The Debates of Rava and Rav Nachman

This is an essay I wrote for Professor Yaakov Elman's class on Classical Jewish History. The assignment was to find several arguments between some amoraim from the Talmud, and to attempt to find a common diving line between them. People have been doing this for the debates of Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, and other tannaim for a long time now, and he felt it would be good for the class to see the possibilities of creativity within these kinds of essays. I more or less went overboard with the subject, and even included some sacrilege as a joke. It is completely made up, but according to my derech, I had quite a few chiddushim and even solved a few Tosafot along the way.

Halachic Single-Faith Theory

Rabbi Norman Lamm, while discussing the role of religious faith in his seminal article, Faith and Doubt, mentions Professor Harry A. Wolfson’s unique delineations of the various ways people have traditionally dealt with the religious faith when juxtaposed to the acceptance in the truth of philosophy and logic. Wolfson had divided them into three main approaches: "Single-Faith Theory of the Authoritarian type", where there is only faith in the authority of the text and a rejection of rationalism, "Single-Faith Theory of the Rationalist type", where the text is reinterpreted based on what rationalism determines to be true, and "Double-Faith Theory”, where the text is authoritative while using rationalism as an aid. Two extremes, the single-faiths, and one compromise, the double-faith. Rabbi Lamm, and Professor Wolfson, used these terms in reference to adherence to systems that were sometimes in conflict with each other, in their case the religiously faithful along with secular knowledge. This can aid us in appreciating the decisions involving law. There are two opposing features of the law process – precedent/procedure, wherein the law generally follows how it has traditionally judged these cases, and reason, where arguments can be made that may result in new or changed laws. When these two considerations come to a head, one very often must give. 

The concept of tradition is found in those who were called "Sinai", as memorizers of the tradition without offering their own new understanding. The opposite of this were the "Oker Harim", who would uproot the Sinais. Horayot 14a, Berachot 64a records that this existed as a battle between the schools of Rabbah and Rav Yosef. Indeed, in Avot 5:15, there is a list of 4 types of Torah students: 1) The absorbers of tradition, and his opposite, 2) The person who forgets all he learns. 3) The person who can discern various truths and figure out what is good to retain, and his opposite, 4) Those who retain the wrong things because they cannot discern what is correct. It is also possible this is the variant traditions of who R. Ami and R. Asi were pitted against in Ketubot 17a: those who couldn't use reason properly, or those who could remember (One side says Sarmisin (reason) or Sarmitin (memory); or Chamisin (reason) or Turmisin (memory). It is our contention that this dichotomy can be found in the arguments between the Amoraic Babylonian sages, Rava and Rav Nachman. A careful examination shall bring this out fully.

We start with Yevamot 66a-b:

It is stated: If a wife brought goods [Rashi: Slaves she owned] into a marriage, and she says “I will take the goods [with me in the divorce]”, and he says “I will give you their worth [and keep them]”, whose side does the law take? Rav Yehuda says, “It sides with her.” Rabbi  Ami says, “It sides with him.” Rav Yehuda says the law is with her because she has the right [lit. praise] of her father’s house with her [and those slaves belonged to her father before the husband]. Rabbi Ami says the law is with him, since Master had said, “If they [the wife’s slaves] die, they are the loss of the husband, and, if their value increases, they are a profit to him. Since he is responsible for them, they can eat Terumah, [they are considered his for all intents and purposes].” ... A baraita accords with Rav Yehudah, and a baraita accords with Rabbi Ami… Rava said in Rav Nachman’s name, “The law is like Rav Yehudah.” Rava asked Rav Nachman, “But there is a baraita that accords to Rabbi Ami [so by what criteria have you decide that we conclude like Rav Yehuda over him?]” [Rav Nachman answered,] “Even though there is a baraita like Rabbi Ami, Rav Yehuda’s reasoning of the rights of her father’s house is more logical.”

