The Waters of Meriva - Déjà Vu?

I saw an interesting commentary on the Mei Meriva story by Rabbi Yosef Bechor Shor over Shabbat. Rabbi Joseph ben Isaac Bechor Shor was an early Tosafist who lived in France, a student of the famous Rashbam and Rabbeinu Tam. He was a very interesting guy. Here's how Wikipedia describes him (with no footnotes, so no idea on accuracy):

Even more than Rashi, to whose exegetical school he belonged, he confined himself to literal interpretations (peshat). Anticipating later Biblical criticism, he assumed the presence of duplicate narratives in the Bible, and he strove to give rational explanations to the miraculous stories. Thus he interprets "tree of life" (Genesis ii. 9) as "tree of healing", explaining that the fruit of the tree possessed the virtue of healing the sick, without, however, bestowing eternal life. In regard to the transformation of Lot's wife into a pillar of salt (Gen. xix. 26) he explains that, disbelieving in the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah, she lingered on the road, and was overtaken by the rain of brimstone and fire, which are usually mixed with salt.

Well acquainted with the Vulgate and Christian Biblical exegesis, Joseph, in commenting on Psalm ii., cites Jerome, whose explanation of the word he criticizes.

Anyway, to cut to the chase, Bechor Shor suggests that the story of the people complaining about lack of water, and Moses hitting the rock, is one and the same with another story with very similar details - in the book of Exodus. Let's see our story, in the full. Translation from Rabbi Aryeh Kaplan's Living Torah:

Miriam's Death; Lack of Water
20:1	In the first month, the entire Israelite community came to the Tzin Desert, and the people stopped in Kadesh. It was there that Miriam died and was buried.
20:2	The people did not have any water, so they began demonstrating against Moses and Aaron.
20:3	The people disputed with Moses. 'We wish that we had died together with our brothers before God!' they declared.
20:4	'Why did you bring God's congregation to this desert? So that we and our livestock should die?
20:5	Why did you take us out of Egypt and bring us to this terrible place? It is an area where there are no plants, figs, grapes or pomegranates. [Now] there is not even any water to drink!'
20:6	Moses and Aaron moved away from the demonstration to the Communion Tent entrance, and fell on their faces. God's glory was revealed to them.
	Water from the Rock
20:7	God spoke to Moses, saying,
20:8	'Take the staff, and you and Aaron assemble the community. Speak to the cliff in their presence, and it will give forth its water. You will thus bring forth water from the cliff, and allow the community and their livestock to drink.'
20:9	Moses took the staff from before God as he had been instructed.
20:10	Moses and Aaron then assembled the congregation before the cliff. 'Listen now, you rebels!' shouted Moses. 'Shall we produce water for you from this cliff?'
20:11	With that, Moses raised his hand, and struck the cliff twice with his staff. A huge amount of water gushed out, and the community and their animals were able to drink.
	Punishment of Moses and Aaron
20:12	God said to Moses and Aaron, 'You did not have enough faith in Me to sanctify Me in the presence of the Israelites! Therefore, you shall not bring this assembly to the land that I have given you.'
20:13	These are the Waters of Dispute (Mey Meribhah) where the Israelites disputed with God, and where He was [nevertheless] sanctified.

Review: The people are at the Tzin Desert. The people complain about water, that they need to water their livestock, and they question why they were brought out of Egypt to die of thirst. God says to Moses to take a staff, and speak to the "cliff" (or bedrock) in front of the people, and the cliff will give off water. He hits the cliff, and it fed the people. God says that Moses and Aaron failed, and they would never go into the land of Israel. They called the place "Mei Mariva".

