shkop never planned to stay longer than he had to:

When I arrived here [Miami beach], I was given your telegram in which you requested that I continue in the Yeshiva. It surprises me that you still ask that I do so. Haven't I already told you many times that I cannot fulfill this request. It is my fondest wish that God should help me return to my Yeshiva in Grodno before Rosh Hashanah.... May the good Lord aid you in selecting the proper man to head the Yeshiva.^[v]

Though its possible that Rabbi Shkop would have stayed had his colleagues not urged him to return, it seems more obvious that he himself never really wished to stay in America at all, nor did he have “misgivings” for his decision to leave. We see that there may be some rewriting of Rabbi Shkop’s history on the Modern Orthodox side as well, which is definitely an under-described phenomenon.^[vi]

            Rabbi Shkop’s willingness to teach at YU demonstrates his general openness to breaking away from the mold in the yeshiva world. One of his most famous writings is the book entitled, “Shaarei Yosher”, which contains essays discussing various specific issues in Talmudic law, such as testimony law. His introduction itself, however, is an extremely interesting and innovative reading of famous passages in the Torah and Talmud to prove his understanding of man’s role in the world.

His thesis, in short, is that man’s purpose is solely to improve the lot of the many. While the idea of aiding the community certainly exists as a Jewish value, the denial of the inherent value of personal worship of God is certainly at odds with the amount of today’s Orthodox focus on the individual’s performance of the commandments. To prove his surprising thesis, he must place preeminence on sources that were not valued as such before. For example, the Talmud in several places^[vii] interprets the Torah command to “walk in [God’s] ways”^[viii] means to imitate God by doing acts of kindness, like He acts. He visited the faint Abraham recovering from circumcision, so too do Jews have an obligation to visit the sick. Many recent authorities have placed great importance on this concept, known in Latin as imitatio dei.^[ix]

But for Rabbi Shkop, the import of this passage is even beyond a command to worship God by helping others. He writes that the command of imitatio dei means “that we, the select of what He made, should constantly hold as our purpose to sanctify our physical and spiritual powers for the good of the many, according to our abilities.”^[x] For Rabbi Shkop, to truly be like God, all our actions must be devoted to others, like His are. Further, he understands the concept of holiness as expressed in Leviticus 19:2, “Be holy, for I, God your God, am holy,” in the same vein. Leviticus Rabbah understands “holiness” as “separateness,” yet Nachmanides^[xi] interprets the verse as relating the obligation of the Jewish people to stay away from acts of debauchery and becoming what he calls a “naval be-reshut ha-Torah” - “despicable person with the permission of the Torah.” Rabbi Shkop asks, “According to this, it would seem the Midrash is incomprehensible. What relevance does the concept of separation have to being similar to the Holy?” His answer, seen in full, is remarkable:

And so, it appears to my limited thought that this mitzvah includes the entire foundation and root of the purpose of our lives. All of our work and effort should constantly be sanctified to doing good for the community. We should not use any act, movement, or get benefit or enjoyment that doesn’t have in it some element of helping another. And as understood, all holiness is being set apart for an honorable purpose – which is that a person straightens his path and strives constantly to make his lifestyle dedicated to the community. Then, anything he does even for himself, for the health of his body and soul he also associates to the mitzvah of being holy, for through this he can also do good for the masses. Through the good he does for himself he can do good for the many who rely on him. But if he derives benefit from some kind of permissible thing that isn’t needed for the health of his body and soul, that benefit is in opposition to holiness. For in this he is benefiting himself (for that moment as it seems to him), but no one else.

            Thus, Nachmanides’ category of “naval be-reshut ha-Torah” becomes, to Rabbi Shkop, a person who does things that will never have any good for the community. This is indeed quite innovative. Fundamentally, Rabbi Shkop believes that every action one takes must be for the benefit of others. He continues with a caveat. It is humanly impossible to be exactly like God, because, “His Holiness is only for the created and not for Himself,” which humans cannot hope to replicate. Rather, even acts of personal benefit must ultimately allows man to better serve his fellow man, otherwise they are “vanity and ignorable.”

Rabbi Shkop’s conception of the intense Jewish value of caring for the community seems on the face of it to be in line with Modern Orthodox values. Indeed, Rabbi Yitzchak Blau claims that for this same reason, Modern Orthodoxy should generally distance itself from TV and movies.^[xii] He writes that “Modern Orthodox Jews pride themselves on their sensitivity to communal needs and on a commitment to benevolence. They sometimes contrast their approach with a Haredi view that tends to prize Torah study above other values.” Therefore, argues Rabbi Blau, if TV can be shown to hinder that commitment to benevolence, it would be a danger to Modern Orthodox values as a whole. Rabbi Blau draws from political scientist and Harvard professor Robert Putnam’s argument for the negative effects of TV on civic engagement in his book, Bowling Alone, which can be summarized as follows: 1) It uses the scarce time that could be spent helping others, 2) It has psychological effects that inhibit social participation, and 3) TV promotes materialistic values which are opposed to social engagement.

Though Putnam’s conclusions at face value seem mere correlation, rather than causation, of the majority of TV watchers and their social habits, we can accept them for the sake of argument. Assuming his conclusions are correct, the real question is whether Modern Orthodoxy values communal beneficence so much that any value that entertainment and leisure could have must go by the wayside in pursuit of it. In other words, does fun have value in Modern Orthodoxy, and does it overcome the adverse effects described by Putnam? And how much of Rabbi Shkop’s extreme value of community does Modern Orthodoxy posses that would prevent it from ascribing value to leisure and entertainment?

Avi Woolf, in his response to Rabbi Blau, writes:

I believe that what Rav Blau is complaining about is deeper than the issue of TV – whether watched for value or the pure pleasure of it. I believe Rav Blau inadvertently exposed a very serious lacuna in Modern orthodox thought – the complete lack of intrinsic value attributed to leisure in general, and fun and play in particular.^[xiii]

Mr. Woolf points to Modern Orthodoxy’s shying away from something so widespread in the Modern Orthodox experience. However, recently many Modern Orthodox writers have indeed written about it.^[xiv] Gil Student, in an essay on his TorahMusings blog entitled, “Is Leisure Kosher?”, distinguishes between different kinds of leisure. His first category, derived from Rabbi Norman Lamm’s essay entitled, “A Jewish Ethics of Leisure” (in Faith & Doubt: Studies in Traditional Jewish Thought) is “constructive leisure,” leisure that expands the personality and spirituality of the person enjoying it. Rabbi Student includes in this category leisure for the sake of exercise, which ensures bodily health as well. His second category is “distractive leisure”, leisure that rest the mind and body so that one can better serve God and prevent burnout. Thus, value is ascribed to fun, and therefore are “allowed” within a Modern Orthodox perspective.