איתמר המכנסת שום לבעלה היא אומרת כלי אני נוטלת והוא אומר דמים אני נותן הדין עם מי רב יהודה אמר הדין עמה ור' אמי אמר הדין עמו רב יהודה אמר הדין עמה משום שבח בית אביה דידה הוי ר' אמי אמר הדין עמו כיון דאמר מר אם מתו מתו לו ואם הותירו הותירו לו הואיל וחייב באחריותן יאכלו…תניא כותיה דרב יהודה ותניא כותיה דרבי אמי… אמר רבא אמר רב נחמן הלכה כרב יהודה א"ל רבא לרב נחמן והתניא כותיה דר' אמי אע"ג דתניא כותיה דר' אמי מסתברא טעמא דרב יהודה משום שבח בית אביה

What emerges from this discussion is exactly the dichotomy we mentioned before. When Rav Nachman decided that the law was like Rav Yehuda, he was making a statement that disregarded the authority of Rabbi Ami’s support. Rava does not believe this can be done, to simply disregard authority. To him, the baraitot of Rav Yehuda and Rabbi Ami are on equal footing, and thus we only can only declare both are correct, but not decide one over the other. In other words, to Rava, a “teiku” response is warranted here, or at least there should be some kind of vote as to who is correct. However, according to Rav Nachman’s response, these Tannaim are not on equal footing. It’s true that both have separate supporting baraitot for their opinions. But one, Rav Yehuda, has something in his favor that outweighs his opponent: he makes more sense. To Rav Nachman, logic can win out in an otherwise deadlocked halachic argument. Rava does not see logic as an advantage in the halachic decision process. To him, there is only precedent, and one cannot apply his own logic to decide definitively on conflicting precedents.

We know that Rava was a follower of the "Sinai" school of learning, as exemplified by Rav Yosef (Berachot 64a, Horiot 14a), going so far as to make his feet bloody to accord him honor, see Yoma 53a. When Rava was a child, Rav Yosef referred to him endearingly, see Shabbat 142b. We also know that Rav Safra called Rava "Moshe", which sounds like a Sinai (Shabbat 101b; Succah 39a). And we know that Rava named his son "Yosef", which is surely not a coincidence. Perhaps we can place Rav Nachman into the "Oker Harim" camp of Rabbah. It is true that Rav Yosef praises Rav Nachman for having interpreted verses like "a Sinai" (Kiddushin 20b, Arachin 30b), but this was evidently a rare thing. And putting them in this category can make sense. If one is a sinai, a vast memory and well-versed in tradition, the importance is on authority and precedent, and who one heard the tradition from. Rava in Megilla 22a is careful to say that although he didn't hear that exact halacha, he has a tradition for something similar. See also Succah 43b for telling over the teachings of his father. In Eruvin 14b he refutesRav based on having heard something else from him. When Mar Yehudah tries to change precedent, Rava gets upset (Eruvin 61b). Rava was upset when Rav Huna misquoted Levi (Bava Metzia 47a). We see that Rabbi Eliezer ben Hyrcanus had this ability and was very careful never to say something from his own mind. But if one is an oker harim, precedent and authority can give way to logic and reason in cases that warrant it.

            With this in mind, we can understand the basis of another argument between Rava and Rav Nachman in Beitza 23a:

Rabbis taught: What is “karud” and what is “kirtzuf”? Karud are small [combs] which make wounds. Kirtzuf are large [combs] which don’t make wounds. Three argue on this: Rabbi Yehuda holds that if it is something that [causes a prohibited result] which is unintended [henceforth called DSM – dvar sheino mitchaven], it is [still] prohibited [on Shabbat/Yom Tov]… but we do not make a decree on [prohibiting] kirtzuf [which does not cause wounds] because of karud [which does cause wounds. We are not afraid people will be confused on what’s allowed]. The Rabbinate holds, like Rabbi Yehuda, that DSM is prohibited, and they also forbid kirtzuf [to protect against confusion] because of karud.  Rav Elazar ben Azarya holds like Rabbi Shimon that DSM is permitted, and both karud and kirtzuf are permitted. Rava said in Rav Nachman’s name, … “The law is like Rabbi Shimon [that DSM is permitted] for Rav Elazar ben Azarya agrees to him.” Rava said, “Why doesn’t the master [Rav Nachman] say the law like Rabbi Yehuda, for the Rabbinate agree with him [and majority should rule]? [Rav Nachman] said to him, “I hold like Rabbi Shimon, and furthermore Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya agrees to him.”