Let's see the place in Exodus where something interestingly similar happens:

Water from the Rock
17:1	The entire Israelite community moved on from the Sin desert, traveling according to God's instructions until they camped in Rephidim. There was no water for the people to drink.
17:2	The people began to quarrel with Moses. 'Give us water to drink!' they exclaimed. 'Why are you quarreling with me?' asked Moses. 'Are you trying to test God?'
17:3	The people began to suffer thirst because [of the lack] of water, and they began demonstrating against Moses. 'Why did you bring us out of Egypt?' demanded [the leader]. 'Do you want to make me, my children and my livestock die of thirst?'
17:4	Moses cried out to God. 'What shall I do for this people?' he said. 'Before long they will stone me!'
17:5	God said to Moses, 'March in front of the people along with the elders of Israel. Take in your hand the staff with which you struck the Nile, and go.
17:6	I will stand before you there on the rock at Horeb. You must strike the rock, and water will come out of it for the people to drink.' Moses did this in the presence of the elders of Israel.
17:7	[Moses] named the place Testing-and-Argument (Massa u'Meriba) because the people had argued and had tested God. They had asked, 'Is God with us or not?'

The stories are almost the same. They are in the Sin Desert (similar to Tzin Desert), they complain to Moses about no water to drink, that they need to water their livestock, and they question why they were brought out of Egypt to die of thirst. God tells Moses to take his staff and hit the rock in front of everyone. He does, and everyone's happy. This place is not named Mei Meriva, but rather Massa u'Meriva.

A couple of extra details are different, and they're pretty obvious even from the English, but all in all, pretty much the same. Bechor Shor writes that at the end of the Torah, in Deuteronomy, the two names are combined into one name because it is one story in reality:

33:8: You tested him at Massah, contended with him at the Waters of Dispute.

A few questions bother me about this.

First, a lot of hoopla is made by Rashi about the fact that in our story in Chukat, Moses is told to speak to the rock instead of hit it, and Rashi even identifies that as the sin of Moses. Even if that's not the sin, God does indeed tell him to take the staff, speak to the rock, and Moses hits it instead. Why, in the earlier story in Exodus, is there no confusion about what Moses was to do or what he did instead? The Daat Zekenim, a compendium of the comments of the Tosafists, quotes Bechor Shor approvingly, and answers for him that all it says in our story is that he should speak "el" the rock. "El" can mean "in front of", meaning speak to the people of Israel in front of the rock that they should watch what will happen because God is awesome.

Second,  Moses' response to the people is different. In our story, he shouts, "Can we take water from a rock?" and in the Exodus story, he asks why they are fighting with him, are they trying to test God? This, too, is answered by the Daat Zekenim. When he asked "Can we take water from a rock?" he was really saying, "Why are you asking me to get water? Ask God! Are you testing God, as if you don't believe He can do this for you?" In this way (although a little forced), the responses match up.

The question I really want to get to is: Why have the same story in two places? Bechor Shor contends that the Torah wanted to describe the times that the people of Israel asked for food, such as the manna story, and the fish story, and then put the story again in its appropriate place in the timeline of events that happened to the people of Israel. The fact that we learn some new details doesn't bother him, for this happens in other contexts as well, such as the sending of the spies, which is repeated somewhat and more details are added in Deuteronomy 1:22, where we find that the people had actually asked to send spies, and it didn't come straight from God out of the blue like Shlach would have you believe.

I find this to be a difficult answer, mostly because there are so many discrepancies, such as which desert they were in, or what they named the place after.

I think we should look at the stories as telling alternate-universe stories of the same event. In Exodus, things were still on track. The people left the land of Egypt and were on their way to Israel. They could do no wrong, and even when they did, Moses would fix it. But when you get to mid-Numbers, things have taken a turn for the worse. God promises that their debacle with the spies means they will die in the desert, and only their children will see the land of Israel. They would spend their days in the desert for nothing. A huge shift has happened, and we read with our dismay the difference between what could have been, and what happened. As one of my rebbeim, Rabbi Pesach Wolicki explained, this was the purpose of the backward "nuns" that interrupt the storyline by saying, (Numbers 10:35) "When the Ark went forth, Moses said, 'Arise, O God, and scatter your enemies! Let your foes flee before You!' This is what could have been! they would have went straight into Israel and their enemies would have scattered before the glory of God! In fact, one opinion in the gemara is that that verse represents its own book of the Torah! But that idealistic state didn't happen. And so we now enter the lacrymose history of a people who made one too many mistakes. Looks different, doesn't it?