This “move” is necessary from an Orthodox perspective. There are many sources in the Jewish tradition calling for the sanctification of one’s daily life. Rabbi Student points to such sources as the Shulhan Arukh OH 231:1 and Hovot ha-Levavot (Avodah, 4), which bolster the position that even neutral actions can be permitted, so long as they have a religious value to them. Rabbi Student summarizes this in what he calls “leisure le-sheim Shamayim, for positive religious purposes.” Rabbi Mayer Schiller^[xv] asks similarly, “May a ‘Kingdom of Priests and a Holy Nation’ be functional Americans?” and adds many more sources to the effect that everything an Orthodox Jew does should be for a religious purpose.^[xvi] An interesting Birkei Yosef (231:2) suggests that one declare before he/she performs mundane actions that this is “for the sake of God.” The Arukh ha-Shulhan (231:4) considers physical pursuits “animalistic” if not in the service of the religious lifestyle. The Sefer ha-Hinukh (387) actually categorizes having pleasure for its own sake as a transgression against “do not follow after your heart and after your eyes.” Therefore, so long as leisure and fun are sanctified for a holy, religious purpose, they can be legitimate actions.

I must admit, I find that these approaches attempting to justify the Modern Orthodox lifestyle simply fall short of how leisure is experienced and the motivations for it. My experience in the Modern Orthodox world is that many are simply uninterested in “holiness”, in turning their TV watching into a religious experience. For many young Modern Orthodox Jews, holiness and religiosity don’t really exist outside of prayer, or learning, or other acts of religious Judaism. So many do not see the need to create meaning and purpose in entertainment. As Woolf continues in his response to Rabbi Blau:

A la Rav Blau, Modern Orthodoxy is very much a religion by intellectuals, for intellectuals, with little room for enjoyment or development of other aspects of life such as music, sports and games. There is little place for just “living” outside of the MO “mission”.

Modern Orthodox people want to have space outside of the religious realm, a space that allows for non-religious activities. And the fact is, most people in the world, let alone those in Modern Orthodoxy, are not intellectuals and don’t have any desire to be. Therefore, I think a fairer view of the phenomena of TV, movies, and general entertainment in Modern Orthodoxy, is that Modern Orthodox Jews want some space to “live” outside of Judaism, while remaining firmly within Jewish life and religion. To do this, we must accept Woolf’s next comment:

...We need to stop dividing the world into only “good and “bad” things. There are many phenomena in the world that are simply neutral. Furthermore, oftentimes “bad” things can contain “good” elements and vice versa, as any religious defender of secular Zionism can tell you. A sense of proportion is key.

            Movies and entertainment allow a varied perspective from the general Jewish-religious one. There can be much good there, as it can help a person see from a perspective they would never have seen otherwise in their inevitably limited social circle. While there should be recognition to the thinking Jew about the problems pop-culture can present to the religious life, there must also be recognition of what good it contains. Rabbis and teachers should accept the fact that this kind of connection to secular culture will not be going away in the Modern Orthodox community, that this is a consequence of living in both worlds, and emphasize the good aspects. It just has to be of a “proportional” sort, as Woolf exhorts, and one should not go overboard with permissiveness, recognizing what things are allowed and not allowed at homes and at large. If Rav Shkop requires a communal value to any action, we can certainly find it in entertainment, even if it is not absolute.

There is even an advantage to being well-versed in pop-culture inherent in the Torah itself. It may be that the Torah depends on it. At the turn of the century, Bible academics began to argue that the Torah’s creation myth and flood myth were different versions of other Ancient Near East myths, such as the Epic of Gilgamesh. Some of the more serious responses from Orthodox Jewish academics, such as Cassutto, were to argue that the Torah is indeed making reference to those ANE myths. But, it was only in order to parody and smartly clash with them in such a way that the readers of the Torah, familiar with those myths, would understand the real fight the Torah ideology represented contrary to their previous myths. This theory relies on the expectation that the Torah’s audience would be people very familiar with what was basically “pop-culture”, or the myths and tales of their times. The way to understand the Torah was through that lens. Leaders today, especially, should make use of pop-culture’s hold on Modern Orthodoxy as a key to reach youths and adults alike. Some of my best teachers did this, and many of those tie-ins were the most memorable teachings for me.

            In summary, Rabbi Shkop sees man’s religious role as being like God, ultimate givers to humanity and to our community in particular. Rabbi Blau thinks that TV and movies inhibit this special Modern Orthodox value. However, I don’t think they need conflict with this ideal. Though there are many good reasons for leisure in general as part of religious life, Modern Orthodox life simply includes those who enjoy TV and don’t look for the values in doing so. And that is alright. Not everyone is an intellectual, and not everyone cares enough to be. Sometimes, it gives us a better way to interact with the world and with Torah. All in all, a sense of proportion is key, and Orthodox seriousness about every action must be balanced with the values of entertainment as part of it. Rabbi Hershel Schachter records^[xvii] Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik’s comments in a eulogy for Rabbi Moshe Shatzkes on the strange Talmudic statement, in Avodah Zara 3b, that God spends a quarter of His day “playing with the Leviathan.” Rabbi Soloveitchik stated that, in emulating God, we, too, should not take ourselves so seriously all the time. Let us suggest that an extension of this  is that even watching a movie can be an imitation of the divine.