תנו רבנן איזהו קרוד ואיזהו קרצוף קרוד קטנים ועושין חבורה קרצוף גדולים ואין עושין חבורה וג' מחלוקות בדבר רבי יהודה סבר דבר שאינו מתכוין …ולא גזרינן קרצוף אטו קרוד ורבנן סברי נמי כר' יהודה דבר שאינו מתכוין אסור וגזרינן קרצוף אטו קרוד ור' אלעזר בן עזריה סבר לה כר' שמעון דאמר דבר שאינו מתכוין מותר ובין קרוד ובין קרצוף שרי אמר רבא אמר רב נחמן …הלכה כר' שמעון שהרי רבי אלעזר בן עזריה מודה לו אמר ליה רבא לרב נחמן ולימא מר הלכה כר' יהודה שהרי חכמים מודים לו א"ל אנא כר' שמעון ס"ל ועוד שהרי רבי אלעזר בן עזריה מודה לו

What we see here is yet another argument between Rava and Rav Nachman on how to decide between various Tannaim. This time, it’s over the support one has from other rabbis. Rava proposes that the law should be decided according to Rabbi Yehuda by virtue of the Rabbinate’s support for him, and we always support the majority ruling. However, Rav Nachman doesn’t care about the authority of the majority, but rather about consistency. He holds like Rabbi Shimon elsewhere, that DSM is permitted. A look at the Talmud in those places[1] show that Rabbi Shimon’s ruling was accepted by many. Since Rav Nachman already held this way there, he stayed consistent to his word, for logically this should be so, even in the face of the dictum of “majority rules”. Rava, however, sticks to the rules of ruling, regardless of other cases being inconsistent with his proposed plan, and wants to hold like Rabbi Yehuda, because the authority of the Rabbinate is behind him. Once again, we find that Rava and Rav Nachman’s argument can be boiled down to logic versus authority/precedent.

To Rava, the rules of who to decide like and with what criteria are very important. To Rav Nachman, not so much. There are two more examples of this. Let us start with Berachos 36a:

[The blessing] on wheat flour: Rav Yehuda says, [One must say] “He who creates the produce of the ground.” Rav Nachman says, [One must say] “That everything is created by His word.” Rava said to Rav Nachman, “Don’t argue against Rav Yehuda, for Rabbi Yochanan and Shmuel hold like him, as Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel, and similarly Rav Yitzchak said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan, ‘Olive oil requires a ‘Who creates the produce of the trees.’ We see that it is talking about if it has been altered [from olives to olive oil and you keep the same blessing], so too here when it has been altered [from wheat to wheat flour it should keep the same blessing].” [Rav Nachman responded,] “Are these similar [cases]? There [with olives and olive oil], oil is the best [thing to be made from olives]. Here, [with wheat and wheat flour], there is something better to be made, bread.

קמחא דחיטי רב יהודה אמר בורא פרי האדמה ורב נחמן אמר שהכל נהיה בדברו א"ל רבא לרב נחמן לא תפלוג עליה דרב יהודה דר' יוחנן ושמואל קיימי כוותיה דאמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל וכן א"ר יצחק א"ר יוחנן שמן זית מברכין עליו בורא פרי העץ אלמא אע"ג דאשתני במלתיה קאי ה"נ אע"ג דאשתני במלתיה קאי מי דמי התם לית ליה עלויא אחרינא הכא אית ליה עלויא אחרינא בפת

We see that Rava is very concerned with the support other people have for their positions, and advises Rav Nachman not to argue against them. Rav Nachman is not so concerned. Although Rav Nachman ultimately defends his position within those Tannaim, we see that Rava questioned him based purely on the information that many people disagreed with him. Rava did not care for the logic Rav Nachman had for his position, but if they followed the rules of how to decide law. We find him arguing with Rav Nachman again based on authority rules as well in Ketubot 54a:

