"Love your fellow as yourself" and seeing your future wife before marriage

The Talmud in the beginning of the second chapter of Kiddushin (41a) states that one must make sure to see his future wife at least once before he marries her - lest he marry her and find her unattractive to him.

Soncino translation:

 MISHNAH. A MAN CAN BETROTH [A WOMAN] THROUGH HIMSELF OR THROUGH HIS AGENT. A WOMAN MAY BE BETROTHED THROUGH HERSELF OR THROUGH HER AGENT. A MAN MAY GIVE HIS DAUGHTER IN BETROTHAL WHEN A NA'ARAH [EITHER] HIMSELF OR THROUGH HIS AGENT.

If he can betroth THROUGH HIS AGENT, is it necessary [to state] THROUGH HIMSELF? — Said R. Joseph: [This inclusion intimates that] it is more meritorious through himself than through his agent... Some say that in this matter there is even a prohibition, in accordance with Rab Judah's dictum in Rab's name; for Rab Judah said in the name of Rab: A man may not betroth a woman before he sees her, lest he [subsequently] see something repulsive in her, and she become loathsome to him, whereas the All-Merciful said, but thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.

The gemara uses the verse "You shall love your fellow as yourself" as a proof for this. The verse can be used in two ways toward this, in my understanding. Either, 1) it will hurt her feelings if you can't find your wife attractive, which is not how you would want to be treated as well. Therefore, you shall love her as yourself and preemptively make sure there will be no problems like that. This understanding would mean that it would violate the command of loving one's fellow to not look out for the possibility of future hurt, even if it is understandable once you're in that situation. Or, it can mean 2) that in this instance, the gemara is using the verse on a very literal level. You shall love your fellow as yourself - if you don't find your wife attractive, it means you won't love her as you would want to be loved by her, a violation of the literal expression of "ahava" the verse uses.

Be that as it may, it is curious to me that such a broad verse about being nice to others is being applied here. It makes sense according to my second explanation, but for the first, what is the connection between the broad verse and the specific case?

The Baal HaTurim writes something interesting on "You shall love your fellow as yourself." He is trying to solve for the apparently arbitrary juxtaposition of this commandment and the prohibition of forbidden mixtures, kilayim, that you shouldn't create a new animal by mixing two different ones.

He points to two different Talmudic passages, as sourced by the HaMaor Mikraot Gedolot Chumash:

וסמיך ליה לא תרביע כלאים האוהב אשתו לא ישמש עמה ועיניו באשה אחרת ולא יכפנה לתשמיש:

It juxtaposes it to "Do not mate different animals...", [because] one who loves his wife may not have sex with her while his eyes are on another woman (Nedarim 20b), and he may not compel her to have sex (Eruvin 100b).

Meaning, that when a man has in mind another women while having sex with his wife, or when he is violating both "love your fellow..." and "kilayim" (the latter in a metaphorical sense).

The quote from Nedarim 20b goes:

"And that ye seek not after your own heart." [Deducing] from this Rabbi taught: One may not drink out of one goblet and think of another. 

(Also see Bamidbar Rabbah 9:34 - אָמְרוּ רַבּוֹתֵינוּ בִּזְּמַן שֶׁהָאִשָּׁה מִיַּחֶדֶת עִם בַּעֲלָהּ וְהִיא מְשַׁמֶּשֶׁת עִמּוֹ וְלִבָּהּ לְאִישׁ אַחֵר שֶׁרָאֲתָה בַּדֶּרֶךְ, אֵין לְךָ נִאוּף גָּדוֹל מִזֶּה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (יחזקאל טז, לב): הָאִשָּׁה הַמְנָאֶפֶת תַּחַת אִישָׁהּ תִּקַּח אֶת זָרִים, וְכִי יֵשׁ אִשָּׁה שֶׁמְנָאֶפֶת תַּחַת אִישָׁהּ, אֶלָּא זוֹ הִיא שֶׁפָּגְעָה בְּאִישׁ אַחֵר וְנָתְנָה עֵינֶיהָ בּוֹ, וְהִיא מְשַׁמֶּשֶׁת עִם בַּעֲלָהּ וְלִבָּהּ עָלָיו. )

The implication in the discussion after this is that the such sex will result in blemished children. Presumably, the Talmud believes in the concept common then (and is even held by Shadal in the 18th century in Jacob's tricking Lot and achieving the kind of sheep he wanted) that thought during intercourse affects the offspring of that coitus. By thinking of another woman, the Baal HaTurim is saying, one engages in the creation of a new species that shows his lack of love for the wife he had sex with. Relating this to the passage in Kiddusin above, one can see how someone who does not find his wife attractive would violate loving one's fellow as oneself, when that verse is related to how one should not imagine another woman when having sex with her. If he is disgusted by his wife's appearance after he marries her because he didn't know what she looked like before, he will be forced to think of someone else when he wants to perform the commandment of peru urvu.