Aryeh Sklar is a student at Bernard Revel School for Jewish Studies, studying Jewish Philosophy

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^[i] http://hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=22056&st=&pgnum=10

^[ii] Rabbi Aaron Rakeffet, Bernard Revel: Builder of American Jewish Orthodoxy, (JPS 1972), 119

^[iii] Ibid., 120

^[iv] http://yu.edu/riets/about/mission-history/historic-roshei/shkop/

^[v] Rabbi Aaron Rakeffet, Bernard Revel: Builder of American Jewish Orthodoxy, (JPS 1972),, 120

^[vi] For some description of how this was done to the Rav as well in terms of ideological history, see Lawrence Kaplan’s “Revisionism and the Rav: The Struggle for the Soul of Modern Orthodoxy,” Judaism 48 (1999): 290-311

^[vii] Shabbat 133, Sotah 14

^[viii] Deuteronomy 28:9

^[ix] See more about Rabbi Soloveitchik’s interesting approach here http://www.vbm-torah.org/archive/rav/rav05.htm

^[x] Translation by R. Micha Berger at http://www.aishdas.org/asp/ShaareiYosher.pdf

^[xi] On Leviticus 19:2

^[xii] “Modern Orthodox Arguments Against television,” Tradition 44, no. 2 (Summer 2011): 53–71.

^[xiii] Avi Woolf, “Does Modern Orthodoxy Not Believe in Fun?”, September 2011, http://www.torahmusings.com/2011/09/does-modern-orthodoxy-not-believe-in-fun/

^[xiv] I thank Rabbi Uri Cohen for his helpful sources.

^[xv] Rabbi Mayer Schiller, “Fun and Relaxation Reexamined,” Jewish Action, Spring 1991

^[xvi] He adds in addition to the Shulhan Arukh above, the Tur (OH 231), both of which are quoting Rabbeinu Yonah’s comment on Avot 2:12.

^[xvii] Nefesh HaRav, p. 69, and also see Rabbi Daniel Feldman’s “Does God Have a Sense of Humor?” https://www.ou.org/jewish_action/05/2013/does-god-have-a-sense-of-humor/. I have also seen this in the notes of my grandfather, Rabbi Herbert Bomzer z”l, who attended the Rav’s shiurim for an extensive period of time.

Rabbi Zvi Dov Kanatopsky and the Kosher Switch

This appeared in YU's Kol Hamevaser Spring 2015

R. Zvi Dov Kanotopsky and the Kosher Switch

The past few weeks have seen a renewed interest and debate over the halakhic and socio-religious merits of the “Kosher Switch”. The device purports to be a light switch that allows a person to actively turn his/her lights on or off during the Sabbath day in a completely permitted manner. It makes brilliant use of several leniencies in halakha, by introducing delays, randomness, and indirect causes to the process. In an attempt to raise funds for its manufacture, and to raise awareness in the Jewish community toward the product (which has actually been out publicly since 2011), the creators of the Kosher Switch began a Indiegogo campaign recently. The campaign has been fairly successful in the Orthodox Jewish community, managing to raise a hefty $57,000 in the last few weeks, with more than 20 days left and already 15% more than their original goal.^[i]

However, rabbinic opposition has been swift and harsh. While it is true that several rabbis (including our own Rabbi Ben Haim) have supported the product, several top American rabbis such as R. Shmuel Kaminetzky, R. Dovid Feinstein and R. Yisroel Belsky have signed a document strongly disagreeing with its purported halakhic viability. Their collective letter declares that contrary to the claims of the makers of the Kosher Switch (my translation), “it is built upon heterim that are not reliable.”^[ii] R. Belsky went as far as to call it in his own letter, a “Rube Goldberg contraption comprising an entire melocho [Shabbat violation]… If the Sanhedrin were empowered, that act would be punishable by mitat bet din [the death penalty].”^[iii]

But what is more interesting is that these missives also include declarations as to the spirit of the Sabbath and how the implications of the Kosher Switch run counter to it. In the letter signed by R. Kaminetzky, R. Feinstein, and others, it states that (my translation) “it is clear that it is a denigration of the Sabbath, and by this standpoint alone it cannot be permitted.”^[iv] In R. Belsky’s own letter, he declares the Kosher Switch “an agonizing distortion of Torah values… It portrays the holy and wonderful Shabbos as a nuisance and a problem to be solved… The limitations of Shabbos are what characterizes (sic) it and what endows (sic) it with its sweetness and majesty.”^[v]

To this writer, the “spirit of Shabbos” is a particularly nebulous concept that ends up becoming “how the Sabbath has been until now”, and that any change from this somehow becomes “not in the spirit of the Sabbath”. Sabbath clocks, which turn lights on and off in a home according to a schedule set before the Sabbath, was also once a controversial issue. Now, it is so common that to not use it would raise eyebrows. Similarly, the permissibility of the “Sabbath mode” on ovens was hotly debated, with Rav Heineman, a major rabbi in America, having supported it. And the entire tractate of Eruvin is dedicated to creating semi-privatizing fences to allow for carrying on the Sabbath. R. Belsky doesn’t seem to make a distinction between the Kosher Switch and these leniencies, which don’t take away the “sweetness and majesty” of the Sabbath. It appears that under this definition of the “spirit of the Sabbath”, if/when the Kosher Switch becomes normalized in the Jewish community, it will be difficult to claim any violation of the spirit of the Sabbath.

It is thus necessary to examine what the goals and philosophy of the Sabbath is, in order to determine its spirit. A disclaimer is first in order: I will not be commenting on the halakhic implications of changing times, but only if the Sabbath spirit can accord with such a device. There are many articles being written about the halakhic advantages and disadvantages of the Kosher Switch, and it is not my place to make any declaration as to their merit. That said, regarding the Sabbath spirit, I am drawn toward an idea I once saw in the writings of the late R. Zvi Dov Kanotopsky. R. Zvi Dov Kanotopsky was a beloved rabbi at Yeshiva University for 28 years. He learned as a student from the Rav, Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik, whom he considered his rebbe muvhak. He was also the rabbi of the Young Israel of Eastern Parkway, and later, the rabbi of the Young Israel of West Hempstead. He taught many students who became accomplished teachers and leaders in their own right. R. Avishai David, the rosh yeshiva of Yeshivat Torat Shraga in Israel, considers R. Kanotopsky his closest rabbi, his rebbe muvhak. Former OU president and current OU chairman Stephen J. Savitsky remembers R. Kanotopsky as having a great influence on him as his high school rebbe and synagogue rabbi during his formative years.^[vi] R. Shlomo Riskin, Chief Rabbi of Efrat, was his student in Yeshiva University High School in Brooklyn. The list goes on.