So think about what would happen if the people were thirsty. How would the people ask for it, and how would Moses react? It completely changes! In the Exodus story, the people simply demand water, for their kids and livestock. Moses pushes them away at first, but when he sees they're getting really agitated, he acquiesces to their request and making a sanctification of God's name. In the Numbers story, the people begin by saying they should have died in Egypt! This is a "terrible place" to them! Egypt was better, they say. Moses responds by getting angry at them, a sure sign of someone whose nerves are frayed, having had to deal with this rebellious people for quite a long time. None of this is in the Exodus story.

This is what I thought of when I saw that Bechor Shor. Unfortunately for me and my desire to be mechadesh, I see now that Rabbi Nethaniel Helfgot has written basically this understanding and more, based on the Netziv, in his book, Mikra And Meaning, page 113. Ayin Sham.

Chukim and Rambam's Reason For Shiluach Haken

I have had many discussions about the concept of chukim in the Torah. Inevitably, someone will say, "A chok is a mitzva that makes no logical sense." I've even heard, "The chukim teach you that there is no reason for any mitzva." I usually ask about whether not murdering makes sense, or I mention the argument whether the arayot are chukim, and that usually makes them change their tune. But while I disagree with this answer, and I believe the many rishonim who wrote books which gave reasons for the commandments disagreed with it, there is many sources that seem to lend this support the concept in the Talmud, for example Berachot 33b:

מתני' האומר על קן צפור יגיעו רחמיך ועל טוב יזכר שמך מודים מודים משתקין אותו: גמ' ...על קן צפור יגיעו רחמיך מ"ט פליגי בה תרי אמוראי במערבא רבי יוסי בר אבין ורבי יוסי בר זבידא חד אמר מפני שמטיל קנאה במעשה בראשית וחד אמר מפני שעושה מדותיו של הקדוש ברוך הוא רחמים ואינן אלא גזרות

Mishna: If one [in prayer] says, "Your mercy reaches to the bird's nest",  "Your name should be remembered for the good things," or "We acknowledge , We acknowledge " he is silenced.

Gemara: ...  "Your mercy reaches to the bird's nest" - Why [is it forbidden to say]? Two amaraim argued in the West, one Rabbi Yossi Bar Avin, the other Rabbi Yossi bar Zvida. One said, "Because it places jealousy into the natural world [that God only has mercy for the bird]." The other one said, "Because he presents the measures taken by the Holy One, blessed be He, as springing from compassion, whereas they are but decrees."

Thus, at least according to one opinion in the Talmud, there is no reason that we are allowed to posit for the commandment to send away the mother bird.

(As an aside, while we're on the topic, Rav Reuven Margolios has a fantastic book which is dedicated to figuring out all the "one said this... one said that..." of the Talmud, called Shem Olam. I think it goes without saying that such a project, before the age of computers (and even were it so), bespeaks a great deal towards Rav Reuven's genius. Since we have a "one said... one said..." we might as well use it. 
The same argument pops up in Yerushalmi Berachot 5:3, where it says "Rabbi Yossi (and when it says just Rabbi Yossi, it means Rabbi Yossi bar Zvida, see Yerushalmi Challah 1:1 and Bavli Menachot 70a) says in the name Rabbi Simone, 'It is like setting a limit on God's mercy [that it only extends to birds but not other creatures].' Rabbi Yossi bey R' Bon [similar to "Bar Avin"], 'Because he presents the measures taken by the Holy One, blessed be He, as springing from compassion..." See also Yerushalmi Megillah 4:10.)

(Another interesting aside is the grammatical mistake that is often made when pronouncing "shiluach haken" as "shiluach hakan". This mistake stems from the use of the phrase "kan tzipur", with a patach, which is meant to show possession. So people started to call it "shiluach hakan". I laughed out loud in the seforim store when I found an entire book devoted to the mitzva called "A Practical Guide to the Mitzva of Shiluach HaKan." !!! To their credit, pretty early on in the book they explain the grammatical situation, and say that they asked Rav Chaim Kanievsky, who advised they go against the grammar, and go for common usage. Interesting, but I can't fathom that logic.)