Rav Nachman says, “Even though the Mishnah is like Shmuel, the law is like Rav.” … Rava said to him, “Once the Mishnah is like Shmuel, why is the law like Rav?” He responded, “It’s ostensibly like Shmuel, but if you look deeply into it, the law [of the Mishnah] is like Rav…”

אמר רב נחמן אע"ג דתנן במתניתין כוותיה דשמואל הלכתא כוותיה דרב …אמר ליה רבא לרב נחמן וכי מאחר דתנן מתניתין כוותיה דשמואל אמאי הלכתא כוותיה דרב אמר ליה לכאורה כשמואל רהיטא כי מעיינת בה הלכתא כוותיה דרב…

We see again that Rav Nachman seems to rule in a way that is against the standard way to rule, and he even admits it. When a Mishnah is in accordance with one opinion, the law usually follows that opinion. However, Rav Nachman says that even so, the law is against the Mishnah. Rava jumps on that, because he is concerned for the rules, and asks how he can decide against the Mishnah. Rav Nachman responds by showing how the Mishnah actually does not actually support Shmuel. We should ask, though, why then did he originally state that the Mishnah is like Shmuel? Perhaps one can say that Rav Nachman would still have held that way, even though it goes against the rules of deciding law. But Rava only cares about authority. The Mishnah is authoritative, and one should generally follow the Mishnah. Rav Nachman explains how it can work either way, but he is not actually concerned if it doesn’t.
We see Rava caring very much about authority in Kiddushin 32b, where he felt the honor of certain sages was slighted by others who did not have more authority than them.

Now we will see a case where Rava and Rav Nachman as to when Bet Din errs. This can be seen in Yevamot 92a:

[Mishnah: A woman gets remarried on one person’s testimony that her husband who had traveled overseas is dead.] If she was married through Bet Din, she must leave [her marriage, but doesn’t have to bring a sacrifice for adultery]: [Gemara:] Ze’iri said, “The Mishnah is not correct, as was taught [in a baraita] in the study hall, for it was taught in the study hall that if Bet Din rule that the sun had set, and later it shone [showing it hadn’t set], it was not considered a “ruling” [that the people wouldn’t have to bring sacrifices if they erred based on the Bet Din’s decision], but rather a “mistake” [which would require people who erred based on Bet Din’s decision to bring a sacrifice, while in the case of the mistaken marriage case, she wouldn’t have to bring a sacrifice, showing that for the Mishnah, it is considered in the category of “ruling” when Bet Din makes a mistake]. Rav Nachman says it is a “ruling”, as he himself said, “Know that it is a ‘ruling’, for in the entire Torah, one witness is never believed, but here he is believed. What’s the reason for that? Is it not because it is [in the category of] “ruling” [and therefore is authority from the Torah, and that is why the Mishnah does not consider the mistake a mistake of the individual, but rather of Bet Din]? Rava said, “Know that it is a “mistake”, for let’s say Bet Din had ruled that one could eat the forbidden fats and blood. Then, they saw the reason why it should be prohibited [and decided it was prohibited]. Then, if they decide it is permitted again, they would not be heeded. Here, though, where one witness comes, we permit [her to get remarried]. Then, two come [to testify he is alive, and the courts forbid her from getting or staying remarried]. Then, when one witness comes afterwards [saying he’s actually dead], we permit her [to get remarried, even though the first lone witness was proven to be faulty, we accept this lone witness]. What’s the reason for that? Is it not because it is a “mistake”?

ניסת ע"פ ב"ד תצא וכו': אמר זעירי ליתא למתני' מדתני בי מדרשא דתני בי מדרשא הורו בית דין ששקעה חמה ולבסוף זרחה אין זו הוראה אלא טעות ורב נחמן אמר הוראה היא א"ר נחמן תדע דהוראה היא דבכל התורה כולה עד אחד לא מהימן והכא מהימן מ"ט לאו משום דהוראה היא אמר רבא תדע דטעות הוא דאילו הורו ב"ד בחלב ובדם להיתירא והדר חזו טעמא לאיסורא כי הדרי ואמרי להיתירא לא משגחינן להו ואילו היכא דאתא עד אחד שרינא אתו תרי אסרנא כי הדר אתא עד אחרינא שרינן לה מ"ט לאו משום דטעות הוא

