Antinomian Tendencies in Maimonides

Aryeh Sklar

Medieval Jewish Philosophy

Antinomian Elements in Maimonides’ Thought

Though Maimonides is perhaps most well-known and studied in academic scholarship as a philosopher and physician, his contribution to Jewish law as one of its premier lawmakers cannot be understated. His commentary to the Mishnah, written in Arabic, opened the scope of Talmudic opinions and discussions to the masses, while his Mishneh Torah, written in Hebrew and innovative in its complete systemization of Talmudic law, has withstood the test of time and is studied by students of the Halakha to this day. His fight against the Karaites regarding several areas of Jewish law was an attempt to defend Rabbinic Judaism in the same way as Saadia Gaon had centuries before. The many volumes of his responsa indicate his popularity as a decider of Jewish law to the community. There is no gainsaying the fact that Maimonides’ attention to the importance and authority of Talmudic law encompasses a great amount of his written oeuvre. So much is Maimonides’ focus on the law, that it leads scholars such as Professor David Blumenthal to state unequivocally, “There is no antinomianism… in Maimonides.”

Yet, some scholars have written to the opposite effect, detecting elements of antinomianism indeed in Maimonides’ writings. In other words, in certain cases, Maimonides seems to give credence to ideas that might lead certain individuals to reject part or all of the law. This paradoxical possibility is what we will explore in this paper, in two main areas. The first is the moral life of man in conflict with Jewish law. The second is examining how the possible identification of Maimonides with Aristotelian creation aligns with this antinomian outlook.

In Maimonides’ Commentary to the Mishnah, he writes extensively about the Middle Path in his Eight Chapters, also known as his introduction to Avot. In some ways, this is similar to Aristotle’s Golden Mean, and in some ways different. Maimonides states that the goal of man is to find the middle path in all dispositions and temperaments. Additionally, he writes about the purpose of obedience to the commandments of the Torah, namely that they encourage moral virtue. But what if these two concepts collide, and a commandment veers one away from the middle path? Lawrence Kaplan argues that, “If, on the very rare occasion, disobedience of a command is necessary for acquiring a moral virtue, the Law, in Maimonides' view, will tacitly allow for such disobedience.”

Firstly, he contends, Maimonides consistently claims throughout the Eight Chapters that the law only contains instrumental value, not intrinsic value in itself. If so, one could argue that if the purpose is achieved, the law’s instrumental value ceases to be required. How so? In Chapter Four, Maimonides discusses the requirement at times for a man seeking virtuousness to sometimes overreach the mean to the other side to eventually end up at the mean, in accordance to his distance from the mean on the other side of the extreme. For example, if someone is a glutton, it is easier to reach the mean after spending time as an ascetic and slowly moving toward the middle. Indeed, Maimonides writes that the purpose of many commandments is in order to ease man to the mean through some extreme actions. For example, in Chapter Four, he writes,

The Law did not lay down its prohibitions, or enjoin its commandments, except for just this purpose, namely, that by its disciplinary effects we may persistently maintain the proper distance from either extreme. For, the restrictions regarding all the forbidden foods, the prohibitions of illicit intercourse, the forewarning against prostitution, the duty of performing the legal marriage-rites which, nevertheless, does not permit intercourse at all times... all of these God commanded in order that we should keep entirely distant from the extreme of the inordinate indulgence of the passions, and, even departing from the exact medium, should incline somewhat towards self-denial, so that there may be firmly rooted in our souls the disposition for moderation.

Maimonides sees support in Proverbs and the Talmud for this concept: “The prophets, similarly, urge us on in saying, (Proverbs 3:6) ‘In all thy ways know Him’, in commenting upon which the sages said, (Berachot 63a) ‘even as regards a transgression (of the ritual or ceremonial law),’ meaning thereby that you should set for every action a goal, namely, the truth, even though it be, from a certain point of view, a transgression.” Kaplan focuses on this last phrase, “from a certain point of view a transgression.” He argues that the “transgression” Maimonides is referring to is an actual violation of the law when it conflicts with the goals of virtuousness.