The Baal HaTurim also reference Eruvin 100b:

Rami b. Hama citing R. Assi further ruled: A man is forbidden to compel his wife to the [marital] obligation, since it is said in Scripture: And he that hasteth with his feet sinneth. R. Joshua b. Levi similarly stated: Whosoever compels his wife to the [marital] obligation will have unworthy children.

Baal HaTurim is saying that this is another case of not loving one's wife and forcing her to create kilayim, unworthy bastard children. Again, this is related to one's love of wife, but not necessarily with how much he finds her attractive. Still, the Baal Haturim's first comment is helpful for us.

Hilarious interview between Rabbi Yair Hoffman and Haym Soloveitchik

This interview is hilarious.

YH: To begin, your great-grandfather revolutionized the Yeshiva system of learning, much in the same way that you write the Baalei HaTosfos revolutionized Gemorah study in the middle ages of Europe. Did your great-grandfather’s Brisker legacy inspire or inform at all your analysis of the impact of the Baalei Tosfos on Gemorah study?
DS: No. My interest in the Ba’lei HaTosafos stems from their centrality in the understanding of the Gemara.

...

YH: Do you have any thoughts about how the field can be promoted in terms of undergraduate texts?
DS: Not really.

...

YH: You write in one of your essays that it was mostly written for the eyes of your father, Jacob Katz and Professor Saul Lieberman. What was your relationship with Lieberman?
DS: He was very nice to me. He gave me of his time.

Chizkuni on the Cherubim in the Holy of Holies

Interesting answer by the Chizkuni on why the Torah allowed a graven image (the Cherubim) into the Holy of Holies:

"ואף על פי שאמר 'לא תעשה לך פסל וכל תמונה' (שמות כ', ג) כאן התיר צורת הכרובים שהרי לא נעשו להשתחוות אלא לישיבתו, דוגמא כרובים דכסא הכבוד (ישעיהו ו, א-ב). ודברים הרבה כאלו מצינו בתורה כמו שכתוב 'כל העושה בה מלאכה יומת' (שמות ל"ה,ב) והתיר לעשות בה תמיד, מוסף מילה. ערוות אשת אח ויבום, לא תלבש שעטנז גדילים תעשה לך"

Firstly, they weren't meant to be worshiped. Secondly, for everything the Torah prohibits, there is one thing it permits. You can't do work of Shabbat, yet you can offer the Tamid offering and the Mussaf offering. You cannot sleep with your brother's wife, yet you could through Yibum. Etc.

I always thought that was a joke! One time I asked a guy in shul why we seemingly pray to the moon in Kiddush Levana and he jokingly said this answer. This is presumably based on the Talmud Chullin 109b, but I don't think he knew either source.

Rashi, Ralbag, and Shadal on "The Evil Eye"

Rashi, Ralbag, and Shadal all believe in the concept of "the evil eye" (I was surprised about the last two), but all very differently.

Rashi believed that the evil eye was the effect of a mystical entity that damages people who single out either themselves or their possessions.

Ralbag, as a rationalist, attempted to explain the evil eye naturally, saying that there is a physical negative reaction when someone who is jealous looks at the object of his jealousy, like a poisonous gaze.

Shadal believed not so much in the evil eye, but in the concept behind it, that when someone who has something singles it out, it creates arrogance in its possessor, and God wants to knock him down a peg. He calls this a concept that the Torah is founded upon. Instead of being a mystical force, Shadal believes it is God's providence in this world, to prevent us from being haughty and becoming overly confident in our own strength and possessions, thereby forgetting God. However, he says, God didn't want to throw away this great concept, even though the masses attribute it to the evil eye. So He commands them to count themselves by giving coins to the Mishkan, showing them that not only will nothing bad happen to them when they do it this way, but they can always use the Mishkan as a place for atonement to avoid what they believe is the evil eye, but is really God's providence. However, Shadal says, God is saying that counting the people like this must be for a purpose. David, at the end of his life, decided to count the people out of sheer arrogance of power, and he brought plague upon the people. For this reason, he was inspired to begin the building of the Holy Temple, a direct outgrowth of this concept of the Mishkan as a way to atone and not get the wrath of God's providence when one gets haughty.