His passion for the land of Israel manifested in bringing his family to Israel in a time when it was rare for an established rabbi to do so. After making aliyah in 1970, he became the head of the Institute for Advanced Talmud Study at Bar-Ilan University, while also teaching at Hebrew University and Michlala College for Women in Jerusalem. Tragedy struck his family when R. Kanotopsky passed away at the age of 50 in 1973.

R. Kanotopsky was well-known for his sermons, as well as his examination into the psychological background of the characters and commandments of the Torah. Though he kept meticulous notes of all he spoke about, he published very little in his own lifetime, save for a book on Jewish values in 1956 entitled “Rays of Jewish Splendor”, and several articles in various Jewish journals. After his passing, his wife, children, and close students compiled a book of some of his choicest essays on the Torah, calling it “Night of Watching”. It was republished under the name “The Depths of Simplicity” in 1994. In 2007, some of his holiday sermons were put together by David Zomick, another close student of R. Kanotopsky, at the request of the Kanotopsky family, which turned into a book called, “Rejoice in Your Festivals.”^[vii]

It was a dusty, ear-marked and marked-up “Night of Watching”, which I discovered in a secondhand bookstore in Jerusalem in 2010, that impelled me to learn more about this great rabbi, so integral to Yeshiva University’s history, yet somewhat forgotten. His general methodology of reading Tanakh is quite fascinating. Every essay in the book discusses an engaging and far-reaching philosophical concept.He then he proceeds to show in an extremely meticulous manner how the concepts discussed can be found embedded in classical sources of Judaism. His unique approach highlighting the psychology of characters and the uniquely Jewish philosophies that emerge is particularly resonant today. How did Jethro fulfill his fatherly role toward Moses? How can the laws of impurity and a newborn be looked at as a rehabilitative structure necessary for a puerperal mother? What was Joseph’s plan when he confronted his brothers in Egypt? The text itself is mined for these gems of insight into characters and laws in a creative, yet solidly founded way.

His very first essay in the book discusses the concept of the Sabbath and is a great example of how he approached the text. His analysis is framed through a debate between Maimonides and Nahmanides.^[viii] He notes that while the Decalogue in Exodus 20:11 relates the command of the Sabbath to the theme of creation, the second version of the Decalogue in Deuteronomy 5:15 connects it to the drama of the Exodus from Egypt. According to Maimonides (Guide for the Perplexed 2:31), this indicates that the Sabbath is meant to commemorate both themes - creation as a truth, and exodus from Egypt as an impression of true freedom. Nahmanides, however, posits (Deuteronomy 5:12) that Sabbath is only meant to commemorate creation, and the exodus from Egypt is remembered as evidence of the Creator of nature by the very fact that the Jews were redeemed by means of a disruption of nature’s laws.

Meanwhile, there is a similar debate between Maimonides and Nahmanides regarding the symbolism of the festival of Sukkot. According to Maimonides (Guide 3:31), Sukkot is a festival celebrating agriculture - represented by the ritual sitting in huts outside with vegetation for shade, and by the gathering of various plants, at the end of an agricultural season. But for Nahmanides (Leviticus 23:36, 40), Sukkot is a festival celebrating creation - the agricultural symbols are only in terms of the theme of creation. The seven main days of Sukkot are parallel to the seven days of creation, and the eight represents Israel together with the Sabbath. The various species of fruit and vegetation are meant to atone for the sin of Adam and the forbidden fruit.

On this point, R. Kanotopsky asks, how can it be that Nahmanides attributes the same symbolism - that of creation - to two different festivals, Sukkot and Passover? According to Nahmanides, apparently the Exodus is merely just proof for creation, and Sukkot celebrates creation itself. Why, then, are both necessary? His answer is that there are really two implications in creation ex nihilo - one is the creation itself, and the other is the initiation of a process that sets into motion the world’s events and will eventually culminate in the redeemed world of the Messiah in the future. Nahmanides sees Sukkot as purely reflecting the creation of the world, while Passover is the perpetual revelation of the forces of nature - two aspects of creation.

If so, what is the Sabbath meant to commemorate? The Sabbath reflects a combination of these two themes of the divine drama of creation. R. Kanotopsky proposes that both are manifest in the two characters interacting with the Sabbath - God, and the Jewish people. God is the Creator. But the Jews, in keeping the Sabbath, are invited to take part in this initiated process. What remains unclear is exactly how, within this consideration, is the Sabbath considered a continuation of the process of creation? Jews are specifically enjoined to refrain from creative acts on that day, not to continue them.

Perhaps the answer can be seen in a sermon written by R. Kanotopsky in the 1954 RCA Sermon Manual.^[ix] In his essay on the portion of Va-etchanan, which records the second version of the Decalogue, he examines an interesting midrash that pertains to the Sabbath. In Genesis Rabbah 11:8, the rabbis portray the Sabbath as complaining to God. Whereas every other day of the week has a mate/partner, Sunday with Monday, Tuesday with Wednesday, and so on, the Sabbath stands alone, as the odd day out. God’s response is that the Sabbath’s partner is the nation of Israel. What is this meant to indicate?

R. Kanotopsky favors the interpretation of R. Isaac Arama, the medieval author of Akedat Yitzchak. As explained by R. Kanotopsky, R. Arama submits that the Torah abhors a lack of creativity. All of nature, even the days of the week, need to have a “partner”, a creative mate that can produce good for the world. Seemingly, the six days of the week have all the creative power, yet the Sabbath seems to lack it. Where is its creative partner? “Israel, through its observance of the Sabbath, makes the day productive in a very real sense,” writes R. Kanotopsky. How? R. Kanotopsky points to the ability on the Sabbath to devote one’s time to Torah learning and a spiritually-charged home atmosphere. But he also adds, “The prohibitions of Shabbos are also creative, in a positive sense. When one recognizes these prohibitions as Divine directives and learns to limit and regulate his own activities in consonance with these directives, he is in an affirmative sense engaged in a fruit-bearing activity.”^[x]

But R. Kanotopsky goes further than finding the creativity of the Sabbath in its prohibitive nature; it is also to be found through the creative process in which “inventive and originative impulses can be realized” in the Jewish people. For R. Kanotopsky, Sabbath is not only a day commemorating creation, but the initiation of a process the Jewish people are meant to take part of.