Kaplan finds support for such a suggestion by examining Raymond Weiss’ discussion as to how some of Maimonides’ suggestions to arrive at the mean contradict his decisions of Jewish law in his Mishneh Torah. For example, in Chapter Five, Maimonides suggests that if one seeks to stave off depression, one should listen to music. Yet, in a well-known responsum of Maimonides, he declares music to be prohibited by Jewish law in order to “restrain the appetitive power.” In that responsum, Maimonides does not express any exception there for those who are rare individuals on the moral path and desire to maintain it as such against the onset of melancholy. Similarly, Maimonides allows in the Eight Chapters for the viewing of beautiful art or sculptures to settle the soul. Yet, what of idolatrous or sinful art? Maimonides doesn’t specify. To Weiss, and Kaplan, this indicates that Maimonides allowed the perfected individual to violate the law when it conflicted with the true goal.

Kaplan is faced with a contradiction to his suggestion. That is, Maimonides clearly forewarns his reader of the Guide of the Perplexed (3:34), supposedly an elite individual, that just because a certain law does not apply to that individual, he is still obligated to keep it:

It is also important to note that the Law does not take into account exceptional circumstances; it is not based on conditions which rarely occur. Whatever the Law teaches, whether it be of an intellectual, a moral, or a practical character, is founded on that which is the rule and not on that which is the exception: it ignores the injury that might be caused to a single person through a certain maxim or a certain divine precept.

Seemingly, Maimonides’ declaration in the Guide contradicts this antinomian approach. That is, though it may be true that a certain law will be injurious to the perfected individual’s Golden Mean, the law cannot make exceptions, since, in Maimonides’ words, “it would be imperfect in its totality, each precept being left indefinite.”

To answer this, Kaplan distinguishes between the Guide 3:34, which is Maimonides’ description of the law, and his conception of the virtuous man in the Eight Chapters. True, the law requires obedience to it, but Maimonides’ virtuous man is an individual who at times must go beyond the law, and indeed violate it in order to maintain his virtuous status. Kaplan argues Maimonides is saying here that, “obedience to the Law must give way to the unique urgent need on the part of this unique human being for the attainment of the virtues, since the goal of this individual is the truth, that is to say, the knowledge of God.”

There is an assumption here that Kaplan makes in terms of Maimonides’ conception of man’s perfection. He must assume that Maimonides in Eight Chapters only conceives of the perfection of the moral soul. But what of society as a whole? Is this absent from Maimonides’ thinking? In the Guide, Maimonides expresses the belief in the necessity of the perfection of societal functioning through the moral soul, and only then to correct beliefs. Maimonides writes in 3:27, “The Law as a whole aims at two things: the welfare of the soul and the welfare of the body.” How so? Maimonides explains that the law wants the multitude to acquire “correct opinions,” which are not always stated explicitly. This accords with the concept that the aim of man is intellectual perfection, the contemplative life of Aristotle. In addition, the law desires the welfare of the body, which occurs through a peaceful society, “an improvement of their ways of living one with another.” The law, by nature of its imposition on man, means that man is “not being permitted to act according to his will and up to the limits of his power, but being forced to do that which is useful to the whole.” Instead of the acquisition of true beliefs, it “consists in the acquisition by every human individual of moral qualities that are useful for life in society.”

For Maimonides, there is a particular order for these to occur. In terms of importance, intellectual perfection is what he calls “indubitably more noble.” But it can only be reached through moral perfection. In terms of chronology as well, moral perfection must come first. For morality cannot exist in a vacuum. The perfection of one’s moral state must come in consequence society’s perfection, “for an individual can only attain all this through a political association, it being already known that man is political in nature.” It is also true that he cannot attain intellectual perfection when he is hungry, hot or cold, and therefore society is required to be perfected first. Torah law, then, seeks to provide a good society first and then correct beliefs.