First Milchamot Hashem on Mesechet Shabbat

Here's the rabbinic attack pun breakdown.

The Rif asks a question "Mai Taama..."

The Baal Hamaor thinks the question is nonsense, writes, "ein bah taam v'rei'ach."

The Ramban (the first one in mesechet Shabbat) defending the Rif, writes "yesh bah taam k'ikkar".

Good stuff.

What does "Fear of God" mean?

Nechama Leibowitz makes an amazing observation: Every time someone is described as "God-fearing" or not "God-fearing" in the Torah, it refers to how they treat the weak or defenseless. For example, Genesis 42:18 in reference to Joseph being kind to the brothers, or Exodus 1:17 regarding to the midwives saving the babies, or Deuteronomy 25:17-18, in reference to Amalek attacking the weak of the Jewish people.

Meaning, the definition of "fearing God" in the Biblical sense is directly correlated with how you treat people who need your help.

Incidentally, she "paskens" that the war against Amalek is no longer an ethnic or racial one, but against those who do not fear God in this sense. She quotes Rashi on Exodus 17:16 which becomes so much more powerful when read that God's throne is incomplete while "Amalek" (cruelty to the defenseless) still lives.

However, as some of my friends point out, there are many times that the phrase "fear of God" does not seem to refer to the protection of the weak. See, for example, the angel stopping Abraham from slaughtering Isaac, declaring that now he can see that he fears God, Genesis 22:12

"Do not lay a hand on the boy," he said. "Do not do anything to him. Now I know that you fear God, because you have not withheld from me your son, your only son."

 But perhaps Professor Schrader is correct in this very interesting article, and the true test of the sacrifice of Isaac was how he withheld the slaughtering of his son, despite the social acceptance of it, by the word of God. So the "fear of God" was that he protected his defenseless son.

Alternatively, I'd say that now God "knows" he was willing to sacrifice the son he loved and allow his older and less loved son to be his heir to the nation, a function of his fear of God to care about the weak. But that is a big chiddush.

A friend asked about Deuteronomy 10:12-13, "And now, Israel, what does the Lord your God require of you, but to fear the Lord your God, to walk in all His ways and to love Him, to serve the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul, and to keep the commandments of the Lord and His statutes which I command you today for your good?"

This doesn't preclude the above definition, in fact in 10:18, Moshe continues by describing God as the helper of the needy and the defenseless, and caps it off in 10:20 by repeating the need to fear the Lord.

It should be noted that Nechama Liebowitz was very careful with her words and said this interpretation only on regard to descriptions of people or groups as God-fearing, so these verses don't have to do with that at all.

The counterpart to the Rasha

We often think of the counterpart to the Chacham child is the Rasha, but it seems more like the counterpart to a wise child is a simple child, the Tam. Does that make the wicked child's counterpart the child that doesn't know to ask, the "eino yodea lishol"?

Perhaps the purpose is to show that the "eino yodea lishol" knows that he can't ask, so doesn't. Meaning, in his ignorance, he has not enough information to even formulate a question. Therefore, the response is to start him off. Give him information so that he could ask.

What makes the rasha a rasha is that he asks questions, even though he is ignorant. Meaning, he's aware that he lacks the information necessary to put forward a valid question, yet he is brazen enough to ask anyway. This type of personality requires you to cast him lower, take away some of his ego, by declaring him a person who would not have been freed in Egypt. Though this seems harsh, the solution is for his own good. Knock down his ego just a bit, the purpose being to show that he lacks the ability to really ask the question.

Although I suspect this educational suggestion would have an opposite effect today.

Haman's descendants in Bnei Berak?

The Abarbanel in his commentary to the Haggadah writes that the story of the rabbis sitting in Bnei Brak is significant in that Brak was the place named after the children of Haman who had converted, as the Talmud Sanhedrin 96b states that his descendants ended up learning Torah in Bnei Brak.