With this idea of the Sabbath in mind, one can view the Kosher Switch in two senses. In one sense, it is brilliant in its creative use of the directives of the Sabbath to allow the observance of the Sabbath that much easier to maintain. But in another sense, it adds nothing itself toward the “inventive and originative impulses” that the Sabbath is meant to engender. I believe the existing Sabbath leniencies are indeed successful in this regard.

Let’s examine the eruv as a case point. Perhaps the earliest example of a Sabbath “leniency” is the eruv, that allows carrying on the Sabbath within the rabbinical prohibitions of carrying objects from private to public spaces and vice versa. Today, a typical eruv is comprised of near-invisible string tied to poles at strategically spaced intervals around a certain area of a town to allow carrying within it on the Sabbath. The eruv is mocked by both Jews and non-Jews for its supposed legal fiction, in what appears to be a device that “tricks God.”

Yet it is precisely within this leniency where we find the spirit of the Sabbath. Common problems without an eruv like being stuck in prayer without one’s tallit or siddur, or a person being in pain because he was forced to walk to shul without his cane, this is against the creative spirit of the Sabbath. Not being able to bring one’s children to the park or shul, not being able to carry the house key and therefore worrying about one’s unlocked door all of the Sabbath, these again detract from the Sabbath spirit. The eruv really adds to the ability of the Sabbath to provide productive prosperity, and the Talmudic rabbis saw that, and found ways within the law to accommodate its spirit. Similarly, the satisfaction and joy in warm food and family, through “Shabbos mode” ovens, contribute to quality creative contentment.

I cannot know what R. Kanotopsky would say about the Kosher Switch, but his philosophy of the Sabbath makes it difficult for me to see the action of turning on and off lights on the Sabbath as within this viewpoint. The Kosher Switch is marketed as a positive development to the entire Sabbath experience, for all people, when it can only ever relieve a negative one in specific cases. Perhaps in cases of necessity, of pain and disturbance, I would submit, can this device be useful in terms of the spirit of the Sabbath. Only when something is disturbing the marriage of Jewish people to the Sabbath day, as R. Kanotopsky would phrase it, can the switch be kosher in terms of the Sabbath spirit. But however creative in halakha the switch may be, it must accord with the productivity found in its restful nature.

R. Kanatopsky recognized that the Torah must be shown to be relevant with the times and new situations. In his essay on Niztavim for the 1954 RCA Manual, R. Kanotopsky calls upon teachers and rabbis to look to the Torah for lessons within the context of modern life.^[xi] Quoting Deuteronomy 30:11’s “It is not too distant from you,” he writes, “This is intended to silence the argument that Torah itself has been left behind in the scientific and technological progress of our times. Torah surely has a living, vital message for us, far superior to the message of physics or the message of psychology.” But while we live in ever-changing times, the Torah’s lessons are timeless. Seeking to improve the Sabbath must be done carefully, with great thought as to the philosophy of the Sabbath and what its goals are in the present day. The way to do so is to follow R. Kanotopsky’s example in studying Torah and Tanakh - search for its “living, vital message” in the creative and productive capacity that has been granted to us, and taking part in the created world’s ongoing procession toward the redemption.

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^[i] As recorded on their IndieGoGo fundraising page, viewed here https://www.indiegogo.com/projects/kosherswitch-control-electricity-on-shabbat

^[ii] Rabbi Yair Hoffman, “The Kosher Switch Part II Follow Up,” The Yeshiva World News, 23 April 2015, available at: http://www.theyeshivaworld.com/news/headlines-breaking-stories/303891/the-kosher-switch-part-ii-follow-up.html

^[iii] Rabbi Yair Hoffman, “HaRav Yisroel Belsky Writes Letter Slamming ‘Kosher’,” The Yeshiva World News, 23 April 2015, available at: http://www.theyeshivaworld.com/news/headlines-breaking-stories/303911/harav-yisroel-belsky-writes-letter-slamming-kosher-switch.html

^[iv] Rabbi Yair Hoffman, “The Kosher Switch Part II Follow Up,” The Yeshiva World News, 23 April 2015, available at: http://www.theyeshivaworld.com/news/headlines-breaking-stories/303891/the-kosher-switch-part-ii-follow-up.html

^[v] Rabbi Yair Hoffman, “HaRav Yisroel Belsky Writes Letter Slamming ‘Kosher’,” The Yeshiva World News, 23 April 2015, available at: http://www.theyeshivaworld.com/news/headlines-breaking-stories/303911/harav-yisroel-belsky-writes-letter-slamming-kosher-switch.html

^[vi] Stephen J. Savitsky, “Review: Rejoice in Your Festivals: Penetrating Insights into Pesach, Shavuot and Sukkot,” Jewish Action, 13 September 2008, available at https://www.ou.org/jewish_action/09/2008/rejoice_in_your_festivals_penetrating_insights_into_pesach_shavuot_and_sukk/

^[vii] Zvi Dov Kanotopsky, Rejoice in Your Festivals: Penetrating Insights Into Pesach, Shavuot and Sukkot, Urim Pub., 2007

^[viii] Harold B. Kanotopsky, Night of Watching: Essays on the Torah, 1977, 17-18

^[ix] RCA Sermon Manual, 1954, p.184 available at http://hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=12874&st=Kanotopsky&pgnum=184

^[x] Although not explicitly mentioned by R. Kanotopsky, it seems to me that he is referencing here to a concept discussed in an expanded way by R. Soloveitchik regarding the kabbalistic notion of tzimztum. Tzimtzum, literally “constriction”, refers generally to the creation of the world as God having “constricted” Himself to allow it to exist. To the Rav, this had implications for how Jews, in their imitation of the divine are meant to live as well. My grandfather, Rabbi Chaim Zev Bomzer, who studied under the Rav as well for many years, quoted the Rav regarding this in a sermon I have in my possession. “Tzimtzum symbolizes self-control, discipline, the ability to restrain oneself... Present any mitzvah and it is possible to point out the aspect of tzimtzum it represents. Tefillin, Shabbat, Kashrut - these are limiting ourselves from certain natural tendencies, in thought, action, even diet... The goal of Torah and mitzvot is to emulate G-d and withdraw ourselves, our intellect and our desires, natural drives (sex, food, power), thereby sublimating them to the service of God.”