Maimonides changes terms on us. He states that the law desires the welfare of the body and soul, but then begins to refer to the chronology and importance of the perfection of the body and soul. Perfection is altogether different than mere welfare. It would seem that perfection cannot be achieved through the acquisition of correct beliefs, but the ability to demonstrate them. This is something that cannot be done when one is in pain through maltreatment by the hands of a bad society. But correct beliefs could be attained even when one is hungry. It requires just the statement of facts, no more. It seems to me, then, that Maimonides required everyone to keep the law regardless of if they believed they had acquired correct beliefs, because one requires the perfected society so that eventually there will arise those who can maintain correct beliefs and demonstrate them. However, one must attempt to achieve both these aims in one’s own lifetime in order to create a good society.

To him, the law in general achieves just a basic health of body and soul. But the Torah, what he calls the true Law, enables both perfections, but not immediately. He thinks Torah law is “so that every one… achieves his first perfection [of the body]; I mean also the soundness of the beliefs and the giving of correct opinions through which ultimate perfection is achieved.” It is ultimately for a different time, when ultimate perfection can happen. One must keep the law until then. This is for the betterment of man.

Thus, Kaplan would be forced to say Maimonides had changed from the time he wrote Eight Chapters when he was younger. If, according to Kaplan, Maimonides in Eight Chapters believes that for the welfare of the soul, man eventually would seem to not have to keep the law, this could not be true on a societal level. For if those who believed that they achieved moral perfection ceased from the law, many ignoramuses might believe the same and cease from it as well, and ostensibly this would not work for society as a whole, which the Maimonides of the Guide believes is important.

Thus far is Kaplan’s argument toward Maimonides’ somewhat secretive antinomianism. Another area where Maimonides’ thought could tend toward antinomianism is any identification of Maimonides with Aristotle’s theory of the eternity of the world. In several writings, including the Guide, Maimonides declares Aristotle’s theory of the eternity of the world entirely incompatible with Jewish religion and law. For example, we find Maimonides state this explicitly and at length in the Guide 2:25:

If we were to accept the Eternity of the Universe as taught by Aristotle, that everything in the Universe is the result of fixed laws, that Nature does not change, and that there is nothing supernatural, we should necessarily be in opposition to the foundation of our religion, we should disbelieve all miracles and signs, and certainly reject all hopes and fears derived from Scripture, unless the miracles are also explained figuratively. The Allegorists amongst the Mohammedans have done this, and have thereby arrived at absurd conclusions…

Accepting the Creation, we find that miracles are possible, that Revelation is possible, and that every difficulty in this question is removed. We might be asked, Why has God inspired a certain person and not another? Why has He revealed the Law to one particular nation, and at one particular time? why has He commanded this, and forbidden that? why has He shown through a prophet certain particular miracles? what is the object of these laws? and Why has He not made the commandments and the prohibitions part of our nature, if it was His object that we should live in accordance with them? We answer to all these questions: He willed it so... But if we assume that the Universe has the present form as the result of fixed laws, there is occasion for the above questions: and these could only be answered in an objectionable way, implying denial and rejection of the Biblical texts, the correctness of which no intelligent person doubts. Owing to the absence of all proof, we reject the theory of the Eternity of the Universe.

Thus, Maimonides equates an acceptance of Aristotle’s theory of creation with a rejection of divine law. Yet, several scholars claim that Maimonides indeed did accept Aristotle’s theory as the correct one. Some claim it is as simple as finding Maimonides extraordinarily ambiguous about the matter. As Klein-Braslavy states, “If Maimonides had been of the opinion that the world was created [after non-existence], he would have said it… explicitly and unequivocally.”