The Rambam in the Guide for the Perplexed (3:48) goes explicitly against the second opinion here:

This is also the reason for the commandment to let [the mother] go from the nest. For in general the eggs over which the bird has sat and the young that need their mother are not fit to be eaten. If then the mother is let go and escapes of her own accord, she will not be pained by seeing that the young are taken away. In most cases this will lead to people leaving everything alone, for what may be taken is in most cases not fit to be eaten. If the Law takes into consideration these pains of the soul in the case of beast and birds, what will be the case with regard to the individuals of the human species as a whole? You must not allege as an objection against me the dictum of [the Sages], may their memory be blessed: He who says: Thy mercy extends to young birds, and so on... For this is one of the two opinions mentioned by us — I mean the opinion of those who think that there is no reason for the Law except only the will [of God] but as for us, we follow only the second opinion. (Pines Translation, v.II, p.600)

Thus, the reason for sending away the mother bird is truly compassion, and Rambam feels no qualms disagreeing with an opinion in the Talmud over another. It thus came as quite the surprise to me to find that the Rambam, in including the law into Hilchot Tefilla 9:7, had this to say:

מי שאמר בתחנונים מי שריחם על קן ציפור שלא ליקח האם על הבנים או שלא לשחוט אותו ואת בנו ביום אחד ירחם עלינו וכיוצא בענין זה משתקין אותו. מפני שמצות אלו גזרת הכתוב הן ואינן רחמים. שאילו היו מפני רחמים לא היה מתיר לנו שחיטה כל עיקר. 

One who says in his supplicatory prayers: "May He who showed mercy on a bird's nest prohibiting the taking of the mother together with the chicks, or the slaughter of an animal and its calf on the same day, also show mercy on us," or [makes other] similar statements should be silenced, because these mitzvot are God's decrees and not of mercy. Were they of mercy, He would not permit us to slaughter at all.

I had given hope in reconciling such a huge contradiction in the Rambam's thought, and chalked it up to the fact that the Rambam probably wrote the Guide much later than the Yad, and so might have changed his mind. Indeed, Tosaoft Yom Tov on Mishna Berachot 4:9 suggests this exactly for a different contradiction in the Rambam. Alternatively, I thought, his different objectives with both books allowed him to state different things at different times, but I thought that that had much wider implications than I was willing to commit to, although the Ben Yedid suggests something very similar to that. Recently, I came across an article by Roslyn Weiss on this topic, and she has a footnote devoted to previous answers to this question, which I will post here:

See the commentaries of Shem-Tov and Narboni on the Guide of the Perplexed, 3.48; Maharal of Prague, Sefer tiferet yisra'el (Bene-Brak, 1980), chapter 6; Isadore Twersky, Introduction to the Code of Maimonides (New Haven, 1980), pp. 356-514; Jacob Levinger, "Abstinence from Alcohol in the Guide of the Perplexed," [Hebrew] Bar Ilan University Annual: Decennial Volume (1955-65): 299-305.

When I came home from a year in Israel for summer, Parshat Chukat came up, and I was looking at the bookshelf in the den for something to read, spying my father's old Frameworks books by Rabbi Matis Weinberg. They're very large, somewhat long, but it is nice to read the poetic language he writes in, and so I started to go through them. Well, he raises this very question, and makes three distinctions when one tries to understand the commandments:

1) The reason for the mitzva - i.e. what caused God to give it.

2) The purpose of the mitzva - i.e. what God meant to accomplish through it

3) The connotations of the mitzva - i.e. what it teaches and implies

These are very important categories to put taamei hamitzvot in, and might even have a nafka mina in what it means to be "doresh taamah d'krah".

The Rambam explains in a few places how to understand chukim in the Yad, for example Hilchot Me'ilah 8:8, or Hilchot Temura 4:13. It would see that the Rambam felt that the chukim should be contemplated, and we should assign explanations to them. This very much sounds like number 3, the connotations of a mitzva.

We cannot claim that God's mercy applies to the bird's nest, because we don't know. But certainly we can take away lessons, moral guidance, even if we don't understand their true meaning. And therefore the Rambam could say in the Guide that it teaches us that if we have kindness to animals, certainly to other humans.

This is slightly different than my good friend, Adam Friedmann's take on the issue of Rambam and reasons for mitzvot, after I misquoted him, as I am wont to do:

I did say that the RAMBAM in Meilah taken in isolation seemed to imply that there are certain mitzvot with no reason. However when taken together with his approach in the Moreh where he claims reasons for mitzvot quite confidently one might conclude that the RAMBAM held of stratified meanings of mitzvot where one can know A meaning which is correct in a sense but not THE meaning.