^[xi] RCA Sermon Manual, 1954, p.200 available at http://hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=12874&pgnum=200

The Rabbis Are Sitting in a Stolen Sukkah!

The Rabbis Are Sitting in a Stolen Sukkah!

Sukkah 31a states:

ההיא סבתא דאתאי לקמיה דרב נחמן אמרה ליה ריש גלותא וכולהו רבנן דבי ריש גלותא בסוכה גזולה הוו יתבי צווחה ולא אשגח בה רב נחמן אמרה ליה איתתא דהוה ליה לאבוהא תלת מאה ותמני סרי עבדי צווחא קמייכו ולא אשגחיתו בה אמר להו רב נחמן פעיתא היא דא ואין לה אלא דמי עצים בלבד

Several questions come to mind:

1. Why particularly a “savta”?
2. Is her claim correct? Did the Reish Geluta and the Rabbis really steal the materials for a sukkah?
3. Why did Rav Nachman ignore her?
4. What is the meaning of her claim that she comes from a “forefather who had 318 servants”? What’s the connection, how would that place her in need of being paid attention to?
5. Why does Rav Nachman call her a “cryer”?
6. Why didn’t he just tell her to begin with that she can claim the money from them?

Answers:

Before we get to answers, it should be noted that a somewhat similar format of a story occurs in Bava Batra 9b:

אמר ליה ואלא שרץ דמטמא אדם מנלן לאו משום דמטמא בגדים אמר ליה שרץ בהדיא כתיב ביה (ויקרא כב, ה) או איש אשר יגע בכל שרץ אלא שכבת זרע דמטמא אדם מנלן לאו משום דהואיל ומטמא בגדים מטמא אדם אמר ליה שכבת זרע נמי בהדיא כתיב ביה (ויקרא כב, ד) או איש לרבות את הנוגע

Rav Sheshet said to him: But from where do we derive that the carcass of a creeping animal renders a person impure? Is it not because we know that it renders his garments impure? Rav Aḥadvoi said to him: It is written explicitly with regard to the carcass of a creeping animal: “Or a man who touches any creeping animal, whereby he may be made unclean” (Leviticus 22:5). Rav Sheshet said to him: But from where do we derive that semen renders a person impure? Is it not because we say that since it renders his garments impure (see Leviticus 15:17) it also renders a person impure? Rav Aḥadvoi said to him: It is also written explicitly with regard to semen: “Or a man from whom semen is expelled” (Leviticus 22:4), and the Sages expound the superfluous word “or” as serving to include as impure one who touches semen.

אהדר ליה בבדיחותא חלש דעתיה דרב ששת אישתיק רב אחדבוי בר אמי ואתיקר תלמודיה אתיא אימיה וקא בכיא קמיה צווחה צווחה ולא אשגח בה אמרה ליה חזי להני חדיי דמצית מינייהו בעא רחמי עליה ואיתסי

The Gemara relates that with each of his answers Rav Aḥadvoi responded to Rav Sheshet in a mocking tone, intimating that he doubted Rav Sheshet’s grasp of Torah verses. Rav Sheshet was deeply offended, and as punishment, Rav Aḥadvoi bar Ami became mute and forgot his learning. Rav Aḥadvoi’s mother came and wept before Rav Sheshet. She cried and cried but he ignored her. As she had once been Rav Sheshet’s nursemaid, she said to him: Look at these breasts of mine from which you suckled. Upon hearing that, Rav Sheshet prayed for mercy for Rav Aḥadvoi, and he was healed. 

I have written previously about two aspects of this story. One is the idea that Rav Ahadvoi responded in a mocking tone. Another is on how Rav Sheshet seems to have not known explicit verses in the Torah.

Now let’s talk about a third aspect. The similarities of these cases are striking. A woman cries out (“tzavcha”) to a rabbi about an injustice done to her. He ignores her (“lo eshgach ba”). She does something shocking, and he finally responds.

One point to make here is that this was apparently a literary convention of the Talmud, a formula.

A similar story, but where the woman does not continue to make claims after the initial one, occurs in Ketubot 80b (in the St, Petersburg 187 manuscript, instead of Rava this is Rav Nachman again):

אמר רב פפא הא דיהודה מר בר מרימר לאו בפירוש אתמר אלא מכללא אתמר דההיא איתתא דעיילה ליה לגברא תרתי אמהתא אזל גברא נסיב איתתא אחריתי עייל לה חדא מנייהו

Rav Pappa said: This statement of Yehuda Mar bar Mareimar was not stated explicitly in Rava’s name. Rather, it was stated from an inference based on an incident that occurred in which a certain woman brought in for her husband two maidservants as part of her dowry. The man went and married another woman in addition to the first. He subsequently brought in to the second wife one of the maidservants to attend to her needs.

אתאי לקמיה דרבא צווחה לא אשגח בה מאן דחזא סבר משום דסבר מה שעשה עשוי ולא היא משום רווח ביתא והא קא רווח

The first wife came before Rava and cried about the injustice done to her, but Rava took no notice of her, claiming she had no right to complain. He who observed this incident thought that Rava ruled this way because he holds that what he did is done, i.e., takes effect, and a husband may sell his wife’s usufruct property and use its produce as he sees fit. But that is not so, as the Sages instituted the ordinance that a husband owns the rights to the produce of his wife’s property for the gain of the house, and here the house does gain from his action, as the maidservant also performs work for the house.

And see Bava Batra 54a:

ההיא איתתא דאכלה דיקלא בתפשיחא תליסר שנין אתא ההוא רפיק תותיה פורתא אתא לקמיה דלוי ואמרי לה קמיה דמר עוקבא אוקמיה בידיה אתאי קא צווחא קמיה אמר לה מאי אעביד לך דלא אחזיקת כדמחזקי אינשי

The Gemara relates: There was a certain woman who profited from an ownerless palm tree by cutting its branches for thirteen years. Another then came and plowed beneath it a bit. The case came before Levi, and some say that it came before Mar Ukva, who established the property in the possession of the one who plowed. The woman came and shouted before him, protesting the perceived injustice of his ruling. Mar Ukva said to her: What can I do for you, as you did not take possession of the property in the manner that people take possession?