Although this argumentation is difficult to understand without much background in the underlying issues, we can attempt to identify the basis for the argument between Rava and Rav Nachman. It seems that Rava is of the opinion that in this case, when Bet Din errs, we consider their mistake stemming from the witness’s testimony, not from the fact they shouldn’t have used a lone witness for proof. Therefore, to Rava, every time they retract their previous claim, we can accept it based on their ruling. However, to Rav Nachman, the fact that we accept a lone witness, instead of consistently making use only of two witnesses like any other case, shows that this is an exception to the usual mistaken cases. To Rav Nachman, consistency is key. To Rava, it doesn’t have to be consistent, just how we look at this case here. To Rav Nachman, it is logical that we should require two witnesses instead of one, for we can determine if they are lying or not on cross-examination. However, Rava is not concerned for whether they are lying, but how Bet Din judges the truth of his claims. If they think he is right, they have the authority to accept it.

Tentatively, we suggest that this can help us understand some aggadic passages of Rava and Rav Nachman. Let us look at Eruvin 29a. It is important to note first that Abaye was wont to say, “Behold, I am like Ben Azzai in the marketplaces of Tiberias.”[2] This means, according to Rashi, that Abaye felt he had mastery of both the exoteric information of the Torah, as well as the ability to expound and use logic to delve deeply into it. Meaning, he was ready to take on any question people could throw at him using logic. Each time, he was successful in answering the questions. One time, in Eruvin 29a, Rava, not Abaye, said the same thing, and failed miserably:

Rava said, “Behold I am like Ben Azzai in the marketplaces of Tiberias.” One of the rabbis asked Rava, “What is the amount of citrus fruit [for an eruv]?” [Rav replied,] “Can one make an eruv with citrus fruit? [Of course not].” One cannot? A contradiction from a Mishnah…. [Rava fails to defends himself against the Mishnah]… What amount is it [since Rava couldn’t answer the question]? Rav Nachman says, “Citrus fruit are a kav [amount].”

אמר רבא: הריני כבן עזאי בשוקי טבריא. אמר ליה ההוא מרבנן לרבא: תפוחים בכמה? אמר ליה: וכי מערבין בתפוחים? ולא? והתנן … וכמה? אמר ר"נ: תפוחים בקב

Rava attempted to answer a question based on extrapolation and logical inquiry, but could not. This was not Rava’s forte. Rava was much more into the authority of rulings, not of logic. It took Rav Nachman, who is into logic, to answer the question in the end. What we see is that Rava was simply unable to answer questions that required more effort than bekiyut. We do indeed find that Rav Nachman occasionally could not answer questions posed by Rava, and his response was silence (see Eruvin 37b). This could be that at the time, he could not figure out an answer to a logic question at that moment. We see he gets upset with himself for having not given an answer he thought of later to one of Rava's queries in Keritot 18a.
Perhaps this can also explain Rav Nachman’s response to Rava in several places, in Shabbat 4a, Eruvin 36a.[3] In both places, Rava asks Rav Nachman what the law is in two similar, yet different, scenarios. In both places, Rav Nachman rules that one case it is good/permitted, and the other is bad/prohibited. When Rava inquires as to why, Rav Nachman always answers:

Go measure a kor of salt!

לכי תיכול עלה כורא דמילחא

This is indeed a very strange answer to give to someone inquiring to Rav Nachman about seeming inconsistency! Rashi on Shabbat suggest two understandings of the phrase. One may be that Rav Nachman was trying to get Rava to understand the differences between the two cases himself. “Measure out the salt” may mean that he was saying “earn the answer”, work hard, and then I will help you figure out why they are different. If this is true, Rav Nachman may have understood the obvious lacking his friend and colleague had, and strove to help him get better at it. The second answer of Rashi is that he was saying that Rava would never understand, even if he ate a kor of salt he wouldn’t understand. This fits right into what we have been saying about Rava. Through these answers, we see that Rashi understood Rav Nachman as recognizing this fault in his colleague. If we look at Tosafot on Eruvin 36a, we see that he points out that Rava himself knew the difference between the two cases, based on how he explained a baraita elsewhere. Tosafot give a suggestion of why Rava asked what the difference was, but here is not the place to go into it. However, we humbly suggest that perhaps Rava didn’t know the answer because it required more extrapolation and abstract thing than Rava was capable of.[4]