Warren Harvey puts forth several arguments as proof for Maimonides esoteric support for Aristotelian cosmogony. Firstly, Maimonides tells us in several places he wishes to assume Aristotelian cosmogony for the purpose of proving several other theories that might be rejected by someone who assumes Aristotelian cosmogony if Maimonides would argue from the “shakier” or more doubtful theory of creation ex nihilo. We can see this, for example, in his programmatic statement in the Guide 1:71:

The true method, which is based on a logical and indubitable proof, consists, according to my opinion, in demonstrating the existence of God, His unity, and His incorporeality by such philosophical arguments as are founded on the theory of the eternity of the Universe. I do not propose this method as though I believed in the eternity of the Universe, for I do not follow the philosophers on this point, but because by the aid of this method these three principles, viz., the existence of God, His unity and His incorporeality can be fully proved and verified, irrespectively of the question whether the universe has had a beginning or not.

Maimonides claims this is the assumption he will have while examining the concepts of God’s existence, unity, and incorporeality, which occurs in Guide 2:1-2. Though, as Harvey notes, Maimonides claims this is methodological, Harvey argues that too much is founded on this presupposition to believe that Maimonides didn’t care for it. Not only do the arguments of the Guide 2:1-2 base knowledge of God entirely on the Aristotelian premise of eternity, but several statements in Maimonides’ Mishneh Torah indicate that the Aristotelian premise of eternity is required to fulfill the command to know God. Indeed, Maimonides sees Abraham having come to know God on the basis of the Aristotelian premise of eternity.

Another piece of evidence is Maimonides referring to the many “adherents of the law” who believed King Solomon to believe in an eternal world in Guide 2:28:

Many of our coreligionists thought that King Solomon believed in the Eternity of the Universe. This is very strange. How can we suppose that any one that adheres to the Law of Moses, our Teacher, should accept that theory? if we were to assume that Solomon has on this point, God forbid, deviated from the Law of Moses, the question would be asked, Why did most of the Prophets and of the Sages accept it of him? Why have they not opposed him, or blamed him for holding that opinion, as he has been blamed for having married strange women, and for other things?

Though he seems to deny it, he goes on to display their proofs and explicate the verses in favor of such a theory. Why would he do this, when it was not necessary to do so? Harvey also suggests Maimonides believed others to hold of this opinion. In Guide 2:26, Maimonides claims he cannot explain a passage of Chapters of Rabbi Eliezer, where Rabbi Eliezer seems to advocate for an eternal world. Though he does not explicitly say that Rabbi Eliezer actually held this position, he seems to imply it is the obvious interpretation of the passage.

Harvey continues to advocate for this understanding of Maimonides, but does not interact explicitly with the connotations of Aristotelian cosmogony in terms of the law. He argues that Maimonides might not have believed a created world and an eternal world to be mutually exclusive. He notes that a few medieval interpreters of Maimonides understood Maimonides to believe in both being true at the same time. That said, Harvey is a minority position in the debate over Maimonides’ views on creation. However, according to his and some other Maimonidean scholar who opin Maimonides truly accorded with the Aristotelian eternal world, the law would in consequence likely be abrogated. If Maimonides “concealed” this opinion for the elite student who would understand, he would also imply an antinomian outlook toward Torah law.

What has been seen in the course of this paper is two areas which tend toward antinomianism. It was shown that Lawrence Kaplan argued vigorously for a Maimonidean view of the necessity of certain individuals having an exemption from Torah law in the pursuit of perfected virtue. It was also shown that Maimonides also viewed a belief in an eternal world as implying irrelevance to the Torah’s revelation and lawmaking. It was shown that according to some scholars, Maimonides indeed identified with the belief in an eternal world, and thus the implication is that he didn’t think the Torah’s revelation to have happened, since an eternal world would make it impossible. It was noted as introduction how much importance Maimonides seems to have placed on the law. Thus, the next project to be taken is why Maimonides would contain antinomian elements, and to explore the accusation in medieval polemical writing against Maimonideans that his later followers used Maimonides as support to allegorize the commandments and to cast off the ones found to be irrelevant to practice.