See also another story in Shabbat 55a:

רב יהודה הוה יתיב קמיה דשמואל אתאי ההיא איתתא קא צווחה קמיה ולא הוה משגח בה אמר ליה לא סבר ליה מר אוטם אזנו מזעקת דל גם הוא יקרא ולא יענה אמר ליה שיננא רישך בקרירי רישא דרישיך בחמימי הא יתיב מר עוקבא אב בית דין

The Gemara relates: Rav Yehuda was sitting before Shmuel when this woman came and cried before Shmuel about an injustice that had been committed against her, and Shmuel paid no attention to her. Rav Yehuda said to Shmuel: Doesn’t the Master hold in accordance with the verse: “Whoever stops his ears at the cry of the poor, he also shall cry himself, but shall not be heard” (Proverbs 21:13)? He said to him: Big-toothed one, your superior, i.e., I, your teacher, will be punished in cold water. The superior of your superior will be punished in hot water. Mar Ukva, who sits as president of the court, is responsible for those matters.

In Eruvin 25a, we have Rav Nachman again, and he is taking property away from a woman, but this time he immediately responds:

ההיא איתתא דעבדה מחיצה על גבי מחיצה בנכסי הגר אתא ההוא גברא רפק בה פורתא אתא לקמיה דרב נחמן אוקמה בידיה אתת איהי וקא צווחא קמיה אמר לה מאי איעביד לך דלא מחזקת כדמחזקי אינשי

The Gemara cites a related incident: A certain woman erected a partition on top of another partition in the property of a deceased convert. A certain man then came and plowed the ground a little. The man came before Rav Naḥman, who established the property in his possession. The woman then came and cried out before Rav Naḥman. He said to her: What can I do for you, as you did not take possession of the property in the manner that people take possession.

However, in Rabbeinu Chananel’s girsa, he does ignore her and then tell her (somewhat difficult to understand the ignoring and then the answering): אוקמה רב נחמן בידיה לההוא דרפק בנכסי הגר אתא היא צווחא קמיה ולא אשגח בה אמר לה לא מחזקת כדמחזקי אינשי.

(I’m only mentioning this for the similarity, see Avoda Zara 28b:

ההיא אמתא דהואי בי מר שמואל דקדחא לה עינא בשבתא צווחא וליכא דאשגח בה פקעא עינא למחר נפק מר שמואל ודרש עין שמרדה מותר לכוחלה בשבת מאי טעמא דשורייני דעינא באובנתא דליבא תלו

Rav Yehuda continues: But was it of my own accord that I issued this ruling? It is the ruling of Mar Shmuel, as demonstrated in the following incident: There was a certain maidservant who was in the house of Mar Shmuel whose eye became infected on Shabbat. She screamed in pain, but there was no one who attended to her. Eventually, her eye popped out of its socket. The next day, Mar Shmuel went out and taught: With regard to an eye that rebelled, it is permitted to apply blue eye shadow to it on Shabbat. What is the reason for this leniency, seeing as one may desecrate Shabbat only to treat life-threatening afflictions? The reason is that the tendons [shuraynei] of the eye are dependent upon the valves of the heart.

)

1. It should be noted that nearly all the kitvei yad do not have it as a “savta”, but rather a regular woman “iteta”. Most of the Rishonim have this as well.
2. Rashi says it actually happened, but not that the Reish Geluta did it, but his servants did it: ההיא סבתא - דגזלו ממנה עבדי ריש גלותא עצים וסככו בהן:
   
   See also the Meiri, who retains this interpretation:וכמו שאמרו בההיא דהוה צווחה ואמרה ריש גלותא וכולהו רבנן בסוכה גזולה יתבי ומפני שעבדים של ריש גלותא גזלו ממנה את העצים
   
   Let’s note that the woman did not claim that the rabbis stole the Sukkah, but that they were sitting (wittingly or not is unclear) in a stolen sukkah. Thus, it would seem she is not angry at them for stealing the materials, only that they haven’t paid her. This gets into the answer for number 3
3. According to the Meiri, some say they wanted to pay her the money they owed her but she refused to take anything other than the actual materials itself, which the Rabbis declared owned by the thief because of takanat hashavim:אלמא שלא נפרעה עדיין ומ"מ יש אומרים דכל שלא פרע לא יצא וההיא איתתא רוצים היו ליתן לה את הדמים ולא היתה רוצה ליטלם אלא שהיתה צווחת ליטול את עציה
   
   This might explain why Rav Nachman ignored her. The matter was being taken care of. The rabbis wanted to give her money. She was hoping Rav Nachman would demand they give back the materials itself, not knowing that he himself holds that it is a monetary matter now. She was also being a nudnik and possibly preventing the rabbis from enjoying the Sukkah. Rashi also makes this clear, that she did not want payment, but “צווחה להחזיר לה עצים עצמן”.
   
   Its also possible it was on the Yom Tov itself and she wanted either the wood or the money, neither of which could be done on Yom Tov.
   
   This gets into the question of whether they could sit in the Sukkah so long as they had not resolved the issue. The first answer of the Meiri is yes, the second is no. The Ran on the Rif suggests that ever since takanat hashavim, hefker bet din hefker means that it is not a sukkah gezula, even though originally it would have been pasul d’oraita: היינו בתר דעבידו רבנן תקנת מריש אבל מדאורייתא סוכה גזולה היא ופסולה אלא דבתר תקנתא כשרה דהפקר ב"ד הפקר ואין לנגזל אלא דמי עצים בלבד
   
   The Maharitz Geius has a more nuanced answer: ש"מ דהגוזל עצים וסכך בהו קננהו בתקנתא דרבנן דיהיב דמייהו אבל למיפסל סוכה לא מיפסלא דהא רב נחמן לא פסלה לההיא סוכה אלא אמר אין לה אלא דמי עצים בלבד ודאמרינן לך למעוטי גזולה הני מילי לכתחלה הא דאיעבד נותן דמים.
   