Rav Reuven Margoliot (in his commentary to the Haggadah) thinks the Talmud's line was a mistaken text, that it never said "the descendants of Haman". Instead, it actually said, "the descendants of NA'AMAN learned Torah in Bnei Brak", which flows with the previous section of the Talmudic discussion. He points to a Baal Haturim in Exodus 28:7 which quotes this alternative text. This alternative text, he writes, resolves the contradiction that the Mechilta states that God swears that no descendant of Amalek can convert into the nation of Israel.

What's particularly interesting is that Maimonides holds an Amalekite can convert to Judaism, seemingly because of this statement of the Talmud that, according to Rav Reuven, is mistaken.

At the end of his comment, Rav Reuven says, "And praise be to God that I merited to fulfill the mitzvah of 'You shall surely erase the memory of Amalek'."

Three different ways to view the holiday of Pesach

1) Philosophical/Theological - "I am the Lord your God who took you out of the land of Egypt..." (Exodus 20:2) Pesach reminds us of God's existence and activity, and the background arguments towards that. This lines up with the traditional view of Avraham's journey to God - making philosophical and theological arguments as to why idols are useless and why God must exist and be omnipotent.

2) Experiential - "[The] Passover-offering [is offered] because the Omnipresent One passed over the houses of our ancestors in Egypt. Unleavened bread [is eaten] because our ancestors were redeemed from Egypt. [The] bitter herb is [eaten] because the Egyptians embittered the lives of our ancestors in Egypt. In every generation a person must regard himself as though he personally had gone out of Egypt..." (Mishna Pesachim 10:5) We do funny little things on Pesach to induce a spiritual experience, to make it seem alive and real. Very often, they are not fun, such as eating matza, or maror, but it gives our lives a spiritual flavor which we remember. This lines up with Yitzchak's story - at one point (almost) sacrificed, the medrash relating that he even saw the angels above, which we equate with the ultimate spiritual experience which we remind ourselves of at Rosh Hashana and Yom Kippur in preparation for repentance. The story of Yitzchak has another detail that should never be forgotten - he repeatedly redug the wells of his father in spite of harassment - he didn't just have a singular spiritual experience, but he took it with him into real life and reinvigorated tradition with a new well of water.

3) Historical - "This is the bread of affliction that our fathers ate in the land of Egypt...This year we are here; next year in the land of Israel. This year we are slaves; next year we will be free people." (Haggada) The focus is the amazing journey we as Jews have had, from the little family, to enslavement, to glorious freedom, and on to the Holy Land. We have had our ups and downs since then, but the story is nonetheless amazing and full of wonderful people. We care not only about where we were in our past, but where we are now and where we will be in the future. This is the Yaakov story, the father to a powerful people who gather to await the message about the days to come. He is the person our nation is named after, Yisrael, and we are his spiritual descendants.

These three ways are also powerful ways of getting people more involved in Judaism and staying Jewish. The first is what I call the "Aish" method, and I don't think it will work for much longer. The second is what I call the "Carlebach" method, but it is too subjective. The third has yet to be popularized, but I think it is the most powerful. Focus on our past, our present, and how we can carry it into the future.

Shadal on the question of 430 years or 210 years in Egypt

Shadal answers the question in two very interesting ways, on Exodus 6:20:

"We are forced to say that Scripture left out some of the generations between Kehat and Amram, for in [Numbers 3:28] the count for Kehat of all the males from a month and up was 8,600, and he only had four sons as his family, so each of those four sons would [have had to] have 2,150 sons. And behold Amram only had Aaron, Moses, and Miriam. Moses only had two sons, and Aaron four, so how is is possible for Amram, Yitzhar, Chevron, and Uziel to have 2,150 souls [each] in the second year after leaving the land of Egypt? Therefore, one must conclude as I.B. Koppe in his essay, "Israelitas non 215, sed 430 annos in Eagypt commoratos esse," Gottinga 1777, where he said (and Rossenmueller agreed with him) that Levi, Kehat, and Amram were not in sequential generations, but rather other generations were between them. And according to this, one can answer as its plain meaning the number of 430 years that Israel was in Egypt [Exodus 12:40]. And according to this, the powerful procreation of the Israelites in Egypt can be understood, which the Torah did not speak of as an actual miracle.