Another example of aggada that could fit into the split between Rava and Rav Nachman is found in Eruvin 64a:

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel, “If one drinks a reviit of wine, he should not make decisions regarding law.” Rav Nachman said, “That isn’t a good teaching, for if I don’t drink a reviit of wine, my mind is not clear.” Rava said to him, “How could you say such a thing, for Rav Acha bar Chanina said… ‘Anyone who says that one teaching is good but another teaching is bad loses the treasure of Torah.’?” [Rav Nachman] said to him, “I retract [my statement].”

אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל: שתה רביעית יין אל יורה. אמר רב נחמן: לא מעליא הא שמעתא, דהא אנא כל כמה דלא שתינא רביעתא דחמרא לא צילא דעתאי. אמר ליה רבא: מאי טעמא אמר מר הכי? האמר ר' אחא בר חנינא … כל האומר שמועה זו נאה וזו אינה נאה מאבד הונה של תורה! אמר ליה הדרי בי.

Tosafot ask on this, how could Rav Nachman say “This isn’t a good teaching”, for isn’t this a Tannaic argument in Keritut 13b, regardless of Rava’s objection whether it is proper to say such a thing? He wasn’t just disagreeing with Rav Yehuda and Shmuel, which isn’t nice to say aloud, he was disagreeing with and possibly denigrating the Rabbinate’s opinion there, which is surely not allowed! In the end, Tosafot cannot answer the question and leave it standing. If we use what we have been saying until now, we could perhaps understand where Rav Nachman is coming from. Perhaps we can say that Rav Nachman felt he had the right to state his disapproval on a logical level with both Tannaim and Amoraim. Even though he is not necessarily disagreeing with the Tannaim there, he still feels that as far as logic goes, there is no reason to make a blanket ruling for everyone about drinking and making rulings. He has a clear head when he drinks, so why should it be forbidden for him? Additionally, it could be that he was specifically upset that Amoraim were propagating a teaching that logically should not continue. To Rav Nachman, why should this teaching, which is based on illogical premises about human nature, still being agreed with by other Amoraim? Rav Nachman is saying, maybe the statement that drinking clouds judgment was true in the time of Tannaim, or maybe it’s true for some people, but we know it’s simply not true for everyone. Why are we continuing to side with the outdated opinion? We see elsewhere that Rav Nachman disagrees with broad statements about human nature, such as the statement of when men say "Rachav", see Megillah 15a, Taanit 5b. Rava, who cares about the authority of Tannaim and Amoraim, reminds him that he shouldn’t disregard their statements, because even if he disagrees with them, they still hold an authority and a certain amount of sanctity. Rav Nachman realizes that although he has a right to disagree, perhaps he shouldn’t express this out loud, especially when Tannaic arguments are involved. He can agree with what’s proper to say and what’s not, so he retracts his statement.

It’s also possible to say that Rava was had issues with people disregarding authority because of his rabbinical position in Machoza. If he was indeed being pestered with questions about rabbinic authority,[5] perhaps he was hyper-aware of the dangers of dismissing the rules that govern rabbinic decisions, which Rav Nachman was doing. In his arguments with Rav Nachman, this side of him came out in full force.

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[1] Shabbat 22a , 41b, 46b, to name a few places.

[2] See Soṭah 45a; Ḳiddushin 20a; Arachin 30b

[3] In Chullin 12a and in Chullin 112a, it is Rav Dimi b. Yosef who asks the question to Rav Nachman. Apparently this was a phrase Rav Nachman enjoyed using before explain the subtle differences between two cases.

[4] I also saw this suggested here http://www.haoros.com/print.asp?kovetz=909&cat=2&what=kovetz

[5] http://www.hakirah.org/Vol%2011%20Elman.pdf pg. 10 on.