   There are many other positions here. Some of the argument revolves around whether she wanted payment or the actual materials, and the nafka minas of both.
4. This question is most difficult. What is the meaning of these 318 servants? Rashi clarifies that this forefather refers to Abraham, who had those 318 people with him to fight the war of 4/5 kings “לאברהם אבינו ילידי ביתו שמנה עשר ושלש מאות”. Although the Raah suggests it could be she’s referring to her actual father being very rich and important - שהיה אביה עשיר ונכבד,

But if it is as Rashi has it, Bnei Yisoschar Tishrei Maamar 10 poignantly states, why does the Talmud feel the need to remember and record this? מהראוי להתבונן בדברי האשה הזאת למה ייחסה את עצמה אחר אברהם אבינו במקום הזה, וגם גידלה מעלת אברהם אבינו במה שהיה לו שי"ח עבדים, ואם היא שלא בהשכל דיברה למה הביאו חז"ל דבריה בגמ'.

His answer there is very midrashic and kabbalistic, and it isn’t convincing to me. However, there are elements that are interesting. For example, the relationship between 318 and its gematria, siach. Avraham sends away Hagar and Yishmael to the desert, and they are soon in danger. She can’t bear to see her son die, so she casts him beneath the “bushes”, in Hebrew the “sichim”, so she won’t be able to see him. Thus, the term “siach”, gematria 318, represents the cry of Hagar as she watches her son be “taken” from her. Thus, the woman was asking Rav Nachman - God listened to her cries, but you don’t listen to mine??

Another element he mentions is the significance of the concluding conversation Avraham has with Malkitzedek after Avraham and his 318 men defeat the 5 kings. Avraham refuses to take for his people spoils, and this might be because he didn’t feel one is allowed to take spoils at all, for it is in essence stealing. Thus, the woman might have been exclaiming, “I come from a man who fought at risk to his life alongside his 318 men, and he refused even a shoelace in case it was stealing. And now, you allow stealing to occur under your nose, Rav Nachman?”

A similar interpretation can be found in Tel Shechakim. The author thinks that the problem was the woman assumed the Reish Galuta was morim heter that he can take from anyone he wants because he is the reish geluta. She was not Jewish, and the reish geluta is stealing from non-Jews. No, Rav Nachman says, he cannot do that.

The Rosh David of the Chida on Balak asks:  ולכאורה יפלא מה ראתה להזכיר שהיא בת אברהם אבינו, ועוד מה ענין שי"ח עבדי הכא, ואי משום להגדיל יקר תפארת גדולתו של אברהם אבינו מלבד שאין צורך לזה כי הוא מפורסם ואי בעיא לומר שבח אברהם אע"ה כה תאמר שהיה נשיא אלהים אהובו של הקב"ה וכיוצא מכמה מעלות של א"א ומאן דכר שמא דשי"ח עבדי

Firstly, why mention she is the daughter of Avraham? Second, if that’s the emphasis, who cares about the 318 servants? And if its to say how illustrious Avraham was, didn’t Rav Nachman know that? And if its to say that he was God’s beloved, why mention the servants as the proof?

He has a long explanation based on a lot of kabbala. The thrust is that she wanted the actual items. When Rav Nachman refused, she decided to show him there is no such rule as takanat hashavim, that if something is stolen from you, you only pay instead of the actual item. So too, Avraham and his 318 soldiers, they fought a huge war for the sake of one person, Lot. They wanted the actual item too. They were willing to “destroy the sukkah”, destroying cities, for Lot.

Rabbi Yitzchak Blau cites in Fresh Fruit and Vintage Wine, 119, that Reb Tzadok in Divrei Soferim 16 suggests that she was invoking Avraham as her father because just like he never gave up hope on having kids, and never gave up hope when going to war with just 318 men, so too she never had yeush, and therefore the stolen items never transfered property to the rabbis. Therefore it continued to belong to her.

An explanation that comes to mine is that this is all a metaphor. A woman comes to Rav Nachman (a savta no less) and she was crying that no one was going back to Israel and rebuilding Sukkat David, the Beit Hamikdash. They were all content in Babylonia. She says that by staying in Galut, the rabbis (with the Reish Geluta at their head) are living in a stolen Sukkah - on land that is not theirs, with materials that were not Jewish materials. Rav Nachman ignored her - what does she want us to do? Destroy what we have built here? It would be too massive an undertaking. She continued, am I not from Avraham, who loved the land of Israel and left everything, his homeland and his father’s house, to go to Israel? Was he not successful there, building a people of 318 that could even successfully fight the wars to be won? Go back to Israel! Pay attention to this claim! He responds, the rabbis long ago saw that if we thought we would have to lose everything and return the items, in order to go back to our own Sukkah (the Beit Hamikdash and Israel), it would never happen. Meaning to say, that is too hard of an ask. The people building life here in galut need to believe in a certain amount of permanence, or they will never go back to Israel. This is the Babylonia rabbinical “takanat hashavim”. Give us time, they said. With this, the only thing we can say is that when we have the wealth and the power from those who we “stole” the Sukkah from (through Hadrian, etc), then we can go back and return the items. Once we get the money, you will be satisfied.

There’s a kernel here that seems very true. I can’t put my finger on the entirety of it.

5. Jastrow actually defines this as a “noisy, quarrelsome woman.” His one proof is from this gemara in Sukkah. But many have pointed out that the root “פעי” comes from the same root as in Isaiah 42:14’s “ כַּיּוֹלֵדָ֣ה אֶפְעֶ֔ה”, where God says He cannot be silent anymore, He will scream like a woman in labor. This is also the same root in this week’s parsha, Shemot, regarding the second of the midwives (Exodus 1:15), “פּוּעָֽה”. Rashi states this explicitly, “פועה. לְשׁוֹן צְעָקָה, כְּמוֹ כַּיּוֹלֵדָה אֶפְעֶה” Although why she would be called “scream” is a bit funky, but it is related to childbirth in some way. Also see Rekanti on Genesis 36:39 regarding the city of Pa’u, which he says comes from this root of “scream”.
   
   So, it would seem that Jastrow probably got this wrong.
   
   So why does Rav Nachman respond this way and also tell her an answer? So it could be that, as mentioned above, he was silent because it was Yom Tov and he could not adjudicate financial matters. When she pushed him with her misunderstanding of the law and her importance, he finally reluctantly told her the judgement and corrected her preconception.
   
   Or, like my metaphor of galut and Israel, he calls her the pa’ata because just like God is crying out from the labors of the time of mashiach, bringing the Jewish people out to Israel as in Isaiah 42.
   
   And, like we said, it could be the rabbis were trying to recompense her and she was being annoying and not accepting it.