And the scholar Jost (Volume 1 page 2) said that the names mentioned here are family names, so it is saying that so long as the father was still alive, for the most part the children stayed bonded together as one family (even though sometimes sons would divide their fathers household, as was the case for Isaac and Ishmael in the lifetime of Abraham, and Jacob and Esau in the lifetime of Isaac), and with the death of the father the family would split, and sometimes even after the death of the father they would not split off until some time. So the plain meaning of this section according to his opinion is that the family of Levi remained one family unit, and was called "Levi" for the span of 137 years after the death of Jacob, and then, after Levi died, the family split into three, the names of which being Gershom, Kehat, and Merari. So, the family of Kehat stayed as one unit for 133 years, and afterward it was split into four families. And at the time of the exodus from Egypt, 137 years had already passed, and the Amram family was one family, of which came Moses and Aaron. So if you add together the three numbers of 137, 133, and 137, and add 17 years on that for how long the Israelites were in Egypt before Jacobs death, you have 424 years, meaning close to 430 years. Therefore (he says) whenever it says "the son of Yitzhar", "the son of Kehat", etc, it means "the descendant of Yitzhar", "the descendant of Kehat".

Rashi and Peshat on Loving One's Fellow

Nechama Leibowitz's understanding, like many interpreters of Rashi before her, was that Rashi only ever comes to solve pshat questions, as Rashi himself stated. Even when he states a gematria, or a wild medrash, its to solve for pshat, and the job of the reader is to figure out what was bothering Rashi.

Rav Moshe Lichtman once asked her how Rashi's comment on Leviticus 19:18 "You shall love your fellow as yourself..." is to solve for pshat. Rashi states simply, "Said Rabbi Akiva, zeh klal gadol batorah - This is a great principle of the Torah." (And many a song have used those lyrics). What was the pshat problem?

Her answer? "I don't know." (Which is such a Rashi answer, isn't it?)

Well, Rav Yisrael Herczeg is of a similar philosophy of Rashi, and he was sitting at the lunch table with us when we were discussing this, so he asked for a Chumash. When he looked at the verse, he almost immediately had an answer.

You see, "love your fellow as yourself" is put in a verse that starts off with "Don't take revenge, don't bear a grudge..." You might think that the meaning of the full verse is that the reason you cannot take revenge or bear a grudge is because you must love your fellow as yourself, and that is the extent that the commandment to love your fellow goes. However, one is hit with the problem of why the phrase is "AND you shall love your fellow..." instead of "BECAUSE you should love your fellow..." The vav is out of place. So Rashi, through Rabbi Akiva's statement, shows that it is standalone. You cannot take revenge, etc, and ALSO you must love your fellow as yourself, a principle that applies at all times and in all situations.

Shadal gets both pshats in: "All other transgressions against one's fellow man are objectively immoral, except for revenge, which seems like justice. Therefore, 'love your fellow as yourself.' Just like you don't want others to take revenge on you, so you should not take revenge on your fellow, even though you are in the right to take revenge. And so too in all other ways you should love your fellow as you love yourself."

I want to suggest a different answer that is kind of the opposite, in a way. Christian scripture, Mark 12:31, declares that there is no greater commandments than loving God and loving your fellow as yourself. Galatians 5:14 declares that one need only keep "Love your fellow as yourself." Romans 13:8 similarly. So Rashi, engaging in direct pshat polemic, brought Rabbi Akiva to show that it is not separate from the Torah. It's a great principle OF THE TORAH. The rest is relevant as well, it follows after other commandments. You might think it is separate from the rest, but it is not.

The connection between rising before the elderly and not trying to raise the dead

Many commentators try to figure out the connection between Leviticus 19:31 and 19:32:

Leviticus 19:31

Do not turn to mediums or seek out spiritists, for you will be defiled by them. I am the LORD your God.

Leviticus 19:32

Stand up in the presence of the aged, show respect for the elderly and revere your God. I am the LORD.

Ibn Ezra says the connection is associative, that while we're talking about death, you should rise for the elderly who are close to death. Which is hilarious.

Arnold Ehrlich, 19th century koifer who wrote Mikra Kipshuto, actually has a beautiful answer here.

He says that scientific change makes what seemed like science in days of old just folky superstition now. What used to be magical is now explained easily by laws of nature. It's easy for us to look at our elderly people and declare them no longer with it, out of date, superstitious.

We look at a law that forbids us from practices of long ago that was based on false beliefs of the nature of the soul and the world. And we might think that means that people who believe in the old systems of belief are not fit to be honored.

The Torah tells us that we are still obligated to honor our elderly, still obligated to look back at tradition for guidance even as we move forward. We shouldn't treat those wizened by years of experience lightly.