Looking back at Meilah now I realize I was completely wrong. The RAMBAM there does not posit that there are mitzvot with no reasons. Nor does he write that we should come up with systems of understanding which we know to be false. Rather he paskens an obligation to understand the laws of the Torah to their fullest:

ראוי לאדם להתבונן במשפטי התורה הקדושה ולידע סוף ענינם כפי כחו

Then he writes:

ודבר שלא ימצא לו טעם ולא ידע לו עילה אל יהי קל בעיניו

The RAMBAM uses two terms to describe the “reasons” of mitzvot טעם and עילה. A quick Davka search reveals that these refer to two different sorts of rationales. טעם seems to a be a cause which relates directly to the effect. The practical purpose for חז"ל to impose a two day Yom-Tov in ארץ ישראל is a טעם (Hilchot Shvitat Yom Tov 1:21). עילה is a much less common word in the RAMBAM. It appears to imply an underlying motive for an action which is not directly related to the action itself. Thus the עילה is accomplished by the action but דרך אגב. For example the potential unsavory reasons for a person to convert to Judaism (i.e. marriage, money etc.) are an עילה (Isurei Bia 13:14, 14:1. See also Tmidin U’Musafin 7:11).

Thus the RAMBAM refers here to two separate levels of potential meaning in mitzvot, one which is very clear, and one in which a motive is perceived which is accomplished indirectly by doing the mitzvah. In no way however is this statement an indication that there is no meaning at all. In the continuation of the RAMBAM he mentions that the reasons of the חוקים are not known:

והחוקים הן המצות שאין טעמן ידוע

However, they do have reasons and אין ידוע does not necessarily mean they cannot be known. Though the חז"ל which the RAMBAM quotes next might seem to indicate otherwise:
אמרו חכמים חוקים חקתי לך ואין לך רשות להרהר בהן

That is still up for debate I suppose. There are also further דיוקים to be made in this RAMBAM, but they are not as related. Overall, if one were to conclude from this Halacha that the pursuit of a rational/philosophical view of Torah is impossible, or even unnecessary they would certainly be תופסין טפל ומשליכין עיקר. The whole point of this RAMBAM is to emphasize the importance of pursuing the meaning of Torah DESPITE the difficulty of its attainment. Having said this the RAMBAM does seem to concede, here and in other places, that certain facts within Torah are beyond the range of rational discussion. Rav Soloveitchik discussed this concept in several places most beautifully in ובקשתם משם in the first few chapters. (Yes Adrian, even Rav Kook admits to teleological suspension of natural ethics in Torah. See Drasha 22 of Midbar Shur). These warrant a separate discussion. However, what is clear is that “being in the system” is a prerequisite to the ultimate search for philosophic truth through the lens of Torah as concluded להלכה by the RAMBAM, not an excuse to give up on such a search.

I could talk a bit about how I think this applies to understanding why anything happens in the world, especially catastrophes, but maybe I'll hold that to another time.

The Nature of Impurity

I had a professor for Classical Jewish History, Prof. Yaakov Elman, who felt that some rabbis in the Talmudic age understood the nature of impurity in the Bible as completely institutional, as opposed to ontological. Meaning, the reason we have rules regarding what is pure and impure is only insofar as it relates to the Temple, but not because it has an actual basis in reality. If true, this would accord with how man see the Rambam's view of tumaah, see Maimonides' Confrontation with Mysticism by Menachem Kellner. See for yourself the medrash Prof. Elman based this on:

שאל עובד כוכבים אחד את רבן יוחנן בן זכאי אילין עובדייא דאתון עבדין נראין כמין כשפים אתם מביאים פרה ושורפין אותה וכותשין אותה ונוטלין את אפרה ואחד מכם מטמא למת מזין עליו ב' וג' טיפין ואתם אומרים לו טהרת אמר לו לא נכנסה בך רוח תזזית מימיך אמר לו לאו ראית אדם שנכנסה בו רוח תזזית אמר לו הן א"ל ומה אתם עושין לו אמר לו מביאין עיקרין ומעשנין תחתיו ומרביצים עליה מים והיא בורחת א"ל ישמעו אזניך מה שאתה מוצא מפיך כך הרוח הזו רוח טומאה דכתיב (זכריה יג, ב): "וגם את הנביאים ואת רוח הטומאה אעביר מן הארץ" מזין עליו מי נדה והוא בורח לאחר שיצא אמרו לו תלמידיו רבינו לזה דחית בקנה לנו מה אתה אומר אמר להם חייכם לא המת מטמא ולא המים מטהרין אלא אמר הקב"ה חקה חקקתי גזירה גזרתי אי אתה רשאי לעבור על גזרתי דכתיב "זאת חוקת התורה".

(Bamidbar Rabbah 19:8)
Translation goes like this:

A non-Jew once asked Rabbi Yochanan Ben Zakkai, "These things you do seem like witchcraft... You bring a cow, burn it, crumble it, take its ashes, and if one of you is impure by a dead body, you sprinkle him with two or three drops, and then you say say he's purified!"

[Rabbi Yochanan Ben Zakkai] said to him, "Has a restless spirit (Jastrow identifies it as epilepsy or insanity) ever entered you?"

"No."

"Have you ever seen someone who had a restless spirit enter him?"

"Yes."

"What do you do for him?"

"We bring roots for him and smoke them under him, and we sprinkle water on him. And [the spirit] runs away."

"Hear with your ears what's coming out of your mouth! This is such a spirit, a spirit of impurity! As it says (Zachariah 13:2) 'and also I will cause the prophets and the unclean spirit to pass out of the land.' We sprinkle him with water for impurity."

After he left, our rabbi's students said, "You pushed him off with a reed. What will you say to us?"

He said to them, "By your lives, a dead person doesn't make things impure, and the water doesn't make things pure. Rather, God said, 'I have engraved a rule, I have decreed a decree, and you have no permission to transgress what I decreed,' ("חקה חקקתי גזירה גזרתי") as it says "This is a chok (rule) of the Torah."

 Then, the medrash goes on with another story, which indeed offers a purpose for the Red Heifer, and is in fact the one quoted by Rashi:

מפני מה כל הקרבנות זכרים וזו נקבה א"ר איבו משל לבן שפחה שטינף פלטין של מלך אמר המלך תבא אמו ותקנח את הצואה כך אמר הקדוש ברוך הוא תבא פרה ותכפר על מעשה העגל:

"Why are all other sacrifices male, but this one is female? Rabbi Avo said, It is akin to a maidservant's son who defecated in the palace of the king. The king said, "The mother should come and clean up the mess." So was God saying, "Let the cow come and atone for the sin of the golden calf."

What is the connection between the two? They are in the same section, does that mean they are connected thematically? I think so.

The broader idea between the two, I believe, is an approach to Jewish law in general. The law requires a regimented lifestyle, and tons of rules and regulations. To what end is all of this?

Rabbi Yochanan ben Zakkai first offers the "non-Jewish" approach. That is the one where the rules are an actual response to reality. A woman in niddah is contaminated, she needs to immerse to wash it away. A man touched a dead animal, he is contaminated, he needs to immerse to wash it away. This is because they actually have some kind of spirit of impurity on them, as Zachariah seems to say, and this immersion will heal them.

But his students knew he was just "answering a fool according to his folly", "educating the child according to his way." He was pushing him away with a reed, something that seems strong, but easily bends if you want it to. They wanted to know, what is the real answer?

He answers that the source of all rules, including the seemingly most mentioned and most important, tumaah and taharah, are because God said so. That's it. They don't have to serve any purpose beyond that.

The next medrash believes the same thing, but goes further.

Rules are there to fix what was broken with the Israelites at the mountain. They did not yet have very many rules. There had to set the months, to eat the pascal lamb, keep the Sabbath, and don't have any other gods before Me, etc. And they still managed to screw it up.  But God was saying to them, rules will fix your outlook, will make you better people, and God-oriented, God-driven. By doing these laws, letting them invade every aspect of your lives, your Judaism becomes more real, and stronger. Religious life, God, it's in the details.